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Executive Summary in Dutch 
DE EERSTE VREDESOPERATIES VAN DE VERENIGDE NATIES IN EGYPTE 
AND DE GAZA-STROOK, 1956-1967: EEN ZAAK VAN IMPERIAAL 
MULTILATERISME? 
 
Historici die onderzoek doen naar de wereld- en imperiale geschiedenis hebben 
aangetoond dat dynastieke en tributaire rijken honderden jaren lang de wereld hebben 
gedomineerd. Pas vanaf het midden van de 19de eeuw deelden bureaucratische en 
marktgeoriënteerde imperiale formaties de lakens uit. Vandaag de dag erkennen steeds 
meer academici dat dit globale imperiale systeem diepgaand de structurele logica van 
Verenigde Naties (VN) en aanverwante organisaties heeft beïnvloed. Het systeem heeft 
ook een verregaande invloed op de manier waarop de internationale instellingen onder 
de paraplu van de VN opereren en optreden.  
Toch is dit lang niet volledig doorgedrongen tot het onderzoek naar de 
vredeshandhaving van de VN. Dat onderzoeksveld wordt gedomineerd door op het 
heden gefocuste sociale wetenschappers. Enkel een handvol onderzoekers, laten we ze 
het 'imperiale segment' noemen, zien de interventies en het internationale systeem waar 
ze deel van uitmaken van nature als imperiaal. Aan een steeds hoger tempo installeren 
internationale organisaties externaliserende en ontoerekenbare bestuurssystemen in 
voormalige kolonies. Ondanks de bijdragen van de 'imperiale' onderzoekers is hun 
denkwijze en benadering allesbehalve gemeengoed. De meeste onderzoekers op het 
vlak van vredeshandhaving linken de toenemende problemen met interventies en hun 
staatsopbouwende componenten nog steeds uitsluitend aan de opmars van het 
neoliberalisme. 
In de context van het expanderende regime van interventies in voormalige kolonies 
en het feit dat het onderzoek zich vooral concentreert op de synchrone aspecten ervan, 
heeft deze verhandeling twee doelstellingen. In de eerste plaats beoogt dit onderzoek 
de interdisciplinaire dialoog te bevorderen. De studie wil het onderzoek naar de 
vredesoperaties van de VN vanuit de sociale wetenschappen koppelen aan de 
historiografie over inter-imperiale samenwerkingsverbanden rond veiligheid. Het wil 
met andere woorden een diachrone dimensie aan het debat toevoegen. Op de tweede 
plaats beoogt deze verhandeling een theoretisch kader op te bouwen en een analyse aan 
te reiken van de eerste VN-interventie in Egypte en de Gazastrook van 1956 tot 1967, 
als basis van een nieuwe vertelling over 'peacekeeping'. 
Deze verhandeling neemt 'multinational imperalism' en 'imperial multilateralism', 
twee concepten van de expert internationale relaties Philippe Cunliffe, als vertrekpunt. 
Het theoretische kader koppelt deze concepten aan de systemisch georiënteerde 
imperiale geschiedschrijving aan de ene kant en de netwerk-, ruimte- en mensgerichte 
imperiale frontier studies aan de andere kant. Het historiseert VN-tussenkomsten en het 
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internationale systeem en legt verbanden tussen wat conventioneel als de 'globale' 
geopolitiek en het 'lokale' dagdagelijkse leven wordt gezien. Op die manier benadrukt 
het theoretische kader dat de internationale politieke en militaire bestuurssystemen geen 
onveranderlijke wereldwijde structuren zijn. Het gaat over zowel lokale als globale 
menselijke gebruiken die begrepen, geproblematiseerd, uitgedaagd en dus ook 
veranderd kunnen worden. 
Het onderzoek valt uiteen in twee grote delen. Het eerste deel onderzoekt hoe de 
geschiedenis van het VN-paradigma begrepen moet worden in het verlengde van de 
shift van het imperiale systeem van louter imperiale concurrentie naar imperiale 
concurrentie en inter-imperiale samenwerking in de late 19de eeuw. Het vertrekt daarbij 
hoofdzakelijk van een systemische visie in de imperiale en internationale historiografie. 
Vervolgens toont de analyse hoe die verschuivende grenzen zich manifesteerden in het 
Middellandse Zeegebied en het Midden-Oosten, de eerste regio waar in 1956 een VN-
vredesoperatie plaatsvond. Tot slot onderzoekt het eerste deel hoe de toenemende 
regionale concurrentie, veroorzaakt door de verschuivende imperiale grenzen van 
Groot-Brittannië, de Verenigde Staten en de Sovjet-Unie, een situatie creëerde, met 
name een gezamenlijke invasie door de Fransen, Britten en Israëli's van Egypte, die 
leidde tot de vorming van een VN-interventie. In tegenstelling tot het meeste 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek gaat deze verhandeling ervan uit dat de VN-interventie 
niet enkel opgezet is om een (wereld)oorlog met de Sovjet-Unie en nieuwe gevechten 
tussen Israël en Egypte te vermijden. De interventie was, volgens deze verhandeling, 
een van de vele multilaterale westerse initiatieven die erop gericht waren om na het 
sluiten van het Suezkanaal de olieleveringen te heropenen en te stabiliseren voor de 
almaar ongerustere Europese leden van de Navo. 
Het tweede deel verlegt de focus naar het geopolitieke en het dagelijkse leven. Het 
vertrekt daarbij van de onderzoeksliteratuur, gepubliceerde bronnen en tot nog toe 
veelal ongebruikte VN-documenten. Dit tweede deel van de analyse toont hoe de VN-
vredesmacht aan de ene kant vooral de militaire infrastructuur van de NAVO en het 
westen gebruikte. De in het westen getrainde strijdmacht zorgde voor conflicten met de 
Egyptenaren 'op de grond' toen de VN-macht de Britse en de Franse troepen naar buiten 
'escorteerde'. Langs de andere kant gebruikte de operatie bijna uitsluitend westerse 
bedrijven en werd ze betaald door westerse gebruikers van het kanaal. Vervolgens 
onderzoekt deze verhandeling hoe de VN legertroepen in de Gazastrook moest 
ontplooien om de terugtrekking van de Israëlische bezettingsmacht te verzekeren zodat 
Egypte het Suezkanaal zou heropenen. Dat leidde op zijn beurt tot confrontaties in de 
Gazastrook. De bewoners dwongen de VN om het opborrelende idee van een 
gezamenlijk bestuur door Egypte en de VN te verlaten. Ze dwongen de VN ook om het 
gebied waar ze opereerden, namelijk de Gazastrook en langs de demarcatielijn na de 
wapenstilstand, te beperken tot een zone nabij de demarcatielijn. Opnieuw in 
tegenstelling tot het meeste onderzoek argumenteert deze verhandeling dat de VN-
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macht diende als een extra beschermingslaag voor de Israëlische grenzen. Tot slot 
onderzoeken we de uiteenlopende relaties tussen de VN-eenheden, de Palestijnen in de 
Gazastrook, met name zowel de vluchtelingen als de inheemse bewoners, en de 
bedoeïen, die gevangen zaten tussen Israël en Egypte. Onze analyse suggereert dat de 
VN-interventie op veel manieren leek op het Britse Mandaatregime. De gelijkaardige 
manieren om 'veiligheid' te creëren, vertaalden zich ook in 'lokale' ervaringen van 
'onveiligheid'.  
Het theoretische kader en het kritisch onderzoek van de eerste VN-interventie in deze 
verhandeling, die de VN kadert als het resultaat van inter-imperiale samenwerking, 
biedt een radicaal ander vertrekpunt om 'peacekeeping' te begrijpen. Dit onderzoek doet 
dit op een moment dat het westen de VN en andere 'veiligheidsorganisaties' financiert 
om meer interventies te lanceren. Het westen gebruikt daarbij vooral troepen uit 
voormalige kolonies en installeert steeds vaker externaliserende en ontoerekenbare 
bestuurssystemen in voormalige kolonies. Deze verhandeling suggereert zo dat het 
onderzoeksveld van de imperiale geschiedenis actuele, zo niet cruciale theoretische en 
methodologische tools aanreikt om de huidige vorm van interventies en 
staatsopbouwende projecten te begrijpen, te problematiseren en te contesteren. Ze roept 
onderzoekers op om zowel de context als de transparantie van hun werk in overweging 
te nemen. 
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Executive Summary in English 
REVISITING THE FIRST UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING INTERVENTION 
IN EGYPT AND THE GAZA STRIP, 1956-1967: A CASE OF IMPERIAL 
MULTILATERALISM? 
 
For several hundred years, imperial and global historians have shown, the world was 
dominated by dynastic and tributary empires until bureaucratically organized and 
market oriented imperial formations came to dominate from the mid-1800s. 
Increasingly, scholars within the research fields of international history, international 
relations and development studies recognize that this global imperial system has 
influenced deeply the structural logics, ways of organising and practices of the 
international organisations under the umbrella of the United Nations regime, which 
emerged in and after the Second World War.  
However, this is far from the case within the research field on United Nations 
peacekeeping, which is dominated by primarily contemporary oriented social science 
disciplines. Only a handful of scholars, classified here as the ‘imperial segment’, see 
the interventions—that install externalising and unaccountable systems of governance 
in former colonies at a growing speed—and the international system they are part of, as 
imperial in nature. Despite their contributions, their thinking appears not to have gained 
wide traction. Consequently, most peacekeeping scholars link the mounting problems 
of the interventions and their state-building components in the ‘mission areas’ only to 
the rise of neoliberalism.  
In the context of an expanding regime of interventions in former colonies and 
research concerned chiefly with the synchronic aspects thereof, the dissertation seeks 
to realise two aims. First, it seeks to advance interdisciplinary dialogue by connecting 
research on United Nations peacekeeping from the social sciences with the 
historiography on inter-imperial security cooperation, in other words add a diachronic 
dimension. Secondly, it seeks to build a theoretical framework and provide an analysis 
of the first UN intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip from 1956 to 1967 as the basis 
for a new narrative of ‘peacekeeping’.  
Taking as its point of departure scholar of international relations Philip Cunliffe’s 
concepts of ‘multinational imperialism’ and ‘imperial multilateralism’, the theoretical 
framework connects these with systemically oriented imperial historiography on the 
one hand and network-, space- and people-centred imperial frontier studies on the other. 
Thus both historicising the interventions and the international system and creating 
linkage between what is conventionally seen as ‘global’ geopolitics and ‘local’ 
everyday life, the theoretical framework insists that the international political and 
military systems of governance the interventions represent are not unchangeable global 
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structures but simultaneously local and global human practices that can be understood, 
problematized, challenged and subsequently transformed.  
Consequently, the analysis comprises of two main parts. Taking a predominantly 
systemic view on the basis of not only but especially imperial and international 
historiography, the first part examines initially how the history of the UN paradigm 
needs to be understood in extension of the shift in the imperial system from only 
imperial competition to imperial competition and inter-imperial cooperation in the late 
19th century. It then turns to show how this changing frontier manifested in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East, the region that would come to host the first United 
Nations peacekeeping operation in late 1956. Lastly, the first part examines how the 
increasing regional competition engendered by the shifting British, American and 
Soviet imperial frontiers created a situation—in the form of a joint British, French and 
Israeli invasion of Egypt—that led the making of the UN intervention. In contrast to 
most scholarship, the dissertation suggests that the UN intervention was not only set up 
as a means to avoid a (world) war with the Soviet Union and renewed fighting between 
Israel and Egypt, but also represented one of several Western multilateral initiatives 
aimed at reopening and stabilising the oil deliveries to the increasingly anxious Western 
European members of NATO following the closing of the Suez Canal.  
Shifting to relating geopolitics and everyday life on the basis of research literature, 
published sources and hitherto mostly unused UN records, the second part of the 
analysis shows initially how—on the one hand—the UN force was built using mainly 
NATO military infrastructure and Western or Western-trained forces which led to 
conflicts with the Egyptians ‘on the ground’ during the UN force ‘escorting’ the French 
and British forces out, and—on the other—the clearance operation used almost only 
Western companies and was also paid for only by the Western canal users. It then turns 
to examine how the UN then had to deploy the force into the Gaza Strip to ensure the 
withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces for Egypt to allow the Suez Canal to reopen. 
In turn, this led to confrontations with the Gaza Strip residents, which forced the UN to 
both abandon the emerging idea of a joint UN-Egyptian administration and change the 
UN force area of operations from both inside the Gaza Strip and on the Armistice 
Demarcation Line (ADL) to consist only a zone near the ADL. Again in contrast to 
most scholarship, the dissertation argues that the UN force in this way came to serve as 
an extra layer of border security for Israel. Finally, the second part of the analysis 
examines the diverse relations between the UN units and the Palestinians of the Gaza 
Strip, native residents and refugees alike, and Bedouin, trapped by both Israel and 
Egypt, both near the ADL and inside the Gaza Strip, suggesting that the UN intervention 
in many ways resembled the British Mandate regime and that its similar ways of 
engendering ‘security’ also often translated into ‘local’ experiences of ‘insecurity’.  
At a time when the West is funding the UN (and other ‘security’ organisations) to 
launch more interventions with units mostly from former colonies and install more 
  
ix 
 
externalising and unaccountable systems of governance in other former colonies, the 
dissertation’s theoretical framework and critical re-examination of the first UN 
intervention—which frames the UN as an outcome of inter-imperial cooperation—offer 
a radically different point of departure for understanding ‘peacekeeping’. In doing so, 
it both suggests that the research field of imperial history offers perhaps timely, if not 
crucial, theoretical and methodological tools to understand, problematize and contest 
the current form of interventions and state-building projects, and calls for scholars to 
consider both the context and the transparency of their work.   
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Introduction  
 
 
 
“A peacekeeping force is like a family friend who has moved into the 
household stricken by disaster. It must conciliate, console, and 
discreetly run the household without ever appearing to dominate or 
usurp the natural rights of those it is helping”.1 
 
Brian Urquhart (Former British military officer, UN Under-Secretary-
General, and involved in several interventions) 
In Short…. 
Global and imperial historiography have shown that a large portions of humankind lived 
under dynastic and multi-ethnic empires from 1400 to 1800s and what we label 
imperialism from the mid-19th century to the middle of the 20th century. Today, 
however, our schools and universities teach us— as our politicians and representatives 
of international organisations remind us—that we live in an international system 
comprised of nation states and international organisations that want nothing more than 
to eradicate poverty, save the planet and so forth. Would it not be odd, however, if the 
nation states, as both relatively new phenomenon in global history and the children of 
colonial empires and imperialism, influenced our international system more than the 
dynamics of empires and imperialism, which for several centuries dominated the history 
of our world?  
With this dissertation, I seek to link this broader question of the links between the 
‘imperial’ and the ‘international’ to the recent lines of concrete and critical enquiry in 
research on international military interventions (known as ‘peacekeeping’ operations). 
Scholars from a range of disciplines have taken to examine these issues from various 
perspectives. As of now, however, only few scholars studying international 
interventions have clarified what they exactly mean by ‘empire’ or ‘imperialism’.2 The 
                                               
1 B. Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, New York, 1987, 248. 
2 For more on this point, see Philip Cunliffe, “Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between 
Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today,” International Peacekeeping 19, no. 4 (2012): 
426–42. 
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discussion has yet therefore to lead to radical new narratives that go beyond the 
scholarship itself. I consequently seek to expand the existing common ground to invite 
‘mainstream’ scholars into the debate. To do so, the dissertation ‘imperialises’ the 
traditional narratives of the 20th century by way of a composite theoretical framework 
rooted in both imperial historiography and research on international interventions and 
an analysis of the first ‘peacekeeping’ intervention on basis of hitherto unused and 
unpublished sources.  
This may seem a radical step. However, it is not. It is merely an invitation to take 
part in a long overdue contestation of the prevailing Western periodization of the 20th 
century in most research on international interventions. Periodization, American 
foreign policy historian Andrew Bacevich notes, obscures rather than clarifies.3 This 
has to do with how, historian of Asia Prasenjit Duara contends, “Periods are shaped by 
structures emerging from centres of power that tend to dominate historical life. Like all 
hegemonic formations, such structures tend to channel and restrict the imagination of 
the social, the political, and selfhood (…).”4 However, the counter-narrative scholars 
tuned in on the ‘imperial’ already promote needs to be expanded into, rather than 
identity itself in opposition to, ‘mainstream’ research on international interventions. 
State of the Art on International Interventions 
To this day, students of political science and international relations still read the 
textbook narratives that have their roots in the 1940s. Typically, these place nation-
states and the United Nations at the centre of a completely ‘new’ international system 
that facilitated the end of imperialism by 1960 by promoting peace, development, 
human rights, and democracy on the one hand and decolonisation as the end of 
imperialism on the other. For example, one textbook argues that, “The demise of 
imperialism in the twentieth century was a fundamental change in world politics.”5 
Subsequently, most textbooks do not emphasise institutional continuities; try to 
historicise the emerging global hegemony of the US (and the Soviet contestation 
thereof) beyond the Cold War logic; gender and racialize the narrative of 
                                               
3 Andrew J Bacevich, The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy since World War II 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), XII. 
4 Prasenjit Duara, “The Cold War as a Historical Period: An Interpretive Essay,” Journal of Global History 
6, no. 3 (2011): 458. 
5 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 95. 
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‘peacekeeping’; or challenge the end of the Cold War as another rupture.6 However, the 
influence of these narratives go beyond textbooks.  
Within the multi-disciplinary research field on international interventions,7 many 
scholars view the interventions through the narratives’ rupture-oriented periodization 
with imperialism (1945/1960), decolonisation (1945-1960), and the end of the Cold 
War (1989). Consequently, many critical scholars see the growing problems of 
insecurity, gendered violence, economic failure, and aid dependency associated with 
neo-liberalism rather than outcomes of the international system’s deeper dynamics. 
Despite the mounting criticism of the early post-Cold War and current interventions, 
many scholars nevertheless still do not question the Cold War interventions, assuming 
these were simple and consensus-based ‘peacekeeping’ within a pluralist and all-new 
international framework working towards decolonisation.8 Following the interventions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, an upward number of scholars across a range of 
disciplines have unsurprisingly re-introduced the notions ‘imperial’ and ‘imperialism’ 
in the debate on the American interventions,9 the international interventions and the 
broader paradigm of governance these are part of. Countering Urquhart by putting the 
UN in the role of a ‘false friend’, the latter group of scholars is the one relevant here.  
Far from uniform, the group of scholars that study international interventions and 
use an imperial vocabulary span several disciplines, analyse different interventions with 
different methodologies, and display various different attitudes towards the logic and 
execution of the interventions. For analytical purposes, the scholars can be seen as 
making up two loose clusters rather than two established ‘schools’. Scholars that 
explicitly or implicitly accept the narratives of decolonisation and Cold War 
peacekeeping, but find the post-Cold War interventions akin to different forms of 
imperialism make up the first cluster. Scholars that perceive the broader international 
                                               
6 See for instance Robert H Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories 
and Approaches, 2013; Emilian Kavalski, Encounters with World Affairs: An Introduction to International 
Relations, 2015; Norrie MacQueen, The United Nations since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War (Essex, 
U.K.; New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999); Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and The International 
System (Milton Park, New York: Routledge, 2006); Jill Steans, Lloyd Pettiford, and Thomas Diez, 
Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes (Harlow, England; New York: 
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005). 
7 Research on international interventions now spans at least anthropology, cold war history, conflict studies, 
development studies, international history, international law, international relations, military history, military 
sociology, peace studies, security studies, strategic studies and war studies.  
8 See for instance Paul Higate and Marsha. Henry, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance 
in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia (London; New York: Zed Books, 2009); Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations 
Seen from below: UN Missions and Local People (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2006); Laura Zanotti, 
Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold 
War Era (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011). 
9 See for instance Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 
2004); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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system as imperial in nature and accordingly decolonisation as a mere shift and the 
interventions within that framework make up the second. I take the first cluster to 
consist of Austrian military historian Erwin Schmidl, Canadian historian turned 
international relations and human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff, American political 
scientist Kimberly Marten Zisk, British scholar of international relations David 
Chandler, and American anthropologist Robert Rubinstein. While all see the 
interventions launched after the Cold War as a new form of imperialism (Schmidl who 
focused on the Cold War interventions excluded), the attitudes towards the 
interventions differ vastly. Yet, common for this group is the hierarchical attention to 
states, institutions, policy-making, and modes of governance, rather than spaces and 
how people in everyday life negotiate the presence of the interventions.  
Writing before the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Austrian military 
historian Erwin Schmidl showed how the European interventions in the Mediterranean 
and Ottoman provinces in the 19th and 20th centuries reflected the waxing of the 
European imperial frontiers and the waning of the Ottoman Frontiers. While he tried to 
engage in the discussions of social science scholars, writing for social science journals 
addressing scholars of strategic, military and war studies as well as the international 
interventions, his important insights appear to have been overlooked either on account 
of his historicising approach being ‘too early’ or perhaps too nation-state-centric or his 
lack of connecting to the post-Cold War interventions.10  
An example of a scholar adopting the prevailing narrative, Canadian historian turned 
human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff focused on the US-led interventions in Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Afghanistan, categorising them as manifestations of an ‘empire lite’ that 
has failed to deliver on its promises of democracy and progress.11 However, he saw the 
execution rather than the goals in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan as flawed. In doing 
so, his work reflected not only the long-standing Canadian loyalty to the US,12 but also 
a defence of the work of the pro-interventionist International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, where he worked.  
Publishing soon after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, American political 
scientist Zisk used some of the troubled post-Cold War interventions to argue that 
current interventions should find inspiration in the imperial interventions of Great 
                                               
10 Erwin A. Schmidl, “The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 10, no. 2 (1999): 4–20; Erwin A. Schmidl, “The International Operation in Albania, 1913–14,” 
International Peacekeeping 6, no. 3 (1999): 1–10. 
11 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 
2003). 
12 See for instance Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, “Global Order, US Hegemony and Military 
Integration: The Canadian-American Defense Relationship,” International Political Sociology 2, no. 4 
(2008): 305–21. 
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Britain, France and the US to narrow their focus from state-building to security.13 
However, schooled in ‘classic’ American political science (and its traditions of 
proximity to power, state-centrism, selective approach to and use of history, and 
distance to the ‘receiving ends’ of foreign policy),14 her use of imperial historiography 
left much to be desired. Indicative hereof, a fellow American political scientist 
subsequently diplomatically noted that she was (…) generally stronger on the 
contemporary cases than the historical cases of imperialism.”15  
Writing a few years later as part of a group of scholars challenging American 
intellectual hegemony within the discipline of international relations,16 British Chandler 
saw international interventions as new colonial framework far more intrusive of the 
nineteenth century empire creating “(…) ‘phantom states’ whose governing institutions 
may have extensive external resourcing but lack social or political legitimacy.”17 
Explicitly stating that the emergence of western hegemony at the end of the Cold War 
replaced the ‘pluralist post-war framework of the United Nations’ overnight, however, 
Chandler seems to accept the narratives of the UN and decolonisation unequivocally.18  
More recently, American anthropologist Robert Rubinstein have labelled the post-
Cold War interventions as ‘the return of imperial policing’ due to the outward-oriented 
turn of the local systems of governance and economies, the merger of UN civilian and 
military objectives and the emergence of an intervention culture of violence. As 
Chandler, he also contrasted post-Cold War and Cold War interventions, seeing the 
latter as unproblematic expressions of a legitimate and consensus-based international 
system.19 As with Ignatieff, however, his work can also be read as a defence of his own 
pro-interventionist position permeating his applied work for the US Army Center for 
                                               
13 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from The Imperial Past (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004). 
14 Lucian M. Ashworth, “Interdisciplinarity and International Relations,” European Political Science 8, no. 1 
(2009): 16–25; J. M. Hobson and George Lawson, “What Is History in International Relations?,” Millennium 
37, no. 2 (2008): 415–35; George Lawson, “The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations,” 
European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 2 (2012): 203–26; Ole Waever, “The Sociology of a Not 
so International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations.,” International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727. 
15 David M. Edelstein, “Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past.(Book Review),” Political 
Science Quarterly 120, no. 4 (2005): 680. 
16 Ashworth, “Interdisciplinarity and International Relations”; Wayne S. Cox and Kim Richard Nossal, “The 
‘Crimson World’: The Anglo Core, the Postimperial Non-Core and the Hegemony of American IR,” in 
International Relations Scholarship around the World (London: Routledge, 2009), 287–307. 
17 David Chandler, Empire in Denial : The Politics of State-Building (London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2006), 
8. 
18 Ibid., 28. 
19 Robert A. Rubinstein, Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 
2008); Robert Rubinstein, “Peacekeeping and the Return of Imperial Policing,” International Peacekeeping 
17, no. 4 (2010): 457–70. 
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Strategic Leadership, the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, and the UN after the Cold 
War.20  
As should be clear, research in international interventions, and applied research 
especially, does not take place in powerless vacuum: disciplinary legacies, national 
historical narratives, and the international situation matter. To recap, these scholars 
(aside Schmidl who did not address contemporary interventions) had no illusions on the 
current interventions (although their attitudes differed markedly). They did lack, 
however, a deeper historical understanding of how the emerging international system 
before the Second World War and the American expansion during and after the war, 
which led to the formation of the UN, re-actualised colonial and imperial practices.  
I see the second cluster consisting of Canadian historian turned sociologist Serene 
Razack, British scholar of development studies Mark Duffield, Australian international 
relations scholar Philip Darby, British imperial historian John Kent, Canadian scholar 
of international relations Bruno Charbonneau, and last but not least British scholar of 
international relations Philip Cunliffe.  Aside Kent, who did not consider post-Cold War 
interventions, they have all—with variation—argued that international interventions 
reflect the imperial character of the international system.  
Not focused on Iraq or Afghanistan despite writing in 2004 when the debate on 
imperialism had kicked into a higher gear, Canadian historian turned sociologist 
Sherene Razack focused on the 1992 intervention in Somalia. Anchoring her analysis 
in the Canadian court case that saw Canadian soldiers on trial for racial violence and 
the fact that the trial was in Canada (rather than Somalia), she portrayed the Canadian 
participation in the Cold War interventions as a continuation of settler-colonialism in 
Canada and as serving US interests. In extension thereof, she linked the violent and 
racist settler colonial history of Canada and the Canadian military violence in Somalia 
in 1992. Subsequently, she saw the Canadian narrative of ‘peacekeeping’ as a national 
mythology masked as a history of ‘doing good’, thus contesting the strong rupture 
orientation of the aforementioned narratives seeing the post-Cold War international 
interventions constitute a ‘new imperialism’.21  
Broadening the scope, British development scholar Mark Duffield used British 
imperial history and the notion of the ‘western external frontier’ to argue that the post-
Cold War interventions more broadly constitute an integral part of a Western-dominated 
international regime to contain the fleeing Third World populations generated by the 
global market economy. He placed this in contrast to how previous surplus 
                                               
20 For more, see Rubinstein, Peacekeeping under Fire. The tradition of anthropology serving western 
geopolitical objectives has, if anything, been revived. Recently, American anthropologists (and sociologists, 
geographers and other social scientists) deployed with American military forces in Afghanistan as part of the 
Human Terrain System project. Similarly albeit at a much smaller scale, the Danish Army has also found it 
useful to turn to an anthropological after a sociologist failed to deliver a loyal publication. 
21 Sherene. Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New 
Imperialism (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
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underdeveloped populations were exported, e.g. the British settler colonies that became 
the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).22  
Along the lines of Duffield but preferring the older if still much-contested notion of 
‘imperialism’, Australian and scholar of international relations Philip Darby argued that 
international interventions are cast in the colonial mould of intervention from above 
and outside and are part of upholding an inequitable global order that locks non-
European people into a world not of their making. As one of the few scholars concerned 
with how local populations claim agency by negotiating the interventions, he argues 
that future interventions must entail locally rooted and accepted mechanisms.23  
Focusing on a single intervention, British imperial historian John Kent used the early 
Cold War intervention in the former Belgian colony Congo to connect Cold War 
geopolitics with the conditions of the Congolese population, their struggles and ethnic 
tension. He argued not only that the intervention was used to advance an African system 
of nation states with allegiance to “(…) the principles, if not old colonial practices, of 
Western capitalism”,24 but also that the UN was central for the US in promoting its 
vision of a broader world order, thus challenging the narratives of the UN and 
decolonisation. Framing his analysis within the Cold War historiography, however, 
Kent targeted the debates amongst Cold War and African historians rather than those in 
the multi-disciplinary field mostly interested in the recent or ongoing international 
interventions.25  
Writing a few years later with the aim of joining the dialogue on the imperial via a 
study of French interventions in their former African colonies, Canadian scholar of 
international relations Bruno Charbonneau initially argued that the interventions 
represented colonial continuities recast in a neo-imperial world dominated by the US 
and Great Britain. Using works by historians on French imperialism, his research stood 
out as building bridges.26 While still recognising imperial legacies in “(…) old 
capabilities, new organising logics and, specific practices and power relationships”,27 
Charbonneau has since stepped back, calling for scholars to bring in the historicity of 
particular imperial experiences to challenge what he argued to be a too simplistic duality 
                                               
22 Mark R. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2007), 1–31. 
23 Philip Darby, “Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial,” International 
Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (2009): 699–716. 
24 John Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 193. 
25 Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation. 
26 Bruno. Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Aldershot, 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2008). 
27 Bruno Charbonneau, “The Imperial Legacy of International Peacebuilding: The Case of Francophone 
Africa,” Review of International Studies 40, no. 3 (2014): 629. 
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between imperialism and internationalism on the one hand, and the local and 
international on the other.  
Finally, British scholar of international relations Philip Cunliffe also considers the 
systemic and its structural components, concentrating on the states that provide troops 
for the interventions. In 2012, Cunliffe noted that it was impossible for scholars to 
overlook how military forces are sent to pacify unruly marginal areas in the 
international system with force while installing institutions and ideals found useful by 
the dominant members of the international system.28 Subsequently, he argued that the 
current interventions are not only rooted in an historic tradition of imperial security, but 
also that they amount to a system of imperial multilateralism, envisioned at its 
formation to carry out tasks hitherto carried out by colonial empires.29 The supply of 
colonial forces for imperial service, especially during the two world wars and later 
counter-insurgency operations, ensured the formation of a shared transnational military 
culture of experience, doctrine, habits and training. In his view, it was not coincidental 
that the colonial territories suppling imperial military units became the largest troop 
suppliers after the Cold War. Finally, he argued that: “(…) the imperial functions of 
peacekeeping are therefore a congenital component of the United Nations and not 
merely a by-product of the overstretch resulting from the multiplication of UN missions 
after the end of the Cold War.”30  
Razack, Duffield, Darby, Charbonneau, and Cunliffe—hereon onwards the ‘imperial 
segment’—confronted how the interventions from the outset generated hierarchical and 
gendered relations through their lack of accountability, asymmetries in political action 
and systems of ordering rooted in the waxing and waning of imperial frontiers. Aside 
Kent, these scholars view the overall international system as imperial and the 
interventions within that framework. They also, some more explicit than others, say that 
our analytical frameworks support status quo and therefore need to de-centre the West 
and the state and concurrently re-centre the imperial, the colonial and the local. As in 
the other cluster of scholars, however, disciplinary legacies, national narratives, and the 
international situation still take centre stage. Indicative of the continued Western 
dominance of the research field, American researchers are not only markedly absent in 
the ‘imperial segment’. The strongest attempts of decolonising knowledge of the 
interventions have also so far come from scholars from other Western countries and not 
’peacekept’ countries, even if they view the interventions and the international system 
from different platforms, move in different directions and agree little on the concepts 
and the importance of the ‘mission areas’ and their populations.31 To the best of my 
                                               
28 Cunliffe, “Still the Spectre at the Feast,” 427. 
29 Philip Cunliffe, Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South (London: Hurst, 2013). 
30 Ibid., 220. 
31 Awareness of the settler colonial and imperial origins of the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, American 
and South African academic worlds is gradually emerging. See for instance, James Belich, Replenishing the 
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knowledge and indicative both of my own position within this Anglo-Saxon dominated 
research field and the intimate links between the knowledge we generate on 
international system and this very system, scholars working in or on the former colonies 
as well as in other languages than English have also yet to untether from the mainstream 
or counter-neoliberal narratives to fully engage with the challenge of historicizing the 
interventions systemically32 or have begun to do so in English.33 Consequently, the 
debate on the imperial in the international, in my view, face three challenges. 
The Challenges of the Field 
The first challenge relates to how the connections between imperialism and Western 
academia have left significant blind angles in research on ‘peacekeeping’. The second 
connects to the question of how to overcome the difficulties created by the 
multidisciplinary research field (and thus how scholars relate across disciplinary 
divides). Partly an attempt to deal with these challenges, the third revolves around how 
to go about historicize the international system, the networks of the states that 
contributed forces and the ‘mission areas’ in a way that crosses the disciplinary 
differences.  
A consequence of the entangled histories of the disciplines with colonial 
imperialism, the first challenge concerns the blind spot of research on international 
interventions, including the ‘imperial segment’: the links between the interventions and 
the historical angle that is the colonial, social and political geographies of the ‘mission 
                                               
Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Tamson Pietsch, Empire of Scholars: Universities, Networks and the British 
Academic World, 1850-1939 (Manchester, New York, Vancouver: Manchester University Press, Palgrave 
Macmillan and UBC Press, 2013). 
32 See for instance Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts 
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011); Kwesi Aning, Kwesi and Samuel Atuobi, “Responsibility 
to Protect in Africa: An Analysis of the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture,” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 1 (2009): 90–113; Tony Karbo, “Peace-Building in Africa,” in Peace and 
Conflict in Africa (London ; New York: Zed Books, 2008), 113–32; Germain Ngoie Tshibambe, Grace Maina, 
and Erik Melander, “Analysing the Peace Process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo : From War to 
the Uncertain Peace,” in Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa (Capetown: University of KwaZulu-
Natal Press, 2016), 161–91; Rashed Uz Zaman and Biswas, Niloy Ranjan, “Bangladesh’s Participation in UN 
Peacekeeping Missions and Challenges for Civil–Military Relations: A Case for Concordance Theory,” 
International Peacekeeping 21, no. 3 (2014): 324–44. 
33 Bruno Charbonneau, “Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in Africa,” Modern 
& Contemporary France 16, no. 3 (2008): 279–95; Charbonneau, “The Imperial Legacy of International 
Peacebuilding.” 
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areas’ and the colonial experiences of their populations. As the American scholar of 
international relations J. Ann Tickner argued, “(…) most western knowledge cannot be 
separated from its implication in the history of imperialism.”34 This is also true for the 
disciplines involved in the study of international interventions. Having been debated 
since the 1960s, the ties between anthropology and colonial systems probably represent 
the well-known connections. The discipline cannot be understood without its 
intellectual linkage to European colonial imperialism or how many but not all 
anthropologists served imperial projects and colonial states.35 As historians and 
development scholars aware of their discipline’s origins have shown, the field of 
development also has a history of origins tied to Western colonial imperialism.36 Vernon 
Hewitt argued, “As a project, international development can be defined as a product of 
empire, a universal language of ‘improvement’ and civilisation acted out through a 
series of complex – and contradictory – processes and interactions.”37 Sociology is less 
known for its ties to colonial imperialism as most see sociology as originating in studies 
of industrialising urban Europe. However, sociology has a link to imperialism as ‘on 
the ground’ advisors not only in European colonies in Africa, but also the Russian 
continental and American Pacific and Caribbean expansions.38 History has also had a 
similar role. The strong favour of British imperial historians of the British Empire is 
probably the more famous, but historians of other European colonial powers were 
equally busy writing their nations’ paths to glory. Dismissing the US being an empire, 
American historians claimed that the US was ‘exceptional’.39 The discipline of 
international relations has its roots in European 19th century studies on politics, but 
coalesced into a proto-research field involving geographers, historians and political 
economists placing emphasis on imperialism and war in an international system only 
                                               
34 J. Ann Tickner, “Retelling IR’s Foundational Stories: Some Feminist and Postcolonial Perspectives,” 
Global Change, Peace & Security 23, no. 1 (2011): 12. 
35 Helen Tilley and Robert J Gordon, Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism and the Politics 
of Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). 
36 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Mark Duffield and Vernon M. Hewitt, eds., Empire, 
Development & Colonialism: The Past in the Present (Woodbridge, Rochester: James Currey, 2013); Joseph 
Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British 
Colonialism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007). 
37 Vernon Hewitt, “Empire, International Development & the Concept of Good Government,” in Empire, 
Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present (Woodbridge, Rochester: James Currey, 2013), 31. 
38 George Steinmetz, ed., Sociology & Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline (Durham, 
London: Duke University Press, 2013). 
39 See for instance Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 14–19; Remco Raben, “A New Dutch Imperial History?: 
Perambulations in a Prospective Field,” BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review 128, no. 1 (2013): 5–30; 
Athena Syriatou, “National, Imperial, Colonial and the Political: British Imperial Histories and Their 
Descendants,” Historein 12 (2013): 38–67; Jackson Frederick Turner and John Mack Faragher, Rereading 
Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and Other Essays (New 
Haven (Conn.); London: Yale univ. press, 1998). 
  
11 
 
from 1880. After the Second World War and the rise of the US politically, militarily, 
economically, and academically in the social and natural sciences,40 focus shifted to the 
US, thus aligning the discipline with the view from Washington until the end of the 
Cold War. With this shift, history fell into the background, often to become a selective 
pool of evidence with little regard to historiographical traditions. This removed 
imperialism, gender and geography from the British pre-war and inter-war international 
relations tradition.41 Finally, colonialism was not peripheral but central to international 
law due to the need of colonial empires to legitimise the governing of non-European 
peoples.42 Indeed, as Tickner argued, Western knowledge production and imperialism 
have intimate relations, something that continued in Cold War research. Most of this 
work shows that the outlook of the imperial metropoles on the one hand and the colonial 
state apparatus’ quest for technologies of power and knowledge on the other continued 
to inform the different disciplines’ ways of looking and understanding beyond 
decolonisation.  
To be sure, ‘white’ male American, and to a lesser extent British and Canadian, 
researchers of the state- and Western-centric disciplines of international relations, 
international law and political science undeniably held research on the interventions in 
an iron grip during the Cold War. They promoted them in publications on legal, 
financial and logistical issues as well as foreign policy decision-making processes in 
the leading Anglo-American journals, New York, Washington and London-based think 
tanks reports and American university publications, thus fuelling the narratives on the 
UN and decolonisation in the mainstream.43 Although a few American and British 
                                               
40 For the natural sciences, see especially John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction 
of Science in Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006). 
41 Ashworth, “Interdisciplinarity and International Relations”; Lucian M. Ashworth, “Feminism, War and the 
Prospects for Peace: Helena Swanwick (1864-1939) and the Lost Feminists of Inter-War International 
Relations,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 13, no. 1 (2011): 25–43; Lucian M. Ashworth, A 
History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations, 
2014; Wayne Cox and Kim Nossal, “The ‘crimson’ World: The Anglo-Core, the Post-Imperial Non-Core, 
and the Hegemony of American IR,” in International Relations Scholarship around the World (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 287–307; Hobson and Lawson, “What Is History in International Relations?”; Lawson, 
“The Eternal Divide?” 
42 Antony. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
43 The literature is vast an too large to go into detail with here, but see for instance Edward H. Bowman and 
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scholars of area studies and international relations were able to escape the militarisation 
of their research fields and offered critical work,44 they did not reflect on the colonial 
era, just as their work soon drowned in ‘technical’ articles by other scholars and pro-
intervention publications by (‘white’, male) UN officials.45 Additionally, the broader 
militarisation of the American social sciences through the formation of 40 research 
centres run by the US military and Defence Department and the military contract work 
of civilian universities pushed closer the social sciences to the interests of power.46 It is 
indicative that the few sociologists who tried to look beyond ‘the state’ in works 
intended as responses to the militarisation of the social sciences also failed to escape 
the paradigm of the interventions despite introducing field work and arguing that local 
populations were relevant.47 Moreover, the few third world PhD fellows that studied 
UN interventions in American universities (mainly close to power in Washington and 
New York) appear not to have published on UN interventions after defending their 
dissertations, leaving the field to westerners, mostly also male.48 Due to the origin of 
the Western and state-centric top-down ways of looking and knowing of Cold War 
scholarship in the connections between the disciplines and imperialism, these prisms 
effectively rendered the local population and geographies of each ‘mission area’ 
unimportant and with them their colonial histories invisible.  
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This effect, so deeply engrained in the involved disciplines, is to some extent visible 
amongst even the scholars in the ‘imperial segment’. While Razack was attentive to the 
meaning of Canadian Settler colonial history in the violence of the Canadian soldiers in 
Somalia, she focused almost only on the soldiers, leaving the different Somali she let 
us encounter only as victims. As Duffield analysed an adapting system, the few 
individuals that made it into his analysis were largely from the Western political elite. 
Darby spoke of indigenous agency in relation to the interventions as something 
necessary to integrate into the fabric of future interventions, not in relation to past 
interventions. Throughout his work, Kent focused only on Congolese politicians as 
individuals although he recognised Congolese agency and means to negotiate the 
outcome of the intervention with force via the countrywide riots as the UN was leaving 
and the US taking over via mercenaries. Despite his call to challenge to the local-
international binary Charbonneau has rarely focused on other ‘local’ actors than 
politicians, mobs and demonstrators. Seeking to move beyond states, Cunliffe’s 
analyses of some ‘mission areas’ made it clear that international relations still has 
difficulties analysing non-state relations such as socially and spatially integrated 
interactions between people.  
The second challenge links to the multidisciplinary character of the research field 
and the histories of the different disciplines. As argued by scholars of planning and 
development Arild Buanes and Svein Jentoft, disciplines are not only organised in 
departments, but also ordered epistemologically through internal ‘languages’ of 
methodologies, concepts and theories, and normatively regulated by norms and values 
of what is proper scholarship and what is not.49 This has made informed dialogue on the 
imperial and the international, let alone broadening it to include others, difficult. That 
scholars from a number of disciplines got involved when the debate on empire and 
imperialism picked up in the 2000s may also have allowed too many scholars, as 
Cunliffe argued in 2012, to get away with equalling interventions to imperialism 
without qualifying these claims. While it is necessary to qualify such claims, even when 
the connections seemed obvious, it has been harder for most. As Cunliffe notes, “(…) 
imperialism remains under-theorized and under-utilised in the study of peacekeeping 
(…).50 While Cunliffe is right here, there has been little to connect to not only because 
few scholars in the field have qualified their critiques of international interventions as 
imperialism empirically and theoretically, but also because most researchers remain 
oblivious or disinterested in the deeply entangled imperial histories of their own 
disciplines. While exploring different aspects of the interventions, Kent, Duffield, 
Charbonneu, Razack, Darby and Cunliffe in many ways qualified their ideas (and asked 
others to do so also), for the most part connected to each other’s work (when possible) 
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and to various extents sought to pull the overall research field towards common ground, 
especially by way of publishing in the main research journals. Their efforts and the 
deeper entanglements of the connections between Western scholarship and colonial 
imperialism notwithstanding, however, the lack of what the historians and sociologists 
Anne Markowich and Terry Shinn called ‘disciplinary elasticity’51 has not aided the 
interdisciplinary dialogue on the links between imperial and international. The second 
challenge is thus to not only to continue to seek common ground in a field that is still 
governed by disciplinary boundaries, methodological traditions, conceptual languages 
and limitations while elucidating the issue of the imperial, but also to continue to engage 
the interdisciplinary mainstream.  
Subsequently, the third challenge revolves around the historicization of the 
international system, the networks of states that contributed and still contributes forces 
and the ‘mission areas’ on the one hand and doing so in a way that bridges the 
disciplinary differences of the multidisciplinary research field on the other. A sensible 
point of departure, I argue, would therefore be the gap between imperial and colonial 
historiography and the blind angle of both the ‘imperial segment’ and ‘mainstream’ 
critical research towards the colonial, social and political geographies of the ‘mission 
areas’ and the colonial experiences of their populations. As philosopher of history Frank 
Ankersmit notes, “(…) big problems have long histories; and as long as we remain in 
the dark about these histories we shall be unable to deal with them.”52 Hence, this 
challenge entails both moving past how much research has indirectly served the status 
quo by not re-centring the ‘mission areas’ as a means to understand better the links 
between imperial and international. Accordingly, the webs between the countries 
sponsoring the interventions, the countries supplying the troops, vehicles and supplies, 
the UN bureaucracy providing the experts and the ’mission areas’ themselves central to 
understanding the international system in the same way the imperial webs were key to 
the different forms of imperialism. Thus, it becomes necessary to pay attention to see 
the ‘mission areas’ as webbed socio-spatial palimpsests in which colonial, imperial and 
international regimes of governance overlapped and re-actualised imperial practices 
and conflicts, often to the detriment of most of the ‘mission area’ populations. 
Connecting these challenges, the ‘imperial segment’ requires a counter-narrative that 
both connects colonial and imperial historiography with the ‘imperial segment’ as a 
way to emphasise the links to the imperial and the international and both the importance 
of people in the ‘mission areas’ on the one hand and works towards broadening the 
interdisciplinary dialogue on the other. 
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The Aims and the Main Research Questions  
Consequently, my first aim is to join and advance the interdisciplinary dialogue on the 
imperial and the international as a historian with an awareness of both the imperial 
historiographies and the research done by scholars in the ‘imperial segment’. The 
International Centre for Trans-disciplinary Research that see transdisciplinarity as that 
“(…) which is at once between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and 
beyond all discipline (…)” and has as its goal “(…) the understanding of the present 
world, of which one of the imperatives is the unity of knowledge.”53 If going by their 
understanding, transdisciplinarity may thus be a long-term goal, and interdisciplinary 
dialogue the short- and intermediate term means to move towards it. As ought to be 
clear, this involves asserting that research does not take place in a vacuum. If anything, 
scholarly inquiries are inherently political. Positions are not choices but inevitable. It is 
thus before anything else a question of thoroughness. With this goal of 
interdisciplinarity is also therefore also the hope to promote self-reflection amongst 
scholars as disciplinary legacies, prisms of nation, age and gender, and possible military 
experiences are factors on our work and how in extension thereof how we dare re-
envision the international.  
My second aim is twofold. First, I intend to take a step towards a broader framework, 
a way of looking and understanding rooted in the marriage of imperial and colonial 
historiography and Philip Cunliffe’s notion of ‘imperial multilateralism’ that can work 
towards unpacking the imperial dynamics of the international interventions and 
elucidate how the interventions re-actualise colonial practices and ideas. Second, I aim 
to provide an analysis that via the framework both elucidates the shift from dynastic 
empires over modern imperialism to a broader Western networked form of 
imperialism—imperial multilateralism—and shows how people in the ‘mission areas’ 
relate to and resist the form of governance sought implemented via the apparatuses of 
the international interventions, civilian and military alike. Paying greater attention to 
both the networked character of the interventions and the ‘minor histories’ of the 
‘mission areas’ can be a way to not only unpack the imperial dynamics of the 
international system and expound how the interventions re-actualise colonial practices 
and ideas, but also a way to keep the dialogue on common ground, if not expand it. 
Focusing on the networks of the interventions is a way to explicate the dynamics of the 
shifting forms of governance as the colonial empires gave way to a Western dominated 
networked means of retaining influence by partially internationalising the regimes of 
governance of the new formally decolonised members of the international community. 
Moreover, granting equal importance to the histories of everyday life in the mission 
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area that many scholars probably consider minor histories given the continued role of 
Western- and state-centric perspectives are all but unimportant. ‘Minor’ histories, 
anthropologist and imperial historian Ann Laura Stoler has suggested, “(…) should not 
be mistaken for trivial ones. Nor are they iconic, mere microcosms of events played out 
elsewhere on a larger central stage.”54 Rather, they mark “(…) a differential political 
temper and a critical space. It attends to structures of feeling and force that in “major” 
history might be otherwise displaced.”55  
Aiming to link between the imperial and the international on the one hand and the 
systemic and the practices of everyday life on the other, I thus want to understand  
 
- How the post-1945 regime of international organisations under the umbrella 
of the United Nations emerged from inter-imperial cooperation and the 
systemic significance thereof; 
 
- And in this context, what forms of civilian and military regimes of regulation 
and governance the interventions of the United Nations, intentionally and 
unintentionally, transferred to and engendered ‘on the ground’ in the ‘mission 
areas’; 
 
- And accordingly within this context, how different population groups ‘on the 
ground’ in the ‘mission areas’ related to and/or resisted the forms of civilian 
and military regimes of regulation and governance the interventions of the 
United Nations, intentionally and unintentionally, transferred to and 
engendered in the ‘mission areas’. 
 
To attempt to provide some satisfactory answers to these questions and tackle the 
challenges laid out, I choose to focus on the first intervention designated 
‘peacekeeping’: the clearing of the Suez Canal in 1956 and 1957, and the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that operated in Egypt in 1956 and the Egyptian-
controlled Gaza Strip from 1957 to 1967. Before taking to generating research questions 
to this joint intervention and explaining why this is the better choice compared to other 
interventions, however, I must pave the way by attending to my theoretical framework. 
The following two chapters are dedicated to discussing these. 
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 1 Chapter 1: Theorising 
Imperialism and International Interventions  
My theoretical framework is rooted in a merger of the various imperial historiographies 
and an operationalisation of the scholar of international relations Philip Cunliffe’s 
concept of ‘imperial multilateralism’ from his main work on international interventions. 
For obvious reasons, the broader imperial historiography is indispensable in discussing 
imperialism. I use Cunliffe’s work and primary concept because—as will be clear in 
the following section—he provides a strong point of departure that is still open to debate 
and modification. Cunliffe does not base his work on a structured theoretical framework 
(as is otherwise common in his field of international relations). Rather, he uses what he 
calls a “moving prism (…) to catch light from as many angles as possible”.56 This 
involves both critically engaging the wider mainstream and mainstream critical 
interventions scholarship and incorporating British and French imperial and colonial 
military historiography albeit not in a chronological structure. It is therefore not fair 
to distil his thoughts into a theoretical framework. It is, nevertheless, necessary to 
‘freeze’ his arguments in order to first anchor and thus strengthen, rather than juxtapose, 
them in the theoretical discussions of the historiography he seeks to utilise against the 
mainstream interventions literature, and then operationalise it as the base of my 
analytical framework via imperial frontier studies.  
1.1 Empires and the Modalities of Imperialism: 
Anchoring Cunliffe’s ‘Imperial 
Multilateralism’ in Imperial Historiography  
Cunliffe’s fundamental idea is that “As such, UN peacekeeping can be assimilated into 
a long history of imperial security in which metropolitan centres of power have sought 
to reduce the costs of policing empire by devolving these responsibilities to the 
periphery itself.”57 Thus, he notes, UN forces are the heirs to colonial armies, NGOs the 
heirs to missionaries, Special UN Representatives the heirs to Viceroys and civilian UN 
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Staff the heirs to colonial administrators. While Cunliffe thus ventures well out of the 
confines of most international relations schools of thought by seeing imperialism as 
integral to the international system, he does not define or discuss what he sees the 
concepts of empire and imperialism to entail, something Bruno Charbonneau rightly 
criticises him for in his review.58 Reading backwards from the way in which Cunliffe 
sees ‘the essence of empire’ as distilled into the post-war UN system as “(…) a 
hierarchic and paternalistic regime for maintaining order across a diverse set of peoples, 
while recreating political dependency as part of a global civilising mission”,59 it is clear 
that he sees empires as hierarchical, paternalistic and ruling over diverse sets of peoples. 
However, he leaves too much unsaid. Concepts find use in particular contexts. 
As the conceptual historians Helge Jordheim and Iver B. Neumann have pointed out, 
the discussions of ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ (and other forms) are today global.60 
Recognising this, many of the foremost imperial and global historians, as well as some 
anthropologists and political scientists, have adopted global and systemic perspectives 
on empires, in direct opposition to the heretofore-dominant teleological Western-centric 
and (nation) state-centric historiographies.61 Taking a broad view, Jane Burbank and 
Frederick Cooper, two prominent imperial historians who see empires as “(…) large 
political units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities 
that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new people”,62 link the 
empires in a global framework. They argue that the formation and expansion of empires 
from 1400 until the late 1700s both shaped and were shaped by what was essentially 
the making of a global system. According to Burbank and Cooper, the dominant 
empires of Eurasia, the Chinese, Russian, Mughal and Ottoman empires mainly relied 
on similar ‘repertoires of power’ in the form of strongly hierarchal dynastic and 
patrimonial forms of rule, the co-optation of conquered peoples and lands by various 
connective measures such as tribute, marriages, and the acceptance of difference in 
customs, religion and social organisation. In contrast, the Habsburg, Portuguese, Dutch, 
British and French empires over the 16th and 17th centuries relied on less hierarchical 
merchant elite and aristocratic networks, trade and—later—plantation and mining 
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slavery to both expand and sustain themselves as empires. While their expansion led to 
settlements along the African and Indian coastlines, in what became Latin and North 
America and the Indonesian archipelago the European empires were unable go beyond 
the fringes of the larger Eurasian and interior African empires and kingdoms for 
centuries technologies, local arbitrators and non-hostile terrains facilitated entry. 
Altogether, most scholars are united in the view that most early-modern empires were 
hierarchical power structures revolving around centres dominating their geographically 
adjacent peripheries, if the Habsburg, Dutch and British Empires were also ‘hybrids’ 
indicative of the following centuries. 63  
As multiple scholars have noted, this balance of power between the larger Eurasian 
and smaller European empires began changing from the early to mid-19th century. 
Cunliffe does not address this change directly; he only does so implicitly and very 
briefly, speaking of a long transition from empires to multilateral imperialism.64 Here, 
however, we enter the heart of the discussion on the global imperial system changing 
from being dominated by dynastic and tributary empires ruling geographically adjacent 
territories towards being led predominantly by non-dynastic empires with growing 
bureaucratic state apparatuses and geographically non-adjacent territories over the 19th 
century. A commonly accepted periodization distinguishes between the dynastic 
empires with adjacent territories from the corporatist empires engaging in imperialism 
from the middle of the 19th century. For decades, historians (and others), however, were 
unable to agree whether or not to use the concept of imperialism and what it meant. 
While some heavyweights active before (formal) decolonisation had taken place argued 
that imperialism was no word for scholars as it both was imprecise and led to violent 
and emotional responses,65 others later argued in favour of accepting the debate as an 
irritating ‘fact of life from which historical analysis must begin.”66 Fernando Coronil, 
anthropologist of the Americas, noted, “(…) imperialism is out in the streets as an 
indispensable political term”, and that the question has become “(…) not so much 
whether to use this term or not but how to recast it to make it useful.”67 Most scholars 
now accept a distinction between ‘early modern empires’ and ‘modern empires’ and the 
use of the concept of ‘imperialism’, understood “(…) as the “process by which they are 
established, extended, or maintained”,68 in relation to ‘modern empires’. Again, 
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Cunliffe’s ‘moving prism’ makes it rather difficult to elucidate what his view of 
imperialism entails as ‘it’ is spread over two separate chapters. Imperialism in one place 
appears as a state-led (rather than dynastic-led one assumes) expansion.69 In another, he 
also sees it as a hierarchical and paternalistic form of governance with colonial armies 
to incorporate indigenous authorities and reduce costs.70 However, he also argues, 
“Historically, empire has been the solution to the gap between liberal ideas and a non-
liberal reality—imperialism being the means for realising liberal ideas where they do 
not exist”,71 thus implying that the Japanese, Italian and German imperial projects 
cannot be classified as imperialism. Indicatively, Cunliffe refers mainly to British and 
French imperialism before 1945 and American empire after 1945, apparently 
overlooking the broader debate amongst historians on the global dynamics of the 
different modalities of imperialism. For example, John Darwin, a global and imperial 
historian, plays down the liberal dimension of imperialism as he casts it as a continuum 
with wide variation in its objects and methods revolving around “(…) the attempt to 
impose one state’s pre-dominance over other societies by assimilating them to its 
political, cultural and economic system.”72 Darwin thus emphasises the connections 
between imperialism and colonial rule rather than imperialism and liberalism and 
imperialism and capitalism. The work of Cunliffe, reflecting his choice to exclude the 
political economy of the contemporary interventions while recognising its importance, 
also disregards the links between imperialism and capitalism.73 This narrow focus is odd 
as he elsewhere links imperialism with colonies, making economic spheres of influence, 
establishing privileged trading zones that could exclude rivals and the taxation of local 
populations.74 In contrast, Coronil ties imperial expansion and capitalism as twin forces, 
arguing “Just as imperialism makes evident the political dimension of capitalism, 
capitalism makes visible the economic dimension of imperialism, revealing ‘states’ and 
‘markets’ as dual faces of a unitary process.”75 Burbank and Cooper link the collective 
rise of the European empires to both the bureaucratisation of the imperial repertoires of 
power and the emerging nexus of imperial expansion, capitalism, and industrialisation. 
As for the former, the desire to keep control with their colonial territories and the 
increasingly fierce milieu of inter-imperial competition to expand, Burbank and Cooper 
argue, led all empires to modernize their repertoires of power. The European empires 
were the first to make simultaneously ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ institutions such as 
census and tax collection systems, health systems, gendarmes and imperial armies. 
Seeing the potential, the expanding continental Russian and American empires, the 
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‘unified’ Italian and German empires and the hard-pressed Ottoman and Japanese 
empires followed suit. This, Burbank and Cooper posit, led to a wide range of imperial 
authorities and sovereignties, many of which were increasingly sought grounded in the 
racialised idea of the superiority of ‘‘white’ civilisation’ (despite the orientation of the 
empires of the US, Germany, Italy and Russia towards the idea of a nation state).76 As 
for the emergent nexus of imperialism, capitalism, and industrialisation, Burbank and 
Cooper see it as a globally contingent process that both shaped and were shaped by the 
expansions via the militarisation of the commercial circuits.77 Focused on the world 
rather than only empires, the global historians Michael Geyer and Charles Bright also 
saw the mid-19th century as the opening of the modern era with the globally 
transformative processes of the expansion in the industrial forms of production and 
destruction, migration and new (imperial) regimes of order and state building projects.78 
As for the subsequent phase of the global rule of imperialism, the scholarly debate 
has largely revolved around the question of whether it is best understood as the coming 
apart of modern empires and imperialism, or, better, as a phase of transformation 
towards new decentralised forms of empire and cooperative forms of imperialism. In 
line with recent scholarship that favours seeing imperialism through the prism of 
cooperation, decentralisation and internationalisation in different ways, and Cunliffe 
who speaks of ‘multinational imperialism’, I opt for the latter view. While Cunliffe does 
note the emergence of ‘multinational imperialism’, which he argues amounts to a step 
towards imperial multilateralism from around 1900, he sticks to the narrow view once 
again. He mentions only the inter-imperial force, the so-called ‘Eight-Nation Alliance’, 
deployed against the Chinese anti-foreign rebellion in 1900, the creation of Albania in 
1912-13 at the edge of the Ottoman Empire by the European empires and their deployed 
military forces, and the policing operations and mandates of the League of Nations.79 
Again, his idea would have been had he rooted his work more broadly in 
historiographical works on the higher degree of inter-imperial cooperation, the 
increasingly bloc-fixed forms of imperialism, and the emergence of webs of semi-
autonomous inter-imperial institutions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For 
example, imperial historian Valeska Huber contended, “(…) colonialism and 
internationalism were not contradictory projects but rather intricately intertwined”80 in 
her work on how the Suez Canal became part of turning the Mediterranean into a 
European imperial space by both supporting imperial military logistics and serving as 
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a space for disease surveillance.81 Antony Anghie, a legal scholar, similarly sees 
international law, its principles and doctrines—such as the concepts of ‘sovereignty’ 
and ‘belligerent occupation’—and the international institutions promoting it as formed 
by (and forming) the legal practices of the different colonial projects, their gradual 
universalisation and late 19th century ‘internal’ European practices regarding colonial 
occupation.82 Also working on the imperial legal and security systems, imperial 
historian Daniel Brückenhaus likewise points to the roots of early 20th century police 
cooperation in metropolitan Europe in inter-imperial needs to monitor anti-
colonialists.83 Imperial historian Ulrike Lindner has also shown how inter-imperial 
knowledge exchange was increasingly formalised.84 International historians Naomi 
Nagata and Tomoko Akami have likewise argued that the paradigms of the League of 
Nations on diseases both evolved out of imperial concerns and inter-imperial 
cooperation, and became sites for Japan to claim equality with the ‘‘white’’ imperial 
powers.85 Daniel Gorman, historian of the British Empire, notes similar inter-imperial 
‘‘white’’ concerns and ‘pro-’white’’ dynamics in the humanitarian responses to not 
only, but especially, the trafficking of women and children in the 1920s.86 In relation to 
the launch of the League of Nations, the international historian Mark Mazower operates 
with an ‘imperial internationalism’ that took for granted not only the durability of 
empire and the idea of ‘‘white’’ superiority, but also that international organisations 
should serve as vehicles for both. In light of the global preponderance of British 
imperialism from the middle of the 19th century to the First World War, he also contends 
that the League can be seen as a liberal imperial bloc in contrast to the collapsed Russian 
Empire that the Bolsheviks recast as the Soviet Union.87 As for these bloc-oriented 
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forms of imperialism, Prasenjit Duara, historian of Asia, sees initially Japan in the 
1930s and subsequently the US and the Soviet Union after 1945 engaged in 
‘imperialism of nation states’. Duara saw this form of imperialism as having “(…) a 
strategic conception of the periphery as part of an organic formation designed to attain 
global supremacy for the imperial powers”,88 even if that meant promoting anti-colonial 
ideologies, making major economic investments and turning subordinate territories into 
(nominally) sovereign nation states.89 Interestingly, Duara’s ‘imperialism of nation 
states’ appears to roughly correspond to both Fernando Coronil’s mode of ‘national 
imperialism’, which he sees as ‘(…) the informal dominion of a nation-state over 
independent nations”,90 and his mode of ‘global imperialism’, which he defines as “(…) 
the informal dominion by a network of capital and states over an increasingly integrated 
worldwide system.”91 Additionally, historian of modern American history Paul Kramer 
sees the US as a ‘colonial nation-building project’ also embracing and practising 
‘international empire, producing “(…) asymmetries in the scale of political action, 
regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and 
produce relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction and exploitation.”92 
As for the bloc the UN represented, Mazower argues that the charter agreed upon in 
1945 came to form—as it evolved out of both the ideas and practices of British 
imperialism and American war planning—“(…) in this respect, a more effective and 
ideologically more liberal, version of the 1940 Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy 
and Japan.”93 With regard to the links between the development and demographic 
paradigms of the British Empire and those of the UN, Gorman speaks of an 
internationalisation of British imperialism,94 while imperial historian Joseph Morgan 
Hodge sees the UN as a form of internationalisation of the late imperial British 
agricultural and science doctrines.95 International historian Michael Connelly similarly 
see the demographics programmes under the auspices of the UN as the heirs to British 
settler colonial programmes and “(…) another chapter in the unfinished history of 
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imperialism.”96 Similarly, political scientist Véronique Dimier contends that the aid 
system of the European Economic Community and later the European Union in many 
ways were shaped primarily by French colonial officials and on account of their 
experiences.97  
The heir to his pre-1945 ‘multinational imperialism’, Cunliffe sees ‘imperial 
multilateralism’ as emerging in three phases, beginning with the period from 1945 to 
1989 that includes the formation of the UN and decolonisation.98 For him, the UN both 
reflected the American imperial expansion after 1945 and served as a means to reduce 
the disorder brought about by the dissolution of the European colonial empires.99 Rather 
than seeing decolonisation as a systemic rupture, Cunliffe notes that it corresponded 
“(…) with the growth of international institutions to discipline and regulate the 
behaviour of newly independent states in place of old imperial strictures.”100 
Additionally, Cunliffe argues that this period also saw how the experience of imperial 
warfare overseas had “(…) laid down a transnational military infrastructure of 
experience, doctrine, habit, organisation, training and manpower that was inherited by 
the United Nations via its newly independent member states and thereby re-directed to 
the purposes of post-colonial peacekeeping.”101 As colonies became states, the military 
dependence and engagement in international interventions of many former British and 
French colonies during the Cold War sustained the ‘new’ imperial security system.102 
Providing cover for the withdrawal of the British, Dutch and Belgians from their 
colonies, the Cold War interventions thus saw the participation of units from the armies 
of many former British and French colonies and small states and middle powers such 
as the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Canada and Australia.103 In contrast, the US, 
Great Britain, France as well as Spain and Italy dominated the interventions of 
Cunliffe’s second phase from 1990 to 2000 due to the political space the collapse of the 
Soviet Union gave the West to concentrate legal, military and political power in the UN 
system.104 Accordingly, the third phase from 2000 saw a massive increase in the use of 
units from former colonial armies,105 marking thus neither “(…) a cosmopolitan break 
with previous patterns of military deployment”106 nor the emergence of a single, unitary 
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empire,107 but a transformation of the interventions to “reduce the costs of policing 
empire by devolving these responsibilities to the periphery itself.”108  
A brief recap of the discussion is necessary at this point. In contrast to the early 
modern dynastic and tributary empires, several scholars see modern European, 
American and Japanese imperialism both furthering and furthered by capitalism and 
other exploitative socio-economic practices and racialised colonial regimes of order 
based on direct intervention. Due to the end of incorporable territory, an increasingly 
aggressive ‘multinational imperialism’ took on the Chinese and Ottoman empires, both 
previously out of reach for the smaller European early modern empires, at the beginning 
of the 20th century. It is now common amongst scholars to see the League of Nations as 
the institutionalisation of this still racialised inter-imperial system with the British 
Empire and direct colonial rule and ‘internationally’ sanctioned territorial rule at the 
centre. To use Cunliffe’s concepts, several scholars also see the system of 
‘multinational imperialism’ become a system of ‘imperial multilateralism’ not with the 
British Empire and direct colonial rule at the centre, but the US, the British Empire and 
the Soviet Union and indirect rule via the UN and new national elites of postcolonial 
states with complex loyalties.  
When thus embedded in and qualified by the broader historiography, Cunliffe’s 
concept of initially ‘multinational imperialism’ and later ‘imperial multilateralism’ 
concept become even more compelling, analytically potent and the antithesis of the 
purely “ideological construct” Hughes sees it as,109 despite focusing on the works on the 
military history of the British, French and American imperial modalities.  
1.2 Systems, Networks, Agency and Places: 
Anchoring Cunliffe’s ‘Imperial 
Multilateralism’ in Imperial Frontier Studies 
To begin with, I want to emphasize the need of adopting a both-and approach to the 
global imperial system and its manifestation ‘locally’ (rather than either-or). This will 
enable capturing, theoretically and conceptually, not only the system’s transformative 
dynamics, its forms, and technologies of power, but also the human agency making up 
the system and how it is negotiated ‘locally’. With this approach, rooted in Cunliffe’s 
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concept of ‘imperial multilateralism’, I will show, it becomes possible to elucidate the 
shifting character and thus turn to the time dimension as a means to explain systemic 
change. Promoting a micro-spatial approach to global history more broadly, global 
historian of punishment Christian De Vito argues that planetary, macro or structural 
approaches for the most part create a false local-global divide. Instead, he calls for 
approaches that see local and global as connected, parts of one another and as 
simultaneous concrete spatialised processes involving individuals in various numbers 
and settings around the world (but do not focus exclusively on individuals).110 Linking 
directly to imperialism, cultural and political geographer John Morrissey similarly 
argues “(…) it would be a mistake to either consider the local as always ‘on the 
periphery’ or overlook imperialism’s perennial concerns with localized techniques of 
occupation and economic production.”111 Similarly, global anthropologist Eric Wolf has 
argued, global processes link to peoples’ lives ‘locally’ and vice versa. He therefore 
argues it necessary to delineate the significant elements working in these processes, 
their systemic combinations and negotiated transformative characters. In other words, 
we need to consider the ‘local’ histories of incorporation into the global processes—
such as the rise of Cunliffe’s system of ‘imperial multilateralism’.112  
There should be no doubt that Cunliffe is taking to task the lack of attentiveness to 
imperialism within both the discipline of international relations and the other social 
sciences in the research field on international interventions. In brief, he focuses on the 
changes in the countries that contributes military forces for the interventions. In doing 
so, however, he is also grappling with the parallel line of thought amongst imperial 
historians that he relies on when it comes to local agency and the importance of not 
only who contributes troops but also where they go.  
The tradition of imperial historians in short reads as follows. For more than a century, 
imperial historians have discussed the transformative character of imperialism in the 
Middle East, Europe, East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and South East Asia, and the 
relationships between their different parts and other empires. Although occasionally 
still the case, imperial historians traditionally analysed the empires through studies of 
the military strategies of the government and metropolitan elites, the big picture in 
relation to economic dynamics and trade patterns of histories of expansion (and 
decline). For many years, this privileged the top-down and outward views from what 
were perceived to be the ‘centres’, binary views of home and empire, and grand 
narratives of empires bringing civilisation and modernity to the colonies. In turn, these 
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perspectives engendered the colonies—and the people living in them—mostly 
insignificant in themselves but often also invisible, despite being perhaps the most 
important locations in a systemic sense. Prior to the Second World War (and in some 
cases beyond), most imperial historians were also apologetic to the particular projects 
of imperialism they linked to due to a sense of shared (national) imperial identity rooted 
in ideas of race and religion.113 While Cunliffe is both clearly attentive to and critical of 
the evolution of the broader system of imperial multilateralism, he appears to offer little 
theorisation on the ‘mission areas’ in themselves and their relation to the emerging 
system, nor on the associated importance of local agency and the social categories of 
race, gender, class, age and so on. Rather than reflecting his analytical choices, this 
mirrors the broader weaknesses of the fields of international relations and imperial 
military history due to their epistemological and ontological links to their subjects and 
subsequent state-centric character. I therefore turn to anchor his system of ‘imperial 
multilateralism’ further in the imperial frontier studies, a particular segment of research 
linking the imperial and colonial fields of study.  
This link, or spill over if you will, between the imperial and colonial fields evolved 
out of the socio-political changes that happened with decolonisation and the 
immigration ‘waves’ from former colonies to the former metropole. With people from 
the former colonies migrating, scholars such as colonial historians, anthropologists and 
geographers began paying attention to the colonised and colonisers, albeit initially as 
static categories. However, with the combined and growing influence of social and 
cultural history, the French post-structuralist Michel Foucault and the postcolonial 
scholar Edward Said, they changed their focus with time. Gradually, attention was 
granted to the ways in which the colonial regimes of governance and local populations 
negotiated power materially, institutionally, spatially and discursively, how they 
mutually shaped each other and formed interconnected hybrid identities through the 
ambivalent intimacy of everyday life or the ways in which the colonial violence affected 
indigenous communities. Accordingly, colonial historians (and others) thus broke down 
gradually the traditional divide between imperial and colonial historiography by placing 
the metropoles and colonies on the one hand, and the coloniser and colonised on the 
other, in the same (intra-imperial and inter-imperial) analytical field(s). Recently, these 
scholarly currents have crystallised into what has become known has ‘critical imperial 
studies’ and ‘new imperial history’, or rather ‘new imperial histories’.114 Scholars 
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relating to this current, or at least inspired by it, have conducted studies on how 
imperialism and, for example, diseases, family and motherhood, gender, sexualities, 
race and bodies in both colonial and broader imperial spaces were connected. Their 
work has shown that the imperialism of modern empires was not only spatially 
configured, but also as intimate as the personal was political and, therefore, negotiated 
by some and downright violently resisted by other ‘locals’ in the colonies.115 Within this 
body of research, imperial frontier studies stands out. By emphasising not only systems, 
networks, but also agency and places, it is able to capture the transformative dynamics, 
forms, technologies of power making up the changing global imperial system and how 
it is negotiated through human relations.  
The analytical use of the ‘frontier’, however, originates not in imperial studies, but 
in the field of American history in the 19th century.  While the American historian 
Frederick Jackson Turner was most probably not the first scholar to use the notion of a 
‘frontier’,116 he made the analytic use of the concept popular from 1893 onwards. 
Writing not long after the US had extended its imperial reach to the Pacific, he saw the 
frontier operated as an incorporative ‘edge of civilisation’ that given its character and 
advancement of individualism initially by ‘white’ settlers and later by federal 
institutions of the United States, promoted American democracy, economic equality 
and ultimately political equality. Ignoring the genocide against indigenous populations 
the expansion entailed, Turner saw the ‘white’ settlers and American state institutions 
as culturally superior and thus as bringing ‘civilisation’ to the lands of ‘primitive’ 
indigenous peoples.117 Subsequently, many historians of the United States detached this 
racialising aspect of Turner’s frontier concept and emphasised instead (especially from 
the 1990s) how the frontier was a fluid physical space of contact and conflict, which 
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also, when seen from the indigenous perspective, brought destruction and havoc.118 
Historians studying Eurasian and South American ancient, medieval and early modern 
empires have since also adopted the concept in this capacity, as a fluid space on 
political-geographical periphery in relation to the centres of the agrarian empires.119  
More importantly here, however, scholars studying modern European empires and 
imperialism also turned to the ’frontier’, emphasising also its systemic dimension to its 
territorial dimension. This broadened the understanding of the ‘frontier’ from strictly a 
political-geographic space between geographically adjacent territories or several 
patches of such territories making up a larger frontier-belt as promoted by Turner, 
historians of the United States before the 1870s and historians of ancient, medieval and 
early modern empires. No longer limited to the study of large land-based and dynastic 
empires, the analytical value of the ‘frontier’ increased for historians of modern empires 
and imperialism. Historians and others therefore turned to the concept to analyse, for 
example, how metropolitan imperial imaginaries mobilised support for the imperial 
projects from public rather than state initiatives; how imperial warfare depended on the 
populations of the colonies for soldiers; how colonial governmentalities were resisted 
and modified; and how shifting imperial frontiers affected the global power relations 
between the empires. In other words, historians and others of modern empires and 
imperialism have taken up the use of and appropriated the concept of the ‘frontier’ to 
show not only how ‘the periphery’ was central to the ‘centre’. They have also shown 
how imperial formations are best understood as fluctuating two-way processes that 
shape and are shaped by both the imperial institutions, the agency of the people and 
places incorporated into the empires and the networks connecting the metropoles and 
the colonies.120 In extension thereof, the aforementioned scholar of development Mark 
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Duffield has also used the frontier concept in relation to  the building of a fluid and 
relational ’external sovereign frontier’ via imperialism that the new international 
institutions helped to maintain upon decolonisation in form of de facto condition of 
state inequality via technologies of security such as development and international 
interventions.121 It is thus fair to say that scholars have proven the worth of the frontier 
in relation to De Vito and Wolf’s similar calls to link global systemic processes to 
peoples’ lives ‘locally’ and Morrissey’s warning to consider local peripheral or ignore 
the strong imperial attention to the development of local technologies of governance.  
While Hessel Duncan Hall, League of Nations official, Commonwealth historian and 
geographer, did not appreciate frontiers as two-way systemic processes, it is necessary 
to use also his notion of the ‘frontier zone’ as the particular site of incorporation. 
Already in 1948, he used the ‘frontier’ to conceptualise what he called ‘earth’s political 
crust’ and ‘frontier zones’ as the multi-sited institutions in which this manifested. In 
other words, he used the concept of the ‘frontier zone’ to show how the emerging 
international organisations were intimately intertwined with European and American 
imperialism in ways not too dissimilar to Duara’s ‘imperialism of nation states’, 
Fernando Coronil’s modes of ‘national imperialism’ and ‘global imperialism’, 
Cunliffe’s ‘multinational imperialism’ and Mazower’s ‘imperial internationalism’ 
manifested themselves in particular political-geographical modalities. Examples on this 
list of ‘frontier zones’ counted Suez Canal regime, demilitarised islands under peace 
agreements, the mandates in the colonial territories of the collapsed German and 
Ottoman empires and international regimes in Danzig and Tangier of the League of 
Nations, the UN trusteeships and Germany and Korea after 1945.  
Altogether, the concepts of the ‘frontier’ and the ‘frontier zone’ are well suited to 
operationalise Cunliffe’s ‘imperial multilateralism’. They offer a systemic, but 
spatialised and networked approach to the interventions that historicises the systems, 
networks, agency and places that shaped and were shaped by the interventions. In the 
following section, I therefore offer my theoretical framework based on the marriage of 
the two concepts.  
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1.3 Spatializing and Networking the ‘Mission 
Areas’ of International Interventions as 
‘Frontier Zones of Imperial Multilateralism’ 
Following the previous sections of this chapter, the expansion of the system of imperial 
multilateralism was not merely a geographical expansion of the existing global imperial 
system revolving around American and European imperialism. The expansion in itself 
also changed the overall system ‘centrally’ as well as ‘locally’. In this sense, it makes 
sense to speak of understanding the building of imperial multilateralism as frontier 
building with both diachronic and synchronic dimensions. The diachronic dimensions 
involve more than the formation and practices of the UN as an institutional paradigm 
in 1945. Part thereof were also the palimpsest foundations of the UN contained in the 
gendered and racialised ideas and practices of the principally inter-imperial military 
alliance from 1942;  the increasingly region- and bloc-oriented modalities of American, 
British, Soviet and French imperialism of the 1930s and 1940s; the inter-war ‘imperial 
internationalism’ that took empire for granted and internationalism as a means to sustain 
it; and, finally, the pre-First World War ‘multinational imperialism’.  
Within the framing of the frontier of imperial multilateralism, the systemic expansion 
happened not via colonies, as did the modern empires, but via especially the ‘mission 
areas’ the international interventions’, or ‘frontier zones of imperial multilateralism’. 
These zones were political-geographical palimpsests of actively and passively 
occasionally conflicting or cooperative colonial, post-colonial and international 
gendered and racialised regimes of governance in which actors negotiate both the 
international presence and the imposition of regimes of social and spatial ordering. 
Here, actors encompass national and international decision makers, UN military and 
civilian staff, ‘local’ decision-makers, and various ‘local’ communities, their population 
groups and individual members thereof. In extension of the various forms of 
incorporation as spheres of influence, protectorates, colonies or commonwealths into 
the modern empires, the territories incorporated into the UN system as frontier zones 
by way of interventions attained different degrees of sovereignty and forms of 
governance.122 Consequently, the frontier of imperial multilateralism can be seen as 
being both a gendered and racialised multi-sited political assemblage and 
simultaneously but by no means linear and uncontested expansive processes of 
broadening and deepening.123  
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As for the systemic expansion in breadth, it follows that this overall process relied 
on several factors. Firstly, the growing number of troop contributors amongst the group 
of small Western states or pro-western former Western colonies ensured the means to 
expand. Secondly, the establishment of new frontier zones in the ‘Third World’ 
provided a growing number of sites for expansion. Thirdly, the making of an 
analytically relevant but much-ignored gendered and racialised multi-sited web of 
imperial multilateralism via 1) Western military infrastructure such as airfields, naval 
and military bases, 2) supply systems by water and air, and 3) the Western dominated 
UN bureaucracy steeped in the ways of Western knowledge systems and conventions 
(i.e. cartography and ‘development’ ideology) ensured the ability of the system to 
reproduce itself.  
Equally part of continuing what was essentially the—if negotiated—
internationalisation of Western and western colonial governmentality and military 
infrastructure, the expansion in depth hinged on the continuation of these processes of 
tying all systemic actors and sites closer together. The use of Western (male) experts in 
top positions in the UN in New York and each ‘mission area’ ensured their and the 
broader Western systemic influence. Providing military units repeatedly also 
guaranteed political and institutional ‘alignment’ amongst former colonies or small 
Western states. Additionally, the longer each intervention was active by way of renewed 
mandates, the deeper the integration of each frontier zone in the overall system and the 
reach of its ways of operation and dynamics. That is not, however, to say that the 
processes of expansion by establishing new interventions, further integrating existing 
mission areas, and reproducing the overall system were not sought negotiated both in 
the bodies of the UN and ‘on the ground’ in the ‘mission areas’.  
At the political arenas of the UN in New York, the members partly or wholly opposed 
to or in favour of the interventions acted within both the formal and informal spaces for 
political manoeuvring to further their own interests or counter their opponents. 
However, states are both institutions and processes of territorialised systems of power. 
At the UN, the analytically relevant actors are hence not only ‘states’ as such, but also 
the involved clusters of predominantly male national and international decision makers, 
government representatives and diplomats and equally predominantly male UN 
officials, many of whom were former colonial employees, and the relations in between 
the states and organisations they represented. The dynamics of the negotiations at the 
General Assembly, the Security Council and the corridors can thus be understood as 
influenced by the probable dominant group of representatives’ common experiences 
from colonial or international deployments and self-identification in relation to race, 
gender and class on the one hand, and the geopolitical alignment of the different 
member states, the geopolitical importance of the mission area to these, and their 
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formal/informal authority in the international hierarchy on the other. The views of 
governments and organisations were subsequently not always uniform, but could (and 
did) vary from adamant resistance to establishing missions or covering operational 
expenses to ‘barking but no biting’ and quietly supporting the interventions, perhaps 
with troops, as a means to get influence ‘on the inside’. Although the Soviet Union 
under Stalin had been a founding partner of the UN and the number of representatives 
of former colonies that were becoming legally independent states was increasing year 
by year, they put forward their different forms of opposition at the UN initially in the 
context of Western dominance of the organs of the organisation. However, the shifts in 
the balance of power allowed the representatives of the opponents of the interventions, 
as Cunliffe notes, to ‘storm the citadel’ from the late 1960s.124 While not a linear 
process, the ‘siege’ lasted until the Soviet system weakening and collapse and the 
Western bloc became able to gain further control with the UN system and subsequently 
outsource further the maintenance of system stability.125  
The frontier zones of imperial multilateralism were and are not top-down projects in 
the same way the colonial regimes were not what geographer Doreen Massey calls 
‘power-geometries’126 with strict linear top-down dynamics due to the relations between 
the different colonial regimes of governance and different ‘local’ actors that drew upon 
a wide spectre from violent resistance to cooperation.127 As the gendered and racialised 
colonial regimes, they were and are part of everyday life, sometimes very intimately so. 
In line with De Vito, Wolf and Morrisey, it is therefore not sufficient to analyse only 
the relations between national and community decision makers and the UN 
headquarters in the mission areas as important as these relations are. Even if spatial 
theorists argue “(…) space is fundamental in any exercise of power”,128 and how spaces, 
therefore, can be “(…) delineated for various purposes: to produce grids of 
classification, order and discipline; but equally to foster particular kinds of 
environmental qualities (…)”,129 it is necessary to study the everyday negotiations of the 
interventions with members of the ‘local’ communities and population groups. The 
cluster of analytically relevant actors thus expands from mainly national and 
international decision makers and UN officials at the UN to include also deployed UN 
military and civilian staff, ‘local’ decision-makers, and not the least various ‘local’ 
communities, their population groups and individual members thereof. As for the 
former, the positions and perspectives of the ‘international’ different actors ‘on the 
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ground’ in what they see as ‘mission areas’ were and are different than those involved 
mostly or only at the arenas of the UN in New York or the institutions in the web of 
imperial multilateralism around the world. The deployed UN staff, whether civilian or 
military, may be additionally influenced by for example their orders, organisational 
culture, experience from previous colonial or deployments, understanding of the 
‘mission areas’’ geopolitical and cultural histories, relations to other civilian 
organisations/military units, and previous encounters with ‘locals’ and the dynamics of 
the site of encounter within the ‘mission area’. As for the latter, ‘local’ decision-makers 
and members of ‘local’ communities and population groups were likely shaped by 
experiences in the colonial era, the degree of external orientation and militarisation of 
their post-colonial society and communities, self-identification in relation to 
ethnicity/race, gender, class and age, previous encounters with international personnel 
and the dynamics of the site of encounters. Given how the various actors ‘on the ground’ 
had shifting agendas that sometimes overlapped and other times conflicted, the 
pluralised spatial reflections by sociologist Brooke Neely and scholar of race Michelle 
Samura are useful here. They argue, “Space is 1) contested, 2) fluid and historical, 3) 
relational and interactional, and 4) infused with difference and inequality.”130 This 
means not only that “(…) meanings and uses of space change over time”131 and “(…) 
social actors create, disrupt and re-create spatial meanings through interaction with 
one another”,132 but also that “(…) political struggles over space play out through 
structures of difference and inequality that define and organize spaces according to 
dominant interests (…)”.133 While one use of space can thus reinforce regime power, 
another can be used to resist the very same power. Contested spaces, Neely and Samura 
note, are therefore gendered and racialised “(…) geographic locations where conflicts 
in the form of opposition, confrontation, subversion, and/or resistance engage actors 
whose social positions are defied by differential control of resources and access to 
power.”134 Additionally, geographer and spatial theorist Doreen Massey notes, “From 
the symbolic meaning of spaces/places and the clearly gendered messages which they 
transmit, to straightforward exclusion by violence, spaces and places are not only 
gendered themselves gendered but, in their being so, they both reflect and affect the 
ways in which gender is constructed and understood.”135 The gendered and racialised 
everyday negotiations of the interventions in fields, roads, checkpoints, villages, urban 
neighbourhoods and so on were and are all thus simultaneously both part of the 
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geography and materiality of the ‘mission areas’ and the homes and communities in 
which people sought to make the best of their lives.  
Altogether, the building of the frontier and each frontier zone thus shifted the centre 
of gravity forth and back between the various states involved, the UN bodies in New 
York and the frontier zones that were simultaneously ‘mission areas’ and ‘home’. In 
other words, the processes of systemic expansion were if unequal, gendered and 
racialised encounters nonetheless negotiated and thus reversible multi-sited and multi-
dimensional processes. To sum up, the frontier zones were, in all their diversities, as 
integral to and reflective of the frontier of imperial multilateralism as the spectre of 
imperial possessions such as settler colonies, crown colonies, plantation colonies, 
protectorate and dependent territories, and spheres of influence were to the different 
empires and imperial projects.  
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 2 Chapter 2: Methodology 
In this chapter, I offer my methodological reflections. In the first section, I explain why 
the first United Nations interventions is the best suited of all to answer the broader 
questions I outlined in the introduction. I use the second section, a historiography, to 
place the scholars and their works on the first UN intervention in their political and 
disciplinary contexts, linking thus to the discussion of the research field in the 
introduction. Calling for attention to the links between research, scholars, the 
international organisations and the interventions, I would be remiss not to offer any on 
reflections my own context. I do so in the third section, connecting to scholarship on 
reflective research practices and auto-ethnography within both International Relations, 
imperial history and ‘peacekeeping’ research. In the fourth section, I introduce the 
unpublished and published records and materials I use in the chapters 4 through 9 and 
situate the material within a theoretical understanding informed by critical archive 
theory. Finally, I provide both my intervention-specific questions that I ask as the point 
of departure for an interdisciplinary and historicising counter-narrative and an outline 
of the structure of the thesis, linking specific research questions to specific chapters. 
2.1 Why (only) UNSCO and UNEF?  
Why choose the intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip from 1956 to 1967—or rather 
the United Nations Suez Clearance Organization in the Suez Canal from 1956 to 1957 
and the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt and the Gaza Strip until 1967—over 
other interventions, or several others for the site(s) in which to build my analytical 
political history?  
As for the early international interventions of the UN, several others stand out in 
their own rights. I could have chosen the broader mandated intervention in Congo from 
1960 to 1964, which the aforementioned Cold War historian John Kent, whom I linked 
to the ‘imperial segment’, has argued was used to advance an African system of nation 
states with allegiance to “(…) the principles, if not old colonial practices, of Western 
capitalism”.136 In his scathing works, the American political scientist David Gibbs has 
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also argued that the UN intervention was an extension of US foreign policy.137 Another 
option could be the intervention in West Papua from 1963 to 1964, which historian John 
Saltford has similarly argued was akin to “(…) ’big power’ Cold War politics in which 
the rights of the Papuans counted for nothing,”138 in relation to the agreement between 
the United Nations, Indonesia and the Netherlands on the Papuans’ right to self-
determination upon decolonisation in 1962. Additionally, I could also have considered 
the intervention on Cyprus, which was initially to have been a NATO force but became 
a UN force deployed in 1964, inviting to Cyprus an influx of NGOs, INGOs and 
international agencies promoting not entirely problem-free Western forms of 
development.139 An interesting case study linked to the later part of Cunliffe’s first phase 
of imperial multilateralism could also have been the intervention launched by the 
Organization of African Unity in Chad from 1981 to 1982, which political scientist 
Terry M. Mays argues “(…) served as a foreign policy tool for Nigeria, France, the 
United States, and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain”.140 In Cunliffe’s later phases, the 
interventions in Somalia from 1992 that both Razack and Cunliffe reviewed scathingly 
as imperial in character,141 and in Cambodia that French political scientist Beatrice 
Pouligny has shown was little popular with the local communities and that led to aid 
dependency according to Cambodian-American political scientist Sophal Ear142 are also 
interesting as potential case studies. More recently, the interventions in Haiti, Kosovo 
and Liberia, which sociologist Paul Higate and developmental scholar Marsha Henry 
argue produced insecurity for the populations in the ‘mission areas’ in the context of a 
global neo-liberal security scape, provide other interventions to scrutinise in relation to 
the main research question.143 So again, why the first UN intervention instead of the 
following interventions? 
When considering the body of research on international interventions several 
decades has produced, there is no doubt that the interventions following the end of the 
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Cold War have received the most scholarly attention. This is perhaps not surprising 
given that both the pace of initiating new interventions along with the scope of their 
mandates have only increased following the end of the Cold War and it is now possible 
to speak of a multi-disciplinary research field rather than scholars from various 
disciplines merely taking an interest for intra-disciplinary purposes. The little interest 
in the Cold War epoch also characterises ‘the imperial segment’ that predominantly 
focused on the post-Cold War interventions. Only Kent, who focused on the 
intervention in Congo from 1960 to 1964, and Cunliffe, who offers a section on the end 
of empire and birth of imperial multilateralism, have taken an interest. As mentioned 
before, however, Kent did not link his work to the research on international 
interventions, but only the research field of Cold War history. Cunliffe on the other 
hand specifically argues, “The imperial character of peacekeeping is visible even in the 
much reduced peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era”144 as they were often used 
to either cover the retreat of the American allied European colonial empires or prevent 
a violent aftermath following imperial divide-and-conquer practices. If we also recall 
the broader views of the Cold War interventions of, for instance, David Chandler and 
Robert Rubinstein, who both saw them as relatively trouble-free and rooted in a 
consensus-based international community,145 it becomes even more interesting to focus 
on the Cold War interventions.  
Then why focus ‘only’ on the intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip and not also 
the Cold War interventions in Congo, West Papua and Cyprus, since these were clearly 
problematic and have not yet been properly contextualized? Indeed the intervention in 
Egypt and the Gaza Strip does not appear to stand out as extreme with regard to 
dimensions such as the geopolitical bearings of the interventions, the degree of racism, 
and everyday low-level violence towards members of the communities of the ‘mission 
areas’. Future research may suggest that the interventions in Congo and West Papua 
were perhaps clearer examples thereof.  
However, the joint interventions in Egypt and the Gaza Strip from 1956 to 1967 is 
pivotal as the expansion of the frontier of imperial multilateralism hinged on them, as 
the use and deployment of UN forces in the Korean War under US command had only 
materialized due to the Soviet boycott of the Security Council. In much research, the 
intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip therefore stands as the ‘first real’ and the best 
example of a ‘classic’ peacekeeping operation as since articulated by politicians, 
scholars and veterans. The UNEF and its smaller sibling in the form of UNSCO are thus 
not merely any (‘joint’) case study of a frontier zone of imperial multilateralism from 
the Cold War. They are, as I will show in the following section of this chapter and in 
chapter 5, the first stitches in the myth of ‘peacekeeping’ and the success of UNEF, 
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which is woven into military culture and organisation, officer academies, high school 
and university textbooks, university and think-tank research, policy recommendations, 
policymaking, public narratives, and frontier building in other ‘mission areas’. Showing 
how ‘peacekeeping’ is anything but, and consequently is not only the most effective 
way to attempt to pull the threads of the still very dominant narrative of ‘peacekeeping’ 
with what that unravelling could potentially bring, but also the intervention in which to 
anchor the counter-narrative of the interventions expanding the frontier of imperial 
multilateralism.  
Additional factors weigh in as well. In most research, the oil and shipping 
dimensions of the intervention are severely under-studied, intentionally or not. Often, 
scholars do not mention them at all. If acknowledged, as I will show in the following 
section, they mention only briefly the United Nations Clearance Organization, without 
offering any further comments. The process started at the beginning of the 20th century, 
but Western Europe only made the full transition to an oil-based economy after the 
Second World War, with strong American nudging by way of the Marshall aid.146 The 
UN’s concerns about disturbances in the Suez Canal regime in the years following the 
establishment of Israel in 1948 and the American and European concerns with keeping 
the oil flowing through the canal—to keep growth rates high enough to check the 
attraction of Communism to Western European working class voters—were therefore 
all but insignificant. While of lesser geopolitical significance, the shipping dimension 
was also important. 
Finally, the intervention also appears, as far as I have been able to ascertain, to be 
the Cold War intervention that has seen interest from the broadest range of disciplines. 
Not only foreign policy historians, military historians, legal scholars and scholars of 
international relations have taken an interest. Sociologists, peace scholars and 
anthropologists have also published on the intervention. This would suggest that it is 
the perhaps most suitable Cold War intervention to use as a point of departure for further 
interdisciplinary dialogue.  
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2.2 Research On UNEF and UNCSO: The 
Building, institutionalisation and 
Internationalisation of the Myth of Imperial 
Multilateralism 
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu suggested that scholars of the social sciences 
often take over ‘problems’ as they are defined by state apparatuses and governments.147 
As will be clear, his argument appears valid for most of the research in English on the 
intervention’s two components. While I am unsure of how much research exists beyond 
that in English,148 I focus here on works in English not only because I (aside from being 
able to read them) feel confident they make up the largest cluster. I also centre them as 
they—reflecting global power relations—unveil much about the links between 
American foreign policy and social sciences, the influence of American imperialism on 
the social sciences in the West via the dissemination of the transnational narrative of 
‘peacekeeping’ that includes UNEF’s success, and, once UNEF ended in 1967, the 
institutionalisation and internationalisation thereof.  
Before moving to the research from UNEF’s operational period, it is necessary to 
note that, as anthropologist David Nugent argues, the funding of social science research 
fields (such as area studies and international politics), journals and internationally 
oriented think-tank’s by American trusts established in late 19th and early 20th centuries 
by the wealthiest American businessmen was all but coincidental. Rather, as Nugent 
argues, the financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, 
and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial 
Foundation and others to universities was fundamental in building a post-war global 
geography of knowledge aimed at securing capitalist development and political stability 
around the world.149 For example, the formation of the journal, International 
Organization, was one of the vehicles the Rockefeller Foundation funded. In 1954, the 
Rockefeller Foundation convened a conference. Several former, serving and future 
political heavyweights and private actors took part and requested that the predominantly 
political scientists from the well-connected American East coast universities such as 
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Columbia, MIT, and Tufts show ‘what they could do for them’.150 While many scholars 
were former UN diplomats and military officers, the growing presence of the military 
in American social science both as an employer of researchers and sponsor of policy-
oriented university research pulled, as Cold War historian Joy Rohde has shown, many 
scholars closer to the interests of power.151 As I will show, the American and Canadian 
academic landscapes were rather similar and would come to influence the emerging 
research on UNEF.  
Within six months of the operation, Maxwell Cohen, Canadian former soldier turned 
legal scholar and later UN representative for Canada, published the first article in a 
Canadian journal in the spring of 1957. Seeing the European empires and the 
Commonwealth as the basis of world order, his framing revolved around the use of 
troops from ‘independent’ nations, Canadian resolve, and praise of the UN Secretary-
General.152 Another Canadian, Graham Spry, historian turned oil executive with Middle 
Eastern tasks, had an article published in the Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored journal 
of the British think tank, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in which he praised 
Canada, expressed concern with the internal Western rift, and other worries of several 
‘‘white’’ Commonwealth states.153 At Columbia University, American political scientist 
Leland M. Goodrich and his Ph.D. student Gabrielle Rosner, enrolled in a research 
programme backed by the Rockefeller Foundation,154 wrote another ‘loyalist’ article in 
International Organization. Goodrich was not only the editor of the journal, but also a 
member the international secretariat at the San Francisco conference, co-drafter of the 
UN Charter and a recipient of Rockefeller Foundation funds for work on American UN 
policy in 1951. As insiders, they praised the UN Secretary-General and Canada, 
professed hope for the intervention to last, and backed the making of a permanent UN 
force.155 In an article in ‘his’ journal, the editor of Foreign Affairs (that has roots in the Journal 
of Race Development) Hamilton Fish Armstrong, both admired the intervention and supported 
expanding the UN’s organisational and military abilities.156 Also publishing in the journal of which 
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he was chief editor, American historian Matthew A. Fitzsimons applauded the US 
government for co-opting the UN.157 Framing UNEF as in compliance with international 
law in an American law journal, legal scholar Dudley H. Chapman he recommended 
that it be granted greater discretion with respect to its authority and deployment and the 
Secretariat be expanded for future interventions.158 Prominent Western scholars, who 
published in ‘their own’ journals and were involved in frontier building by academic 
legitimization within the fields of international law, political science and international 
relations, establishing the UN or securing Western access to Middle Eastern oil, thus 
not only dominated research from the outset. They were also instrumental in founding 
a pro-interventionist scholarly discourse rooted in western imperial knowledge 
conventions.  
For a while, Western scholars shifted focus away from the Middle East as the 
hostility of both the Soviet Bloc and the governments of several newly independent 
third world states towards the growing costs and number of UN interventions 
intensified. However, in 1963, the Rockefeller Foundation convened scholars and UN 
officials at MIT to take stock of the ongoing interventions, provide ‘lessons learned’, 
and emphasise the need for permanent standby forces. The participants included for 
example Lincoln P. Bloomfield, former officer of the US Navy and the Office of 
Strategic Services turned political scientist and counsel for the State Department and 
Henry V. Dicks, officer for US military intelligence and psychological warfare expert 
in the Second World War turned psychiatrist. The journal edited by Goodrich instantly 
published their papers. In one article, the British political scientist touring American 
East-coast universities Herbert Nicholas commended UNEF for providing both 
contingents from countries detached from local and great power conflicts and making 
its temporary character the solution to the Middle East problem.159 In another, Edward 
E. Bowman, a strategic and corporate management scholar at MIT and consultant with 
the arms manufacturer Honeywell, and James E. Fanning, one of Bowman’s graduate 
students, summarised the logistical ‘lessons learned’ on basis of UNEF and the 
intervention in Congo. Adopting a pro-interventionist position, they argued that the UN 
needed to work on coordination, planning, air transport capabilities, and supplies.160 
Aside praising the clearance of the Suez Canal and the intervention in which he had 
been part, Brian Urquhart, former British officer and diplomat turned special advisor to 
the UN Secretary General from 1953 to 1961, advised using ad hoc forces to acclimatise 
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governments to the idea of a permanent force.161 Combined, these publications were 
outwardly moderate manifestations of the Western ideas for how to use the UN. The 
same year, Rosner also had her dissertation published as the second book in a Columbia 
book series that the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored and Goodrich edited along with 
William T. R. Fox, a fellow Columbia scholar. Fox was as embedded in the power 
matrix as Goodrich, having been in the international secretariat in San Francisco, co-
founder of the journal in which Goodrich and Rosner and the 1963 conference papers 
were published, anchor-person in the 1954 Rockefeller conference, consultant for the 
State Department, and finally lecturer for the US military. Moreover, Andrew Cordier 
served both as an interviewee for Rosner and in an ‘advisory capacity’ for the book 
series. Cordier was no small fish in neither the US nor the UN. He served as national 
security advisor in 1944 and a US delegate at San Francisco in 1945 before becoming 
Undersecretary-General in charge of the General Assembly and the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General in several interventions until forced to resign 
(to Columbia University) due to the Soviet criticism of his partial actions in the Congo 
intervention.162 Expectedly, she was kind towards the UN and UNEF and ended by 
supporting a permanent force.163 The first internationalisation of the narrative took place 
within the ‘white’ Commonwealth the same year when two Australian scholars of 
international relations, Arthur Lee Burns who had spent time at Princeton and spent 
time with Fox amongst others and Nina Heathcote, also took to promoting the narrative 
of success in their book in a Princeton book series on world politics.164 As the Congo 
intervention divided the UN on ‘peacekeeping’, the American MIT political scientist 
Norman J. Padelford offered a theoretical model of the negotiation of support and his 
reflections on how to, on basis of UNEF, move on from the financial and political 
‘stalemate’. His position was not surprising as a member of the US delegation at the 
Dumbarton conference in 1944, co-author of the UN charter and a board member of the 
journal, International Organization, in which he published.165 Fellow American 
political scientist Jacob C. Hurewitz took it even further, arguing that the involvement 
of the UN and the US in the Middle East after 1945, including the UNEF intervention, 
was ‘dis-imperialism’. Considering Hurewitz’ ‘pedigree’, this is not surprising. He was 
deeply embedded in the American power matrix, having served in the OSS’ Middle 
East Section in the Second World War, then the State Department and finally as counsel 
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to several administrations before turning to academia. Predictably, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Council of Foreign Relations, the Ford Foundation, and the Rand 
Corporation all funded his work on the Middle East.166 Peter V. Bishop, a Canadian 
political scientist and recipient of Ford Foundation funds, engaged in the debate in 
Canada. He both depicted international law and ‘peacekeeping’ as a global public good 
and praised Canada’s role in UNEF, ‘peacekeeping’, and the financial dilemma.167 In 
1966, a Scandinavian journal published a different kind of article. Part of promoting the 
emerging field of peace studies, the Norwegian sociologist from the Norway-based 
Peace Research Institute Ingrid Eide was perhaps the second scholar (after Armstrong) 
to visit the ‘mission area’ and the first to argue that the ‘locals’ were important to an 
intervention.168 Few, however, took notice.  
When UNEF was terminated in 1967, the ‘old’ generation of American and Canadian 
scholars either retired or lost interest in UNEF due to its end, the continued deployment 
on Cyprus, and the launch of a second intervention in the Sinai Peninsula in 1973. 
However, most researchers were still predominantly ‘white’ and pro-interventionist 
American and Canadian males rooted in state-centric disciplines that saw the world as 
a system of nation states, providing mostly ‘technical’ perspectives. Topics as the 
Palestinians and the links between UNEF, imperialism and oil had no traction. An 
example of this group, aforementioned Canadian legal scholar Cohen published his 
disappointment as he saw in the end of UNEF at the request of Egypt a sign that 
peacekeeping had lost momentum and the more encompassing peacemaking 
interventions as taken off the agenda.169 After having been a Rockefeller Fellow at 
Columbia in 1968, the British international relations scholar Alan James also praised 
UNEF for diffusing the ‘Suez Crisis’, maintaining the truce and keeping quiet the 
border in a book for the British Institute of Strategic Studies (a British think tank) in 
1969.170 Moreover, only few non-Western and female scholars had gained access to the 
debate. An example of this group and in part the upward influence of the emerging 
Third World at the ‘citadel’, the Ugandan international relations scholar Yashpal 
Tandon was one of the very few not to argue the intervention a success but rather that 
it had relaxed the pressure for a political solution. Nevertheless, he had the advantage 
of hindsight and his point was first made by UN Secretary-General U Thant. His interest 
in ‘peacekeeping’, hereunder UNEF, also began only after having met Goodrich and 
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others during a fellowship at Columbia.171 In the following years, UN-associated 
scholars institutionalised and Indian and Scandinavian scholars further internationalised 
the narratives of ‘peacekeeping’ and UNEF’ success. In 1972, for example, the James 
Boyd, who had served as US Air Force attaché in Egypt from 1956 to 1959 and 
subsequently Chief-of-Staff at the UN Military Staff Committee, applauded UNEF’s 
success.172 In 1974, Indar Jit Rikhye, Bjørn Egge and Michael Harbottle, three army 
officers from Norway, India and Great Britain turned UN military officials in Egypt 
and the Gaza strip, Congo, and Cyprus and insiders par excellence, saw UNEF as 
successful and its ending as unfair.173 Indicatively, their book was born out of a 
conference at the New York-based International Peace Academy created after the 
launch of a new UN force in 1973 and the call for a permanent UN force at the General 
Assembly by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.174 After a ten-year pause reflecting 
the drop in the political interest in ‘peacekeeping’, Canadian political scientist and 
director of peacekeeping programs of the International Peace Academy Henry Wiseman 
again took to promoting both UNEF and interventions generally with other UN-scholars 
and officials.175 Predictably, Rikhye also began promoting UNEF’s success again.176 
Altogether, these most often ‘white’ men using ‘temporally flat’ (nation) state-centric 
epistemologies successfully institutionalised the narrative between 1967 and 1989. 
Additionally, a new generation of UNEF-oriented scholars in troop-contributing 
countries such as India and the Scandinavian countries and historically interested 
international relations scholars further internationalised the narrative. An example of 
the former, Indian international relations scholar Nand Lal, who did his doctoral 
research at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1973, praised India’s non-aligned 
foreign policy, its engagements with the UN, and the Indian involvement in setting up, 
staffing and running UNEF an article in both an Indian journal and his re-written 
                                               
171 Yashpal Tandon, “UNEF, the Secretary-General, and International Diplomacy in the Third Arab-Israeli 
War,” International Organization 22, no. 2 (1968): 529–56. 
172 James M Boyd, United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations a Military and Political Appraisal (New York: 
Praeger, 1972). 
173 Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, The Thin Blue Line, 47–70. 
174 Kissinger is quoted to open the book. Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, The Thin Blue Line. 
175 However, Nabil A. Elaraby, then Egyptian ambassador to Egypt and former UN representative, made it 
clear that Egypt at the time saw the intervention as a breach of its sovereignty, but accepted as opposed to 
Israel. Michael Comay, former Israeli UN representative and ambassador to Canada turned scholar of 
international relations, merely saw UNEF as keeping a superficial stability and thereby allowed Egypt to 
prepare for war. Michael Comay, “UN Peacekeeping: The Israeli Experience,” in Peacekeeping: Appraisals 
and Proposals (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 93–117; Nabil E. Elaraby, “UN Peacekeeping: The 
Egyptian Experience,” in Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 65–
92; Henry. Wiseman, Peacekeeping, Appraisals and Proposals (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 19–64. 
176 Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping (New York: Published for the International 
Peace Academy by St. Martin’s Press, 1984); Indar Jit Rikhye, The Future of Peacekeeping (New York: 
International Peace Academy, 1989). 
  
47 
 
dissertation, also published in India.177 That his view reads similar to earlier Canadian 
scholars was no coincidence. For decades after independence, Indian international 
relations thinking, argues scholar of international relations Navnita Behera, suffered 
from intellectual dependency on Western traditions. The dominance of foreign policy 
thought by the Ministry of External Affairs, again informed by Nehru’s idea of India’s 
need to ‘join the existing system and modernity’, she contends, only exacerbated the 
centring of the West by Indian scholars.178 Another example was Swedish-based Abdel-
Latif M. Zaidan whose international law dissertation on UNEF opened with a pro-
interventionist quote by the (Swedish) Secretary-General who initiated UNEF and 
ended with a chapter on how to form a permanent force.179 Finally, Evan Luard, British 
diplomat turned politician and scholar, wrote a chapter on the ‘Suez Crisis’, as the 
invasion of Egypt is known as in Great Britain (and the US), and the UNEF in his 
broader UN history. Having left the British diplomatic service over the invasion of 
Egypt in 1956,180 he was naturally very fond of both the UN operation and the UN.181 
A new group of historically oriented scholars of international relations and historians 
began to review UN ‘peacekeeping’, the ‘Suez Crisis’ and UNEF after the call for a 
New World Order with the UN-sanctioned but US-led intervention against Iraq in 1990 
and Somalia in 1992 as well as the release of American, Canadian, British, Israeli and 
UN archival records. An example of the first group of primarily American think tanks 
experts at and military officers turned scholars in the 1990s, Israeli and US-educated 
Middle Eastern scholar Mona Ghali repeated the narrative of UNEF’s success. 
Tellingly, her work appeared in an anthology on ‘lessons learned’ by the Henry L. 
Stimson Center, a think tank formed in 1990 not in New York where the UN was 
located, but Washington (as several others) as an indication of the ongoing tectonic shift 
in the international realm.182 In contrast, the initially Israeli and British diplomatic and 
Cold War historians were mostly empirically concerned with the ‘Suez Crisis’, the 
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Israeli-UN relationship, and the British view on a permanent force in light of UNEF.183 
Their interests in ‘high’ politics came to inform the main current in historical and ‘IR’ 
scholarship interested, if peripherally, in UNEF. Viewing through the (nation)state-
centric lenses and released government records, scholars continued to focus on the onset 
of the ‘Suez Crisis’, the role of the Secretary-General, and the different countries’ 
involvement, reactions, and policy changes only until early 1957 as well as the 
financing of UNEF. Although this scholarship unveiled, to some extent, the Canadian-
American collusion with the Secretary-General in creating UNEF and the Eisenhower 
administration’s wish for the UN to deflect the Soviet criticism and get oil flowing 
again, records and perspectives remained limited to the views of and relations between 
Tel Aviv, London, Paris, New York, Washington and Ottawa. Only Prithvi Muidiam, 
an Indian historian, provided a non-Western view on the ‘Suez Crisis’ in his work on 
India and the Middle East.184  
By the mid-2000s, however, the horizon began to broaden. Using European records 
and literature in addition to works and records in English, diplomatic historian Ralph 
Dietl showed that the governments in at least Bonn, Rome and Brussels informally 
supported the French-British attack on Egypt, reflecting broader West European 
frustrations with the increasingly bi-polar world order.185 It is indicative that it took 
Sohail Hashmi, an US-educated and based Pakistani scholar of international relations 
to draw attention to the economic interests of Pakistan in re-opening the Suez Canal 
and subsequent involvement.186 Yet, the internationalised story of ‘peacekeeping’ still 
dominates. An example thereof, Canadian diplomatic historian Michael Carroll 
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provided a Western- and nation-state-centric analysis, despite the recent achievements 
on the importance of the Commonwealth in both the ‘Suez Crisis’ and the formation 
and running of UNEF as well as empire in relation to Canadian foreign and UN 
policy187. Despite using most of the Cold War literature discussed here, Carroll failed to 
see it in context. Finally, his ‘on the ground’ chapter considers only the standpoint(s) 
of Canadian soldiers.188 Writing from a university in the illegal settlement of Ariel in 
the West Bank, Israeli- and US-educated historian turned political scientist and national 
security consultant for Israel Alexander Bligh expresses a historical interpretation from 
the Israeli far right. Ignoring several decades of UNEF research and using uncritically 
only British and Canadian (and therefore naturally anti-Egyptian) cabinet and embassy 
records from 1956 and 1957(!), he remarkably argues both that the UN and UNEF were 
anti-Israeli and pro-Egyptian from 1956 to 1967(!) and that Egypt’s sovereignty and 
political space for manoeuvring threatened Israel.189 However, a handful of political 
scientists, anthropologists, and scholars of international relations offer wider 
frameworks, illuminating the weakness of the methodological nationalism of 
diplomatic historians. That said, their mostly non-records-based frameworks are not 
problem free either. While British scholar of international relations Norrie MacQueen 
examined ‘peacekeeping’ as a self-interested response of the international system to 
conflicts, he stuck to the established storyline on UNEF.190 Looking at ‘peacekeeping’ 
from a tool for a pluralist international organisation, the American anthropologist 
Robert Rubinstein argued UNEF as against big power interests and a “(…) model 
peacekeeping operation, maintaining peace and order in a buffer zone in the Sinai and 
Gaza Strip between Israel and Egypt.”191 Despite using a good number of records from 
UNEF to focus on the everyday interactions between the Gaza Strip residents and 
UNEF soldiers, the ‘temporally flat’ perspective of Alana Feldman, another (American) 
anthropologist, reproduced the underlying narrative of UNEF.192 Arguing that the 
interventions in the Middle East from 1948 onwards should be seen as a useful 
international regime to discipline the states in the region, American army officer 
Kenneth R. Dombroski turned political scientist at a university in Washington also 
supported the narrative of UNEF’s success, using pro-interventionist Cold War 
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literature and overlooking the advances in historical scholarship.193 Taking a more 
critical view of the UN against the backdrop of the American rise to global power in 
1945, UK-educated Brazilian political scientist and scholar of international relations 
Richard Kareem Al-Qaq sees ‘peacekeeping’ as social ordering on the global periphery. 
Relying on Luard, several works by British and American historians, the memoirs of 
several key figures and published UN documents, Al-Qaq, however, focuses only on 
Egypt and, as others, bypass the importance of oil and imperialism more broadly. 
Nevertheless, he convincingly argues UNEF is a “(…) novel political formula for 
policing Southern states that that [sic, MOJ] had fallen foul of the international political 
economy, which did not necessarily rely on gunboat diplomacy or impinge, at least 
formally, on the sovereignty of these new states.”194 Finally, Cunliffe goes beyond both 
an American post-war global order and American empire. He argues UNEF the onset 
of imperial multilateralism, the post-1945 heir to what he has called multinational 
imperialism, although he under-emphasises the importance of the Gaza Strip in relation 
to understanding the character of the intervention due to a reliance on Al-Qaq, 
Macqueen as well as Israeli diplomatic and military historian (turned diplomat) Michael 
Oren.195  
To recap, especially American and Canadian scholarship from 1957 to 1967 served 
to legitimise the expansion of the frontier of imperial multilateralism via a narrative of 
‘peacekeeping’ that scholars associated with either the UN, the troop contributing 
countries or the ‘‘white’’ Commonwealth then institutionalised and further 
internationalised. Especially in the last decade, however, historians and historically 
interested scholars of international relations have turned to archival records and thereby 
begun to unravel gradually the Cold War narrative of ‘peacekeeping’, and UNEF as 
part thereof. On basis of Western records, researchers have pointed towards but not 
illuminated in detail the collusion between Washington, Ottawa and New York to 
prevent Moscow from interfering, to repair the damaged internal Western relations, and 
to re-open the flow of oil to Western Europe. Additionally, scholars have begun to move 
beyond the nation state frameworks and connect peacekeeping, UNEF included, to 
changes in the global imperial system. Finally, scholars have also, using UN records 
and interviews, begun a turn to viewing the intervention ‘on the ground’. Nevertheless, 
the interwoven narratives of UNEF as successful, and ‘peacekeeping’ as a global good, 
have not so far been deconstructed. Moreover, scholars have yet to examine in more 
detail the role of the Middle East in relation to the emergence of the frontier of imperial 
multilateralism; the informal empire of both Great Britain and the US in the Middle 
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East until 1956; the oil and trade dimension; the connections between the US, UN and 
troop contributing countries such as Brazil, Yugoslavia, the Scandinavian countries, 
and India; the local realities when it comes to experiencing a shift from British 
imperialism to the UN; and the negotiations of agency, race, gender, class and so on in 
the ‘mission areas’. Thus, much remains to be done.  
2.3 My Working Questions and the Dissertation 
Structure 
To link together my aims and main research questions, theoretical framework and state 
of the art on UNEF and UNSCO, I to ask a series of six working questions. Given the 
need to both situate UNEF in the larger global imperial system and see it from the 
‘inside’ via the everyday negotiation of its regime between the soldiers of the different 
contingents and the Palestinians, Bedouin, Egyptians and Israelis ‘on the ground’, a 
two-part structure seems suitable to answer my research questions.  
The first set of three questions, then, focus on ‘the making of the frontier of imperial 
multilateralism’, while the second revolves around ‘the negotiation of life and authority 
in the frontier zone of imperial multilateralism’: 
 
- How did the creation of the United Nations as a predominantly inter-imperial 
military alliance in 1942 (and its conversion to a broader security 
organisation in 1945) link to the late 19th century shift from agrarian 
tributary empires towards increasingly bureaucratic, industrialised and 
trade-oriented imperial state-systems and colonial state powers as the 
systemically dominant actors on the one hand, and from centring imperial 
competition to also emphasize inter-imperial cooperation in on the other? 
 
- How did both the mounting reach and capacities of the imperial state-systems 
and colonial state powers at the expense of the agrarian tributary empires 
and the coincidence of imperial competition and inter-imperial cooperation 
manifest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the region in which the 
first UN intervention took place? 
 
- How did these deeper systemic changes in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East eventually accrue to create a situation that not only led to the Suez 
Crisis, but also in turn made a United Nations intervention in the form of both 
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the United Nations Emergency Force and United Nations Suez Clearance 
Operation a viable (or the only) option in late 1956? 
 
- How did amassing the UN intervention force, forcing out the British, French 
and Israeli forces from Egypt and reopening the Suez Canal in late 1956 
relate to the global and the regional manifestations of the earlier shift 
towards parallel imperial competition and inter-imperial cooperation both 
systemically and ‘on the ground’ in the form of military cultures, rationalities 
and mental geographies?  
 
- How did the UN deployment from Egypt into the Gaza Strip ‘mission area’ 
in early March 1957 relate to the global and the regional manifestations of 
the earlier shift towards imperial competition and inter-imperial cooperation 
both systemically and ‘on the ground’ in the form of military cultures, 
rationalities and mental geographies?  
 
- In this context, how, and with what outcomes, did the different actors of the 
Gaza Strip ‘mission area’—Palestinians, Bedouin and Egyptians—engage 
the different contingents of the UN force, and thus negotiate the broader UN 
regime in the Gaza Strip, in its operational period from 1957 to 1967? 
 
In this way, each working question provides the basis for a chapter that sets the scene 
for the subsequent chapter. In this way, the six chapters each historicise the global-
regional context and the various dimensions of the intervention, thus providing my 
contribution to the counter-narrative of the United Nations interventions when 
combined.  
In the first part, thus, I focus on the building of the global system of imperial 
multilateralism, then to the regional place of the Mediterranean and Middle East within 
the global system and, finally, the place of the Gaza Strip within the regional system 
and the making of the system in the Gaza Strip. Picking up the discussion from the 
theoretical chapter, I concretely examine in chapter three how the global imperial 
system shifted from ‘national’ imperial systems towards inter-imperial cooperation, or 
from ‘imperial frontiers’ to the emerging ‘frontier of multinational imperialism’ and 
‘the frontier of imperial multilateralism’, in the period from the late 19th century to the 
1950s. In the following chapter, I initially interrogate how these changes manifested in 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East, or how the frontiers of ‘multinational 
imperialism’ and ‘imperial multilateralism’ incorporated the region, ending with the 
joint British, French and Israeli invasion in late 1956. In extension of the invasion and 
the threat it came to represent, chapter five examines how UNEF and the clearing of the 
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Suez Canal subsequently became one of several American-supported and largely 
controlled means to sustain both the regional status quo and the overall frontier system.  
In the second part, I shift focus from the global imperial system and imperial 
multilateralism to the frontier zone by examining the formation of the UN regime(s) 
and their practice ‘on the ground’. In other words, I turn to what I term the expansion 
in both breadth and depth of the frontier by focusing on networks, technologies of power 
and human agency in the frontier zone, which over late 1956 mirrored the UN 
deployment from the Suez Canal area and canal towns in Egypt eastwards over the Sinai 
Peninsula to the Gaza Strip. As the canal clearance finished in spring 1957, it contracted 
to the Gaza Strip and a few logistical sites in Egypt. As suggested in the theoretical 
chapter, the systemic expansion of the frontier in breadth entails the making of frontier 
zones and the linking of chiefly Western military infrastructure, supply systems and 
knowledge systems. Accordingly, chapter six initially ‘dots the map’ and ‘connects the 
dots’ to elucidate how UNEF was built on chiefly Western military infrastructure and 
supply and knowledge systems before it examines UNSCO’s clearing of the Suez 
Canal, and finally the redeployment of UNEF to the Gaza Strip. Focusing on the 
expansion of the frontier in depth in extension thereof, the following three chapters shift 
attention to the practices of UNEF’s regime and how its authority was negotiated ‘on 
the ground’ in the interactions with local actors. With the formation of Israel as the main 
political change in and near the Gaza Strip from 1948 to 1956, chapter seven scrutinizes, 
firstly, the relations between UNEF and the Israeli border regime and, secondly, the 
Israelis living in settlements near the Gaza Strip against the backdrop of the British 
relations with the Jewish settlements in the Mandate period. Subsequently, chapter eight 
turns to the Gaza Strip and the relations between the UN force and the existing UN aid 
and development regime, the local Egyptian military, and, not least, the different 
Palestinian and Bedouin populations against the backdrop of the British regime in 
Mandate period.  
2.4 On Records and Research 
In this section, I will link the structure with the research literature and the archival 
material I use to build my analysis. However, I will merely do so in an overall way here: 
the broader topics of discussion and trends in the main bulk of the research literature 
has already been dealt with in some detail in the theoretical chapter and the specifics of 
the records, or the necessary ‘nitty-gritty’ of the craft of the historian, will be dealt with 
in the different chapters. Altogether, however, it can be said that the structure—which 
moves from an examination of the development of the overall system and how it 
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manifested in the region of the Mediterranean and the Middle East to an interrogation 
of the everyday negotiatedness of the systemic incorporation of Egypt and the Gaza 
Strip as a frontier zone—entails a gradual movement from grounding the analysis in 
mostly research towards grounding the analysis in archival material growing number of 
both published and unpublished records and unpacking these with contextualising 
research literature.  
Examining the shift ‘imperial frontiers’ to the emerging ‘frontier of multinational 
imperialism’ and ‘the frontier of imperial multilateralism’ from the late 19th century to 
the 1950s in the first chapter, this chapter is built first and foremost on research showing 
changes in the global imperial system by focusing on respectively the early modern 
empires, the various ‘national’ imperial systems, the emerging paradigm of inter-
imperial cooperation within the spheres of logistics, health, or security and how these 
systems of governance were put in place and negotiated. Mostly, I have already 
introduced these scholars: imperial and international historians as for example Laura 
Briggs, John Darwin, Daniel Gorman, Greg Grandin, Joseph Morgan Hodge, Valeska 
Huber Gabriel Kolko, Paul Kramer, Peter Lowe, Mark Mazower, Naomi Nagata, Susan 
Pedersen, Dan Plesch and on the one hand and scholars from other research fields and 
disciplines such as military history, US history (whose practitioners do not place their 
work within imperial historiography), Korean history, Cold War history, sociology, and 
defence studies as for example Thomas Borstelmann, Catherine Lutz, Julian Go, Ruth 
Oldenziel, Eric Ouellet, Nicole Sackley, Erwin Schmidl, J. Adam Tooze, and Odd Arne 
Westad on the other. By and large, these works come from separate research fields, but 
commonly revolve around geopolitical decision-making, strategic landscapes, 
institutional change, regimes of governance and state-centric networks and how these 
tied together (although several of these works appear not to have been put in contact 
before). 
Interrogating how these global changes manifested in the systems of governance in 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East, or how the frontiers of ‘multinational 
imperialism’ and ‘imperial multilateralism’ sought to incorporate the region, chapter 
four similarly builds on research literature. Aside building on several scholars also used 
in the first chapter, I have also linked historians of the Ottoman Empire such as for 
example, E. Attila Ayteykin, Karen Barkey, Chales Issawi, Nadir Özbek, Eugene Rogan 
and Mehmet Soytürk and Mandate historians such as Jacob Norris and Peter Sluglett, 
with energy historians such as Anand Toprani, Steven G. Galpern, and David S. Painter 
with historians of post-Ottoman and Cold War Southern Europe and the Middle East 
such as for example Reem Abou-El-Fadl, Mordechai Bar-On, Peter Beck, David Cohen, 
Mohrez N. El-Husseini, Guy Laron, Zach Levey, Amikam Nachmani, Mogens Pelt, 
Tore Tingvold Petersen, Elieh Podeh, Süleyman Seydi, Michael T. Thornhill, B. 
Yeşilbursa. As with the research used to build the first chapter, the works of these 
primarily historians dealt with the (Ottoman) system of governance, the emerging 
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paradigm of inter-imperial European cooperation and how these regimes were 
negotiated. 
Common for the research used in these two first chapters, is, fortunately, trends of 
diversification among scholars with regard to origin, but overall commitment to 
complexity, layers and scales and multiple perspectives, and (accordingly) an 
intensifying use of an ever-growing base of archival materials not just from a growing 
range of state archives beyond those located in London and Washington, but also from 
a growing number of regional and local corporate and private archives, newspapers, 
memoirs and in some cases also interviews. If there is still space for further 
pluralisation, the utilised research has, in other words, generally come a long way with 
regards to with regard not only to who writes, but also what they write about, and on 
which basis they do.    
In extension of the shift from the ‘global’ to the ‘regional’, chapter five the global 
and regional in the ‘local’ in that it examines the beginning of the systemic 
incorporation of Egypt. Concretely, it studies how UNEF and the clearing of the Suez 
Canal subsequently became one of several American-supported and largely controlled 
means to sustain both the regional and the overall status quo. While research on Egypt, 
the US, France, Great Britain, Soviet Union and Israel remains important here, I 
increasingly include both published and unpublished recrods in this chapter. 
Specifically, I have used the volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States (a 
selection of American foreign policy-related documents made available online) on the 
Suez Crisis and the Middle East, published UN documents, communication between 
various European shipping organisations held in the Business Archive of Denmark in 
Aarhus, and the Archive of the UN in New York: documents on the dredging companies 
contracted by the UN to clear the Suez Canal produced by the UN Office of Special 
Political Affairs and the Field Operations Service, and finally the minutes of the 
meetings of the UNEF Advisory Committee. While arguably important to UNEF and 
UNSCO, my main interest has not been the invasion of Egypt and Israeli occupation of 
the Gaza Strip, but rather what followed and the subsequent decade. I have not, 
therefore, looked for archival materials in London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Moscow, and 
Washington. As for the records on the commercial shipping dimension obtained in 
Denmark, the archive of the Suez Company, located in Roubaix in France, is not 
insignificant. However, the Danish archive had much both broad and valuable material, 
which was also readily accessible since it was not under any confidentiality regime, 
needed no further translation (as it was mostly in English) and yet remained 
unexploited.  
In the sixth chapter (and thus the first chapter of the second part of the analysis), I 
shift to an everyday perspective and frontier-zone related research and sources. The 
chapter initially ‘dots the map’ and ‘connects the dots’ to elucidate how UNEF was 
built on chiefly Western military infrastructure and supply and knowledge systems 
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before it lastly examines UNSCO’s clearing of the Suez Canal. Consequently, I use 
again unpublished UN documents on the UNSCO and UN Field Service documents on 
the logistics of UNEF and the volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States 
Series pertaining to both the Suez Crisis and the Middle East on the one hand, and add 
the memoirs of not only Mohamed Heikal, the advisor to the Egyptian President, and 
E. L. M. Burns, the first UN Force Commander, but also several Danish soldiers on the 
other. Finally, I turn to already mentioned Cold War Middle East scholarship and others 
more specifically concerned with the Suez Crisis, Israel, Egypt, and the states 
contributing troops for the UN force, such as for example R. Thomas Bobal, Silvia 
Borzutsky and David Berger, Bruno Charbonneau, Eric Crove, Ralph Dietl, Mikael 
Nilsson Hilde Henriksen Waage, to contextualise the records. 
The seventh chapter studies the redeployment of UNEF to the Gaza Strip, the failure 
to internationalise the control of the Gaza Strip, the relocation of the operational area 
of the UN force and a large part of its contingents to the ADL, and the relations between 
UNEF and the Israeli border regime the Israelis living in settlements near the Gaza Strip 
against the backdrop of the British relations with the Jewish settlements in the Mandate 
period. Consequently, I use documents from FRUS, unpublished cables and reports of 
the UN-employed military observers of the Egyptian-Israeli Military Armistice 
Commission (EIMAC) that were already in the Gaza Strip when the ‘Suez Crisis’ broke 
out as part of the larger the military observer organisation UNTSO, published memoirs 
of UN soldiers and already mentioned research on Israel, Egypt, the British Mandate 
for contextualisation. Here, I have chosen not to try to find supplementary material from 
the governments and militaries of neither Egypt nor Israel the Egyptian, although their 
views are of importance, as I estimate the time I would have had to spend finding these, 
applying for access, learning enough Arabic and Hebrew to read these and other 
relevant records, and visiting the archives would have surpassed both the value of what 
could be found and the time allocated to my project. Finally, the material I was able to 
put together for this also nevertheless also allows for a new, and perhaps controversial, 
reading of the processes examined.  
 The last of the six-chapter analysis, chapter eight, in tune with my theoretical 
framework, links up with Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, both London-based scholars 
of international relations, who argue that we need to move past the orthodox 
‘Westphalian’ model of the international system and the polities therein as it remains 
caught in ‘the territorial trap’ of the state and thus populated by only diplomats, soldiers 
and capitalists. Questioning if this framework was ever viable, they suggest that we 
‘thicken’ (and deepen) the framework to make the international include also “(…) 
social and cultural flows as well as political-military and economic interactions in a 
context of hierarchy.”196 The shift in attention to the relations between the UN force 
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and the existing UN aid and development regime, the local Egyptian military, and, not 
least, the different Palestinian and Bedouin population groups requires a different set of 
records than those used hitherto. Therefore, I have here utilised documents on the 
Armistice Demarcation Line regime such as observation and incident reports from both 
the EIMAC observers and various departments of UNEF itself, traffic incident reports, 
labour records and so on. For context, I linked to research on the British Mandate in 
Palestine, the militarisation of the Israeli foreign policy, border space and public sphere, 
the Palestinian nationalist movement and the UN aid regime in the Gaza Strip. Here, I 
have again chosen not to supplement out material from neither the governments and 
militaries of Egypt and Israel nor the Egyptian governor-general in the Gaza Strip in 
UNEF’s operational period for the same reasons as chapter seven. I also decided not to 
pursue any examination of any UNEF-generated or related records in the archives of 
the Canadian, Brazilian, Indonesian, Norwegian, Swedish, Indian, Finnish and 
Colombian ministries of defence, armies and deployed units My ‘cost-benefit’ 
reflections are again very similar. Such an effort, which would be aimed at the 
unattainable ‘complete history of’ rather than a dislocation and deconstruction of the 
existing narrative by way of an alternative, would have to be the efforts of a multi-
lingual and multi-national research team. 
Altogether, I, thus, seeks to engage broad body of research and a large material of a 
certain breadth and depth to convincingly support my aims and arguments.  
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 3 Chapter 3: From ‘National’ 
Empires to ‘imperial multilateralism’: The 
Roots of the United Nations 
Focusing on bringing together recent European and American imperial historiography 
and thus broaden the discussion from the theoretical chapter, I here present the 
argument that the period from the last decades of the 19th century to the end of the First 
World War saw a rather significant change in the global imperial system.  
From consisting of mainly (the last) remnants of the dynastic and tributary form of 
(early modern) empire and modern increasingly industrialising, bureaucratic and 
market oriented imperial systems, the system also came to be characterised by new 
forms of various inter-imperial forms of cooperation and informal empire often 
involving several empires in the Mediterranean and the Pacific domains of the Ottoman 
and Chinese empires. The different processes in this paradigmic shift gradually became 
even clearer in the former Ottoman, Russian and German lands following their collapses 
in the First World War, in increasingly American-dominated South America in the 
1930s, and in the United Nations military alliance from 1942 and organisation from 
1945 onwards.   
3.1 ‘Multinational imperialism’, 1900-1918: An Ad 
Hoc Expansion 
The gradual paradigmatic shift towards various inter-imperial forms of cooperation and 
informal empire, I argue, involved the three simultaneous and increasingly interwoven 
processes of 1) the emergence of Cunliffe’s ‘multinational imperialism’, 2) the 
American ascendency as an aspiring international empire, and not least 3) the coupled 
British ‘decentralisation’ and turn to the US.  
As for the first process, historians have shown how inter-imperial cooperation 
already existed in the later decades of the 19th century. Collaboration was mostly a 
practice within the sphere of logistics and mobilities in form of agreements and 
autonomous institutions dealing with post and telegraph services and river trade 
between European powers. The Suez Canal, in contrast, required the cooperation of 
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both most European imperial powers and the Ottoman Empire as co-signatories.197 
Scholars have shown that Health was another increasingly important issue. While the 
health conferences saw mostly European representatives, both Japanese and Ottomans 
participated.198 Gradually, the universalisation of the colonial legal practices of the 
European empires led to the formulation of international law.199 At a more informal 
level, the imperial powers also exchanged knowledge on plantation economies. For 
example, American colonial officials travelled to both Dutch Java and East Indies and 
the British Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States to study plantation 
economies.200 The use of bureaucratic technologies and knowledge to advance imperial 
interests—be that trade, the regulation of the mobilities of imperial subjects, ideas and 
goods—and claims of superiority for ‘white’ civilisation grew common.  
By late 19th century, however, military historian Schmidl shows how the inter-
imperial cooperation extended beyond these spheres and the European part of the 
Eurasian continent into the sphere of imperial expansion in both the Mediterranean and 
the Pacific.201 Following the sociologist Eric Ouellet, the Boxer Rebellion, a Chinese 
revolt in 1900 against the growing foreign influence, is instructive. Although the instant 
reaction of the imposing empires related to how their privileges of economic 
concessions, religious influence and extra-territoriality were challenged by the 
‘Boxers’, they each had their own agendas. The American government wanted to keep 
its ‘open-door’ policy. The French wanted more influence close to French Indochina. 
Imperial latecomers, Germany and Italy wanted Chinese colonial territory. The regional 
powers, Russia and Japan, coveted Manchuria. The British sought to protect their 
economic concessions. Commanding the strongest forces, the British sent almost as 
many naval vessels as the other combined and along with the French and Germans most 
troops. At its peak, the inter-imperial force consisted of about 100.000 soldiers. 
Reflecting both past and future practices, the inter-imperial intervention both killed an 
estimated 30-100.000 Chinese and formed hybrid practices of ‘single-empire’ 
governance involving foreign military governors at districts levels and the larger cities 
and basic Chinese institutions locally. However, inter-imperial cooperation faded 
quickly once the military campaign ended in 1901. No common institutions were set up 
aside a single international city administration. Instead, cooperation had been organised 
‘on the ground’ (even if the forces of Germany and France as well as Russia and Japan 
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had to be separated) and helped by a common concept of operations in form of a 
colonialist approach of a ‘punitive’ action against ‘semi-primitive’ people. Soon after 
the campaign, Russia also seized Manchuria the following year, resulting in the war 
between Russia and Japan in 1904.202  
On the issue of the US rise to join the ranks of the empires with global reach, the US 
government deployment of forces to China in 1900 reflected not only a growing interest 
in the wider Pacific, but also, as scholars of American imperial history have shown, a 
longer history of imperial expansion. Historian of American imperialism Paul Kramer’s 
view of American imperialism entail a shift from empire-building nation to 
‘international’ empire over the 19th to the 20th century. Sociologist of American 
imperialism Julian Go see the US expansion in three waves after declaring its 
independence as a British settler colony. From 1810-1825, the governments sought to 
oust rival European powers from the North American continent, secure territory and 
achieve regional dominance through 16 interventions, wars and annexations in the 
North American continent, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Latin America. From 1825 to 
1840, Go argues, the focus of the American political and economic elites turned to 
stabilisation. From 1840, emphasis shifted towards hemispheric dominance. Lasting 
until 1870, this wave of expansion included not only 24 interventions, wars and 
annexations in the North American continent, Mexico (that lost half of its territory to 
the US), the Caribbean, and Latin America, but also another 22 interventions, wars and 
annexations in the Asia-Pacific region. By the turn of the century, the US had increased 
its original territory by four times. However, some new territories remained military 
governorships for decades203 to remove native resistance, prevent settler rebellions, and 
secure conditions for further settlement and commercial development. This meant that 
people in the territories remained imperial subjects rather than (imperial) citizens until 
the federal government granted statehood.204 With the expansion, Greg Grandin, 
historian of US-Latin American relations, notes, followed trade. Initially with Cuba, 
then other Caribbean and Latin American countries and finally China and India. Once 
trade ties were established, the largest American corporations and richest investors also 
trailed to invest massively in banking, infrastructure, and mining, oil, agricultural, and 
fruit industries. Subsequently, the US government not only allowed two private tycoons 
to invade Latin American and Caribbean countries to establish their own fiefdoms, it 
also sent warships into Latin American ports almost 6.000 times between 1869 and 
1897. By 1898, the expansion of American governments and corporations resulted in 
war with the Spanish Empire, already fragile from the loss of most of Latin America in 
the 1820s. The war led to the independence of Cuba, the subjugation of Guam, Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines by American imperial forces, and another war with the peoples 
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of the Philippines who did not want one colonial rule replaced by another.205 Moreover, 
as scholars of gender and race have shown, the differentiation on basis of ideas of race 
was integral to American expansion and the efforts to sustain it. ‘Whites’ were the only 
frontier subjects sure to become citizens. Not only were people from the Midway, 
Samoa, Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal Zone and the Virgin 
Islands (all acquired between 1867 and 1917) never granted a say in their relations with 
the US. Many were also exposed to racist and gendered violence within the spheres of 
colonial ‘health’, ‘education’, and ‘policing’.206 For example, as Grandin argues, 
“Troops understood their time in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Philippines 
as an extension of their experience with political violence at home. Many of them had 
either firsthand experience in the wars against Native Americans or hailed from parts 
of the United States where Jim Crow held sway.”207 Taking the arguent further, Go notes, 
“America’s continental colonialism was more imperial and authoritarian than Britain’s 
settler empire in theory, and it was even more so in practice.”208  
With the First World War, a war among globally aspiring empires, the US 
government was granted a free hand. It expanded the navy, its presence on the profitable 
Japan-Brazil trade routes and into the hitherto British-dominated Caribbean (that had 
already seen the landing of Marines in Cuba in 1902 and Nicaragua in 1912). Without 
much scrutiny from other imperial powers, the US landed marines in Haiti in 1915 and 
the Dominican Republic in 1916.209 Thus, Kramer’s view of US imperialism as (…) a 
dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of 
spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalising difference enable and produce 
relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation”210 sums 
up well the American ascendency as an aspiring international empire between 1810 and 
1918.  
With regard to the British, the expansion of the American Empire was not only a 
concern for Spain as historians of British and American imperialism have shown. In the 
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years following the American takeover of the Philippines, several members of both the 
British political and economic elites also grew irritated the Americanisation of the 
colonial administration and economy of the Philippines, which they—despite Spanish 
colonial rule—had dominated.211 At the same time, the apprehensions of British 
politicians, military strategists and officials were to a much higher extent a reflection of 
the mounting pressures of a global imperial system in which the British Empire was 
omnipresent. Indeed, British and American inter-imperial intellectual and elite social 
contacts led to the formation of a sense of shared ‘whiteness’ and ‘anti-Slavic’ mission 
in the ‘Anglo-American Pacific’. Consequently, several members of the British 
imperial elite hailed the American expansion into the Pacific with the takeover of the 
Philippines and territories in the Caribbean as a great ‘white’ achievement.212 
However, imperial historians Mark Mazower and Duncan Hessel Hall have shown 
how the growing pressures led to an increased British pressure on the governments in 
the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to take part in 
the ‘defence of the realm’ such as the 1899 war against the Boers.213 Although Germany 
was perceived to be the main threat to the realm (especially during the Boer war), the 
British remained somewhat uneasy with the US. To be sure, it helped that the British 
and American imperial governments had improved formal and informal relations upon 
settling a border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, and US traders had 
provided 100.000 horses, 80.000 and US banks provided massive loans covering about 
20% of the Boer war costs. Nevertheless, the widespread public Anglophobia caused 
by the ‘white’-on-’white’ war as well as Irish, Dutch and German immigration was one 
factor pulling the other direction. The American Pacific policy of an informal 
commercial empire that included the ‘open door’ approach in China (and Latin 
America) and formal colonialism in the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam and Samoa was 
another.214  
However, the British were also preoccupied by the imperial activities of the French, 
the Russians and the Germans in China and Japan. While the aforementioned 
intervention in China in 1900 brought the British and Americans closer, the British 
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never suspended their concerns. Imperial historians have shown how the British, fearful 
of additional expansion plans of the Russian Empire that had already put pressure on 
the Ottoman Empire since the 1850s and conquered Manchuria following the joint 
intervention (if only to lose it to Japan in 1905), entered an uneasy, but strategically 
necessary naval alliance with Japan in 1902. While they gained a favourable regional 
military balance, the British anxieties regarding the tense ties between the US and Japan 
following the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05 lingered on. Both rapidly rising militarist 
powers in the Pacific, their tension was at that point rooted in the American takeover of 
Hawaii and the Philippines, the construction of a coaling station in Japan, the racialised 
anti-Japanese (and anti-Chinese) immigration scheme and colliding designs on the 
Pacific Ocean. Additionally, strategists of the British naval establishment had concerns 
about the American build-up of naval capabilities that they were unable to match due 
to existing commitments. Consequently, the Dominions were requested to partake more 
actively in financing imperial security. Simultaneously with the alliance with Japan 
being renewed, the ‘white’ settler colonies were therefore asked to both pay more 
towards the imperial navy and not be overly against the immigration schemes favoured 
by Tokyo. This, to put it mildly, challenged the intra-imperial and especially colonial 
sense(s) of ‘Britishness’/British ‘whiteness’ and thus the colonial racist anti-migration 
schemes aimed at preventing ‘Asiatic’ immigration such as the ‘white Australia’ policy. 
While the Anglo-Japanese alliance remained active, the racial and intra-imperial 
tension did not fade, despite several imperial defence conferences.215 Altogether, the 
onset of the ‘decentralisation’ of the British Empire and turn to the US was therefore 
not only linked to changes in the global imperial system such as the end of territory not 
occupied by other empires, the rise of Germany, the US and Japan, and inter-imperial 
alliances linking both ends of Eurasia, but also its own global presence. When the First 
World War broke out, the British were therefore forced to be somewhat humble when 
it became necessary to both ask its settler colonies for hundreds of thousands of troops 
and the US for massive war loans.216   
To recap, merging European and American imperial historiography reveals that that 
the global imperial system from the close of the 19th century to the end of the First 
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World War shifted from being dominated by the dynastic form of empire and modern 
imperialism with colonies to also promote informal empire(s), imperial alliances and 
new inter-imperial forms of cooperation. 
3.2 ‘Multinational Imperialism’, 1918-1941: 
Towards ‘Imperial Multilateralism’  
In continuation of the previous section and with support from both imperial and 
international historiographies, this part expounds further the argument that the changes 
in the global imperial system towards new forms of imperial cooperation and 
governance became more visible following the end of the First World War.  
As for the inter-imperial cooperation (Cunliffe’s ‘multinational imperialism’), the 
end of the First World War, which is now widely recognised as a war for empire,217 saw 
the formation of the League of Nations and several sub-agencies. While international 
historian Mark Mazower notes that the League of Nations “(…) whose members 
included Abyssinia, Siam, Iran and Turkey was already something with a very different 
global reach to the old European Conference”,218 he also makes well clear that the 
League did not question imperialism as such, nor its permanence more broadly or the 
idea of ‘white’ superiority. As he notes, several of the architects of the League, most 
forcefully personified in the South African general Jan Smuts who was key in the 
racialisation of South Africa, had grown up to respect, defend and expand modern 
imperialism (and thus seen the Boer War as fratricide). That the new international 
organisations were thus to serve as vehicles for imperialism using the very same 
‘civilizational hierarchies’ of imperialism is to him therefore little surprising.219  
Indeed, both the League and its sub-agencies accordingly took up issues colonial 
administrations were already to some extent focused on. For example, the sphere of 
health continued to be important. The international historians Naomi Nagata and 
Tomoko Akami have argued that the League organisations concerned with diseases, 
which evolved out of imperial concerns and inter-imperial cooperation, continued to 
reflect predominantly ‘white’ imperial concerns. However, for that reason Japan used 
the health and disease conferences to claim equality with the ‘white’ imperial powers.220 
Also of importance for the growing imperial attention to health—before the Depression 
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set in and put stability via (some level of) welfare on the colonial agendas—was the 
growing importance of public opinion, and, not least, the involvement of women’s 
organisations as part thereof. The women’s organisations, argues imperial and 
international historian Susan Pedersen, put on the international agenda equal political 
rights, health and education services, and trafficking. However, this, she notes, 
reconciled social progress and imperialism rather than oppose internationalism and 
imperialism.221 Similarly, historian of the British Empire Daniel Gorman contends that 
the initiatives and policy recommendations concerning trafficking were similarly 
directed mainly by ‘‘white’’ concerns and ‘pro-’white’’ dynamics.222 Speaking of ‘old 
wine for new bottles’ and ‘a half-way house between imperialism and internationalism’, 
these dynamics, Gorman argues, were even clearer in the mandates system for the 
territories of the former Ottoman and German empires set up by the League. While 
formulated by Smuts and then adopted and promoted further by the US President 
Woodrow Wilson, the mandate system reflected fundamentally the state of affairs at the 
end of the war. Australia came to govern New Guinea and Nauru, both of which 
Australian forces had occupied early in the war. New Zealand was put in charge of 
German Samoa its forces had occupied in the war. South Africa was to govern South-
West Africa. Great Britain proper, France and Belgium divided the German colonies in 
Africa, which they had also occupied, and Great Britain and France also those of the 
collapsed Ottoman Empire. Only the small and peripheral nations of the collapsed 
German empire were, as ‘whites’, given national self-determination as so strongly 
promoted by US President Wilson.223 Pedersen continues, “In general, mandated 
powers governed their mandated territories along the same lines, and with the same 
personnel, that they governed their colonies; mandatory oversight affected their rule 
only indirectly and in no consistent way.”224 As Mazower reminds us, “Not surprisingly, 
what one historian calls ‘the Wilsonian Moment’ was greeted with demonstrations and 
protests from north Africa to China, even Japanese diplomats felt rebuffed.”225 From the 
perspective of the populations in the mandates, it also appeared as similar systems of 
governance as its predecessors. Pedersen contends, ”Indeed one of the striking things 
about the mandates system is that, for all its rhetoric of training in civilization, in many 
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territories it was politically a step back.”226 Not only were most of the mandate 
populations exposed to patronising racial attitudes, several of them could also see 
similar dynamics of economic imperialism to those of the previous colonial power.227 
This resulted in more than 3.000 petitions to the League’s Permanent Mandates 
Commission. Composed of predominantly high officials or former colonial governors 
thus uncritical of empire, the commission registered only around 1500 and made reports 
on only 325 petitions, or around 10% of the total amount they received.228 Predictably, 
‘disturbances’ broke out in South-West Africa, Syria and Palestine.229 Beyond the 
sphere of neo-colonial governance, the League also dabbled in imperial geopolitics with 
various results. For example, the Soviet Union, which had initially been against the 
League seeing it as a continuation of imperialism, slowly warmed towards the 
organisation once Stalin took over leadership.230 In contrast, the League wound up 
unable to deal with Japanese and Italian imperial expansions into China and Abyssinia 
in the 1930s. The more important of the two, Japan had for more than a decade respected 
and supported the emerging inter-imperial regime, not least because it had received a 
mandate in the Pacific. However, the lack of recognising its rule in Manchukuo, the 
continued denial of equal status with the larger ‘white’ empires and the British lack of 
interest in renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922 (despite continuing a strategy 
of extended credits, trade concessions, market guarantees and loans to bring to power 
moderates) led to the militarisation and nationalisation of Japan. After ‘losing’ Japan, 
the League subsequently also failed to manage the fallout of the Versailles Treaty in 
Europe, which pushed many frustrated Germans towards Nazism231 (despite a similar 
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British strategy of empowering moderates through trade etc.) and the Tripartite Pact 
between Germany, Italy and Japan, and thus prevent the outbreak of the Second World 
War, another global war for empire.232 
Another reason of the League’s failure as an inter-imperial security system was the 
American absence. The US, which had assisted the British in the Boer War, helped both 
British the British and French in the First World War by joining their inter-imperial 
alliance and contributed troops233 and arms, even if too late and too little. As American 
loans had kept the British and French empires afloat, however, US President Wilson 
was the dominant politician at the peace negotiations. There, he got what he wanted: 
bilateral relations with allied debtors after the war and a return to free-market 
economics.234 As its focus was to the south, however, the US never joined the League. 
Still, as British historian of 20th history Adam Tooze notes, “In its pomp Victorian 
Britain had never commanded the kind of leverage over Prussia, or Napoleon III’s 
France, or Alexander III’s Russia, that Washington was accumulating.”235 At the same 
time, as Grandin argues, a growing number of Latin American populations gradually 
began to challenge the American grip on Latin America. Most importantly, the large-
scale and aggressive American intrusions in Mexican politics, economy and society that 
cost half of its original territory Mexico’s at independence, high levels of profit 
repatriation and labour repression resulted in a decade-long revolution from 1910 and 
thereby the nationalisation of the oil industry and the destruction of several US-owned 
mines and plantations. Most American corporations and investors wanted to ‘intervene 
and clean up as usual’. Yet, Mexico was not a small Caribbean island state. Latin 
American nationalism, the US learned (and would learn again), was to be reckoned 
with.236 However, the attention required by the Mexican revolution was soon forgotten 
as the First World War granted the US hegemony in the Americas, the Caribbean and a 
large part of the western Pacific as the new dominant exporter, banker and investor. 
American investments in Latin American went from $754.1 million in 1915 to $2,819.2 
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million in 1924.237 After several interventions, the US in 1927 came to face a seemingly 
endless struggle in Nicaragua due to their opponent’s guerrilla tactics and will to fight. 
By 1928, the severe and rather open criticism ventilated at the Pan-American 
conference (and growing critical press coverage all over the continent) added to the 
hatred that had resulted in the Mexican Revolution and began to influence more broadly 
than hitherto American politicians, diplomats and political pundits. The Depression 
only made a shift further necessary as American companies came to find the 
increasingly protectionist European markets harder to access. While the Hoover 
administration had initiated the ‘Good Neigbor’ policy (as opposed to previous ‘Big 
stick’ policies) and withdrawn from the Dominican Republic in 1924 and Nicaragua in 
1925, the Roosevelt administration took the shift further. Following the withdrawal of 
troops from several countries, the US began to promote better relations via political, 
economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in form of military and political treaties, 
trade agreements, multilateral bodies of consultation and arbitration and cultural 
exchange. As Grandin argues, “In short, the 1930s and 1940s marked a turn in the 
fortune of the American Empire, when diverse expressions of what political scientists 
call “soft power” began to congeal in a coherent system of extraterritorial 
administration (…)”238 Having more or less created an American parallel to the League, 
Washington had diversified its strategy. Intervention, war and occupation were to a 
large extent replaced by regional multilateralism, bilateralism ‘under the radar’ in form 
of political pressure as in Mexico and the support of pro-American regimes as in 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba.239 Nonetheless, Roosevelt 
was still a man of geopolitics. In line with his emphasis of an offensive naval strategy 
combined with air power by way of island bases, Roosevelt already in 1933 asked the 
companies of the emerging American military industry to line up innovative weapon 
systems, one of which was a long-range bomber. Out of tune with the Congress, 
however, it failed. In 1938, Roosevelt’s request of Congress of 20.000 warplanes for a 
military build-up also failed.240 However, Roosevelt successfully initiated in secrecy a 
broad programme under the advisory body of the Council on Foreign Relations to make 
proposals to the State Department on how to safeguard US interests and enhance the 
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ability to influence the post-war world via multilateralism following the joint Anglo-
Polish declaration of war against Germany. Commanding a smaller standing military 
force than each European colonial empires fighting in Europe and facing opposition in 
Congress, however, Roosevelt and his expansionist factions in the State Department 
and various military institutions faced an uphill struggle. When the hard-pressed British 
requested military aid, however, Congress moved a step closer to war.241  
In a similar way in which the US was forced to turn to informal imperialism, Great 
Britain grew less able to reign supreme in its own realm, having moved from ‘a 
Brotherhood of Nations’ to the Commonwealth in 1911 and a new Supreme Command 
in 1917 that granted the ‘white’ Dominions greater influence throughout the war. As 
influence, autonomy and constitutions seized the intra-imperial agenda, Great Britain 
saw Governor-Generals be exchanged with High Commissioners, Ireland achieve 
independence and its ‘children’ within the British Commonwealth claim power for 
themselves.242 The pressure from the Dominions also influenced imperial strategy 
overall. The alliance with the Japanese was not renewed mainly due to strategic 
reconsiderations that placed Japan in the role of a potential regionally dominant 
opponent243 (as Japanese and British goals in China increasingly collided) and the US 
that of a friend and to lesser extent American pressure rooted in the animosity towards 
Japan.244 However, pressure from Canada and South Africa that were both very sensitive 
to American concerns and against the alliance with Japan as well as Australia and New 
Zealand that increasingly looked to the US, helped the decision.245 As the global 
presence of the US grew stronger after the First World War, the British Empire came 
to rely further on American economic military and economic support. Both the British 
and French thus sought to align themselves with the US when necessary and lure the 
US closer when possible. In the matter of the Irish quest for independence, for example, 
the British were able to secure the support of both Wilson and the subsequent Harding 
administration that both declared their support for the Irish in principle, but that it was 
an internal British question.246 On their part, the French sought to stave of the repayment 
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of war loans as long as possible.247 The British were also able to prevent the potential 
re-orientation towards Washington, and thus effective loss, of Canada after Ottawa was 
granted permission to open its own embassy in Washington following the new 
conception of Dominion status.248 Likewise and indicative of the importance of oil to 
the global imperial system, the British, French and American governments and oil 
companies split the oil concessions of the Middle East into three portions with 
American companies gaining dominance in the newly founded kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia in 1927.249 To keep the Americans close, the British (and the French) also sought 
an increased contact between the more internationalist-minded of the British, French 
and American imperial elites over the 1920s.250 Military cooperation also became a part 
of the increasingly friendly relationship as when, partly an echo of the intervention in 
1900, the Chinese nationalists saw a joint Anglo-American attack in 1927. By that time, 
the British and the French recognised the US and its hegemony as a ‘phenomenon with 
no parallel’: “The Advantages to Britain of cooperating with the US were vast, whereas 
confrontation was unthinkable.”251 In the following years, therefore, several imperial 
naval conferences also ensured Anglo-American naval parity (rather than American 
primacy)252 When the British Empire thus entered the war, London thus again turned to 
both its Dominions, colonies and Washington. As in the First World War, however, 
American aid in 1941 did not come cheap. With the deal, the British got 50 aging ships 
at the cost of 99-year base rights to British bases in both the Caribbean and the Atlantic, 
thus enabling Roosevelt’s idea of a network of island bases.253  
Linking scholarship thus shows that the period from 1918 to 1941 saw the formation 
of the League, an American imitation thereof, and intensifying inter-imperial political, 
economic and military ties between the American, British and French Empires on the 
one hand and the German, Italian and Japanese on the other. While multi-imperial, 
many of these projects, organisations and alliances simultaneously reproduced and 
reactualised previous colonial and imperial power relations and categories of race and 
gender ‘locally’ and internationally. With the outbreak of the Second World War 
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(whether marked as 1937, 1939 or 1940), these different processes came together, 
spawning the UN military alliance. 
3.3 The First Act: The United Nations Military 
Alliance, 1942-1945 
In agreement with Cunliffe, I have argued that the United Nations builds on a tradition 
of inter-imperial military alliances, cooperation and governance. In this section, I also 
argue— again on basis of imperial and international historiography as well as scholars 
from other disciplines—that the UN also reflected the immediate situation of the 
Second World War, more concretely the American wartime planning and the Roosevelt 
administration’s thoughts on using multilateralism as a vehicle for informal empire with 
global reach.   
   As Europe, Africa, and Asia became engulfed in war, the Roosevelt administration 
requested and received funding for a call-to arms that involved the building of a dozen 
aircraft carriers that could serve as a network of mobile bases and airfields in support 
of or as replacement of island bases. Missing the American aircraft carriers at the 
American navy and air force base on Hawaii in late 1941, Japan enabled the US to enter 
the war earlier and as more than a supporter as in the Boer War and the First World 
War. As a means to defeat Germany while containing Japan, the Roosevelt 
administration announced the multilateral ideas of the Council of Foreign Relations to 
its British ally. As demonstrated by international historian Dan Plesch, US President 
Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill put aside existing 
ideas on a strictly military alliance with a supreme military council and conceived the 
idea of the United Nations as a military alliance when they met in the Washington a few 
weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.254 Looking at the signatories of the 
Declaration of the United Nations from Washington in 1942 and the place they signed 
it, the inter-imperial character of the military alliance is clear. The UN alliance consisted 
of the various parts of the British Empire, the United States and most of the central and 
southern American countries under the informal empire of the US, the Chinese 
republican heir to the Qing Empire, the Belgian and Dutch colonial empires and finally 
Yugoslavia and Norway. Indeed, the US sought to make the most of the alliance while 
aiding its allies, sometimes at a high cost. 
Soon after the establishment of the alliance in early 1942, the State Department—
the US executive in other words—took over the making of the proposals on how to 
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shape the post-war world order from the strongly influential but merely advisory 
Council of Foreign Relations. By then, the secret project had provided 670 reports, held 
361 meetings, and involved more than 100 high-ranking US officials, indicating it was 
no small undertaking.255 Subsequently, the various factions in the US administration and 
military institutions began to link their different ambitions and ideas on the post-war 
functions of the UN. Increasingly they all came to see it as a vehicle to expand American 
influence globally. In line with the regional ‘Open Door Policy’ from the late 1890s, 
State Department officials increasingly argued against following the European model 
of colonial imperialism and suggested instead a single world economy with American 
global economic preponderance. This was partly to be achieved by loosening the grip 
of the colonial and mandate powers—mostly members of the UN military alliance and 
thus US imperial allies—through what became the UN trusteeship system, which would 
be oriented towards building sufficient capabilities and institutions for national self-
governance. While the Department of Defence wanted permanent bases, Roosevelt 
agreed with the State Department, seeing a globally nation state based international 
system tied together by a single market economy as pivotal for American global 
primacy.256 Thus, none of the different factions, noted historian of US foreign policy 
Gabriel Kolko, worked towards a neutral, unaligned system of equal states. Moreover, 
Kolko argued, the US increasingly tied the questions of American post-war bases to the 
formation of the world organisation.257  
Consequently, the US took part in the war efforts and sought to use the alliance in 
ways that primarily suited its own interests. While the US deployed a significant 
number of forces to the UN theatres of war in the Atlantic, Europe and the 
Mediterranean compared to its pre-war levels of mobilisation, its combat efforts mainly 
concentrated on the Pacific, the area of primary interest to the Roosevelt administration. 
The US did not bear, however, the burden of the Pacific battles that cost a significant 
amount of losses, especially amongst the Japanese and Chinese. In fact, the US also 
came out of war having lost the smallest amount of lives of the members of the UN 
alliance, far behind for example the smaller members of Poland and Yugoslavia. The 
number of dead from the British Empire and its colonies amounted to 650.000. Having 
seen a Japanese occupation, approximately 1.310.000 Chinese lost their lives. Having 
seen most combat during the war, around 18 million Soviets died. In contrast, ‘only’ 
298.000 Americans lost their lives during the war.258  
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Besides a means to coordinate the war efforts in the different theatres (which the US 
also dominated), the UN alliance also comprised of a military-economic network. Not 
surprisingly, the dynamics of the exchanges that saw millions of tonnes of food and 
military equipment, hundreds of thousands of military trucks for logistics and combat, 
thousands of military aircraft, tanks and trains and raw materials shipped between the 
allies were also dominated by the US and its Lend-Lease agreement. While the US 
initially spent 7% of its GNP to provide supplies to primarily the war efforts of the 
British and Soviet imperial powers, it was less of a charity than the British Prime 
Minister and his ministers remarked to the British public. Washington forced London 
to surrender the rights and royalties on nuclear technology and other technologies such 
as radar, antibiotics, and jet aircraft.259 The war and these agreements effectively turned 
the US into the world’s workshop. By 1942, the British and Soviet empires were both 
out-produced by the US. The following year, US factories produced double that of the 
factories in Germany and Japan combined and roughly a third more than Great Britain, 
the Soviet Union and Canada. While the goods and food were produced according to 
British and Soviet needs, the US also gained additional influence on strategic planning 
with particular goods such as tanks for Egypt, where American companies had major 
investments, when the British stood to lose the Suez Canal and thus their ability to 
protect their Middle Eastern oil production in 1941. However, the advantages for the 
US went beyond bypassing rights and royalties of British technologies and gaining 
influence on strategic planning. It also got access to the colonial markets of several of 
the European colonial powers, the markets of the informal European colonies in the 
Middle East and Ethiopia, to which it offered trade, loans and arms for base rights and 
an Italian-built military radio station for intelligence purposes. The picture was more 
complicated in the Middle East. Trade went through the Middle East Supply Centre, an 
Anglo-American military organisation populated by numerous colonial officials that 
centralised Middle Eastern trade control and economic mobilisation much to the 
irritation of local elites who saw it as commercial imperialism as local industries lost 
out to Commonwealth competitors and American companies frustrated with the 
military import-export regime. Nonetheless, the US became the largest consumer of 
colonial goods during the war. Its economic ties with Latin America also grew stronger: 
Nearly 60% of Latin American imports in 1941 came from the US, which until 1945 
only became more involved in the trade of the continent’s strategic materials and 
connected the Latin American industries and militaries.260 As for bases, the US had 
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fewer colonial bases than Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy 
and Japan when it joined the war. As the war came to encompass the entire globe, 
however, the alliance put the number of US bases beyond the wildest dreams of 
Roosevelt and his military strategists and planners. By 1945, the gradual US build-up 
in several Pacific colonies conquered from the Japanese, in French colonies in North 
Africa and the Pacific, and in Portuguese and Danish colonies in the Atlantic left it with 
more than 30.000 military installations in 100 countries.261  
Moreover, the American presence in British imperial politics reached new heights. 
British officials grew irritated with US personnel that they felt was causing tension 
within various imperial locations on purpose. In some cases, US representatives were 
indeed seeking to do so intentionally, although these attempts were often rebutted 
locally, as it happened in Australia. By 1944, however, the British government began 
to fear for its security system if Canada and South Africa isolated themselves and New 
Zealand and Australia turned to US. The untying of the Commonwealth would take 
decades, but the war made the US the big elephant in the room. However, the British 
had both ignored calls for power sharing and failed in the eyes of the Dominions, also 
known as the ‘white’ Commonwealth, to treat them with the respect they felt was due 
given their troop contributions. The Japanese attack on Australia in 1942 only increased 
tension, as it became clear that London could not keep its promises on security. 
Additionally, their UN membership only added to the Dominions’ growing awareness 
of their strategic differences and their international recognition and networks.262 
Another aspect was the widespread racism rooted in wider ideas of racial superiority 
and ‘‘whiteness’. Entangled in the war, the narrative of ‘white’ superiority informed, 
often in conflicting ways due to the large number of colonial and African American 
troops, perceptions on who was fighting and for what.263 With the entry of the US, the 
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links between US expansion, violence and racism embedded in the state apparatus and 
legislation exacerbated the manifestations of racism in the different theatres.264 Indeed, 
the Japanese attack on the US in 1941 was seen as a manifestation of the growing 
Japanese influence and threat to global ‘‘white’’ superiority. As put by historian of US 
foreign policy Thomas Borstelmann, it threatened not only the “political order of the 
western Pacific, but also the social order of the United States and the European 
colonies”.265 Subsequently, many ‘white’ soldiers from the US, Great Britain, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand racialised the war (as did African-American and colonial 
soldiers), enabling a broader male-dominated bond of the ‘white race’ and not only 
British imperial history and culture. Race was not the only social marker at work. In 
several war zones and areas for ‘rest and recreation’, opposing views on gender and 
race intersected in fights on ‘coloured’ soldiers’ relationships with ‘white’ women, the 
role(s) of women in colonial societies etc.266  
As the UN increasingly looked as the winning alliance and inter-imperial market 
access thus to trump the trade systems of European colonial imperialism, US Treasury 
Department officials connected with the post-war the State Department planners to shift 
from strategic thinking to policy-making. In late 1944, their ideas emerged fully at the 
Bretton Woods Conference with the creation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, which were to 
regulate post-war financial flows and direct capital into the lesser developed areas of 
the world, including European colonies. The British economic and military dependency 
on the US267 forced London to accept this link between economy and military matters 
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at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in Washington. The Soviet Union also accepted.268 
The San Francisco conference followed in 1945.269 Here, the US had to accommodate 
the Soviet Union and British Empire to get their final support.270 However, the different 
factions more or less got what they sought: a veto-imbued Security Council, a weak 
General Assembly, a weak Secretariat, several Japanese League of Nations Mandates 
as ‘Strategic Trusteeships’,271 bases ranging from Western Europe and the Atlantic to 
the Pacific,272 and a vehicle of global American imperial frontier building by opening 
“the world to ordering political-economic expansion.”273 Fearing a future as uninviting 
as the past, a West African journalist contended, “New life has been infused into 
predatory imperialism.”274 While failing to mention the American influence in the 
emerging international institutions, the imperial historian John Darwin nonetheless saw 
the influence of the US in both ends of Eurasia as unprecedented and called the new 
American ‘system’ “(…) imperial in all but name.”275  
As the US stood ready to remake the world in its image in 1945, the Soviet military 
presence in Europe made it a power to be reckoned with. While the American and Soviet 
governments had cooperated extensively during the war, all had hinged on the shared 
goal of defeating the members of the Tripartite Pact. Indeed, the tension that were to 
grow into hostility and the mutual readjustment of enemy images and strategies were 
rooted in the joint Euro-American intervention in the Russian Revolution in favour of 
the Tsar’s regime.276 As the war ended, the Soviet Union and its leader, the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, had grown increasingly 
frustrated with the UN. Soviet negotiators had failed to get both UN memberships for 
each of the Soviet republics to minimise the gap between the Soviet and the Western 
blocs, to get influence on the American ‘Strategic Trusteeships’, and to have the 
Secretariat divided to install a Soviet official in a top post. Consequently, Stalin sought 
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to empower the Security Council, where the Soviet Union could counter the Western 
influence with its veto, and to counter what he saw as American abuse of the UN.  
Against the backdrop of the previous three sections of this chapter, it would appear 
entirely reasonable to understand the UN military alliance as a new imperial system 
built on previous racialised and gendered modalities of imperialism and, not least, a 
direct tool for the US to expand its imperial frontiers. The following section will make 
this additionally clearer.  
3.4 The Second Act: The UN, 1945-1956  
If the UN military alliance had not provided the US with opportunities to expand its 
frontier beyond its paradigm of 19th century colonial imperialism and its informal 
empire in Latin America, the post-war version of the UN military alliance certainly 
would.  
However, the UN allies fell out with each other soon after the war and the 
transformation of the alliance into a post-war regime cluster of UN organisations. In the 
changing worldviews of Washington and London, the Soviet Union increasingly 
appeared as a potential adversary with more than just defensive plans.277 This 
understanding also spilled over into the UN. However, many of the immediate post-war 
geopolitical incidents handled by the UN testified to the Western domination of the UN 
despite the attempt of the Soviet Union to gain a foothold as the British international 
historian Evan Luard showed. Despite Soviet criticism of the British military presence 
in Greece and Indonesia, its own military presence in the Azerbaijani region of Iran 
ended by way of the UN in summer 1946. The UN commission tasked with 
investigating the external meddling in the Greek civil war also led to a public setback 
for the Eastern bloc when the interference of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania was 
made public. Soon after, the US took over the support of both Greece and Turkey from 
the British after the latter had declared its resources inadequate.278 Subsequently, Greece 
began to receive Marshall Aid on top of and beyond the already flowing support from 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration that was operating in 
Europe and Asia on basis of American, British and Canadian funding and often relying 
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on colonial officials coming in from colonial positions in Asia and Africa.279 Occupied 
by British, American and Yugoslavian forces, the city of Trieste was divided by Italy 
and Yugoslavia, notably after the latter had broken with the Soviet Union. In South East 
Asia, problems arose with the British troops in Indonesia and the Dutch attempt to re-
take the colony after the Japanese Empire had occupied it during the war. Initially most 
Western countries rallied to their support. However, the Dutch military operations 
against the independence movement made it a hard sell over time. When Washington 
shifted position, a Dutch-Indonesian republic was established via the UN in 1949, 
appearing to settle the matter in a pro-Dutch way until the nationalists declared an 
independent republic. Initially enjoying the support of the Soviet Union, the first UN 
Secretary-General of the UN Trygve Lie also gradually leaned more and more towards 
the Western bloc, also purging his Secretariat for Americans marked by the FBI as 
potential leftists.280 As Luard noted for the first decade of the UN, “(…) the West used 
its majority bestowed on it to ensure that the organisation acted in ways favourable to 
its own political interests and contrary to the principle of great-power consensus (…)”. 
Accordingly, it seemed that the Soviet Union was about to leave the UN in 1947—the 
same year the US according to historian of the US Gene A. Sessions multilateralised 
the Monroe Doctrine via the mutual defence agreement known as the Rio Treaty—
281when it established the Cominform for Eastern Europe.282 As noted by Mazower, the 
dividing line between the US and the international organisation was hard to see.283 
However, Washington and other Western governments grew worried with the 
combination of what was seen as slow beginnings of the Marshall plan, the failure of 
the American plans for global economic expansion to come to full fruition, the apparent 
success of Soviet rapid industrialisation, the expansion of the Cold War beyond Europe, 
and the ‘loss of China’. These developments had not been on the horizon in 1945.284 In 
1949, therefore, the Truman administration announced a new global initiative that 
brought together the efforts in Europe under the Marshall Plan and the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the projects in Latin America under the 
Institute of Inter-American Affairs and private American companies. Turning to 
indirect governance, as argued by historian of US development policy Stephen 
Macekura, the programme architects “(…) envisioned a clear relationship between 
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national economic development, international economic integration, and the promotion 
of liberal political institutions, a relationship that would, in turn, comport with the 
strategic interests of the United States.”285 From 1953, Eisenhower’s administration 
increased government spending in the programme and intensified its cooperation with 
the World Bank, the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, and the Special 
United Nations Fund for Economic Development, having realised the US private sector 
alone was an insufficient approach. Moreover, Eisenhower connected the programme 
with military aid under the Mutual Security Programme, the hitherto largest 
reconfiguration of the programme in a strategic direction. Seeing the programme as a 
means to combat Communism, Washington also began to ‘urge’ its European allies, 
especially the colonial empires, to expand Third World aid via international or multi-
lateral organisations,286 organisations in which the US had influence.287 The British, 
French, Dutch and Italian governments were not the only European governments to do 
so from the late 1950s. As masters of colonial empires, however, they stood to gain 
more from looking after their own interests such as maintaining the Sterling Area, 
develop colonial resources, lead the colonies’ entries into the global market economy, 
and gain goodwill with the US. Western bilateral and multilateral organisation 
increased their aid upon decolonisation, perceiving the stakes to be higher as the Soviet 
Union also engaged itself with the world more actively either through proxies as had 
been the case in South East Asia or directly as Africa and Latin America following 
Khrushchev’s ascendance to power,.288 While the presence of Soviet agents was new to 
many former colonial societies in Africa, South East Asia, the Middle East, the 
Caribbean and Latin America from the late 1950s, the experts that came from the 
international and European multi-lateral and national institutions and agencies were 
often not. Not unlike the situation in mandates in the former German and Ottoman 
Empires, European colonial officials dominated the international staff. Many simply 
stayed after decolonisation. Moreover, many former colonial officials and scientists 
also found work for the European bilateral and multilateral institutions and agencies not 
to mention the UN organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and 
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the World Bank Development Service.289 Staff in new ministries and villagers in the 
rural districts, whom according to historian of US development policy Nicole Sackley 
“(…) became both subjects and objects of expert and state campaigns to develop and 
secure the ‘The World”290 and could therefore experience former colonial officials return 
with similar if not the same colonial models and strategies they used before departing. 
Sackley argues, “Through expert knowledge and state power, the reconstructed village 
(or the model village built from the ground up) promised to secure and legitimate 
empires, Cold War alliances, and new nation-states.”291 In extension thereof, as 
international historian Amy Sayward and geographer Tony Weis contend, the re-
actualisation of the Western colonial agricultural models through the international 
organisations combined with the Western need for outlets for subsidised surplus food 
production not only expanded the colonial monoculture cash crop regime over the 
1950s and 1960s. It also led to dramatic rises in Third World food imports.292 Also 
within the realm of development, the health and demographic programmes and 
strategies of the United Nations Division of Population, UNESCO, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, and a range of American and British NGOs 
led to sterilization of the “unfit” or ethnic cleansing in extreme cases.  As the historian 
of international health and demographic policy Matthew Connelly argued, “(…) the link 
between population control and imperialism is not merely conceptual, but historical. 
The ambition to control the population of the world emerged directly from the travails 
of territorial empires.”293 Summing up, scholar of development Mark Duffield and 
political scientist Vernon Hewitt maintained, “While specific changes to the 
international system and the capacities of international organisations since World War 
II may have reconfigured some of these techniques, they remain embedded in the same 
assumptions and work towards the very same outcomes.”294 
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Connected directly to how the US had turned the Pacific into its imperial lake as 
Friedman phrases it,295 the imperial dynamics of the UN were perhaps the most visible 
in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 than in any other aspect of what Luard called the 
decade of Western supremacy. Korea was effectively divided not long after the arrival 
of the Soviet and American forces in 1945. Using the UN umbrella as a cover for 
engaging in informal empire, the US Accordingly began industrialising the largely 
agricultural south as it had done in Europe. Under the supervision of Western experts 
and the protection of US armed forces, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency administered this modernisation project. As both the largest donor in the UN 
program and bilateral donor, the US reigned supreme in South Korean affairs until the 
formal declaration of independence in 1948 (as in Japan until 1951). Subsequently, 
Washington pressured the UN into employing large numbers of administrators whom 
had previously worked for the Japanese colonial regime as in Western Germany where 
Nazis administrators were able to re-enlist, not least in the security services. South 
Korea thus inherited not only the legacies of an authoritarian Japanese colonial state, 
but also those of a security force controlled by foreigners and a forced industrialisation 
run by Japanese-educated elites.296 The mounting tension between the two regimes 
eventually led to a war, initiated with the Communist regime invasion of the South. The 
US managed to form a UN military operation due the Soviet boycott of the UN Security 
Council in anger with Taiwan representing China in the Security Council. While 
cautious, the ‘white’ Commonwealth states and Great Britain rallied to support the 
Truman administration militarily within days of the war.297 The US, NATO states, 
‘white’ Commonwealth states, US client states (such as the former US colony of the 
Philippines298 and US occupied Japan) and finally Latin American countries, thus 
provided close to 300.000 troops for the United Nations Command (UNC). Supported 
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by Western dominance in the UN General Assembly, the pro-western UN Secretary-
General Trygve Lie in New York, as well as the US Army headquarters in Japan, the 
American and Western use of the UN was painstakingly clear for all to see.299 Not 
surprisingly, the Korean peninsula in extension thereof witnessed an influx of 
technologies and practices with roots in Western and Japanese colonial security 
operations as well as inter-imperial warfare experiences during the Second World War. 
For instance, aerial surveillance rapidly developed as a colonial security technology in 
the Middle East; in Korea, scholarship shows, it gained new prominence. UNC aircrafts 
soon began bombing civilian targets, and used incendiary bombs on North Korean cities 
and villages (in some cases in the South also) – just like UN declaration partners had 
used incendiary bombs on Japanese and German cities in the Second World War. Most 
North Korean cities were flattened.300 The UNC also established relief organisations, 
and a joint council with South Korea. However, civilian Koreans soon learned that UN 
forces showed as little regard for their lives as had the Japanese colonial forces. As 
historian of the Korean War Steven Lee argues, the “emphasis of civil assistance was 
not to stop soldiers from firing on or towards civilians, but to prevent civilians from 
hindering military offensives and other activities, an important distinction which 
reflected the acceptance of violence towards civilians underlying UNC relief 
programs.”301 UN brutality, however, was possibly also linked to racism as much as 
military objectives and military cultures. ‘White’ Australian and Canadian soldiers 
were known as racists already before the war - in the context of the long reign of the 
‘white Australia’ policy and the racialised views of the eastern Pacific.302 UNC pilots 
from Apartheid South Africa also had reputations as eager fighters of ‘gooks’ and 
Communists.303 Reflecting over a century of ‘white’ American racist violence in the US, 
the Caribbean and the Philippines, ‘white’ American soldiers often sported Confederate 
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Flags as a sign of resistance to the integration of ‘white’ and ‘black’ units.304 , the US 
had a long tradition of presidents seeing the world in racial terms with ‘‘whites’ as the 
superior race, and ‘Negros’, ‘Hispanics’ and ‘Asians’ as weaker ‘races’. This also went 
for their officials as the “elite ‘white’ men who ran the State and Defense Departments 
and the intelligence agencies were comfortable with the world they had grown up and 
succeeded in, a world marked by European power, Third World weakness, and nearly 
ubiquitous racial segregation.”305 Accordingly, racism and extremist ideologies may 
well have led to violence against Koreans fleeing the war in search of safety. Such 
interactions between militarised spaces, racialized bodies, and insecurity—against the 
backdrop of western and Japanese colonialism and imperialism—also influenced 
gender relations. Over 180.000 women in prostitution ’catered’ for western soldiers 
during the Korean War; a number exceeding those under the earlier Japanese and 
American regimes. Although most women were involved in prostitution due to the 
poverty caused by the war, many were also forced by the South Korean regime to keep 
the western forces content and prevent them from raping other women. The racialised 
arrangement not only forbade South Korean soldiers to enter UN ‘comfort stations’, the 
UN force’s military hygiene regime predominantly enforced regulation upon the 
women rather than the soldiers in order to reduce the risk of disease. This regime was 
similar to the previous Japanese regime of military hygiene, the regime associated with 
the fifty US military bases established in South Korea over the 1940s, and British and 
American imperial regulations elsewhere.306 During the war, several American and 
British formal proposals and informal enquiries by UN Secretary General Lie suggested 
to make the Korean operation permanent – either in the form of a UN and European 
legion of volunteers or as a permanent UN military force. Not only did these initiatives 
and the concept of a standing UN force fail (or were dismissed by the Soviet Union), 
the war had also left Great Britain distanced on the matters of Asia and frustrated with 
the increasing American orientation of the Dominions.307 
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To recap, I have by way of imperial, international and Cold War scholarship shown 
that Washington beyond doubt intentionally used the UN regime web of organisations 
to serve its imperial interests around the globe, to draw in closer the British and the 
‘white’ commonwealth, and counter the Soviet Union around the. As part thereof, both 
intentionally and unintentionally, the UN regime web also sustained, if in altered and 
occasionally contradicting forms, elements of the European and American imperial 
power relations, ideas and practices that enabled and produced regimes of spatial 
ordering, relations of hierarchy, of asymmetries in the scale of political action, and 
modes of exceptionalising difference.  
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 4 Chapter 4: Building The Frontier 
of Imperial Multilateralism in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1880-
1955 
Above, I focused on the emergence of American imperialism within what became the 
United States, its regional spheres of formal and informal empire and its increasing 
influence on the British and French empires, as well as the emerging regime of the web 
of international institutions, many of which were of American design.  
To set the stage for the international intervention in 1956, I change the focus to the 
region of the eastern Mediterranean as it gained global importance over the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Linking imperial and international historiographies with my theoretical 
framework, I recast the orthodox nation state-based histories of the Mediterranean in a 
broader imperialised perspective. Put differently, I argue that the Mediterranean began 
to shift from a mainly Ottoman intra-imperial space to, from the late 19th century, a 
space of initially European and later primarily British and French multinational 
imperialism and then a space of imperial multilateralism in which the US and USSR 
would make their influence felt after 1945.  
That is not to say that Washington, however initially disputed their allies expanding 
spaces of formal and informal empire in the region. While sticking to the regional 
partnerships with London and Paris, Washington nonetheless began to engage the 
growing number of post-Mandate governments after the outbreak of the Korean War as 
the British influence began to decline and its attempt to create a regional military 
framework weakened its own influence. The new emerging political forces of the region 
in the form of both governments and citizens not only both shaped and were shaped the 
dynamics of the relationship between London and Washington, but also their views on 
what appeared possible, wise or the opposite. Nevertheless, I will argue that the Anglo-
American interdependence and promotion of imperial multilateralism in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East both maintained and furthered several of the 
imperial traits related to the British regional informal (mandate) and formal imperialism 
and, increasingly, the expanding American informal imperialism. The ordering of 
space, the generation of hierarchies and asymmetric political action as well as 
exceptionalising difference in many ways merely changed form rather than 
disappeared.  
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4.1 The Mediterranean and in Middle East in the 
19th and early 20th Centuries: The Piecemeal 
Expansion of the Frontier of European 
Multinational Imperialism 
For several centuries, the Ottoman Sultans managed to expand their influence in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East to become the dominant empire with their heartlands 
in the eastern Balkans and Anatolia and peripheral domains in the northern Balkans, the 
southern shores of the Mediterranean and far beyond its eastern shores into the land of 
the old Mesopotamian river empires. With the expansion, Ottoman historian Karen 
Barkey argues, the Ottoman Empire grew into the ‘typical’ dynastically ruled and 
religiously and ethnically diverse empire with a patchwork pattern of relations with its 
peripheral regions via various networks and forms of ties to local elites with the imperial 
state ruling supreme, if reliant on on provincial compliance, in military and economic 
matters.308 Eventually, however, the growing military assertiveness of both the 
Habsburg and Russian empires with standing imperial armies at the western and 
northern peripheries, Barkey argues, forced the sultans to begin to centralise their tax 
and military systems, emulating the European and Russian empires in the last decades 
of the 18th century. Failing to do so successfully while also losing wars, however, led 
several European empires to shield the Ottoman regime from a harsh Russian peace 
settlement in 1792, the first manifestation of European inter-imperial cooperation in the 
eastern Mediterranean. In its attempt to improve its imperial ‘repertoires of power’ with 
a standing army and a centralised tax system, however, the regime estranged its 
provincial elites. Consequently, the Sultan saw a march of several provincial notables 
and their armies to Istanbul demanding an economic and political empowerment of a 
broader social base in 1808.309 Although the regime managed to partially reform the tax 
system and build a standing army, even if smaller than the Russian imperial army, 
European inter-imperial cooperation, imperial and military historians show, became a 
growing challenge, both militarily and economically. Having already acquired Gibraltar 
in 1713, the British Empire continued to acquire passage routes and islands such as 
Malta in 1802, the Ionian Islands in 1815, and Aden in 1839 whereas the French went 
for land and took Ottoman Algeria in 1830.310 With the European support for the Greek 
independence, the Sultan also felt the growing influence of European multinational 
imperialism closer to Istanbul in 1827. Additionally, Austrian, British and French forces 
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also engaged in localised ad hoc inter-imperial cooperation in the predominantly 
Christian Ottoman province we today know as Lebanon in 1840 (and 1860).311 
Moreover, the European empires also forced the sultan to agree to trade and customs 
agreements with the British in 1838 and later the French empire and others, which 
caused Ottoman imports, deficits, debts and borrowing to explode. Following several 
wars with the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire was forced to eventually declare a 
moratorium on its foreign debts in 1875 and in 1881 cede control of its finances to a 
debt administration that was formally Ottoman, but de facto under joint British, French 
and German control.312 The inter-imperial project of the Suez Canal, which opened in 
1869, also led to increased British interest in Egypt, as it reduced significantly the 
distance to the majority of British imperial territories along the shores of the Indian 
Ocean, in the Malacca Straits and in Oceania. Obtaining a large number of shares in the 
Canal Company, and thus joining the French, the British Empire grew more invested 
and in 1888 pushed through a convention on canal neutrality protected obviously by the 
British Empire.313 Finally, many British, French and increasingly German experts and 
companies—invited by the sultan to take part in the modernisation of the 
communications (ports, railways, telegraphs) and financial infrastructure (banks and 
insurance firms)—began to seize ownership of these and export capital generated in the 
Ottoman Empire. This combination, I therefore suggest, marked the informal 
institutionalisation of European multinational imperialism in the Mediterranean from 
the late 19th century. 
While the following decades allowed this process of frontier building to shift into 
the open and the European empires to cater for their own interests, the Ottoman Empire 
grew less able to do so. Moreover, from 1878 to 1899 the Ottomans lost Cyprus in 1878, 
Egypt (and thereby also Sudan) to the British. The Ottomans lost Tunisia in 1881 and 
East Morocco in 1912 to the French. After the internal colonisation of Italy, the Italian 
Risorgimento also acquired areas in what is today Eritrea in 1886 (after failing to take 
Tunisia) and Ottoman Libya in 1911.314 When recently independent Greece sent troops 
to support an anti-Ottoman revolt on Crete in 1896, the frontier of multinational 
imperialism was formally institutionalised. Realising that the Ottoman Empire was 
threatened and thus potentially the broader imperial order, the British, French, Italian, 
Habsburg, German and Russian empires organised a joint naval blockade and inter-
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imperial force of 20.000 troops to be stationed in Crete. European consuls, military 
attaches and officers from the multinational imperial force subsequently reorganised 
the Cretan administration, the police, and the judiciary. Crete gained wide autonomy 
under inter-imperial supervision, but remained part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, 
however, the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in, reducing 
further the Ottoman European territory. Soon after, the European imperial powers, in 
another example of institutionalised European multinational imperialism, created the 
Muslim state of Albania in another inter-imperial intervention in the Balkan War in 
1913 to prevent the post-Ottoman, pro-Russian and expanding Serbia from getting 
ocean access and thereby strengthen the Russian Empire in the Mediterranean.315  
Within the Ottoman Empire, historians have shown that the populations also felt the 
effects of the European multinational imperialism and the Ottoman Empire’s attempts 
to counter it. Following the influx of more than two million Muslim refugees after wars 
with Russia (that changed the balance between Muslims and Christians in many 
provinces), the global crisis from the late 1870s (that reduced Ottoman commercial 
agricultural exports), and the de facto deindustrialisation of the countryside, a growing 
number of people were left without means to fend for themselves. While locally rooted 
religious care systems cared for sick, old and disabled people, and urban poor, 
conversely, came under an increasing pressure, suddenly becoming ‘idle’ and potential 
criminals requiring surveillance. Having already disabled the constitution in 1876, the 
Ottoman state criminalised the increasingly insecure lower urban classes of homeless 
people, unemployed and striking workers under pressure from a budding Ottoman 
bourgeoisie able to navigate the frontier building of European multinational 
imperialism. ‘Idleness’ and unemployment came to be seen as a disregard for society 
and work a duty. After having been integral to attempts of colonising the imperial 
countryside, pacify peasant revolts and improve tax collection, the Ottoman 
gendarmerie also became involved in dealing with both the growing levels of 
unemployment and the number of strikes as working conditions grew worse. By 1900, 
the gendarmerie saw the protection of the community of commerce as its most 
important task. Additionally, the regime also used Muslim refugees from the wars with 
Russia in forced internal colonisation programmes to populate and develop commercial 
agriculture in thinly populated lands in the Syrian provinces and Anatolia after the 1878 
war (thus shifting their ethnic-religious balances). Although the constitution from 1876 
was reinstalled after a coup in 1908, temporary laws on strikes, vagrancy and suspected 
criminals were passed. Subsequently, mass-arrests, deportations and class-based spatial 
segregation became the norm in the bigger cities. Not surprisingly, discontent in the 
provinces grew significantly. Feminist writings, tax-revolts, peasant uprisings, growing 
political opposition to the regime and the ever-growing foreign influence, and mutinies 
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in the army and navy defined several Ottoman provinces in the early twentieth 
century.316  
The Ottoman Empire thus weakened considerably between 1810 and 1918 due to a 
combination of 57 years of war that not only cost territory and tax revenue but also 
burdened the regime with growing military costs, an externally driven process of 
deindustrialisation and the European inter-imperial collaborative expansions. 
Nevertheless, notes Ottoman historian Eugene Rogan, it did not dissolve early in the 
First World War, a war fought for empire mainly by the German, Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires on one side and the British, French, Russian and American empires 
on the other. It took four years of campaigns, the mobilization of the Ottoman Arab 
populations by way of several different promises of a post-Ottoman independent Arab 
world and the use of millions of British ‘white’ settler colonial and both British and 
French ‘coloured’ and ‘black’ colonial forces before the Ottoman Empire eventually 
succumbed.317  
4.2 The Failure to Institutionalise European 
Multinational Imperialism in the 
Mediterranean, 1918-1942 
Unintentionally buoyed by the then collapsed Russian Empire, the British and French 
empires continued building a frontier of multinational imperialism in the Mediterranean 
region with the demise of the Ottoman Empire without the also collapsed Habsburgs 
and defeated Italians. It came initially in the form of the occupation of several Ottoman 
provinces as the regime of the Allied Occupied Enemy Territory Administration and 
later as carved-out Mandates under the new League of Nations, marking a new degree 
                                               
316 E. Attila Aytekin, “Tax Revolts During the Tanzimat Period (1839–1876) and Before the Young Turk 
Revolution (1904–1908): Popular Protest and State Formation in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Journal of 
Policy History 25, no. 3 (2013): 308–333; F. Ergut, “Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Middle 
Eastern Studies 38, no. 2 (2002): 149–64; Nadir Özbek, “Policing the Countryside: Gendarmes of the Late 
19th Century Ottoman Empire (1876-1908),” International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 
47–67; Nadir Özbek, “‘Beggars’ and ‘Vagrants’ in Ottoman State Policy and Public Discourse, 1876–1914,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 5 (2009): 783–801; Irvin Cemil Schick, “Print Capitalism and Women’s 
Sexual Agency in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
31, no. 1 (2011): 196–216; Mehmet Soytürk, “Modern State and Security: The Gendarmerie System in 
France, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire,” History Studies 4, no. 2 (2012). 
317 Jarboe and Fogarty, Empires in World War I; Manela, R. Gerwarth, and Manela, “The Great War as a 
Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911-1923,” Diplomatic History 38, 
no. 4 (2014): 786–800; Eugene L Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East, 2015. 
  
94 
 
of institutionalised multinational imperialism. Moreover, the British increased their part 
of the Suez Canal Company shares to nearly 80% and installed a permanent British 
military force to relieve the war-time deployment of British, Australian, Indian and 
Egyptian troops. Imperial historians have shown that this was less than London, 
Moscow and Paris arranged for with a plan to divide the region and a British war-time 
campaign to revive, or rather take over, what they called a ‘declined landscape of 
oppressed Arab, Armenian and Jewish nations’ as a ‘new’ British ‘Middle East’ within 
the American president Wilson’s plan for a nation state-based capitalist system.318 After 
the American president fell sick, Washington became less combative and grew willing 
to let London “(…) exercise substantial political control in the Middle East provided 
that this control would act as an umbrella under which American interests could 
prosper and be protected.”319 The American involvement in the rapidly expanding oil 
business in Iraq and Saudi Arabia (beginning in the 1920s) needs to be seen in light of 
this inter-imperial relationship.320 Despite not joining the League of Nations, the US 
took over Armenia as a mandate, thus joining, in effect if informally, the new regime 
in the Mediterranean and the ‘new’ ‘Middle East’. Regardless of their plans and that 
the Russian Empire turned on itself in a revolution, the British and French mandate 
regimes would continue to face the same problems as the late Ottoman regime. Rather 
than dealing with the broad and massive socio-economic problems rooted in the 
increasing regional reliance on cash and monocrops321, the rising living costs and 
urbanisation, the British and French mandates expanded their wartime military regimes 
into frontier zones of multinational imperialism.  
Throughout the 1920s, riots broke out in several Mandates. Accordingly, the 
emerging quasi-colonial security states responded by honing their technologies of 
power in the form of map-making, aerial and demographic surveillance, ID cards, the 
differentiated regulation of mobilities, medical standards, and education. The mandate 
regimes also built networks of linked police stations, military bases, naval facilities and 
airfields, as well as recruited local forces.322 As noted by Darwin, none of these states 
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was “(…) to be governed on a shoestring and garrisoned with a corporal’s guard of 
local levies.”323 Altogether, the legal, fiscal, military, medical and social regulation of 
the mandates and the European colonies both failed to consider ethnic and religious 
groups and internationalised popular racialised imperial imaginaries. Expressions of 
cultural imperialism, the racialised frontiers, which often cast Europeans as rational, 
civilised and masculine and the subject of the ‘Near East’ and ‘Orient’, the Arab or/and 
Muslim as mostly emotional, primitive and feminine, expanded beyond the 
internationalised medical surveillance of mobilities of ‘oriental’ passengers passing 
through the Suez Canal. European and American tourists as well as Jewish settlers thus 
came to be ‘good’ circulation, while nomads, militant nationalists and criminals came 
to be ‘bad’ circulation, having mobilities that needed restriction. Similarly, the attempts 
to handle Mediterranean trafficking was mainly concerned with ‘white’ slavery.324 
Predictably, governing the mandates and the broader region only got increasingly 
harder for the British and French.  
By the mid-1930s, as historians have showed, the onset of the global economic crisis 
and the regional integration process therein made it necessary to devolve power to local 
notables, to increase the troop numbers, and to broaden the powers of enforcement. The 
Saudi royal regime installed by the British came to enjoy increasing freedom as it grew 
central to stability in the Gulf already by 1931. In the late 1930s, however, the Saudi 
kingdom grew aggressive to British dismay. Egyptian nationalist pressure and the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 meant that the British had to grant Egypt formal 
sovereignty and withdraw their reduced forces to several newly built bases along the 
Suez Canal in 1936. In Iraq, formal independence in 1930 left the British with both a 
military presence and growing ethnic and religious tension. Transjordan was quiet due 
to subsidies to the new regime and the de facto British military force.325 The same year, 
Palestinians clashed with security forces. The threat of martial law calmed matters 
initially, but the lack of British willingness to provide balanced policies and curb Jewish 
immigration that was dramatically altering both the Palestinian socio-economic fabric 
and access to land, soon led to peasant guerrilla warfare. The British responded by not 
only censoring the press, issuing collective fines, demolishing houses and installing 
travel restrictions, but also by putting the police under military jurisdiction, arresting 
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people without warrants, and bringing in more forces. As the revolt escalated, the 
British resorted to beatings, humiliations, indiscriminate killings and death penalties, 
eventually ending the rebellion in 1939 by the brutality of more than 20.000 soldiers.326 
The French struggled with similar problems in both its mandates of Syria and Lebanon 
and its North African colonies of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The security regimes 
faced urban dissent, student rallies and violent resistance due to economic trouble, 
nationalist or Islamic mobilisation, biased political reforms, broken French promises of 
political reform and not least the Palestinian revolt. Although security forces ended 
these, their increasing repression and growing influence on policy formation and urban 
policing only intensified the conflicts, eventually leading to martial law.327  
However, pressure on this frontier of British and French multinational imperialism 
also mounted from other imperial powers and alliances through the disenfranchisement 
of the League of Nations and the ‘peace’ after the First World War. For a century before 
1914, imperial historian John Darwin argues, London had seen Berlin as a 
counterweight to Moscow in the Middle East given the region was peripheral to 
Germany’s immediate interests. While Germany had opened a railway line from 
Istanbul to the Persian Gulf to open up the Ottoman economy and provide an alternative 
to the French-British controlled Suez Canal at the end of the 19th century, the British 
understanding only changed in the First World War when the Russian Empire was part 
of defeating the German Empire along with the British. Moreover, the collapse of 
Russia brought, as Darwin put it, “(…) flood-tide of German influence swirling round 
the Black Sea and towards North Persia.”328 However, Mandate regime led Arabs to see 
Germany as a “(…) fellow victim of the post-World War I settlement, and perhaps the 
only major European without imperial ambitions in the Middle East.”329 Nationalism 
and anti-Semitism also gained traction, as it was never realised that Nazi ideology 
placed Arabs at the bottom of its racial hierarchy and that Germany would not support 
Arab independence.330 Over the 1930s, the British and French both saw German 
influence increase in Turkey and feared it would do so in Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. 
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia, however, challenged the regime of the League of 
Nations, as Abyssinia was a member. Accordingly, as imperial historians have shown, 
London and Paris resorted to various measures. First, they used the League to impose 
sanctions on Italy, even if ineffectual given they left oil out. Second, they co-opted 
Istanbul by recalling the Italian post-World War I occupation of Anatolia, the meddling 
in Albania in the 1920s, and the offensive maritime military preparations on the one 
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hand, and handing over Alexandretta, a part of French Syrian mandate, on the other. 
Thirdly, the British turning to tested methods, also began supporting rebels in Italian 
East Africa, consisting of Abyssinia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Finally, the British 
also sought to restrain Italy, Germany and Japan that by then had gotten together in first 
an Anti-Communist Pact between the German and Japanese empires and later in a 
formal military alliance through secret negotiations with Italy and an incorporative trade 
policy aimed at strengthening conservatives in Germany and Japan who preferred 
economic growth to imperial war.331  
These attempts failed. Berlin, in the meantime, had allied with both Tokyo and 
Rome, forming a competing inter-imperial alliance with Berlin recognising Tokyo’s 
imperial project as a parallel to what Mazower has called a Nazi-version of the Monroe 
doctrine bound by territory, history and blood.332 Initially fought in northern Europe, the 
theatres of war soon expanded beyond Europe, the Mediterranean and Middle East 
included. However, not only the Italian interests and failures in Greece, North Africa 
and British Somaliland drove the Axis interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East. The realisation of the German leadership that a larger supply of oil and ability to 
process and distribute would be needed to rid Germany’s dependence on Anglo-
American oil companies after the war was also a major driving factor. As shown by 
military and energy historian Anand Toprani, contemporary experts of the international 
oil industry warned “(…) that the confiscation of the British and French oil interests in 
Rumania and the Far and Near East and the acquisition ad Norwegian tanker fleet was 
the least [of] what could be expected.”333 Indeed, the French Vichy regime began to aid 
Germany and Italy in seizing control of Iraq’s oil fields and the pipelines to the 
Mediterranean. Moreover, the recently founded German oil giant, Kontinentale Öl, was 
preparing to send engineers to Iraq if the German Afrikakorps broke through the British 
defences in North Africa. Finally, Germany was readying subsidiaries to purchase, lease 
or construct tankers, oil loading and offloading facilities and pipelines in the 
Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea.334 Consequently, the involvement of the Soviet 
Union and the US grew necessary, much in the same way that the British and French 
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empires had needed Russia and the US in the First World War, thus reconfiguring the 
frontier of multinational imperialism and its regional manifestation. In late 1941, the 
Japanese attack on the main American naval complex in the Pacific led the US to join 
the alliance dominated by the British and Soviet empires and what remained of the 
French under the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt. By early 1942, as shown in the 
previous chapter, the inter-imperial military alliance of the United Nations had been 
formed. As it would turn out, the members of the UN were just as interested in the 
Middle Eastern and Mediterranean facilities and systems of oil production, refinery and 
distribution as Germany.  
4.3 The Ad Hoc Building of the Frontier of 
Imperial Multilateralism in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East, 1942-1950 
As were to become clear to the British and French imperial governments, however, the 
United Nations was not merely a military alliance. As historians of the American and 
British Middle East war-efforts and post-war foreign policies have shown, the 
formation of the UN connected the frontier of American informal empire in Latin 
America, and its basis in the idea of strong promotion of a capitalist web of dependent 
nation states revolving around the US and multilateral organisations, with what was left 
of the British-French frontier of multinational imperialism and its practices of direct 
interventions and neo-colonial regimes, a legacy predating the First World War. In the 
Middle East, this showed in several ways. First, the British lost the military command 
of the Middle East theatre of war once American forces were deployed to Northern 
Africa in late 1942: the only theatre that British generals had commanded from the 
moment the US joined the war. Friction soon went beyond military command, the 
prestige and strategic influence associated with commanding a theatre. As the war had 
cut off regional trade with Europe aside Britain by 1942, the US began to take part in 
supplying the British and imperial forces via the aforementioned lend-lease agreement 
and the Middle East Supply Centre. As was soon clear to American and British officials 
involved, the essentially militarised trade network increased living costs for people all 
over the Middle East as it curtailed the already reduced civilian trade many had come 
to depend on due to the shift from subsistence farming to commercial crops, and 
industrialisation. Neither the British nor the Americans were particularly concerned 
with this dimension. Rather, the British grew frustrated as they began to fear for their 
post-war markets and the strength of the Sterling Area, a tariff-based neo-mercantilist 
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Commonwealth protection scheme that although it dated back to first attempts in 1932 
had only been fully realised during the war. On their part, American export companies 
were furious that the British were hiding behind military logistics to keep them out, 
since massive profits could be made. Although Washington wanted to enforce the long-
standing ‘open door’ policy and push London towards granting its mandates and 
colonies in the Middle East independence as the majority of these were part of the 
Dollar arrangement, it accepted the trade drawbacks as a wartime arrangement. 
Predictably, additional mistrust developed over oil, which had been a point of 
contention since the 1930s. The US desired an arrangement that would secure equal 
American access, something the British were not keen on given their ability to acquire 
oil in Sterling rather than Dollars and thereby avoid worsening the trade balance. Heated 
discussions followed through 1944 and most of 1945 until the issue faded for the time 
being as the oil companies made their own provisions. The French also felt the effect 
of coming to rely on the US as the French government, or what was left of it in the 
French African colonies, was forced to grant its mandates of Syria and Lebanon 
independence in 1944 to let them formally join the UN military alliance after being 
recognised by both Washington and Moscow.335 
Once the war ended, Anglo-American regional inter-imperial cooperation continued, 
as did the occasional tensions. Whereas London still favoured direct control, 
Washington preferred indirect influence and regional multilateralism after gaining 
successes with this model in Latin America. Multinational imperialism thus began to 
shift towards imperial multilateralism in the Middle East and Mediterranean as it did 
around the world. Washington’s insistence that London grant Trans-Jordan 
independence and end the occupation of Iraq that had been formally independent since 
1930, resulted in Jordanian independence in 1946 and the British withdrawal from Iraq 
to retain only air force bases in Iraq from 1947. The region’s oil was another cause of 
disagreement. To London, buying oil in Sterling rather than Dollars was essential to 
preserve the advantages of the Sterling area and protect its already weakened balance 
of payments. Additionally, the British oil refinery in Abadan in Iran was the world’s 
largest and the main oil supply of the British Empire just as the Suez Canal had returned 
in its role as the imperial ‘jugular vein’. By 1946, nearly 200.000 British troops 
remained in both in what had become the largest military complex in the world with 10 
separate airfields and 34 individual base areas along the Suez Canal and Egyptian cities. 
336 As energy historian Stephen Galpern eloquently puts it, “One need not guess how the 
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British felt about this encroachment in their sphere of influence.”337 To Washington, 
however, it was not merely a question of American oil companies getting sales to the 
Sterling area or an attempt to weaken the machinery of the British Empire. Rather, its 
access to Middle Eastern oil, and thus also in the Sterling area, was an integral means 
in a broader plan of getting Western Europe into an oil-based growth economic 
paradigm that was believed able to dissuade Western European citizens from potentially 
becoming attracted by Communism.338 Having surveyed the past two decades’ literature 
on Anglo-American relations in the Middle East, Galpern argues that they, despite 
minor conflicts on the shared goals and how to achieve these, were able collaborate 
both strategically and economically to defend their regional interests as they and their 
former Soviet ally had grown more than suspicious of each other.339  
London was therefore finally not too worried seeing Washington increase its 
influence in the region by keeping war-time air base rights in Libya and Morocco,340 
promoting a growing number of American companies to get involved in the trade of oil, 
cars, hotel construction, kitchen equipment, cameras, sewing machines, rubber products 
and so on via headquarters in Egypt,341 and expanding the technical assistance 
programmes of the UN organisations within most sectors of the Middle Eastern states.342 
If anything, the British imperial government came to rely increasingly on its ally. One 
example of this was in Iran, where both the Soviet Union and Great Britain in 1942 
deployed troops to prevent Iran from falling under German control and made an 
agreement with the Iranian government to withdraw no later than six months after the 
end of the war. Looking to expand its frontier as in Eastern Europe and secure access 
to oil, however, Stalin allowed for the establishment of a left-leaning administration in 
Azerbaijan, the part of Iran occupied by Soviet forces, just as the Red Army prevented 
the Iranian army from entering the region in 1945. Moscow suggested that Azerbaijani 
autonomy and oil agreement could resolve the matter in the subsequent bilateral 
negotiations. Unable to do much alone, London had Washington put pressure and 
consider relocating naval forces to the region. Against that backdrop, the Iranians 
accepted to enter an agreement concerning the acceptance of the leftist Tudeh party and 
oil negotiations. Once the Red Army left in the spring of 1946, however, Tehran crushed 
the Azerbaijani administration and abandoned its promises of oil negotiations, much to 
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the satisfaction of both Washington and London who hoped to keep the Soviet Union 
out of the oil-rich region.343 Another example was the Soviet pressure on the Turkish 
government. In line with the Tsarist imperial ambitions of expanding into the 
Mediterranean, Stalin initially attempted to refute the existing legal framework that 
granted Turkey control of the access to the Mediterranean in 1945. As part thereof, he 
sought to reach an agreement of a joint defence system agreement with Turkey (which 
had been neutral in the war), which would allow for the building of at least one base in 
the region. Although the Turkish government declined, both top officials in the State 
Department and Truman himself began fearing that Turkey could fall to the Soviet 
Union. Similarly, the British were only just able to handle the Greek civil war, initiated 
in 1946, when Stalin, in accordance with their agreement on zones of influence, reigned 
in the new Yugoslavian, Bulgarian and Albanian post-war Communist regimes that all 
with varying agendas supported the Greek communist faction against the British-trained 
and -backed national army and right-wing faction.344 Feeling increasingly unable to 
resist the Soviet pressure and facing a financial crisis due to a dollar shortage, London 
informed Washington of its inability to support the Turkish and Greek governments in 
February 1947.345 Recent Cold War scholarship has showed the different ways the 
British disengagement mobilised the Truman administration. As mentioned above, the 
US first abandoned its support for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, 
as it offered aid to Albania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, China and Greece, of 
which only the latter two did not belong to the Soviet bloc. To replace it, Washington 
initiated a US programme, the Marshall Plan. Athens and Ankara were not surprisingly 
amongst the first to receive funding and aid via the new scheme in 1948.346 The US also 
began supporting the Greek right in the civil war with finances, equipment and the 
assistance of special forces. The scholar of the Mediterranean Amikam Nachmani 
argued the “(…) US involvement, political, economic and military etc., was literally 
overwhelming”347 and that “(…) the role played by the United Nations and its bodies 
was, if not an integral part of the Truman Doctrine, at least a complimentary form of 
Western intervention.”348 The Greek right predictably won the civil war, although the 
political system ensured a centre coalition government. Additionally, the recently 
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formed CIA opened a station in Athens for its Balkan operations and to serve as a model 
for the new Greek intelligence service.349  
On a broader scale, Truman’s global anti-Communist development programme from 
1949 also resulted in the opening of programme offices in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Jordan, Pakistan and Israel over 1950 and 1951.350 Additionally, as naval 
and military historians have shown, the US also supplemented the British military 
measures by increasing its own military presence. The first step was to maintain existing 
base rights in Libya and Morocco. The second was to acquire access to more facilities, 
which from 1947 to 1949 also put Aden, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and 
Oman on the wish list.351 The third step for Washington was to boost—initially 
temporarily—its Mediterranean fleet, originally a small task force of only 3 ships from 
its post-war force, in 1946, and to expand the fleet to one aircraft carrier, 16 ships, and 
15 support vessels and make it permanent two years later. Another clear sign of 
Washington assigning importance to the region was the institutionalisation of annual 
Middle East meetings with the British and the Canadians from October 1947. Indicative 
of the balance of power, the first joint American, British and Canadian meeting took 
place at the Pentagon, but left the British in command of the Middle East. While the US 
committed fighting units, the strength of the British forces and numerous bases in 
Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan and on Cyprus were decisive. However, as historian of British 
imperial history in the Middle East, Michael Cohen notes, the Atlee government had 
contemplated, if shortly, using the new United Nations to take over British Middle 
Eastern imperial interests, given its focus on balancing social reform and budget 
problems. As a way to share the burden, the British ideas on military arrangements for 
the Middle East thus involved American bombers operating from air bases in Egypt and 
Palestine, not the bases in Morocco and Libya further to the west to which the US had 
access. This combination would allow the goals of both being able to resist a Soviet 
first strike to retain control of the Middle East and to keep the Soviet Union from its oil 
production in Romania, the Caucasus and Baku, as the air bases in Britain only put 25% 
of the Anglo-American bombing targets in the Soviet Union within range. The Egyptian 
bases, in contrast, placed 94% of the bombing targets within range.352 In 1948, however, 
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the British departure from Palestine to the UN forced the British to focus only on 
Egyptian bases. This grew increasingly problematic because of the much hated British 
influence and large military presence. Indeed, the growing Egyptian nationalism forced 
the royal regime to take the British military presence before the UN, thereby forcing 
the British to withdraw to the Suez Canal bases, to pass legislation to increase the 
number of Egyptians in the Suez Canal Company management and staff, to demand ten 
days’ notice from any state wishing to use the canal for warships, and finally to install 
a regime of inspecting and searching vessels from the ports of Suez and Port Said to 
prevent Israeli ships from passing through. The British sought to co-opt the French, the 
Americans and the UN Security Council to counter these measures, but failed.353 
London and Washington also soon disagreed over costs and the deeper issue of what 
the Americans saw as British unwillingness to open the region further and the British 
saw the Americans as overly meddlesome. Additionally, Washington had a period of 
internal disagreement on how proceed. By October 1949, the Pentagon wanted to 
withdraw altogether whereas the State Department, in touch with American companies 
(most notably the oil companies that controlled most of the oil production in Saudi 
Arabia, a quarter of the Iraqi production and shared the Kuwaiti production with the 
British-Iranian Oil Company) wanted to stay. However, the outbreak of the Korean 
War, which began not long after the Chinese Communists took over power, brought 
together the hitherto occasionally estranged staffs of the Pentagon and the State 
Department, thereby expanding and further militarising the frontiers of imperial 
multilateralism, including its manifestation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.354  
4.4 A Troubled Expansion: The Frontier of 
Imperial Multilateralism in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East, 1950-1955 
Less concerned with the Korean War, London sought to retain its influence for 
primarily economic and strategic reasons while Washington took the Korean War as an 
ill-willed attempt of its former ally in Moscow to expand its influence and idea of an 
opposing world order globally. As historians have shown, the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations responded in kind.355 In the Mediterranean and the Middle East, scholars 
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have shown, this translated into a growing American interest in a regional military 
arrangement aimed at Moscow, due to concerns about the ability of the existing British 
arrangement to protect American oil projects, and thus its hold on Western Europe.356 
A month into expanding the frontier in East Asia with troops in Korea Washington, 
London, Paris and Istanbul invited the Egyptian monarchy to join talks on the 
arrangement, thus intentionally and openly seeking to take further both the ad hoc 
Anglo-American inter-imperial cooperation and what had hitherto been 
institutionalised in the still Western dominated UN regime. Already under nationalist 
pressure, the monarchy both rejected and brought up the 1936 Egyptian-British base 
right treaty and the issue of de facto sovereignty. The British wanted the US, Egypt and 
Israel involved, but failed to engage the latter two. The Egyptian king wanted no part 
before the British had withdrawn their forces that were already four times the number 
allowed for in the 1936 treaty and sought to stress the British by restricting their canal 
access, effectively closing their refineries in Haifa, Israel. Hurting from the Iranian 
nationalisation of its oil production in 1951, London doubled its military presence to 
83.000 soldiers. In doing so, London forced about a coup and a military regime that not 
only rejected any British defence scheme but also initiated a guerrilla campaign in the 
canal area until 1954.357 In line with the American experiences in Latin America, a CIA 
committee led by President Eisenhower explicitly formulated a principle of indirect 
imperial control in a strategy for the Middle East in 1951: “Our principle should be to 
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encourage the emergence of competent leaders, relatively well-disposed towards the 
West, through programs designed for this purpose, including, where possible, a 
conscious, though perhaps covert, effort to cultivate and aid such potential leaders, 
even when they are not in power.”358 Preferring therefore the older imperial ‘repertoire 
of power’ of indirect control to direct intervention and recognising Egypt as less central 
than hitherto, Washington refused to join London’s proposal for secret collusion against 
Cairo with Paris, complicating both Anglo-American relations and the defence project 
throughout 1952.359 Moreover, engaged in both Korea and Western Europe, the US 
wanted the British to lead in the region as hitherto the case. While London favoured a 
project rooted in the Arab Middle East, Washington, as I will show, grew weary of 
Egypt throughout 1953 and therefore wanted to involve Turkey due to its strategic 
location, its strong anti-Communist tradition360 and its massive debt to the US from the 
Marshall Aid, and Iran to counter the potential military advantages of location and oil 
of Iran of a Soviet invasion. Turkey was interested, but preferred NATO as it expected 
it had larger funds and it would not come to depend on the British any more than 
necessary due to strong anti-British sentiment. However, it did not help that the US 
consulted unilaterally Turkey and Iran, both already receiving US military aid, and 
Pakistan, which was potentially interested in a scheme without the British.361 However, 
with British consent, a Turco-Pakistani cooperation agreement was carefully announced 
to avoid Pakistani nationalist sentiment and Soviet ire in 1954. The agreement reached 
with Egypt on using the Suez Canal base complex in the event of war soon after changed 
little: the US wanted a northern tier project, leaving the British irritated with what they 
saw as a lack of solidarity in managing Egypt. Although the British hoped to keep Iraq 
out, and the Arab prime ministers had met in Cairo on Egypt’s initiative to dissuade 
Iraq from turning so strongly towards the Western bloc, Iraq joined Turkey and Pakistan 
in what became known as the Baghdad Pact in early 1954 after having received US 
military aid.362 Despite British concerns and Egypt’s insistence on a neutral Pan-Arabic 
scheme, the British joined the pact soon after, also renewing its bilateral agreement with 
Iraq. However, Washington grew concerned that London was turning the pact into an 
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instrument of British rather than Western policy, and therefore, to (re)gain control, 
joined the military deputies committee, but not the pact itself (later renamed the Central 
Treaty Organization) in 1955.363 
At the same time, relations between London and Paris and Washington also soured. 
The continued failure to make progress with the regional military arrangement was one 
factor. Cold War and Middle East historians have shown that other factors included the 
expansion of Germany and NATO into the Mediterranean, the British frustrations with 
American meddling in Iran, the growing British dependence on the US in relation to 
Egypt, and a conflict over strategically important territory on the border between Saudi 
Arabia and three British-dominated Gulf States. Having ‘taken over’ Greece and 
Turkey in the late 1940s, Washington not only forced the moderate Greek government 
to resign in favour of a right-wing government, it also—to British frustrations—
demanded that West Germany, as the potentially strongest European power, share the 
burden in the Mediterranean by providing industrial credits to Greece and Turkey as 
well as economic aid to Israel. Also to British and French irritation, the US 
accommodated the Greek and Turkish wishes to join NATO and saw the formation of 
right wing ‘stay behind’ networks as in Western Europe, due to strategic considerations 
and goodwill from the contribution to the Korean War. This not only reflected 
Eisenhower and his broader foreign policy apparatus’ sense of the British becoming a 
burden (Secretary of State Dulles phrased it as ‘millstones around our neck’) in early 
1953, but also left the British and French frustrated as they remembered the earlier loss 
of regional influence to the Germans.364 Moreover, the inclusion of Greece and Turkey 
into NATO added a naval dimension to NATO. While American vessels in the 
Mediterranean that had been increased to somewhere between 40 and 70 were included, 
it also reduced British, French and Italian strategic autonomy in the Mediterranean as it 
came to encompass a large part of the assigned British, French and Italian naval assets 
in the spirit of ‘burden sharing’.365 This, however, harmonised little with how the US, 
despite the protests of the populations in several cases against imperialism and 
militarisation, also acquired new or further access to facilities, base rights or bases in 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, and Algeria.366 Concerning Iran, 
Anglo-American dealings grew increasingly difficult due to their different views on the 
rise of Iranian nationalism. The White House favoured a fairer deal in the negotiations 
about the main issue of oil than did Whitehall. The immediate outcome was that the 
moderate Mossadeq government nationalised the oil industry after a series of talks, 
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which had also involved US negotiators who had applied pressure on the British as well 
as granted Iran a platform from which to negotiate following an agreement that would 
share 50% of the profits with Saudi Arabia. Subsequently both failing at the UN and 
the International Court of Justice and unable to launch a large scale military operation 
due to the loss of the Indian army and the deployment of a large number of British 
troops in Malaya and Korea, London could only boycott Iranian oil and buy American 
oil from Saudi Arabia. Seeing how Whitehall both struggled to cope with rising military 
budgets and an economic crisis due to the lack of previously cheap oil on the one hand 
and Mossadeq’s turn to the previously illegal leftist Tudeh party on the other, the White 
House therefore had the CIA—with the support of MI6—execute a coup against 
Mossadeq. To British frustrations, the deal with the new Iranian regime subsequently 
granted American oil companies 40% ownership of the new Iranian oil consortium.367 
Until (and despite) the joint intervention in Iran with the White House under the Truman 
administration that had retained some British access to Iranian oil, Whitehall, and 
especially the secret ‘Suez Group’ of MP’s, intelligence officials and cabinet members 
that began to emerge after the Iranian crisis, felt abandoned by their wartime allies 
regarding the Egyptian guerrilla operations against the British forces in the canal and 
thus the safety of the British oil supply and, ultimately, stability. Since 1945, the overall 
shipping volume passing the Suez Canal had tripled with two thirds being European oil, 
and, as the British boycott of Iranian oil meant that British oil had shifted to oil from 
the Persian Gulf emirates and Saudi Arabia, made Metropolitan Great Britain the largest 
importer of oil.368 By the second half of 1953, however, Eisenhower had lost patience 
with the new Egyptian military regime under the nationalist Abdel Gamel Nasser 
regarding its potential as the foundations for an American Middle East policy in part 
due to racialised imaginations of Arabs being irrational, mercurial, and emotional. Not 
long after the coup in Iran, Washington (and Langley) thus turned away from the 
Egyptian regime and recognised the need to stabilise further the British oil supply to 
upholster its main ally and prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence. Initially 
manifested in propaganda against Cairo within Egypt, pressure on the Egyptian cotton 
trade, and support of Canada and France to discretely supply Israel with fighter jets, 
this soon ensured a common interest between the US and the British in removing the 
Egyptian regime despite differences in how to do so. While this suited British strategic 
interests, the British soon came to feel the same sense of both losing influence and 
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military capacity and a growing dependence on the US in Egypt as they had in Iran.369 
Further to the east, Anglo-American relations grew even more antagonistic. Having lost 
their influence in Saudi Arabia to the US, London reacted angrily to the incursion of 
Saudi troops into the Buraimi Oasis, an oasis on the southeast tip of the Arabian 
Peninsula controlling both potential oil reserves and the strategic access to the British-
dominated emirates of Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Oman, in August 1952. London and 
Washington convened talks as the former wanted to regain control and the latter to 
safeguard lucrative oil deals and important airbases in Saudi Arabia. However, 
disagreement lasted until 1957, reflecting an emerging rupture between the two wartime 
allies and founders of the UN.370 As the American National Security Council concluded 
in 1954, “Efforts to prevent the loss of the Near East will require increasing 
responsibility, initiative, and leadership by the United States in the area.”371 
As shown by naval and Cold War historians, the third problem for Anglo-American 
frontier building was the growing assertiveness of the Soviet Union. After the Second 
World War, the Kremlin supported Jewish immigration to Palestine to pressure the 
British. Subsequently, Stalin saw to it that substantial amounts of rifles, machines, 
fighter planes and tanks were delivered to Israel during the 1948 war and Israel 
recognised de jure to force the British out of Palestine and thereby loose, most 
importantly, the port of Haifa and the numerous airfields. However, with the Soviet 
Jewry’s growing fascination with Israel and Israel’s zigzagging in relation to the Korean 
War, the Kremlin broke its diplomatic ties with Israel.372 The following few years of 
absence in both the Middle East and the broader Mediterranean region, it must be noted, 
had less to do with Anglo-American successes in building regional alliances than with 
strategic decisions in Kremlin foreign policy-making. After failing to get a foothold, 
Stalin had initiated a long-term plan to build a blue water navy to counter the Anglo-
American naval supremacy with the ordering of new battleships, cruisers, aircraft 
carriers and submarines. Until these vessels were ready, however, the Soviet navy was 
to operate with strategically defensive but tactically offensive vessels that could operate 
under the protection of land-based air power. The second phase therefore required naval 
and air facilities. After the break with Yugoslavia and Israel and NATOs expansion into 
Greece and Turkey, neutralist Egypt increasingly appeared promising.373 Rooted in 
Stalin’s pursuit of resources and technology, Soviet relations with Eastern Europe and, 
partially, China had been brutal and often close to pillaging, a practice named ‘imperial 
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scavenging’ by historian of the Soviet Union Austin Jersild. After Stalin’s death, 
Khrushchev and the other Politbureau members grew increasingly aware that the Soviet 
approaches beyond the Communist bloc, had to be far more modest if not supportive of 
local regimes, as it had no Red Army presence or offensive blue water navy units.374 
This shift, as the historian of Soviet-Egyptian relations Mohrez Hussini, historian of 
Soviet naval strategy Milan Vego, and historian of US foreign policy David W. Lesch 
have convincingly shown, reflected not only the second phase of navy building. It also 
coincided with the formation of the Baghdad Pact. With the pact, Moscow was able to 
capitalise on the growing Arab irritation with the Anglo-American expansion. First, the 
new leadership under Nikita Khrushchev struck a trading deal involving Egyptian 
cotton for wheat. By 1953, Cairo was considered able and willing to ‘provide’ once 
relations with the West had degraded and ties with Moscow improved. Shortly after the 
visit of Dulles, the American Secretary of State, in mid-1953, which estranged Cairo 
and Washington, Moscow got another deal.375 Additionally, the Baghdad Pact enabled 
Khrushchev to capitalise on the situation in Syria. Here, a pro-Western military coup 
had seen growing anti-government and anti-American riots so strong that the new 
regime had been forced to leave Truman’s global ‘development’ programme along with 
Egypt to move towards each other.376 Despite political differences, a growing number 
of Syrians, not least military officers, were tired of Western intrusion. This was 
manifested in the 1954 counter-coup against the pro-western military dictatorship, 
thereby ending any Western hopes of Syrian participation in the pact. Adding fuel to 
the fire, a right-wing group rumoured to have CIA ties killed the main leader of the 
1954 countercoup, removing Syria completely from the West.377 
With both Washington and Moscow expanding as London, not to mention Paris, 
faced several colonial confrontations, many of the newly independent states began to 
seek more space for autonomy and strategic manoeuvring by either engaging in a 
balancing act between Moscow and Washington, or moving towards either. The new 
Egyptian regime, for example, realised its 1953 cotton-for-oil-and-war-materials-deal 
added a military dimension to Soviet-Egyptian relations. Cairo therefore sought to 
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strike a balance by accepting the military presence of Great Britain at the Suez base 
complex in case of war, engaging in dialogue with the CIA and seeking finances and 
arms from the US, Great Britain, Belgium and Sweden. This strategy, however, proved 
to no avail. Mistakenly feeling betrayed, Whitehall refused to deliver the tanks paid for 
by Egypt before the military coup in 1952, just as Washington declined a request the 
same month as Iraq joined Turkey and Pakistan in the pact, adding insult to injury.378 
When Iraq joined Turkey and Pakistan in 1954, the new Syrian government also next 
announced its support for the Egyptian attempt to counterbalance Western influence via 
Pan-Arabism. Together, and not long before the Yugoslavian leader made a trip to India 
and Burma later in 1954 to find an alternative, Egypt and Syria announced a new Arab 
defence framework under Egyptian command, which both Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
later applauded. In line with the 1950 French-British-American agreement not to sell 
weapons in the Middle East, the US refused to sell arms to Egypt. With US knowledge, 
however, both the British and French struck deals with Israel on British tanks and 
French fighter jets, not only in violation of their agreement, but also leaving Cairo 
behind in an arms race on Israeli initiative.379 Eisenhower would offer only to finance 
Egypt’s modernisation: important to the new regime but only if it would be able to 
defend itself, whether it be with or against its former imperial overlord. In late 1955, 
Egypt eventually bought the vessels and arms it had sought from the West from the 
Soviet Bloc. It did so in a deal that also facilitated a Soviet cultural centre in Cairo and 
talks of more cotton and rice for industrial products and potentially finances for the 
electrification of the country by way of the Aswan dam. The deal, however, was 
arranged only seven months after an Israeli attack on Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip, 
after the US had refused to sell arms to obtain parity and threatened to (illegally) 
blockade all Egyptian ports, and after Nasser’s personal notice to the American 
ambassador and insurances from the Egyptian ambassador to the US that the Soviet 
Union would gain no political influence.380 By then, US officials also managed to 
estrange the government in Belgrade from the West, which it—since its involvement in 
the Greek Civil War—had been forced to turn to for economic and military aid and Italy 
for trade due to the split with the Soviet bloc. The US only succeeded in pushing the 
Communist ‘outcast’ towards a new path of non-alignment in which both India and 
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Egypt also grew interested.381 Aside the Greek, Iranian and Turkish frontier zones 
ensured by Anglo-American cooperation and interventions, Israel, the Jewish settler 
colonial state carved out of the frontier zone of European multinational imperialism of 
Palestine, sought better relations with the Western bloc by way of France. While France 
had donated weapons in 1948 (along with the US that had also sought to gain some 
sway in Israel via economic aid during the Soviet flirt),382 it had since kept Israel at a 
distance. Paris had done so to balance its needs in the Mediterranean for a stable oil 
supply, protected lines of communications to Indochina, colonial stability in Northern 
Africa, and vast profits from selling arms to Syria (until the anti-western coup). From 
1952, France also began to do several deals on arms, artillery pieces, tanks, and 
transport, fighter and bomber planes with Israel, some of which, as mentioned, had US 
support. Additionally, France found attractive Israeli intelligence on Egypt’s 
involvement in Algeria where it was embroiled in colonial warfare, albeit Israeli 
intelligence staff exaggerated the Egyptian support of the Algerian rebels. To Tel Aviv, 
the deals with Paris were the best it could get when Washington and London were 
holding back.383 More importantly, as Israeli historian Guy Laron shows, the Israeli 
armed forces were being re-organised following its higher echelon’s push for an 
offensive strategy to fight wars beyond Israeli territory and in accordance with Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion’s craving for a war to conquer the West Bank from Jordan. 
A middle class revolt, however, took funds from the military border regime. To keep 
expulsed Palestinians from returning to their homes and villages, the Prime Minister 
instead used violent raids on the border forces of the surrounding states to force these 
to control the Palestinians and passed legislation that made ‘infiltration’ a political 
crime. Although Ben-Gurion resigned in 1953, his successor failed to gain enough 
support to alter the new military strategy. Riding/promoting a wave of popular 
militarism driven by fear, Ben-Gurion returned to the post of Prime Minister again in 
1955 and a Chief of Staff, his protégé, looking for a war with Egypt by way of the Gaza 
Strip.384 
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In summary, the 1950s initiated a new phase of external scheming, this time not only 
by the British and French Empires, but also by the heir to the Russian Empire, the Soviet 
Union and its Eastern European satellite system and the Western Bloc under Anglo-
American leadership. In this process, the new states of the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East sought to navigate a number of pressures: which model of modernisation 
to choose and which arms to procure to deal with ‘post-colonial’ conflicts caused by 
British and French multinational imperialism as well as Ottoman imperialism. 
Combined, the mounting external pressures, the growing regional popular and strategic 
frustrations in the context of nationalism, and the regional stocking up of military 
hardware was building up to a substantial crisis on a regional scale. With Egypt not 
surprisingly at the centre, the following year would reveal both how this was to unfold 
and how Washington, with Moscow’s unwitting help, once again, enrolled the UN to 
serve as a vehicle for its geopolitical interests. 
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 5 Chapter 5: Incorporating Egypt 
and The Gaza Strip in the Frontier of Imperial 
Multilateralism via The ‘Suez Crisis’ and The 
UN Intervention(s) 
The crisis would be a result out of how Anglo-American frontier building in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East grew more complex after the Korean War. Firstly, 
the creation of a regional defence regime proved hard. Secondly, Anglo-American 
relations soured with Washington’s increasing influence and military presence. Thirdly, 
the Soviet Union, which also sought a strategic foothold in the region, partly managed 
to use the waning British influence. Finally, both Washington and London misread Arab 
nationalism and the increasingly assertive post-mandate Arab regimes, which the 
British and French had fostered, resulting in among other the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal in 1956.  
However, the Western bloc’s attempt to build a new ‘international’ canal regime, the 
British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt (and the Gaza Strip) and American ‘economic 
diplomacy’, as Diane Kunz calls it,385 also need to be seen in relation to the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary in late 1956. Both crises can be seen as serious rifts in the frontier 
systems the US and the Soviet Union built after 1945. While the Polish army was 
enough for the Polish riots in mid-1956, Moscow, pressed by a regime unable to contain 
popular ire, took to a unilateral military intervention in Hungary. This reflected that the 
turn from an imperial model with native yet heavily supervised regimes that Hungarian 
historian Lazlo Borhi calls ‘empire by coercion’386 to a co-produced model with the 
Warsaw Pact as a first step was still premature. In contrast, Washington was able to 
combine, if painstakingly, its growing global political and economic clout and the 
making of a UN military force and UN clearing operation to hold together, if not 
expand, its frontier system, and thus appear less aggressive than Moscow.  
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5.1 Overstating the Cold War Binary in Frontier-
building: The American and British 
withdrawal of Finances for the Aswan Dam 
and the Egyptian Response, 1953-1956   
The regional confrontation would come to unfold in Egypt, which was at the centre of 
the build-up of opposing agendas, the militarisation of the region and the involvement 
of all the imperial powers and the paternalist polices of the Eisenhower administration, 
the trigger for the subsequent escalation of tension into war. As in other Middle Eastern 
states, and shown above, the Egyptian military government was seeking to navigate 
between external and domestic pressures on the path to modernisation. Over the period 
1954 to 1956, the Egyptian president came to see domestic political repression and the 
building of a massive dam to modernise its electric supply as the largest step in 
modernising the country as a way to balance these pressures.387  
After speaking to Eugene Black, the President of the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) in 1953, Eisenhower decided to use 
Egypt’s push to via the Aswan Dam, which was to provide 50% of the total Egyptian 
power production, as the carrot to rein in the Egyptian military regime. Cairo joined the 
game, and sent representatives from its High Dam Authority to London to hire British 
consulting engineers in September 1955, perhaps to show an interest in the Western 
Bloc as it purchased weapons from the Soviet Bloc the same month.388 By November 
1955, Washington had brought London and the World Bank in on the arrangement to 
finance the dam, but the British government was nervous that the Soviet Union, whose 
presence was increasingly felt in the Mediterranean, would offer finances. Due to 
Egyptian scheming, the deal would also bring the British an enormous contract with a 
consortium with German and French partners. Less concerned with the contract and 
intending to find out whether or not Cairo was revising the budget upwards, Washington 
held back to check the numbers until February 1956, when a deal of 200 million US 
Dollars was signed.389 Additionally, Eisenhower initiated Operation Alpha, a plan to 
guide Egypt and Israel to a peace agreement. However, this failed, mainly due to the 
Israeli want for a war at a time when Egypt had yet to integrate the Soviet arms from 
1955.390  
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However, a little group of high-ranking officials accordingly devised Operation 
Omega, viewing Egyptian attempts to increase its space of manoeuvring through a 
racial lens and deciding they were expressions of irrational emotionalism. This scheme 
was meant to if not rein in at least shrink the Egyptian government’s options by plotting 
to overthrow the Syrian government, to damage the Egyptian cotton industry, and if oil 
routes were threatened in response potentially occupy not only pipeline installations in 
Syria but also the Suez Canal. As the document read, “Measures, even drastic, would 
have to be seriously contemplated.”391 Additionally, American officials concerned with 
oil in both the State Department and the Department of the Interior met with one another 
and NATO petroleum experts several times to consider the impacts of a potential 
closing of the canal to Western ships carrying oil.392 In effect, as the former aide to the 
Egyptian military government Mohamed Heikal noted, the Omega plan was to isolate 
Egypt from the rest of the Arab world to increase American influence.393 Allen Dulles, 
the Secretary of State also wanted to pull the funding of the dam. In June 1956, Black 
told the Eisenhower administration that Nasser “gave every indication of preferring to 
make an agreement with the West (…)”,394 but also warned the administration against 
withdrawing from the dam project as it not only “would have a tremendous impact”395 
but also that “(…) all hell will break loose.” 396 Nevertheless, Dulles kept pushing for a 
withdrawal against the recommendation of several officials. Recovering for several 
weeks after surgery, Eisenhower did not reject Dulles’ plans even if Black sought to do 
so.397 From December 1955, Dulles also expanded an existing strategy of pressuring 
Egypt from the south with exuberant British support. The presence of the Egyptian 
government was considered a nuisance not only in Sudan after the agreement with the 
British, but also in Ethiopia following the 1953 UN backed annexation of Eritrea, where 
the US since the Second World War had maintained and gradually expanded a 
communication station to gather signals intelligence in the Middle East. Consequently, 
they called for Egypt to expand its ‘Unity of Nile Valley’ scheme to include also joint 
water sharing and development plans for several states in east Africa and the great lakes 
region.398  
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Predictably, as most historians taking an interest in the ‘Suez Crisis’ have shown, 
regional tension increased further. Washington, Dulles in particular, grew frustrated 
with what the Americans saw as an increasingly threatening presence of its Muscovite 
imperial rival in the region. Factions in London were angry but could do little about 
neither the withdrawal from the bases along the Suez Canal nor the US. In Paris, 
frustrations linked to the US, but even more so with the Egyptian support of Algerian 
nationalists and the disruption of French shipping in the canal partly in relation thereto. 
Tel Aviv was frustrated as its attempts to start a war with Egypt kept getting sidelined 
while Cairo grew frustrated with being refused arms by the West while Israel got deals 
and therefore engaged in the loading and unloading of French shipping in the ports of 
the Suez Canal.399 Finally, the Egyptian president left for Yugoslavia to speak to both 
Tito and Nehru, the Prime Ministers of Yugoslavia and India and allies in the struggle 
to build a space beyond either imperial bloc, on how to move forward. 400 It was at this 
moment, when the three most important leaders from the Third World involved in 
contesting the increasingly rigid and dangerous international atmosphere, Washington 
and London decided to cancel the funding for the dam.401 Dulles gave the decision to 
Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian ambassador, on the 19th of July as the Egyptian president 
was returning home and after six months of silence from the US on the funding since 
the 200 million Dollar agreement. Informed before he was granted permission to speak, 
Hussein responded to Dulles’ paternalism the only way he could, by letting him know 
that Egypt would then be forced to consult with the Soviet Union, which Dulles found 
a problematic message but delivered with dignity. The same evening the British also 
withdrew their offer to co-fund the Egyptian Aswan Dam project. Although the 
Egyptian president consulted with the American ambassador, Henry Byroade, who had 
grown fond of Nasser as both were military men, he offered no immediate reaction due 
to a religious two-day-long holiday in Egypt in which no newspapers were published.402  
A week later, the Nasser made his intentions of the Egyptian nationalisation of the 
Suez Canal public in a speech to a large crowd in Alexandria.403 As he had calculated 
that the risk of war with the British as 90% in the first days to fade by late October with 
world opinion in Egypt’s favour, he had decided that Dulles’ political decision needed 
a political response.404 The ire of the Egyptian president was understandable after having 
                                               
399 Dietl, “Suez 1956”; Laron, “"Logic Dictates That They May Attack When They Feel They Can Win”; 
Galpern, Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East; Golani, Israel in Search of a War; Nichols, Eisenhower 
1956. 
400 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes, 120–24. 
401 Galpern, Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East, 156. 
402 Borzutzky and Berger, “Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don’t”; Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: 
Suez Through Egyptian Eyes, 130–32; Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, 1991, 72; Nichols, 
Eisenhower 1956, 124–29. 
403 Nichols, Eisenhower 1956, 130. 
404 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes, 133–38. 
  
117 
 
not only been told off after an agreement had been made, but also told off in a paternalist 
fashion. However, putting aside the Western racial lens, the nationalisation could also 
been seen an attempt to increase the Egyptian share of the canal profits to avoid getting 
in bed with the Soviet Union, the—to most—only option left open by Washington. 
Indeed, in 1956, when Egypt received the highest rate of the profits, only 800.000 out 
of 39 million Pounds were passed on from the Suez Canal Company.405 Considering that 
most high-ranking Egyptian officials had not considered nationalisation an option (most 
if not all were surprised, some terrified when they realised it had taken place) and with 
the cost of building the dam assessed to 400 million pounds this seems logical. 
Moreover, although missed by most historians, the historians Silvia Borzutzky and 
David Berger have pointed out that the Egyptian president also discussed dam finances 
with Eugene Black, the president of World Bank, rather than the visiting Soviet foreign 
minister, Dmitry Shepilov when both were in Cairo only four days after Dulles 
withdrew the American financial support.406 This also seems plausible given the ever-
closer consultation with the Yugoslavian and Indian leadership. In any case, a handful 
of Egyptian military units with high ranking officers who had been instructed under the 
threat of death to ensure the continued function of the canal during his speech. The 
nationalisation of the canal thus took place to the loud and wild excitement that could 
be heard in all larger Egyptian cities and towns.407  
Nasser’s move also realised the fears of not only the American Association for the 
United Nations that dated back to the British-Egyptian low-intensity war for the canal 
between 1951 and 1954. The United Nations Association of America’s Commission to 
Study the Organization of Peace, which was populated by several American political 
scientists and scholars of international relations with years of service to the US State 
Department on international matters such as the formation of the UN and strong ties to 
east-coast universities, Columbia especially, and corporate research institutions, also 
grew worried. The commission thus re-sent a statement from November 1951 to both 
Dulles and Hammarskjold. In this, it was argued for the establishment of an 
International Straits Commission and a network of international bases based on that of 
the US to ensure the access of all nations to international waterways such as the Suez 
Canal on basis of the Uniting for Peace resolution used by the US in the Korean War, 
and argued.408 However, the nationalisation had already caused concern in the UN 
Office of Special Political Affairs. This concern was probably not a coincidence, as the 
American Under-Secretary-General Ralph Bunche, a former US Office of Strategic 
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Services analyst, State Department official and major figure in the development of the 
UN trusteeship organisation, led this office. His office subsequently produced a minor 
series of four—by historians hitherto un- or under-consulted—draft memoranda that 
reveal the importance Western high-ranking UN officials assigned to the Suez Canal. 
On basis of the report of the Collective Measures Committee that was born out of 
passing of the United for Peace resolution and possibly also the statement from the 
American Association for the United Nations, UN top officials, most probably from the 
core of high-echelon Westerners, wrote an internal memorandum reflecting on how to 
obtain facilities for a UN force in the Suez Canal area.409 Within a few days, however, 
a rewritten version of the memorandum shifted focus from only the issue of facilities to 
also the establishment of either a UN legion ‘for the defence of the Suez Canal Area’, 
an ‘Executive Military Authority’ drawing troops from a pool provided by ‘individual 
states’. Although it was deleted, the draft suggested that the troops were to be supplied 
by states with a ‘primary interest’ in the utilisation of the Suez Canal, thus an internally 
designed vehicle of imperial multilateralism within the UN.410 Dated the 13th of 
December but with the same name, the third draft stated: “(…) it seems desirable for 
the United Nations to consider what methods might be appropriate to maintain peace 
in the Canal Zone and secure the free passage of ships though the Suez Canal. It is 
evident that armed forces will be necessary to accomplish these purposes.”411 The last 
but also unrealised draft of the memorandum uplifted the functioning of the frontier of 
imperial multilateralism to “the basic principle of freedom of passage to peaceful 
international traffic through the Suez Canal” and “the recognition of special interests 
of States whose vital lines of communication are dependent on free passage of shipping 
through the Suez Canal”,412 which it was suggested a ‘UN Security Authority’ along 
with the states with ‘primary’ interests should uphold.  
Having been of great importance in the world wars and subsequently, the Suez Canal 
had become linked to the British military presence, the oil supply of Western Europe 
and the Commonwealth trade. As argued above, the trigger, reflecting the growing 
American influence, was Washington’s withdrawal of its offer to fund the Aswan dam, 
the centrepiece in the Egyptian military regime’s modernisation project. While Arab 
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nationalism and anti-British sentiments informed the Egyptian regime, it also resembled 
its predecessor, the British dominated monarchy, in its centralised form, which enabled 
the Egyptian government to respond without consulting its broader political apparatus.  
5.2 Washington Versus London/Paris/Tel Aviv: 
The Near Implosion of the Frontier of Imperial 
Multilateralism in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, 1956 
With the Egyptian nationalisation, the Western frontier of imperial multilateralism 
would soon come under pressure due to the very different perceptions of how it should 
be handled. Although a French ship was allowed to pass through the canal without 
paying up front, which was the norm under the Suez Canal Company, as a signal of the 
continued functioning of the canal, the first British reaction was to wage financial 
warfare against Egypt, freezing 60% of the Egyptian Pound reserves, and then put all 
Mediterranean forces on alert. This led Eisenhower, who had now returned, to inform 
Eden, the British prime minister in a stern tone that he found it unwise even to think 
about using force even if the oil situation could become critical. Soon, Eisenhower both 
received word from Eden that the metropolitan part of the British Empire had oil for 
only six weeks and most of Western Europe less and that France was also readying for 
war from the US embassy in Paris.413 Aware of their want for war and the rift that was 
emerging and learning that the nationalisation was the result of the withdrawal of 
American finances, Eisenhower sought to broaden the base of states addressing the Suez 
issue. 
Even if Eisenhower and his officials by way of the CIA knew that London and Paris 
were hesitant about an attack without Washington’s approval, his administration, 
however, to some extent failed to realise but certainly overrode the growing aspirations 
of several European (not to mention several Middle Eastern and Eastern European) 
governments for strategic autonomy.414 Not only had the Marshall Aid, while offering 
financial support, tied the Western European economies into an US dominated 
economic sphere, it had also turned Western Europe into addicts of oil.415 Additionally, 
several of the western European governments and politicians had grown weary of what 
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they saw as American divide-and-conquer politics in Europe. The US had not only 
nuclearized Great Britain (with Canadian help)416 and used ‘the special relationship’ to 
separate it from Europe. Washington had also pressed Western Germany into NATO 
(after the American push for the European Defence Community had failed as Cold War 
historian Michael Creswell has shown),417 forcing about in the process an Soviet military 
bloc on the doorstep of Western Europe, to, as Cold War historian Ralph Dietl argues, 
“(…) assure US control over the Western European subsystem and superpower control 
over a future all-European structure emerging out of the Western European 
subsystem.”418 Subsequently, France abandoned the idea of the ‘Atlantic community’, 
which Canada and Great Britain had also supported. Instead, Paris turned to the vision 
of Eurafrique’, intending to re-centre the Mediterranean, co-opt West-Germany and 
reel Great Britain back in.419 Furthermore, this divisive effect also marked the Western 
sectors of nuclear technology and energy, even if, as the historian of technology and 
science John Krige argues, “The force field of empire that emanated from Washington 
was co-produced”.420 Another factor in promoting Western European dissent—and in 
relation to ‘Eurafrique’ as well as the upkeep of empire—was European shipping. 
Indeed, a projection by the Suez Canal User Association (formed during the crisis) of 
the figures from 1955 to 1956, had a handful of Western imperial and colonial powers 
and NATO members pay 78% of the canal dues (of which the British paying 40%, and 
then the French 11%, the Americans 11%, the Italians 6%, the Norwegians 5%, and the 
Dutch 5%).421  
It was therefore foreseeable that the August 1st emergency meeting that was initiated 
to prevent a silent approval of the nationalisation by the International Chamber of 
Shipping, the globally dominant and western-led corporative shipping interest 
organisation, was only the beginning of a broader European/Western response. The 
representatives from the British Empire, the ‘white’ Commonwealth and India, 
Belgium, the Scandinavian countries, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and the US agreed 
that they should meet with American oil representatives to discuss a users’ association 
and in relation thereto make a small working committee with representatives from Great 
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Britain, the Scandinavian states, Italy, France, the Netherlands and India. Although the 
more moderate Danish, Indian and Greek agents abstained from voting, the chamber 
also passed a resolution stating that—since the canal was international and not the 
domestic affair of one country—using it to finance national projects was 
unacceptable.422 The chamber also lent its support to the Suez Canal Company for which 
its director thanked the chamber as the company ‘felt’—after having run a canal that 
cost thousands of Egyptian lives to marginal benefit of Egyptians—“(…) so unjustly 
robbed”.423  
Seeking to uphold overall control, Dulles also met with Eden and stated that 
Washington would not back military intervention, as it was necessary to use other 
means to regain control of the oil and communications supply lines. Although he, in 
line with the wishes of the International Chamber of Shipping, called a conference in 
London to rein in the American allies, he failed to reduce London and Paris’ 
frustrations,424 which went deeper than imperial lines of communications, shipping and 
weary relations with the US. Facing not only the Suez group and a media landscape in 
favour of intervention despite a regime of censorship but also a growing financial crisis 
and pressure on the Pound, the Eden government called up reservists on the 2nd of 
August, thereby increasing the risk of war.425 Mollet’s government was equally enraged. 
Having lost its mandates earlier and struggling with the violent collapses of the 
discriminative racially ordered social-political colonial states in Indochina and Algeria 
and rising tension in Morocco and Tunisia, Paris wanted to keep not only empire and 
status. The French government also wanted to reduce its dependence on the US and 
NATO (that had paid for communication services in north-west Africa), even if it was 
to make a standby-agreement with the International Monetary Fund by mid-October.426 
Indeed, Tito’s cordial visit to Paris in July had left him with the impression that the 
French were (also) sick of the global duality and, mistakenly, interested in non-
alignment, which he told Nasser.427 Not only was the defence ministry and industry 
                                               
422 Minutes of Emergency Meeting of International Chamber of Shipping 1 August 1956, J. Ch. Aschgreen 
1956 m. fl, 1956-1958, Korrespondance fra Rederiforeningen vedr. Suezkanalen, DNBA 
423  Letter from Manager of Suez Canal Company to Director of International Chamber of Shipping 1 August, 
J. Ch. Aschgreen 1956 m. fl, 1956-1958, Korrespondance fra Rederiforeningen vedr. Suezkanalen, DNBA 
424 Nichols, Eisenhower 1956, 151. 
425 Galpern, Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East, 174–78; Jeff Hulbert, “Right-Wing Propaganda or 
Reporting History?: The Newsreels and the Suez Crisis of 1956,” Film History 14, no. 3/4 (2002): 261–81; 
Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis (London; 
New York; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, I.B. Tauris ; In the U.S.A. and Canada distributed by St. 
Martin’s, 1996). 
426 James M. Boughton, “IMF Working Paper: Northwest of the Suez: Crisis and the IMF” (International 
Monetary Fund, 2000); Peter J. Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition 
in Francophone Africa.,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 3 (2000): 395–419; Martin Thomas, “France’s 
North African Crisis, 1945-1955: Cold War and Colonial Imperatives,” History 92, no. 306 (2007): 207–34. 
427 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes, 128. 
  
122 
 
selling large numbers of fighter jets, tanks and arms to Israel, the Israeli-French 
intelligence and political ties also grew closer, especially after the nationalisation, thus 
putting Paris and Cairo ever more at odds.428 In the Jewish settler colony, Ben-Gurion 
had re-seized power. Increasingly armed with French, British and West-German 
weapon systems and a wish for war with Egypt (before the integration of the Soviet 
arms was complete) and Egypt all but interested in a war, he, other hardliners, and the 
military built up a public expectance of war.429 Moreover, Israel’s relationship with the 
UN deteriorated. The General-Secretary had already driven though the Gaza Strip in 
1955 to draw attention to the border tension just as the Security Council had called on 
Tel Aviv to respect the armistice rather than raid Egypt and Jordan (to instigate war and 
force these to restrict the Palestinians from returning).430  
Fearing that the conference might fail, Eisenhower ordered the State and Defense 
departments to make contingency plans for supplying Western Europe with oil at a 
solely canal-oriented meeting of the US National Security Council on the 9th of August. 
Accordingly, the US Maritime Institute notified the International Chamber of Shipping 
that American companies owned and controlled many of the vessels operating under 
foreign flags.431 When the British transferred 5.000 troops to Cyprus two days later, 
Eisenhower, in recognition that the canal was still open and functioning, decided that 
his administration would not support its allies should they resort to force, confidentially 
accepting thereby the nationalisation by Egypt.432 Although both Eisenhower and Dulles 
expected failure at the conference, they sought to set up an international organisation to 
run the canal over two conferences in London.433 In doing so, they proposed a civilian 
organisation very similar to those proposed (internally) by staff in the UN Office for 
Special Political Affairs and the American Association for the United Nations (USAA=. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, as the USAA had sent the aforementioned statement to both 
Dulles and the US Mission to the UN (and the UN Secretary-General) the day after 
Nasser had nationalised the Suez Canal (and to all its chapters across the US two weeks 
later in a pro-British/French and anti-Nasser letter).434 At the same time as pursuing the 
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users’ organisation, the Eisenhower administration also considered a boycott of the 
Suez Canal with other canal user governments to strike at Nasser by taking oil tankers 
around Africa instead.435 
Wanting to use force but uncertain how, London and Paris saw both options as 
insufficient to legitimise this. Whitehall also, once more, sought support from the 
(white) Commonwealth despite their gradual turn towards the US over the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. To bring the parties closer, Australia led a mission with representatives 
from states belonging more in the American camp than anywhere else: Ethiopia, Iran, 
and Sweden (and the US). However, Australia was no neutral arbiter. Canberra had not 
only found that “The continued commercial and defence importance of the Suez Canal 
in our communication with the Mediterranean and Europe cannot be doubted, and the 
liberty and security if the Canal remain an important Australian interest”436 over the 
1950s. By 1956, 60% of Australia’s imports and exports went through the canal just as 
the Middle East provided 65% of its crude and partly refined petroleum and 40% of its 
total petroleum imports.437 Predictably, therefore, the Australian Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies failed. For its part, Pretoria had long seen Cairo as communism’s potential 
gateway to eastern Africa, and therefore seen the British act unwise and estrange a 
natural ally and not least the host of the base complex along the Suez Canal. 
Additionally, the South Africans could relate to the Egyptian argument that domestic 
affairs were domestic and not British affairs. Along with the Canadians, who had gotten 
close with the US politically, economically and militarily, the South Africans, therefore, 
preferred a conference to settle the differences.438 Disappointed, the British sought to 
enlist the Scandinavians, also shipping nations dependent on oil passing through the 
canal. The Norwegian shipowners wanted western control while Norway’s foreign 
minister, Halvard Lange wanted an international control but no military force. Unaware 
of British and French intentions, Lange saw Great Britain and France as moderate and 
willing to compromise. While the Americans and the British recognised Lange as a 
hardliner given Norway was the second largest canal user by 1956, they saw Danish 
and Swedish diplomats as weak and putting the new organisation at risk. Accordingly, 
they sought to pressure Lange to influence the other Scandinavian governments to take 
firmer stand.439 Additionally, London was frustrated with Washington taking middle 
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and not supportive positions.440 With the British economy effectively left, as Galpern 
notes, in the hands of the Egyptian president, London (and Paris) encouraged all the 
non-Egyptian staff to quit to prevent Egypt from running the canal efficiently (although 
the Egyptian pilots managed to bring through more ships than had the British and 
French pilots).441 In response, Egypt on the 10th of September stated that although it had 
not infringed the rights of any government Great Britain had immediately met it with 
hostile economic measures and threats of war, just as the US, Great Britain and France 
had demanded the appointment of an international organisation. Furthermore, it also 
criticised their invitation of 21 other governments without consulting and inviting 
Egypt. It therefore praised the Sri Lankan, Indonesian and Soviet governments calling 
for negotiations to include Egypt. The note ended with a plea for negotiations that would 
lead to an outcome protecting Egyptian sovereignty.442 
The Egyptian government was not alone in disputing both the intentions and the 
legality of a user association in relation to the conferences. Perhaps more interestingly, 
several of the larger British shipping owners informed Whitehall that they foresaw great 
difficulties in international scheme. Moreover, the Nordic shipping owners also made 
clear that although they would support the resolution at the conference they would let 
their governments know there would be problems.443 In the sphere of international law, 
Max Sørensen, a renowned Danish expert on international law, sent the Danish Foreign 
Ministry a highly critical memo that was passed to the Danish Shipowners Association 
(and probably beyond). He argued that the plan of letting a user association take over 
the coordination, the pilot service and the exercise of ‘other’ rights appeared 
incompatible with Egypt’s sovereignty over the canal and the adjacent area without 
Egyptian consent. Sørensen also argued that the plan of having only this organisation 
collect transfer fees from its members would challenge Egyptian sovereignty. He ended 
by noting that Egypt would be legally free to refuse the organisation to operate in Egypt, 
to stop ships using other pilots than those approved or supplied by Egypt and finally be 
in her full rights to prevent ships that refused to pay to use the canal.444 Not invited to 
the conference, the UN representatives of Lebanon and Syria, which both had 
experienced European and especially French meddling, sent a joint letter to the UN 
Security Council, which was also released to the international press. Using information 
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from the French and British press, their letter expressed both concern with the French 
military build-up on Cyprus under the pretension that these forces (of more than 30.000 
soldiers, troop transport ships, warships and jets) were only to potentially rescue French 
citizens. Finally, they wished for the Security Council to intervene as the build-up, not 
wrongly, constituted a “(…) definite threat to the maintenance of international peace 
and security in the region”,445 and that a potential armed intervention would constitute 
“(…) a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and of International 
Law”.446 Additionally, the continued and effortless operation of the canal was noticed 
in the West. However, the Danish Foreign Ministry, to take one example that was most 
probably typical, assumed Egypt had brought in experienced Soviet pilots, thus 
racialising the Egyptians via a discourse of low expectations even if the Danish shipping 
companies were saying everything was as normal.447 
However, Great Britain and France would ignore not only these criticisms, but also 
the growing domestic opposition, especially in London, and their most important ally 
and sponsor over late September and the first half of October. London and Paris thus 
disregarded (what they may have known about) the Eisenhower administration’s 
attempt to use the World Bank as an intermediary to Nasser at the suggestion of the 
former president of the World Bank John McCloy,448 Dulles’ repeated warning against 
using force again, 449 and, finally, that American oil companies had increased their 
production in the US and Venezuela following Eisenhower’s request to the Foreign 
Petroleum Supply Committee (so that it by mid-September passed the oil going through 
the Suez Canal in volume).450  If anything, the cooperation through the recently formed 
corporatist Middle East Emergency Committee and Oil Emergency London Advisory 
Committee, another vehicle of the frontier of imperial multilateralism, as argued by the 
Indian scholar of international relations M. S. Venkataramani, “(…) was a major factor 
in emboldening Eden and Mollet to go on the war path.”451 After secret deliberation in 
France (as the Israeli attacks on Jordan, the British ally, had nearly forced London to 
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war with Tel Aviv),452 a three-phase plan was consequently agreed upon during October. 
First, British planners made Egypt their target and Israel their ally. Second, Israel was 
to attack Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Third, this would to allow London and Paris to make 
an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel on ending combat and withdrawing from the canal, 
insert bombers to demolish Egyptian defences, and then, when Nasser would 
expectedly fell, deploy a joint expedition force to ‘protect’ the canal.  
The plan was set in motion with the Israeli attack against the Gaza Strip and the Sinai 
Peninsula on October 29th. During the Israeli operations, Eisenhower, in the dark of the 
invasion, informed Nasser that the Western powers would not get involved. However, 
British reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Sinai, Suez and Port Said to gather 
intelligence for the invasion and London and Paris issued their ultimatum the following 
day despite Egyptian pilots still taking ships through the canal.453 Embodying the near 
implosion of the frontier of imperial multilateralism and its oil supply, British planes 
bombed airfields in Cairo that London itself had paid for while thousands of Americans 
evacuated to Alexandria on the 31st of October and the British Prime Minister engaged 
in what historian Keith Kyle has called ‘mounting anti-Americanism.454 Altogether, the 
British and French mustered 230 warships, freighters and aircraft carriers, 20.000 
vehicles and landing craft, 100.000 troops and supplies.455 
5.3 Repairing the frontier of Imperial 
Multilateralism - I: The Sixth Fleet and 
Economic Diplomacy  
Although perspectives are changing, as can be seen in the references in these sections, 
many of the conventional British and American histories of the ‘Suez Crisis’ still hold 
strong influences in historiography in the form of nationally-focused post-war histories 
on ‘the end of empire’ and the Eisenhower doctrine.456 I argue here, conversely, that it 
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is necessary to understand the Eisenhower administration’s navigation of the ‘Suez 
Crisis’, which was in part its own and Eden’s government making, not as two national 
histories, but as a single history of the frontier of imperial multilateralism, which saw 
American involvement from the First World War. 
In Washington, Eisenhower and his officials were not aware that a plot had been 
hatched. The reaction to the Israeli attack on Egypt and the Gaza Strip in October 29th 
therefore reflected an initially narrow, if sharp, reaction. Having both sought to 
negotiate a solution to the nationalisation of the canal and been left dissatisfied with the 
Israeli in relation to the Alpha Plan, Eisenhower had moved further away from his 
predecessor’s affinity for Israel. When his staff informed him both that army units in 
Europe and the US had been placed on alert and the Sixth Fleet repositioned and of the 
risk of all-out war, Eisenhower therefore screamed at Dulles “Foster, you tell ‘em, God-
damm-it, that we are going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations, we’re 
going to do everything we can to stop this thing.”457 Eisenhower grew furious as the 
British and French forces started to bomb Egypt after the Egyptian president’s rejection 
of the false ultimatum. It did not help that Nasser, which Eisenhower (via the racialised 
lens most American officials viewed Arabs through)458 not unlike Eden and Mollet 
considered a ‘villain’,459 asked Eisenhower to commit the US militarily to Egypt, 
something which he had indeed offered earlier. While Eisenhower wanted to prevent 
Eden and Mollet from invading Egypt—unless they could topple Nasser first in which 
case they would American support—he would not attack them as Nasser was in effect 
asking.460 As Truman had used the Uniting for Peace Resolution to make the UN a 
coercive instrument in Korea, Eisenhower also decided to use the UN, having already 
considered it to restrain Israel while also seeing an intensifying Soviet propaganda 
campaign (to shift attention from Hungary to Egypt and the Gaza Strip), and learning 
from the embassy in Cairo that Nasser did not want Moscow involved.461 Thus, 
Washington had its UN representatives consult with the UN Secretary-General (who 
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had previously showed himself to be a man willing to go against the Soviet Union when 
he as a Swedish minister had signed a treaty with the US on exporting strategic and thus 
prohibited commodities to the Soviet Bloc)462 and his staff and Yugoslavian, Indian, 
Latin American and Soviet diplomats. As Yugoslavia stood to gain from brokering a 
deal as relations with Moscow were turning sour and the Soviet Union was trying to 
control its own frontier system, the US gained a bit of breathing space by having both 
the Soviet Union withdraw its criticism of the British and French and the General 
Assembly to take over the matter via the Uniting for Peace Resolution from 1950.463 
Although the British had not been keen on the resolution when Truman pushed it 
through the UN due to fears of it being used against their empire and that it would anger 
the Soviet Union, they had supported it due to the backing of the ‘white’ 
Commonwealth and the wish to avoid a rift with the US.464 To the White House’s 
benefit, the governments of the ‘white’ Commonwealth states were partially irritated, 
as they had not been consulted. While the Prime Minister of Australia Robert Menzies, 
the Prime Minister of New Zealand Sidney Holland (who had a naval vessel with the 
British Mediterranean forces from an earlier posting), and the extremist Prime Minister 
of the Central African Federation Roy Welensky were supportive, their political 
landscapes or foreign policy apparatuses were not. This left the British isolated within 
both the Commonwealth and NATO. Finally, London stood weaker in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East not only with the members of the Baghdad Pact, but 
also Libya, in which it had base rights. Subsequently, London‘s hope of using airfields, 
bases and ports in Libya as staging grounds was shut down with the Libyan 
denunciation of the Israeli attack, and the British ambassador in Libya warned London 
that violence would break out if it were realised that the British planes in Libya were 
covering the fleet bombarding Egypt.465 
On the 2nd of November, however, London undid the work of Washington. The US, 
and thereby the fabric of its frontier in Europe, was again put under pressure by the 
attacks on Egyptian airfields by British and French aircraft from Malta, Cyprus and 
several aircraft carriers. Aware by way of the CIA’s prior overflights of Egypt and Syria 
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with U-2 reconnaissance planes (which the CIA had passed to the British) that Kremlin 
did not immediately have naval and air force assets in place, the Eisenhower 
administration expected a Soviet-led UN blockade against the invading nations as the 
most likely counter-move. Moreover, as Egypt began blocking the canal, which had 
been functioning past the first joint attacks on Egypt, with cement-laden ships, the oil 
supply to Western Europe going via the Suez Canal was cut off. Adding pressure, pro-
Egyptian units in the Syrian army incapacitated three pumping stations on the Iraqi 
pipeline going through Syria to Tripoli in Lebanon, nearly leading the pro-Western Iraqi 
regime to attack Syria to protect its oil outlets.466 Finally, the Egyptian population and 
Nasser’s opponents did not rise to a regime change as the British hoped for. Rather, the 
national guards were armed just as university and secondary school students signed up 
for national service.467 
Consequently, the US took several measures. Both a short term and strategic aim 
was to on the one hand help and on the other pressure its allies to back into the fold and 
move towards re-establishing the oil supply regime via re-opening the canal (as the 
Egyptian regime had not collapsed). Moreover, it was a strategic goal to keep out the 
Soviet Union. The Joint Middle East Planning Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
feared it would not only intensify its anti-Western propaganda against both NATO and 
the Baghdad Pact, transfer large numbers of Soviet forces onto the Soviet Bloc 
periphery, and potentially provide ‘volunteers’. The Soviet Union was also feared to 
seek to turn to indirect means of leverage such as to encourage oil pipeline sabotage, 
offer material support to Egypt, seek Israel expulsed from the UN, and finally, seek to 
be appointed by the UN to restore order in the Middle East.468 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were therefore tasked with both intimidating the British and French and protecting them 
from potential both small and large-scale Soviet attacks. Subsequently, the Sixth Fleet 
moved closer than previously and placed some vessels between those of the British and 
French and let US planes overfly these, in effect beginning to cast a web of NATO 
protection over the forces of its British and French allies despite their status as the 
aggressive belligerents.469 Until the British and French forces were landed in Egypt, 
more vessels would be added over the first days of November to enhance the reception 
of this message with multiple addressees.470  
Moreover, Washington also resorted to economic diplomacy although it initially 
refused to talk of financial aid and oil replacements until a ceasefire and troop 
withdrawal had been agreed upon (even if preparations had been made). As Galpern 
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notes, “The administration pursued this policy not only to penalize Britain for what it 
viewed as country’s disloyalty and irresponsible action, but also to protect US interests 
in the Middle East, which it feared would be damaged by any open association with 
Britain and France.471 This hit the British harder than the French as the latter had drawn 
on its gold and credit allotments from the International Monetary Fund before the 
invasion, and the Eisenhower administration initially refused the British access to funds 
via the IMF or the Export-Import Bank of the United States and American oil 
companies got permission to sell oil for Sterling. Soon, therefore, the British faced a 
veritable run on their reserves, which led them to plummet below what was considered 
necessary for the Sterling area to function and thus a great fear in Whitehall that the 
Sterling crisis would not only lead to the break-up of the Sterling area but also the 
Commonwealth.472 As the White House and Whitehall conferred, the issue of funds 
from the IMF came up again. Wishing to withdraw 75% of its allowance (more than 4 
times the hitherto largest withdrawal), London nevertheless feared that the American, 
Egyptian and Latin American directors of the executive board of the IMF would be able 
to oppose its withdrawal rights if the Chinese, Indian and Japanese directors could not 
be convinced to vote with the European, Australian and Canadian directors.473 Indeed, 
the British request was approved only after the acceptance of the ceasefire and troop 
withdrawal and the American treasury overcame its concern that there would be a run 
against the IMF as there had been against the Sterling. Once that had happened, 
however, as Boughton argues, “All that remained was for the Executive Board to ratify 
the arrangements that been agreed bilaterally between the two great powers.”474 It is 
telling both that the IMF became an international irregular lender when it was needed 
to support the American goal of maintaining its frontier system and that the loan had 
been agreed upon bilaterally for the board later to accept. As a last way to ease the 
financial pains of its ally, the Eisenhower administration waived a loan on 143 million 
Dollars due to fall on December 31st. 475 
In addition to the military and financial measures, the White House reactivated the 
Middle East Emergency Committee to supply its NATO allies with extra American and 
Venezuelan oil until the canal reopened.476 However, it was careful not to do this too 
fast so as not to outwardly appear to be helping the British and French imperial 
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powers.477 At the same time, the Soviet Union slowly began what American political 
scientist Arthur Jay Klinghoffer has called an ‘oil offensive’, which made the re-
opening of the canal and American-directed supplements key. The Soviet Union was at 
the time increasing its export of southbound oil (even if most oil was northbound), 
selling oil to China and transporting to its far eastern regions, as overland transport was 
too expensive.478 By Mid-November, several Western European governments had 
approached Washington to enquire as to when the oil-scheme would provide oil as their 
resources were dwindling to approximately two weeks of crude supply and purchasing 
oil in Dollar would threaten their Dollar holdings.479 The need for oil, however, went far 
beyond rationing, oil and Dollar economics. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for European Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
recognised and informed the Secretary of State, “If we show ourselves unresponsive to 
their needs, it is questionable whether we could count indefinitely upon their unreserved 
cooperation with respect to Western defense and NATO.”480 Thus, at stake was no less 
than the frontier of imperial multilateralism. Washington consequently reactivated the 
MEEC and also closed the Oil Emergency London Advisory Committee. However, to 
keep up appearances before not only the Arabs, which “(…) are moved by emotion and 
not by the judgement of businessmen”,481 and the governments of the non-aligned states, 
Washington also had the Council of the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation establish the broader Petroleum Industry Emergency Group within the OEEC. 
Next, Eisenhower also wrote a personal message to the Saudi King, King Saud, to thank 
him for his understanding and continued efforts in keeping the oil running (so as not to 
make matters worse than retaining oil from the British and French empires aside their 
Muslim colonies).482 As the memorandum of a phone conversation between the 
Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, and the President had Humphrey note, 
“(…) we have got to keep working with the Arabs. We are on their side until these 
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fellows get out.”483 Not surprisingly, the State Department instructed its personnel in 
Middle Eastern countries producing oil for Western Europe (and the US) that 
“Maximum effort should be made to play up their self interest and to demonstrate that 
the US is continuing to do everything possible to minimize financial impact upon 
them”,484 although American officials would continue to focus on ensuring that the US 
kept the Saudi Monarchy’s “(…) interests uppermost in mind.”485 Despite problems due 
to the hostility against its allies, the US managed well. Until the oil supply problems 
caused by ‘Suez Crisis’ had been resolved, this, if ad hoc, US-dominated oil supply 
scheme thus managed to provide as much as 80% of the Western European oil needs 
and strengthen the interdependency within the overall frontier.486 
As in the First World War, the US was able to either support or damage its British 
and French imperial counterparts, especially as it had turned to multilateralism as a 20th 
century version of the mostly collapsed older forms of empire three decades before the 
British and French began to move in that direction. Aside the IMF and the multinational 
oil-scheme, the Eisenhower administration also turned to the UN in a way that will 
make it clear that the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Suez 
Clearance Organization also need to appear in a different role than the first authentic 
‘peacekeeping’ operation as it is labelled within the research field on ‘peacekeeping’.487 
5.4 Repairing the Frontier of Imperial 
Multilateralism - II: The UN  
In extension of the Eisenhower administration’s use of its military means, the Petroleum 
Industry Emergency Group within the OEEC, and the IMF, I argue that the UNEF and 
UNSCO ought also to be understood as part of the efforts to sustain the frontier of 
imperial multilateralism within the global imperial system. Neither UNEF nor UNSCO 
interventions were well-defined plans set in motion, but ad hoc navigation from the 
outset. Nevertheless, they reflected the continuation of building the frontier of imperial 
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multilateralism in the Mediterranean and the Middle East in much the same way the 
inter-imperial interventions in Crete and Albania and the Western-led and dominated 
intervention in Korea were expressions of the frontier of imperial multilateralism. 
At the UN, the Eisenhower administration initially took to writing a UN Resolution for 
the General Assembly to pass to avoid action against its allies, and subsequently the 
involvement of UN institutions to allow the British and French (as well as Israeli) forces 
to withdraw and, finally, to re-open the Suez Canal. As for the resolution, Eisenhower 
had Dulles write up a resolution for the evening meeting in the General Assembly (of 
November 2nd) with the “mildest things we could do”,488 calling for the withdrawal of 
all military forces and the re-opening of the canal. Indicatively, only the invaders, 
Australia and New Zealand voted against the American resolution after several hours 
of General Assembly discussions into the night.  
Concerning the formation of a UN force, the US picked up the idea the Canadians 
launched November 2nd. The suggestion of a UN force came from Lester Pearson, the 
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs who had previously been in charge of running the 
affairs of the Commonwealth and the League of Nations (and who may have been privy 
to internal memo’s of Bunche’s Department of Special Political Affairs). Already 
during the expansion of the frontier of imperial multilateralism in Asia in the Korean 
War, Pearson argued that Canada had to respect American “leadership…in the conflict 
against Communist imperialism.”489 He also argued there could “be times when 
[Canada] should abandon [its] position if it is more important to maintain unity in the 
face of the common foe”.490 On basis of his racialised Anglo-Saxonism and his broader 
take on geopolitics, he wanted to strengthen further Canadian relations to what 
Canadian historian John Price calls its southern ‘imperial ally’ beyond what had taken 
place militarily and politically after 1945.491 Pearson’s idea, however, was not new. As 
noted by his contemporary, the Canadian political scientist Graham Sprye, he had been 
a staunch supporter for a UN police force in the Middle East, which he had promoted 
tirelessly from 1955 in London, Washington, Paris, Tel Aviv and Cairo.492 Pearson and 
Hammarskjold had initially discussed a UN force that would include the British and 
French forces, recalls Urquhart, but the moment had passed.493 After the General 
Assembly passed Dulles’ resolution, Pearson took the opportunity to suggest his much-
wanted UN force in the international forum. Dulles seized the moment in the General 
Assembly to request formally that the Canadians work out a UN force proposal. Closing 
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the day in New York, the Canadian ambassador explained to Dulles that the St. Laurent 
government and Pearson especially wanted American and Canadian troops to lift the 
British Empire out of its predicament and bring it closer to the US again.494 The next 
day, however, Washington once again saw its frontier system challenged. First, the 
British and French started bombing. Second and in response to the bombing, three 
pipelines in Syria were blown up. Third, Eden sought to turn the UN force of the 
Canadian-American suggestion into the ‘police action’ he had initiated with Mollet to 
blur the lines between what the British and French were doing and what the UN was 
potentially setting out to do, despite the risk that the US would be compelled to use the 
Sixth Fleet against them on behalf of the UN.495 Facing an Indian resolution that 
suggested a force from Czechoslovakia and an Asian country with US air transport,496 
the American representative at the UN phoned the Secretary-General, the Swedish 
diplomat Dag Hammarskjold, to gain support for its own resolution proposal that was 
in the making.497 By the evening, on November 3rd, Washington had Hammarskjold’s 
support for a new Canadian resolution proposal and was busy gathering support 
amongst its allies as well as align the Indian resolution proposal with the Canadian.498 
American diplomats spent the following day coordinating troop contributions and 
logistics with Hammarskjold, disregarding that the Mollet government had informed 
the Eisenhower administration that they felt that Eisenhower had taken them completely 
of the canal issue, made them as guilty as Egypt and not least put them under more 
pressure than the Soviet Union over Hungary.499 Ignoring the French, the Eisenhower 
administration and Hammarskjold agreed on the US providing the airlift for the 
emerging UN force. Hammarskjold also informed the American officials that the 
foreign ministers of Canada, India, Norway and Colombia, which aside India were all 
in the orbit of the US, were willing to provide troops. Finally, he added that he was 
going to talk to more NATO members, Latin American states and states such as Iran 
and Ethiopia, which were also all parties to the frontier of imperial multilateralism.500 
Expectedly, the White House not only discussed the composition of the UN force with 
the Secretary-General in private as it had settled the IMF arrangement for the British. It 
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also spent the day drumming up support from its frontier zones in the form of the 
members of the regional organisations of the Mediterranean, the Middle East and South 
East Asia for the vote. From the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, Pakistan, 
Thailand and the Philippines voted in favour.501 The representatives of the French and 
British empires abstained as did those of Australia and New Zealand, even if the latter 
two assigned great importance to their military alliances with the US. Pretoria’s 
representatives not only abstained, South Africa also left the activities of the UN 
altogether at the end of the month.502 Saudi Arabia and all members of the Baghdad Pact 
aside Turkey voted in favour of the UN force.503 Turkey abstained, but instead took to 
limiting the effects of the invasion on the Baghdad Pact of which it was itself a member. 
The American Ambassador to Iraq saw the Menderes government as having a calm 
bearing, even if the British were temporarily excluded from the pact meetings.504 In 
West Germany, however, the British acceptance of the ceasefire caused distress due to 
the sympathies with the invasion. Moreover, Konrad Adenauer, the West-German 
Chancellor, spent time with Mollet in Paris during the peak of the crisis, the 5th and 6th 
of November, when the British and French forces were landed in Egypt, showing his 
sympathy rather than abstaining as Portugal since neither German state could not vote 
at the UN (until 1973). Until the NATO Council meeting in mid-December, France and 
West Germany subsequently sought to move ahead with a ‘Little Europe’ linked to the 
West European Union, having lost Great Britain to the Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship’. However, as international historian Ralph Dietl argues, the NATO 
Council left no doubt: Europe as a ‘third force’ was dead.505 However, the European 
NATO members of Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Spain, many of which were either amongst the largest canal users or with their own 
Mediterranean designs, all voted in favour (on November 4th), as did many of the 
European countries outside NATO: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Sweden.506 Having gained the votes of all 19 Latin American states and most of the non-
aligned states, 507 Washington also ensured that the Soviet criticism that the UN force 
was illegal never gained track. Indeed, the Soviet representatives, and thus also the rest 
of the East Bloc (aside Yugoslavia), were forced to abstain.508 Moscow’s other strategy 
of threatening the invading states and requesting Washington to join an attack on the 
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invading states should they not respect the UN resolutions also failed.509 Washington 
not only responded with a little veiled threat on behalf of the UN that stated opposition 
would be met with use of force, including that of the US, and noted that Soviet Union 
had failed to support the UN force. Washington also began to build up contingency 
forces in Saudi Arabia, ordered its air force to plan for the potential airlifts of the 
different UN contingents and place all heavy troop carrier wings on 12-hour alert, put 
the Sixth Fleet on ‘increased readiness’ and had the Atlantic and Pacific fleets 
reinforced. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the number of aircraft on the 5-
minute ‘advanced state of alert’ doubled and training halted.510 Having secured the UN 
as a means amongst several to stabilise the Western, but American dominated frontier 
system of imperial multilateralism, Eisenhower called Eden to tell him to, 
unconditionally, accept the UN arrangements to the extent Eden began to write down 
what to tell the British parliament.511 Washington, however, still made its anxiety on 
Soviet ‘volunteers’ clear to Hammarskjold and that it would be best if “(…) there be no 
vacuum between time of departure of British-French forces and arrival of UN forces 
(…).”512 While he was content with the creation of a UN force, Eisenhower complained 
to Dulles that it was happening too slowly and that if he were (directly) in charge troops 
would be flown in when they were ready for deployment, even if it would be in groups 
as small as fifty. This would also have made it clear that, as the White House wanted, 
the force was not an occupation force.513  
As for the re-opening of the Suez Canal in light of the unsustainability of the temporary 
OEEC oil-replacement arrangement, the Eisenhower administration also from 
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November 7th began coordinating privately with Hammarskjold, who—if there were 
any doubts about his allegiances—requested the US diplomats to convey his deepest 
appreciation to Eisenhower. They agreed that the British and French offer of technicians 
for clearing the canal to retain some influence and something to bring home were to be 
rejected and that the Secretary-General speak to the Danish and Dutch NATO members 
instead.514 The same evening, Hammarskjold invited the American representatives and 
an intelligence representative from the State Department to a meeting that also included 
his Executive Assistant, the American Andrew Cordier, and his Undersecretary, the 
American Ralph Bunche.515 The latter two were significant. In 1944, Cordier was shifted 
from his post as international security advisor in the State Department to set up the UN, 
which then hired him, possibly with some nudging, first as Undersecretary of the then 
Western-dominated General Assembly, then as Special Representative in the Korean 
War, and, finally, as Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General. By 1956, he was 
thus in one of the most privileged positions in the UN. Cordier’s meddling in Congo a 
few years later is well known,516 but little work appears to have investigated whether or 
not he had two masters until his role in the UN intervention shaped from ‘Suez Crisis’. 
In any case, before the evening meeting with Hammarskjold, Cordier had already 
passed on information to the American ambassador at the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, and 
would later receive information from the US, most likely as a way to seek to get 
Hammarskjold’s attention or support.517 For his part, Bunche was no small fish either. 
Educated in political science with fieldwork in British and Dutch colonies and ties to 
the Carnegie Foundation, Bunche was first hired by the CIA’s predecessor, the Office 
of Strategic Services, where he executed psychological warfare within the context of 
colonial affairs in Africa and the Middle East.518 Then, the State Department recruited 
him to work on the so-called ‘Dependent Areas’ until he was seconded to the American 
UN delegation. There, he, not surprisingly, took part in making the UN trusteeship 
system to then become part of the UN where he eventually, after being involved in the 
establishment of Israel, ended up Undersecretary, thus also a privileged position. While 
Cordier and Bunche appear to have been in the background at the meeting, it is not 
unimportant that they were present when the Eisenhower administration officials 
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briefed the Secretary-General on its priorities, including the Suez Canal, by the State 
Department intelligence representative. It was made clear that the US saw it as urgent 
to commence operations to clear the canal and have the clearance done under ‘optimum 
effort’.519 Indeed, the following day, Eisenhower wrote a memorandum in which he 
noted the “Rapid restoration of pipe line and Canal operation”520 first and that this work 
would require US personnel and perhaps Germans and Italians. However, 
Hammarskjold requested that nothing be done while he was in the Middle East, which 
Eisenhower found useful and hence demanded respected.521 Expectedly, however, Eden 
had his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, use Hammarskjold’s trip to suggest to the 
American UN Ambassador that British experts were the most suited for the clearance 
job and a fleet was already convening to go to work, under UN auspices or not.522 
However,  in the General Assembly on the 20th of November, Hammarskjold noted that 
he had spoken with the Egyptian President, who (thus) also saw the clearing of the canal 
best undertaken with the utmost speed and efficiency and requested the General 
Assembly to authorise him to enter “(…) the financial commitments that are 
unavoidable, although he is not now in a position to indicate the size of those initial 
commitments”523, as suggested by the Advisory Committee established on November 
7th. Although Eisenhower did not get his all-American staff, Hammarskjold did not 
disappoint. To run the operation, he got the World Bank’s senior engineering consultant 
Raymond A. Wheeler, who, as Bunche and Cordier, had also been intimately involved 
in the American international expansion. Wheeler had served three tours as an 
engineer—prior to the First World War, in the late 1920’s and prior to the American 
entrance into the Second World War—at the Panama Canal, the ‘American Suez Canal 
of Latin America’, which Panama Canal historians have argued allowed the US not 
only to transfer soldiers, but also oil to the extent that “(…) the lion’s share of the 
benefits originated from the transportation of petroleum products from California to 
the East Coast.”524 Wheeler advanced to the position of Assistant Chief of Staff in the 
War Department, where he stayed until he ‘retired’ to the World Bank, from where 
Hammarskjold enlisted him. Hammarskjold also hired the aforementioned John 
McCloy. Having worked his way up to lead the World Bank to then ‘retire’ to the 
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position of Chairman of the Executive Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank (and then 
been involved in the Suez Crisis all along), McCloy knew the inner workings of 
capitalism as well as Wheeler knew it from the perspective of the imperial ‘arteries’. 
Hammarskjold could not have found anyone more suited in the eyes of Eisenhower. As 
his UN anchor, UN, Hammarskjold chose Colonel Alfred Katzin, a former South 
African imperial subject, industrialist and military officer who had fought as part of the 
UN military alliance for the British during the Second World War and later served as 
Special-Representative of the Secretary-General in Korea.525 The British foreign 
minister was also ‘most pleased’ when informed by the American UN ambassador. 
Within the UN, Hammarskjold kept Cordier and Bunche close and informally brought 
in the American General Lucius Clay, a former army colleague of Eisenhower and his 
successor as the overall military governor of occupied Germany, most probably to 
reflect quietly on the likely internationalisation of the Gaza Strip.526 The following 
week, Hammarskjold also informed the US that McCloy would draw up contracts for 
the clearance and, more importantly, that Egyptian consent was not required as the UN 
had taken over responsibility to clear the canal.527  
With the British and French vessels’ ‘undercover’ clearance work in November as the 
opening phase of what was to be named the United Nations Suez Clearance 
Organization and the takeover of responsibility to re-establish Western oil flows, 
Hammarskjold, strongly helped by the Eisenhower administration, placed the UN even 
more solidly within the frontier of imperial multilateralism than had the formation of 
the UN force.   
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Summary of Part 1: The Making of ‘Imperial 
Multilateralism’ and its Frontier in The 
Mediterranean and the Middle East 
Altogether, it can be said that the ‘Suez Crisis’ was the result of a transformative process 
of diverging ideas and colliding political projects on the part of governments and to a 
lesser extent the populations of Europe, Egypt and the US in much the same way the 
Hungarian revolution was the outcome of an transformative process of diverging ideas 
and colliding political projects on the part of governments and to a lesser extent the 
populations Hungary, the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union.528 That is not to say that 
the situations were identical and therefore fashioned identical strategies. The Soviet 
Politbureau and the British and French governments favoured direct intervention due to 
what they perceived to be the stakes (even if their military forces at various levels had 
doubts as to what was going on and what the actual aims were). In contrast, the 
Eisenhower administration sought order on basis of initially multilateral and later 
international negotiations in recognition of its and its allies dependency of both Middle 
Eastern oil and the Suez Canal, even if most officials, including Eisenhower himself, 
were as frustrated with the Egyptian government as the British and French.  
The approach of the Eisenhower administration reflected not only how the US had 
developed growing strategic and economic interests in Mediterranean and Middle East 
from 1945 to the extent the region had become, in the words of scholar of American 
foreign policy and culture Melani McAlister, a moral geography to the broader 
American public that oscillated between distance and othering and appropriation and 
co-optation.529 The way in which Eisenhower’s administration sought to draft, if in an 
aggressive manner, the UN, the European, Latin American, Asian and Arab 
governments, especially those in the latter group who governed oil-producing countries, 
to co-produce order also reflected how the global imperial system at a deeper level and 
the role of the US therein had shifted. Over the 19th and 20th centuries, several ‘national’ 
imperial frontiers had merged into both a global European and a regional American 
frontier in the interwar years and then into to two globally opposing frontiers of imperial 
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multilateralism during and after the Second World War. This had manifested itself in a 
shift from mainly direct intra-imperial military intervention towards mainly intra-
imperial policing, intra-imperial autonomy and inter-imperial cooperation. Not that the 
imperial powers did not struggle amongst themselves; the two world wars and the 
Korean War are more than ample evidence of this as well as a continuation of the 
racialisation of imperialism. That the latter two wars of which the UN fought had the 
US come out as the dominant power was only the manifestation of the expansion of the 
US through this new frontier system.  
Due to Washington’s turn to multilateral and economic diplomacy, promotion of 
economic interdependence and, if needed, military campaigns in the inter-war years, 
the American rise to global dominance through and after the Second World War and 
the making of imperial multilateralism in the form of the UN military alliance (and the 
Middle East Supply Center), thus connected well with the earlier shift in the 
Mediterranean to multinational imperialism in the form of disease regulation (i.e. the 
annual sanitation conferences), communication (i.e. the Suez Canal), interventions (i.e. 
Crete in 1900 and in Albania 1913) over the formally institutionalised mandates of the 
League. In other words, the US became part of and globalised the frontier system in 
which the Soviet Union and its predecessor in the form of the Russian Empire had 
already been involved. What changed was not only the American presence, but also the 
region’s global importance to the building of imperial frontiers due to oil, oil logistics 
and the Suez Canal, which in itself was important for troop transports for the colonies 
of Washington’s allies. While less explicit than in the regulations and broader matrixes 
of the European colonial systems in Africa and Asia, the emerging system was also 
deeply saturated with racialised images of the Arabian and Muslim ‘other’ as a 
consequence of the adaption of the European orientalist discourses, something that was 
clear in both the making of the ‘Suez Crisis’ and the crisis itself.  
With the ‘Suez Crisis’, therefore, it was not only the immediate workings of the 
overall frontier system at risk, it was the future of American global influence. The 
Eisenhower administration not surprisingly used all disposable means to gain the upper 
hand. The UN was therefore appropriated to get a benevolent force into the canal area, 
which the US had previously found so important it would itself occupy it, and to clear 
the canal, which Egypt had closed it down with sunken vessels loaded with cement. The 
UN interventions thus reflected the continued change from emphasis on territorial 
control to multilateralism and the support of proxy regimes in the global imperial 
system, some ways thus a deeper (re)turn to the dynamics of the Ottoman, Russian and 
Chinese empires updated with oil, hangar carriers with jet planes, and, not least, nuclear 
technology. That the Eisenhower administration could not act unilaterally but had to 
seek to co-opt both the members of the UN and the UN itself to restore what the British, 
French and Israeli government had undone by way of their ‘old-fashioned’ invasion 
also showed that the process of maintaining and integrating frontier zones had changed. 
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The change reflected the growing number of actors and their gradually narrower space 
for strategic navigation within the global imperial system not in a zero-sum sense, but 
rather that their increasing economic, military and financial interdependence, faster and 
more readily available means of communications, post-colonial nationalisms and more 
destructive weapons both raised the stakes and put far more emphasis on formal 
consultative procedure.  
As for its allies, Washington had little problem leaving them suspended in their mess 
of their own making until they came crawling. Two days after getting on the safe side 
with the UN troops landing in Egypt from November 15th, Eisenhower even spoke to 
two British generals that had informed him that they perceived “(…) an increasing lack 
of confidence in the British Prime Minister”,530 which Nichols argues “(…) perilously 
close to meddling in British politics”.531 Once the Party Leader of the Conservatives in 
the House of Commons, R. B. Butler, and the exchequer, Harold Macmillan, effectively 
also took over from Eden, however, the Eisenhower administration did meddle by 
aiding economically via the IMF and by debt cancellation. Had Washington not done 
so, the British Empire may well have imploded on economic grounds. Not surprisingly, 
Macmillan approached Dulles at the NATO Council in December to distance himself 
from Eden and make up with the Eisenhower administration. In the same vein, 
Eisenhower decided against joining the Baghdad Pact, which had both become linked 
to the British and failed to gain the appreciation of both King Said and Nasser.532 That 
is not to say that the Americans wanted the British out of the region altogether. Their 
bases and ports in Cyprus, port in Yemen, and firm grip on the Gulf States were both 
useful and desired.533 As the State Department noted, “It is impossible, for political 
reasons, for the US to assume all former UK commitments.”534  
As for Egypt, Nasser survived, contrary to both Anglo-French and American desires. 
He was, however, forced to accept the UN force, which he despite its composition he 
presented to the Egyptians as a victory, and the demands on letting the UN take charge 
of re-opening the canal, relying initially and secretly on the British and French vessels 
already present and subsequently vessels from other NATO countries. Not being rid of 
Nasser, the Eisenhower administration decided to use that he saw the involvement of 
the UN as beneficial, or at least presented it so, to get on his better side. The day after 
the UN force had been agreed upon at the UN, the US consequently offered Egypt—
that was on its way to come a frontier zone despite its relations with the Soviet Union 
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and later negotiations on Soviet access to ports—a 75 million Dollar loan to finance the 
Aswan Dam as well as a willingness to allow US private capital to take part.535 
Eisenhower also paid attention to other regional actors so as not to put all eggs in the 
same basket. As the negotiations on the canal and the UN force were nearing an end, 
the State Department sent out a circular telegram to an unlisted number of diplomatic 
missions and consular offices stating that “No opportunity should be lost in playing up 
US peace role”,536 and that “It should be made clear that our concern is not only for 
Western Europe but also for Afro-Asian countries which are directly affected by resent 
situation.” 537 Specifically, this meant that “In oil producing countries of Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq and Iran special emphasis might be placed upon their obvious interest in moving 
the greatest quantity of Near Eastern oil and thus avoiding insofar as possible 
institution of any new supply patterns which would have not only short term but long 
term effect upon their oil income. 538 Indeed, it was advised, “Maximum effort should be 
made to play up their self interest and to demonstrate that the US is continuing to do 
everything possible to minimize financial impact upon them.”539 Eisenhower also 
approved a new plan for Ethiopia, which previously had been used against Egypt. 
Providing a new level of military assistance to the Ethiopian regime under the Emperor 
Haile Selassie, Washington not only outmanoeuvred Egypt and retained its rights to 
Kagnew, its intelligence and communications base in Ethiopia, but also secured 
extended base rights.540 Finally, as historians Takeyh, Yaqub and Kunz argue, the 
Eisenhower administration launched what has since been known as the Eisenhower 
doctrine as a means to counter any future Soviet or nationalist contestation of the 
Western frontier of imperial multilateralism in the Mediterranean.541  
Viewing the ‘Suez Crisis’ in this perspective changes what the UN interventions in 
Egypt and subsequently the Gaza Strip symbolised and therefore symbolise today 
altogether. It is thus clear, that they must be understood, as is the case in the research 
field on interventions, not as ‘peacekeeping’. Rather, they must be seen, I argue, as ad 
hoc and temporary expansions of the Western frontier of imperial multilateralism as it 
evolved via the Middle East Supply Center, the first failed  Middle East Defence 
Organization that was to have included Egypt and Palestine, the establishment of 
NATO’s southern flanks and its multiplane land and sea-based commands, and the 
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MEDO’s replacement in the form of the Baghdad pact, which was nearly undone by 
the invasion had it not been for the domestic sacrifices of the Pakistani and Iraqi 
governments in particular. Their support of the Western overall control with the 
globally strategically important area and its resources and Western wish to keep the 
Soviet Union out were not unlike when the European powers in the Ottoman era sought 
to keep the Russian Empire rather than the Soviet Union from gaining access to the 
region. That the UNEF and UNSCO have not yet been understood in this way, it must 
be added, is caused by several factors. First, there were no American troops ‘on the 
ground’ as in the case of Korea. Second, the subsequent clever use of the press by the 
UN, which was part of creating the myth of ´peacekeeping´ (as will be shown later), 
must also be taken into account. Thirdly, that the Egyptian President managed to not 
only save face outwardly but also gain massive regional popularity by ‘standing up’ the 
European imperial powers and establishing the Egyptian-run Suez Canal Authority, was 
discursively influential. Finally, it must be remembered that the Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip had experienced massacres at the hands of Israeli forces during the occupation 
prior to the arrival of the UN force just as they would experience an Israeli occupation 
from 1967 lasting decades, thereby leaving only horrible memories to compare with. 
Moreover, the UN force and the clearance of the canal must also be seen in relation to 
the American role in the Central-American region, where it dominated, and had for 
long, the Panama Canal, which along with the broader Panama Canal Zone, if anything, 
as Cold War historian Thomas Borstelmann notes, was “Perhaps the most revealing 
demonstration of U.S racial policies and practices.”542 Although, the racialisation of the 
Arab and ‘Muslim’ other would be subtler in both Egypt and the Gaza Strip, the ‘white’ 
UN soldiers, as will be clear, tapped into the already well-established tropes of cultural 
imperialism associated with both the frontier of European multinational imperialism, 
the frontier of imperial multilateralism and not least those of Hollywood. 
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Part 2: Negotiating Authority and Life in a 
Frontier Zone of Western Imperial 
Multilateralism 
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 6 Chapter 6: Forming UNEF and 
UNSCO in Egypt, 1956 
In 1945, the military webs of the war-time UN that had linked civilian and military 
institutions with theatres of war were dismantled in favour of a continuation of the path 
emphasising decolonisation, multilateral (inter-imperial) cooperation and control via 
externalised administrations. Especially the US and the Soviet Union, the post-war 
power-houses, promoted this process. In the following, I will argue that the UN force 
and the clearance of the Suez Canal re-actualised the military webs of the war-time UN 
alliance and the UN in the Korean War firstly in the form of a network of bases and 
infrastructure and secondly in the transfer of the military cultures of parts of NATO and 
the Commonwealth. It is necessary to note here, however, that the operation was not 
only put together “(…) mostly by improvisation (…)”543 as recalled by the British former 
soldier Brian Urquhart who served as one of the UN Secretary-General’s main advisors. 
The ‘white’ Commonwealth members of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa 
were also deliberately kept out (in contrast to Korea), just as the intervention recognised 
third world interests and concerns as legitimate, and generally used co-optation rather 
than direct force.  
In extension of the overall approach revolving around the anchoring of Cunliffe’s 
‘imperial multilateralism’ in imperial historiography, I therefore instead seek to place 
emphasis on the role of Western and Commonwealth military infrastructure and supply 
and knowledge systems in the formation, building of, logistics of, supply of, and staff 
of the UN force, the clearance of the canal and deployment into Egypt and the Gaza 
Strip. The way in which I seek to do so, entails not only an attentive relationship with 
the existing research and public UN documents with the aim of going beyond the 
standardised accounts that dominate the research, old as new. This also entails a re-
reading of the recollections of the first Force Commander Eedson Burns from 1962 and 
the distant memoirs of the British advisor Urquhart and Urquhart’s biography of Ralph 
Bunche (which was to some extent also about Urquhart’s experiences and views), 
paying attention to atmospheres, placement of roles and responsibilities amongst the 
members of the highest UN echelon, and their views with regard to certain states, 
politicians, diplomats and so on. However, going beyond the standardised accounts also 
requires that I consult further material from the US, more specifically the already-
utilised document series made available by the US State, the ‘Foreign Relations of the 
United States’ series Department. Even if it is difficult to know what materials have not 
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been made available, the more than 600 documents of this series on the ‘Suez Crisis’ 
from embassies, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House 
offers insights into the Eisenhower administration’s thinking and policy-making 
dynamics, as well as the degree of American involvement in the formation, logistics 
and supplies of the UN force and coordination with the higher UN echelon. For all but 
‘technical’ details on supplies, equipment, travel routes and maps, I also turn to the 
records of the UN Field Service and its General Division (and its American leadership) 
that was also involved in establishing communications for the UN force immediate and 
in furnishing the force in the medium to long run. Regarding sources that allows for an 
analysis of the canal clearance, I have again included material from the Danish 
Shipowners’ Association and Suez Canal User Association, both which I have accessed 
by way of the Danish Shipowners’ Association, as the first two General-Secretaries of 
the Suez Canal User Association were Danish diplomats that were in relative frequent 
consultation with the Danish Shipowners Association and the Danish Foreign Ministry. 
As for the UNSCO clearance operations, I draw upon UN reports and other records 
from both UNSCO and the UN Field Service sent to the UN Headquarters and the 
Office of Special Political Affairs in New York. While not included here, both the 
personal records of Raymond Wheeler who was seconded by the World Bank and 
records of the World Bank pertaining to the clearance of the canal may have been useful 
in adding supplementary details. To supplement Burns’ recollections from 1962 and 
existing research on the deployment of the UN force from Port Said to Sharm-el-Sheikh 
and into the Gaza Strip, I finally turn to a handful of published excerpts of diaries and 
letters by Danish UN soldiers, which to my knowledge are amongst the only ones 
published pertaining to the late 1956–early 1957 deployment phase.  
6.1 Building UNEF in Naples: ‘Dotting the Map’ 
and ‘Connecting the Dots’ of the Web of 
Imperial Multilateralism  
As noted in the previous chapter, the General Assembly decided upon the formation of 
an organisation to oversee the clearance of the canal and a UN force—for which 
Canada, India, Norway and Colombia had offered troops— in the night between the 4th 
and 5th of November. However, the subsequent process of both forming the force and 
bringing it to Egypt was not without political tension, even if complications would not 
arise between Hammarskjold and Eisenhower who already saw eye to eye on most 
matters and would do so on the composition, logistics and function of the force. Before 
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the vote in the evening on the 4th, Hammarskjold had let the American representatives 
at the UN know that he intended to acquire Egypt’s consent as to the composition and 
its presence so as to avoid any claims of occupation. At the same time, he also wanted 
to keep out the veto-wielding members of the Security Council, to keep out forces not 
only from Great Britain and France, but also the Soviet Union. In agreement with this 
approach, Eisenhower not only told Eden that neither of the veto-wielding members of 
the Security Council could take part by both phone and message the following day.544 
He would also tell his Chiefs of Staff that he wanted Colombia in the force and get 
logistical planning going, which led to two meetings between defence officials on 
bringing Canadian forces from bases in Germany, Norwegian forces from Norway and 
3 more battalions to the naval facility on the Greek island of Crete and from there to 
vessels of the 6th fleet and the Egyptian canal zone.545  
The first complication came when the British and French began landing troops, 
despite the agreement to form a UN force and a UN clearance organisation and the 
Egyptian ambassador meeting with State Department officials in Washington about 
requesting American help.546 Consequently, Eisenhower wrote a personal letter to the 
Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, most probably with the aim of appealing to 
the Egyptian President’s interest in admitting a UN force by way of Indian participation. 
He also had his senior officials led by Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. assure 
that the US military would provide the UN with an officer for liaison purposes so the 
US military would not deal with national delegations and governments directly.547 The 
Czechoslovakian and Romanian offers to provide troops were the second difficulty 
facing the Secretary-General and the US following the invasion. In line with 
Eisenhower’s wish, this was left for Hammarskjold and his officials to deal with. 
Although the Czechoslovakian offer was made public in a press release,548 it appears 
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that the American Under-Secretary-General Bunche, who Hammarskjold had given the 
order “Now, corporal, go and get me a force”,549 as recalled by Urquhart, singlehandedly 
decided against their offers, most probably seeing them as proxies for the Soviet Union. 
Additionally, Egypt would also prove uncertain and hesitant of the UN force. After the 
Secretary-General and Lodge, the Permanent Representative of the US to the UN, had 
exchanged views on the ideal way to bring the force to Egypt, Hammarskjold informed 
the Egyptian ambassador to the UN that he considered a UN force of Indian, Colombian 
and Scandinavian troops ideal, although he withheld the details on using the American 
air force, the sixth fleet and NATO infrastructure on Crete and near Rome.550 Probably 
expecting American influence at the UN behind the curtain, the Egyptian President had 
his advisor, Mohamed Heikal, speak to the American Ambassador in Cairo to pass on 
to Eisenhower that he chose ‘the course of full cooperation with the US’ and that there 
was no need to worry about Soviet moves in Egypt as his first response.551 Concerned 
that the UN might install an international control at Port Said in tune with British and 
French designs (since the first contingent to be promoted was from another NATO 
member with strong ties to the British), Nasser had his Foreign Minister, Mahmoud 
Fawzi, speak to Eedson Burns, the Canadian General and future UN force commander, 
who was passing through Cairo on his way from his post as the Chief of Staff of the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to New York on Hammarskjold’s 
orders the following day. As Burns recalled in his memoirs, Fawzi first rejected 
Canadian participation and then returned to speak to Nasser. The following day, Fawzi 
asked for more information: which functions was the force to have; how its area of 
operation near the Armistice Demarcation Line would be decided upon; how long the 
force would remain after the Anglo-French force had been withdrawn; and finally how 
long the force was expected to remain in Port Said. Dismissing the UN force 
commanders’ assurances, Nasser wanted the Secretary-General to clarify these issues 
just as his resistance to Canadian troops was adamant.552 Moreover, Burns received 
enquiries from the Advisory Committee for the UN force and clearance organisation 
that Hammarskjold had set up on November 7th, with several but not all of the expected 
countries contributing troops in the form of Canada, Norway, Colombia, and India, and 
also Brazil, Ceylon and Pakistan (despite Egypt’s rejection of the latter due to their 
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hostile relations with Egypt (and India) partly on the grounds of being a member of the 
(in Cairo and New Delhi much-hated) Baghdad Pact).553 
Despite these complications, the US Air Force began bringing the first Danish, 
Norwegian, Colombian, and Indian forces to Italy, tellingly with post-Second World 
Warplanes of the US Strategic Air Service known as ‘Globemasters’, from November 
10th.554 In other words, the build-up of the supposedly least controversial force was not 
only initiated before Egypt had formally accepted the composition of the force, it also 
took the form of one NATO member (the US) flying the UN contingents of two other 
NATO members (Norway and Denmark) to the territory of a fourth NATO member 
(Italy), indicative of the logistical web that would come to build and support the frontier 
zone. As Burns recalled, “(…) it was very urgent at that time, Mr. Hammarskjold and 
his advisers believed, to get some United Nations into Egypt at once. It was felt that it 
would be a race between the UNEF’s getting established on the ground and ‘volunteers’ 
from Russia, Communist China, and other similarly oriented countries arriving in 
Egypt to assist the Egyptian forces to expel the invaders.”555 Offering thus an insight 
into the highest echelon of the UN, consisting not only of the Secretary-General but 
also the Americans Bunche and Cordier who grew increasingly concerned with the 
frequent Soviet visits to the Egyptian government, the force commander continued, “It 
was thought quite possible that such volunteers might be sent, and that the Middle East 
might develop into another Korea, with the forces of the West, nominally under the 
aegis of the United Nations, ranged against the forces of the Communist countries and 
deployed in Egypt and possible other Arab countries.”556 His civilian UN colleague, 
Brian Urquhart, recalls a similar anti-Soviet fear.557 Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
Hammarskjold contacted the Egyptian government directly to secure the acceptance of 
the force as a first step. He not only rebutted the Egyptian President’s refusal to permit 
Danish and Norwegian troops, saying that the governments of Finland and Sweden, 
whose contingents Nasser had accepted because they were not in military pacts with 
the British and French, would not contribute without their fellow Scandinavians, and 
that this might mean the end of the UN force. He also told the Egyptian President that 
he would come to Cairo to discuss the Egyptian government’s question about its right 
to withdraw its consent to the UN presence and the entry of the troops of ‘certain’ 
countries,558 meaning Canada that already had a troop agreement predating the 
formation of the force.559 
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As noted, the US Air Force began flying the first units to Naples. The Danish and 
Norwegian contingents were flown directly, while the Indian forces were flown in 
probably with a stopover in Turkey as the Turkish government had already granted the 
US access or Saudi Arabia where the US operated an air force base.560 Relying on the 
global reach of the American Air Force, the first Colombian units was flown from 
Bogota via Puerto Rico, an American colonial territory, to the Azores, an Atlantic island 
group under Portuguese control that the US had rights to use under a bilateral agreement 
(that also linked American usage to NATO), to Naples on November 10th,561 (even if 
Portugal would only formally grant the UN (and its Canadian aircraft) permission to 
use the Lagens airport in the Azores on November 30th).562  
When Burns came to Cairo on November 11th on the day after the airlifts to Naples 
were started, the Egyptian government thus accepted troops from Finland, Yugoslavia, 
Sweden, India, Colombia, Denmark, and Norway. The Egyptian President, recalled his 
advisor, had insisted on contingents from the non-aligned states India and Yugoslavia.563 
Although no troops had yet landed (as Eisenhower impatiently noted the following day) 
and Canadian forces remained unwelcome,564 the efforts of both the Eisenhower 
administration in rallying support and the Secretary-General and his advisors were 
largely paying off in terms of the force composition: the Soviet Union got neither 
proxies nor allies into the UN force. Despite receiving Soviet fighter jets and massive 
loans and having several large commercial and cooperation agreements with the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, the only Communist state contributing troops, was not only moving 
in a direction of non-alignment, the brutal soviet crushing of the Hungarian revolution 
also soured Belgrade’s relations with Moscow over November, leaving them in bitter 
confrontation.565 While the West was courting Finland discretely through trade, it was 
not a member of NATO, just as it was not a Soviet proxy despite treaties with the Soviet 
Union.566 Although seen as taking Soviet propaganda at face value by the Eisenhower 
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administration and also in the non-aligned camp with Egypt (and Yugoslavia),567 India 
was not, as the Indian Prime Minister had informed the Egyptian President and political 
ally after Nasser’s nationalisation of the canal in July (only a week after they had met 
in Yugoslavia), “(…) a disinterested party. She is a principal user of this waterway, 
and her economic life and development is not unaffected by the dispute, not to speak of 
worse developments, in regard to it.”568 Indeed, due to its embedded position in the 
Commonwealth economic web, approximately 60% of the Indian trade went through 
the canal.569 Besides the Soviet Union thus not having any proxies, formal allies or 
strong friends on the force, several of the remaining members were either Western-
leaning or members of NATO. For example, Sweden was neutral, but Western-oriented, 
receiving American arms and nuclear technology and adapting NATO standards.570 It 
happened on a discrete basis, however, as the American ambassadors in the Nordic 
countries had agreed that the “(…) Swedish military strength is important and 
favourable factor in area (…)”571 and that it was therefore necessary to support rather 
than embarrass the Swedish alliance-free policy. On its part, the Colombian government 
and military, whose offer Hammarskjold, or rather Bunche, had accepted prior to 
Egyptian approval (with Eisenhower’s endorsements), was under strong American 
regional influence not only due to the Panama Canal (which had been carved out of 
Colombia), but also via the Rio Treaty of 1947, which had previously both ensured that 
Colombia had deployed a force trained by American officers to Korea under direct US 
command within the UN forces and that American arms and equipment had become the 
standard in the Colombian military by way of standardisation agreements on training, 
logistics, administration and doctrine.572 Another member of the UN force also adopting 
arms, weapons systems, aircraft and naval vessels from the US (and to a lesser extent 
Canada), Denmark had initially been rejected by the Egyptian President for the UN 
force on the grounds of being a member of NATO. Having previously adopted British 
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arms and equipment, sent officers and soldiers to Great Britain for training, and not 
least shared both military information and confidential intelligence with the British after 
the Second World War,573 it was well in the process of also turning to the US. Accepting 
the link to the global American military infrastructure of airbases stretching from Korea 
and Japan to the US and Canada to Western Europe Denmark had also allowed 
Washington to expand its Greenlandic facilities from the Second World War to operate 
long-range bombers,574 which moreover saw increased activity during the ‘Suez 
Crisis’.575 Finally, the other Scandinavian NATO member Nasser sought to reject but 
was forced to accept was Norway that had also become central to American strategic 
planning for Northern Europe, both as US diplomats judged that both Iceland and 
Denmark would to take Norwegian advice on strategic matters and because the Soviet 
Union had built a naval complex on the Kola Peninsula. Over the 1950s, Oslo thus 
accepted Washington’s help to build both a military industry (as elsewhere in Western 
Europe in the early 1950s),576 and a complex of air force bases and submarine facilities 
in the north of Norway.577 As argued by the Norwegian historian Mats Berdal, Norway 
(as Denmark) came to provide the US with political support, access, and capabilities 
enabling the US to project military power more effectively at an operational level while 
the US in return gradually replaced Great Britain in providing Norway’s security 
platform.578 Altogether, the UN force might thus be considered both a highly improvised 
rescue operation, and, amongst UN top officials and the Eisenhower administration, a 
manoeuvre to keep Soviet influence in the Middle East to a minimum, and, thus, within 
my analytical framework, came to serve a Western frontier of imperial multilateralism. 
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6.2 Bringing UNEF to Abu Sueir: The First Step in 
Building the Frontier Zone 
Before leaving New York for Cairo to see the Egyptian President, the Secretary-
General met with the Advisory Committee in his conference room. At the meeting, he 
made clear that speed was of the essence. Along the lines of Eisenhower, he called for 
‘boots on the ground’ first and then to build up the force. He also argued that the force, 
if its presence was conditional to the Egyptian government’s consent, was to stay until 
its task were complete subject to the assessment of the General Assembly. Sceptical of 
the phrasing of both Hammarskjold and the Canadian Foreign Minister, Pearson (who 
had supported the Secretary-General straight away), Lall, the Indian representative first 
noted that this force was not a permanent UN force, and then that he found it difficult 
to see “(…) how the United Nations would wish to impose conditions on a country 
which has been aggressed against—which has been the victim of aggression. That 
would be a very difficult principle for the United Nations to take up.”579 Supporting 
Hammarskjold, both Pearson and Prettas-Valle, the Brazilian representative, argued 
that the UN was in fact rescuing Egypt from a difficult position. Seeking to 
accommodate Lall, the representative from Ceylon, Gunewardene, agreed that it was 
only an ad hoc force. However, dead set on both getting a force and getting Canadian 
troops into it, Pearson also argued, “(…) we cannot make it too easy for Egypt to 
withdraw, with our help, and then say she intend to change her policy.”580 Although it 
appeared that especially Lall had more to discuss, Hammarskjold tellingly had Bunche 
end the meeting with an overview of the build-up in Naples and the preparations in 
Egypt.  
When the Hammarskjold landed in Cairo on November 14th and the UN staff in New 
York were scrambling to learn to organise a military force as Urquhart was the only UN 
official with military experience (aside two American liaison officers), the Egyptian 
host had not agreed upon all aspects of the UN force. Nevertheless, aircraft from the 
American and Italian air forces as well as the Swiss commercial airline Swissair began 
flying UN units to the Egyptian air base Abu Sueir, a former British air base and the air 
base closest to both the canal and Port Said.581 To Hammarskjold (and his American 
officials as well as the Eisenhower administration), speed was of the essence: ‘details’ 
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such as a status-of-forces-agreement concerning the legal matters could be settled 
consequently (and was so only in February 1957).582 Haste (and the American influence) 
also meant that the US Navy in Italy provided the UN troops with helmets that were 
painted light blue for anti-sniping purposes.583 According to a Danish officer, it also 
meant that many of soldiers of the different UN contingents arrived confused and thus 
viewed everything through a prism of uncertainty.584 Additionally, several members of 
the UN contingents arrived with predisposed ideas of who were allies and who weren’t. 
Many of the Danish young and often rural conscripted soldiers,585 for instance, were 
exposed to lectures from senior officers or academics that appear to have had an 
orientalist under-current when laying out the situation in the supposedly inherently 
violent and dangerous Middle East region or in the case of one of the three infantry 
companies an obviously racist lecture from a British former colonial military officer on 
“(…) Egyptian characteristics and how to engage the local population” such as walking 
on the footpath while forcing the Egyptians into the gutter.586 Upon arriving in Egypt, 
recalls a Danish soldier, the young and inexperienced Danish soldiers disembarked the 
American aircraft nervous, with loaded weapons (with a bullet in the chamber and thus 
ready to shoot) and their fingers on the triggers, weary of all Egyptians with arms.587 
The (fellow ‘white’ and) older Canadian soldiers that had arrived and many of whom 
had served in the Second World War thus calmed the young and nervous Danes.588 To 
the Danish officer, many Norwegian and Swedish (who appear also to have been young 
conscripts), displayed similar feelings. Drilling, physical exercise and both national and 
shared Scandinavian religious services, however, were used to let them regain their 
postures.589  
Also in Egypt, Hammarskjold—who was still just as nervous about Soviet 
‘volunteers’ as the Eisenhower administration according to the UNEF Commander and 
the UN official Urquhart590—requested the American representatives in New York to 
keep the administration from pressing ahead in the General Assembly before his return. 
In return and well aware of what was still at stake, the Eisenhower administration 
requested that the Secretary-General observe and ‘promptly’ report if he saw any acts 
of non-compliance with the resolution. During Hammarskjold’s visit to the Egyptian 
President from November 16th to 19th, the State Department also ordered the 
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Ambassador in Cairo to pass on to the Secretary-General concerns about Soviet 
volunteers if the ceasefire broke, and if so that it might be useful and within his rights 
to station UN representatives in seaports and airports to ascertain whether resolutions 
were being respected and complied with.591 The US ambassador was less than 
encouraged despite the Egyptian President’s assurances that he had only requested help 
from the US and had no intention for Egypt to become a second Korea or the reason for 
a third world war and Hammarskjold’s progress on including the Canadian contingent 
before he returned to New York.592 The discussion on Canada had not only revolved 
around its membership of NATO (as with Denmark and Norway), but also its 
relationship to Great Britain. As in the case of Copenhagen and Oslo, however, Ottawa 
had also begun to re-orient its foreign policy towards the US both as part of NATO and 
as a neighbour of the US via trade and oil (to the extent the British government became 
vocal on the matter) and strategic relations.593 Within the sphere of the latter, Canada 
and the US had grown closer with joint officer’s training (between 1946 and 1950),594 
the joint war efforts in Korea with Canada providing one of the largest contributions,595 
and not least the joint radar warning and control line system, to which the Canadian 
Minister to the US George Glazebrook noted in spring 1956, “(…) the existence of a 
border between the two countries will have to be progressively discarded”.596 In any 
case, Hammarskjold used the threat of walking out and cancelling the force three times 
in a seven-hour negotiation with the Egyptian President. Eventually, Hammarskjold 
managed to convince Nasser that Canadian units should be included.597 This, noted 
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contemporary political scientist Sprye, made the UN intervention “(…) very largely a 
Commonwealth operation”,598 as Bunche and Hammarskjold had India and Canada 
provide the backbone of the force, contributing close to half of the force and most of 
the support units. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration officials were trying 
to convince the British Foreign Secretary and UN Ambassador and the French Foreign 
Minister and Ambassador in Washington both that oil would be provided,599 and that 
the UN force, even if small, was adequate in allowing them to pull their forces out of 
Port Said with what Harold Macmillan, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, called 
“(…) a fig leaf to cover our nakedness (…)”.600 In the meantime, the UN force began to 
receive both British material and national and American equipment flown into the 
former British airbase of Abu Sueir by Italian military aircraft (that were provided by 
the US) and to come to terms with the, for many, hot climate and the other 
contingents.601 
When Hammarskjold returned to New York on November 18th, he immediately 
consulted Lodge, the American Permanent Representative at the UN. The Secretary-
General, it turned out, was as sceptic as the American Ambassador to Egypt. However, 
his concerns no longer revolved around the Soviet involvement in Egypt of which he 
seen none (and had confirmed by Nasser), but rather the Anglo-French resistance to 
pull out of Port Said unconditionally. Rioting would, if it materialised, then provide 
Great Britain and France with further cause for intervention in which case the Soviet 
Union may intervene in Syria and Jordan. Mirroring Eisenhower and once again placing 
himself firmly as a fellow steward of the Western frontier of imperial multilateralism, 
the Secretary-General argued it necessary to bring in the UN force and get the clearance 
operations started immediately.602 On the same day, the Secretary-General also 
convened the Advisory Committee to inform them of the Egyptian acceptance of the 
force and stress that it was necessary to bring in the UN force and get the clearance 
operations started immediately. While the Indian representative expressed surprise with 
Egypt’s largely unreserved acceptance, Pearson also stressed the situation’s urgency, 
supporting again Hammarskjold (to whom he had promoted a UN canal force for 
several years).603 Much to Hammarskjold’s irritation the following day, the 20th of 
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November, Lall kept raising issues just as Khan, the Pakistani representative, repeated 
his government’s offer of an infantry battalion,604 reflecting an interest in using both the 
Baghdad Pact and the UN to get things moving as the canal closure was increasing price 
levels and thus pressure on the Pakistani government.605 Returning to the Secretary-
General’s agenda, Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, raised concerns with the 
Egyptian forces guarding the UN force in Abu Sueir. Concluding the discussion (once 
again), Hammarskjold not only dismissed these concerns, but also argued that Egypt 
was not agreeing but (merely) consenting, again de facto placing the UN authority 
above Egyptian sovereignty.606 On the same day, Eisenhower made it clear to the US 
officials that were speaking to the British that his pre-condition for help was their 
withdrawal and to those talking to ‘the Arabs’ that they should let them know that 
pressure was being applied, but also that going against the UN would turn the world 
against Egypt just as the Suez Canal should not just be opened but done so with 
confidence in future operation.607  
As it were, the patching-up of the Western frontier of imperial multilateralism was 
well under-way. With the UN forces arriving in Egypt, the situation had passed the 
point where both the Soviet Union and Egypt could make further use of the ‘Suez 
Crisis’, having been gradually if only just outmanoeuvred. 
6.3 Bringing UNEF to Port Said: Expanding the 
Frontier Zone on the Back of NATO 
With the UN commander’s redeployment of the UN force from Abu Sueir towards Port 
Said beginning on November 21st (as the US Air Force flew in most of the remaining 
contingents), the frontier zone once again expanded. Perhaps less indicative of the 
number of units available and a personal choice than the global colour line’s deeper 
path dependency in the international system with its roots in the global imperial system, 
the Canadian commander deployed first ‘white’ (NATO) Norwegian and Danish units 
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and eventually Swedish and Columbian forces and ‘brown’ Indians units as the last, 
even if the popularity with the locals not to mention the combat merits of the Indian 
forces would have made the Indians the more sensible choice.608 In the same vein, the 
recollections of one of the Danish officers of the passage in trains on the old British 
railway along the Suez Canal also makes very clear the function of the international 
system in relation to the ‘Suez Crisis’: “The journey north along the Suez Canal also 
imprinted each and every one the importance of the canal. One tanker after the other 
were ‘frozen’ in the middle of the desert stretch, towering over the yellow surface as 
the signs of the disunity of the civilised world.”609 The overall situation appears also to 
have spilled over into the understanding of the soldiers. Despite being received with 
open joy by several of the Egyptian military units they passed, several of the Danish 
(and probably also Norwegian) troops felt a sense of pleasure when seeing destroyed 
Soviet-supplied material in light of their overall identification with the West, once again 
confirming how the imperial confrontation of the Cold War was very present. Similarly, 
the young Danes could not help but identify with the British invading force, cheerfully 
engaging in small talk and in awe of the older, professional and frequently tattooed 
British soldiers when taking over their dug-in positions in Ismailia (a canal town).610 
While this most likely tied in with the Danish armed forces’ turn to the British (rather 
than Germany) military after the Second World War,611 Burns’ ‘marriage’ of the Danish 
and Norwegian infantry companies into a single (‘white’) battalion just before entering 
Ismailia may also have reinforced the idea of a ‘Western whiteness’ that merged the 
Scandinavian soldiers’ political-racialised imaginaries of a Nordic ‘whiteness’ with 
those of the older Commonwealth and new trans-Atlantic (NATO) parallels.  
After taking over Ismailia from the British, Burns would also continue to use the new 
DANOR battalion as his primary force for what he deemed most important or to crack 
open a task before passing it on to another battalion, thus reinforcing these ideas. 
Indeed, even the new battalion’s rank and file soldiers began to take notice of and speak 
about of how they had Burns’ favourites.612 When Burns had the force move into Port 
Said, he thus not only had the ‘white’ Nordic UN soldiers seize several smaller military 
camps and a school for headquarters, he also let the British and Danish forces once 
again link up on very friendly terms under Egyptian overview. Whether linked to fears 
of incidents with British units or not (which Burns himself did not reflect on), he only 
put the (professional) Indian troops to use as relief for the ‘white’ Scandinavian that 
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had only months before been conscripts.613 In partially taking over Port Said from the 
British (and eventually French) forces and continuing to build up the force with an 
emphasis on the primacy of ‘white’ forces and the supportive role of the Indian forces, 
the situation resembled how the town, according to Valeska Huber, had been 
established by imperial, commercial and international actors that had pushed through 
an ‘international colonisation’ following the formation of the Suez Canal and the 
subsequent transformation of the Mediterranean from an imperial lake to an imperial 
lane.614 In other words, the UN began the ad hoc and temporary ‘international re-
colonisation’ of Port Said in a way that in several ways reminded of both the 
‘traditional’ British imperial expansion and the frontier-building of multinational 
imperialism. 
At the same time, however, the Anglo-French forces in Port Said did not withdraw. 
Back in New York, Hammarskjold began consulting the American UN diplomats on 
the Anglo-French withdrawal schedule which the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn 
Lloyd, had informed to the Secretary-General about earlier in the day. That the British 
would only begin to withdraw after a four-week period that would allow the clearance 
to begin and the UNEF to be established and thus withdraw under a diplomatic cover, 
impressed neither Hammarskjold nor the American diplomats. Although the Secretary-
General had initially taken London’s bait of anti-Communist rhetoric and expressed a 
strong dislike of Nasser (which it was recognised only the US could promote in the 
Middle East),615 he had grown less concerned with a potential influx of Soviet 
‘volunteers’. Focused mainly on the canal, his attention turned to managing Nasser, 
which Hammarskjold admitted to Lloyd that there was no one he liked to deal less with. 
Aware of the situation, however, he argued that “(…) we must play Arabs down, but 
play them down by fair means.”616 Acknowledging that Egypt would not negotiate the 
clearance of the canal as long as London and Paris were using their military presence 
to pressure Cairo, Hammarskjold suggested three dates for having built up UNEF to a 
certain strength, in order to have the British and French withdraw their forces and begin 
the clearance of the canal, to the American UN representative. As the list of installations 
the UN force was expected to protect in both Port Said and its twin (canal-)town of Port 
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Fouad kept growing, Burns therefore received the message from New York to keep 
building the force as fast as possible.617  
Aside the use of Danish and Norwegian ‘white’ NATO bodies before ‘brown’ 
Colombian and Indian bodies first in both Ismailia and Port Said (despite Nasser’s 
earlier resistance to NATO troops from Canada), Burns appears not to have thought 
twice about letting the British vessels continue their clearance work, despite Nasser’s 
refusal to permit such work and his agreement with the UN Secretary-General.618 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, “(…) the attitude of the commanders and staff of the Allied 
forces [sic] was entirely cooperative,”619 as Burns put it. The UN commander not only 
had jovial relations with the commanders of the occupying power on several occasions. 
He also consulted with the Canadian ambassador to Egypt in Cairo on the nature of the 
Canadian contingent on his own initiative, thus adding a reconnaissance squadron 
apparently before receiving clearance from either the Secretary-General or Bunche, 
who had hitherto had the main responsibility for the force.620 Additionally, the 
Commander of the Danish UN contingency requested the Governor of Port Said 
Egyptian to bring extra police into Port Said, but only allowed them in once the UN 
military observers had vetted the 350 police officers to ensure they were not Palestinian 
militants, fedayeen, and had only their normal weapons621 thus initiating another 
transgression of Egyptian sovereignty in the series of infringements the UN force would 
be responsible for. It was only by the 25th of November the Yugoslavian contingent 
would arrive on Yugoslavian ships and thus add another friend of Egypt aside India to 
the force that was discretely but strongly tied to NATO.622  
In the last days of November, the visible involvement of NATO assets expanded 
beyond the use of American and Italian NATO military infrastructure and the force 
commander’s logistical coordination with NATO’s Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern 
Atlantic and Mediterranean. While the UN built its own communication system first 
via the UN radio transmitters of the UN field Service in Geneva and UNTSO in 
Jerusalem and then in Naples and Abu Sueir and Port Said (and later the Gaza Strip),623 
the UN force relied completely on the US and the British for equipment and the 
supplies. For example, the British invasion force not only sold the UN force vehicles to 
supply both the entire Indian infantry battalion and the Norwegian medical company, 
which Burns admits “(…) the force would have been in great difficulties without 
(…).”624 The British invasion force sold the UN force petrol, oil, lubricants, medical 
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supplies, and rations.625 Moreover, two weeks after buying several hundred British 
vehicles, the UN Secretary-General had his staff approach the British UN diplomats for 
spare parts.626 After meeting the Executive Vice-President of the American-Saudi oil 
company Aramco, the American Director of the UN Field Operations Service, David 
B. Vaughan, also got both supplies and refined oil from a trapped ARAMCO ship 
moving Saudi refined oil to Rotterdam.627 Reminiscent of the Korean War,628, the US 
also provided the Colombian contingent with transport, arms and equipment to US 
standards, and did so at Bunche’s direct request to the Director of the American Mission 
at the UN.629 Washington would also provide more vehicles in December.630 On the 
overall matter of  supplies and logistics, Burns himself noted, “It is axiomatic that a 
military force can function only if it is supplied with food, and the fuel and lubricants 
for the mechanical transport on which it depends for all its movements, plus munitions 
to replace those used up in operations (…)”.631 With this in mind, it is safe to say that 
UNEF would not have been available as a tool to protect the West and its oil supplies 
had it not been for the support of the US and NATO. 
 The dependence of UNEF on the West, and again particularly the US, also extended 
to its staff, as was the case even at the highest levels of the UN Headquarters in New 
York, where several of the General-Secretary’s advisors such as aforementioned 
Bunche and Cordier as well as the Director of General Services, David B. Vaughan, 
and the Chief of the Field Operations Service, George Lansky in 1956 and later Carey 
Seward, were Americans. As noted, UNSCO was also staffed with Americans in central 
positions: McCloy and Wheeler being the most prominent and then others such as D. 
G. Sullivan, who served as Chief Administrative Officer. ‘On the ground’, several of 
the UN military observers of the Egyptian-Israeli Military Armistice Commission that 
had in place since 1948 were also American. In late November 1956, for example, the 
UN Secretary-General let it be known to the head of UNTSO and UNEF, Burns, who 
then let pas it downwards within UNTSO to a US Marine Corps Colonial working as a 
UN military observer in the Gaza Strip, Byron Leary, that the Secretary-General was 
not keen to replace him once his rotation were to end or even grant him leave for 
Christmas. His symbolic presence as a UN official was cited, but, as will be clear in the 
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last section of this chapter, Leary was also handy in relation to his capacity as an 
American military officer to coordinate with the US Sixth Fleet.632 Beyond the 
observers, the UN force itself also employed many westerners, several of whom, if not 
most, were Americans with previous military experience. Some had arrived with Burns 
in November. Others would arrive gradually. Most key staff were, as he called it, 
‘imported’ UN staff.633 The Chief Administrative Officers were American (until 
1967!).634 The first Legal Advisor, Public Relations Officer, and Welfare Officer were 
all Canadian.635 Altogether, the UN force’s outlook and sense of self was defined by, if 
unintentionally, the views and geopolitical imaginaries and the place of the Middle East 
therein of these key figures. Also partly steeped in Western ways, or more specifically 
those of the British Mandate Regime, were many of the Greek and Egyptian “(…) 
locally recruited personnel, who had been working for British military and commercial 
organizations, and were unemployed.”636 Expectedly, aside a few secretaries, most of 
these UN staffers were also all males.  
6.4 London, Paris, Tel Aviv and More ‘Dots in the 
Web’: Expanding the UN Force 
Despite the ongoing relatively problem free and non-violent ‘international re-
colonisation’ of the Suez Canal towns by the UN force (which at least the British had 
influence on), the governments of Great Britain and France were not budging; they 
wanted a forced settlement on the canal to their liking. The Israeli government also 
wanted several requirements fulfilled before withdrawing its forces from both Egypt 
and the Gaza Strip. Accordingly, they kept working American fears of Soviet 
‘penetration’ of the Middle East, of Nasser’s double-scheming and the size of the UN 
force as a problem for it being ‘effective’ at the UN, in Washington, in Tel Aviv, in 
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Paris and in London in the period from mid-November to early December.637 To some 
extent, the lobbying consequently gradually intensified existing concerns. Soviet 
volunteers were often spoken if, even if the Undersecretary of State, Hoover argued that 
Moscow merely used the rumours of Soviet ‘volunteers’ to label itself the champion of 
Arab causes during a White House meeting in mid-November. However, the meeting 
also brought forward concerns on the Gaza Strip as it was learned the Israeli army was 
‘having difficulties’ in ‘holding down’ the Palestinians. A concerned Hoover spoke of 
a “(…) another immediate problem shaping up in the Gaza Strip.”638 Joining him, 
Radford, the Chief of Staff, argued that the UN force was too small to maintain order 
just as it was noted that the Ambassador to Lebanon suggested that Israel should be 
allowed to stay in the Gaza Strip until the UN force was ready.639 At a parallel meeting 
of the US delegation to the UN General Assembly in New York, the American 
Permanent UN Representative told the rather militant delegation members in favour of 
helping the US allies more openly, that the US approach was “(…) to have the UN 
Force ease itself in, get itself established and build up its strength”.640 A few days later, 
Eisenhower told Hoover that he wanted a force that was “(…) of reasonable size—
enough to prevent brigandage.”641 At a National Security Council meeting on 
November 30th, concerns with the stability of the British conservative government, the 
Middle East and NATO were openly expressed: Nixon declared himself scared of the 
prospect of a new government under Bevan and therefore saw it as necessary to prop 
up the Conservatives, Hoover noted that Lodge was thinking of a UN force in Syria, 
and Dulles saw the NATO meeting in mid-December as “(…) most important one ever 
held.”642 The irritation with the Egyptian President also came to the fore to the extent 
that he was seen as engaging in ‘monkey-business’ and a ‘monkey’ on the British back 
to avoid, a racialisation that linked well with the administration’s roots in the American 
south.643  
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Speaking to the British House of Commons (and the White House) on December 2nd, 
the British Foreign Secretary declared that their and the French forces would be 
withdrawn immediately, if he made the withdrawal a 14-day process and conditional 
on the making of an adequate UN force and the proceeding of the canal clearance and 
so with aid of British and French vessels in place. Content, neither the American 
Ambassador in London nor Eisenhower and Dulles problematized the plan, thus not 
only granting the British and French the ‘fig leaf’ requested by Macmillan, but also, as 
will be clear in the following, substantial influence on the UN force.644 It is unclear if, 
and if so to which extent and how, the Eisenhower administration and the UN Secretary-
General and/or his Undersecretary, the American former OSS and State Department 
official Bunche, coordinated and agreed to expand the force. However, it is clear that 
Hammarskjold and Bunche asked the Advisory Committee to support an expansion 
from nearly 4.500 to around 6.000 soldiers two days after Lloyd stated that the 
withdrawal being dependent on the size of UNEF and the day after Eisenhower and 
Dulles agreed that this was a satisfactory plan. First, they discussed the logistics of 
build-up and the problems of getting the last units of the force to Port Said to let the 
British and French forces withdraw, thus emphasising a need for speed and nudging the 
idea of more troops. Then, they turned to the task of moving the force through the Sinai 
to let the Israelis withdraw, noting that the force would be significantly better equipped 
to handle its task with 3 extra battalions, thus a doubling of the non-technical units.645 
After Hammarskjold, Bunche and the Legal Advisor to the Secretary-General—the 
Greek Constantin Stavropoulos who had worked with Bunche when he worked for the 
UN in Palestine—had (once again) ended Lall’s concerns, it was decided to support the 
Legal Council’s and military attaches’ work towards securing that Egyptian courts were 
to have no jurisdiction over the troops “(…) as a matter of course” 646 as the Secretary-
General noted. Thereby, the UN force would continue the practice of extra-territoriality 
of the expansion of the frontier of multinational imperialism. The subsequent meeting 
elaborated on the agreement. Hammarskjold started by saying that it dealt mostly with 
legal details “(…) which can be of no great interest to you.” 647 Stavropoulos then noted 
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that Egypt had no objections, even if the still un-signed agreement, lent the UN more 
privileges than it had in the US via complete freedom of movement in the areas in which 
it operated on any means of transport, meaning that the force would be “(…) to work 
unhindered by any rule or regulation which, normally, would have to apply.”648 
Washington remained content with the withdrawal plan despite a study by senior 
officials in the State Department with the help of the CIA two days later established 
that “(…) collusion and deception did exist [on the side of the British, French and 
Israeli governments] and that it was directed not only against Egypt but also the US 
Government”649 Already having contemplated a larger force, Washington was 
concerned mostly with stabilising its allies, their oil supply and NATO, as was evident 
in subsequent meetings with the French and British.650  
In Port Said, where the force kept building up within the original framework, 
relations between the ‘white’ UN soldiers with the British forces grew increasingly 
friendly as trucks, equipment, and food rations changed hands, positions were taken 
over, and soccer matches were arranged. While reports of this as well as of the UN 
soldiers’ turn in moral with the looting of furniture and other niceties from the villas 
and public buildings may well have reached Egyptian president,651 Nasser probably 
sensed a far larger pressure from both Hammarskjold who had already forced through 
an acceptance of a Canadian force during his mid-November visit that was now 
impossible to reverse and from the Eisenhower administration that via its diplomats in 
both Washington and New York as well as the American Ambassador in Cairo 
‘requested’ “a constructive attitude”.652 Last, but not least, Nasser had a growing interest 
in re-opening the canal due to a growing economic pressure, partly related to missing 
income and partly related to frozen assets in the US and Great Britain, which had forced 
Nasser to both make requests for access to both its assets and American aid and argue 
that aid to the aggressor rather than those aggressed upon was both unfair and unwise 
in a regional context.653  
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In any case, the Egyptian President instantly accepted both an enlargement of the 
UN force and an increase of the Canadian contingent when he met the Canadian UN 
Force Commander in Cairo, perhaps similar to the way the deposed King Farouk would 
have ceded to demands from the highest-ranking local British official.654 Aside the 
Canadians, Hammarskjold and Bunche also wanted to bring in an Indonesian 
contingent, perhaps to help Nasser to sell the increase of the force to the Egyptians. 
Nasser quickly accepted an Indonesian battalion, perhaps from seeing an advantage in 
having soldiers from another non-aligned and ‘brown’ nation that was additionally led 
by his other friend in international politics, the Indonesian President Sukarno. Having 
gained independence from a Western colonial power, Indonesia was by late 1956 in a 
similar place as Egypt, struggling to avoid the conditional embrace of both Washington 
(which under both Roosevelt and Truman had sought to retain the colonial-era 
economic influence, had granted the first independent Indonesian government secret 
US military aid and had pressed for arrests until Eisenhower began losing interest) and 
Moscow that was seeking influence via an aid and trade agreement in late 1956.655 
The Egyptian President, however, for the third time refused a Pakistani contingent 
and had the Egyptian diplomats in New York when the discussion shifted there for a 
full month, until the idea was given up.656 Not only had the distance between Cairo and 
Islamabad grown beyond Islamabad joining the Baghdad Pact, the warming in Cairo 
and New Delhi’s relationship from the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the Pakistani 
government’s participation in the first Suez Canal User Association after the 
nationalisation of the canal. At this point, Nasser had also grown angry with the 
Pakistani government when it turned to the Baghdad Pact, and thus the West, after the 
invasion (even if Islamabad had openly criticised the invasion of Egypt and supported 
a peaceful solution to the ‘Suez Crisis’), and the attacks of the Pakistani Prime Minister 
Hussein Suhrawardy (who was facing massive criticism in Pakistan over price increases 
due to the closure of the canal).657  
Finally, the Egyptian President only just agreed to a Brazilian contingent “(…) after 
a good deal of pressure (…)”658 from the UN Headquarters. According to Burns, the 
Egyptian hesitation towards Brazil had to do its voting pattern at the UN, which was 
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apparently not closely aligned with that of Egypt.659 However, the hesitations of the 
Egyptian President may have been linked to Brazil’s connection to the West, having 
dispatched troops both to the Mediterranean theatre in the Second World War as part 
of the UN military alliance and to Korea as part of the UN coalition in the Korean 
War.660  
A few days after the Egyptian President had accepted the doubling of non-technical 
troops, the heads of governments and diplomats of the NATO members met in the 
forum of the North Atlantic Council in Paris from the 11th to the 14th of December. 
Dulles found not only that there were “no serious fireworks” and “every evidence that 
ranks will be closed”,661 but also that several members, such as especially Norway and 
to a lesser extent also Denmark and the Netherlands, offered outspoken support,662 and 
Greece assured that Egypt was ambivalent as to the Soviet intentions.663 Nevertheless, 
he messaged Eisenhower that resentments endured.664 For example, the British Foreign 
Minister called UNEF for ‘a great step’, but also argued that Great Britain and France 
deserved praise for having created new opportunities for both NATO and the UN, and 
then attempted to put pressure on the US by calling for NATO, meaning Canada, 
Norway, Denmark and the US, to expand UNEF in size and duration.665 When Dulles 
met Eisenhower the next day, he therefore informed Eisenhower that he had struggled 
to keep the meeting from giving the appearance of NATO ‘teaming up’.666 He noted that 
he had dismissed a statement on concerting a policy on the Middle East due to its 
potential impact on world opinion.667 In the end, however, the final communique of the 
council most likely expressed what could be agreed upon.668 On the one hand, the 
                                               
659 Ibid., 234–35. 
660 Edwards, United Nations Participants in the Korean War; Klepak, “Power Multiplied or Power 
Restrained? The United States and Multilateral Institutions in the Americas.” 
661 “Document 45 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and 
Integration, Volume IV - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d. 
662 “Document 41 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and 
Integration, Volume IV - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d.; “Document 43 - Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV - 
Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d. 
663 Greece had special links to Egypt due to the presence of approximately 200.000 Greeks in Egypt. 
“Document 43 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and 
Integration, Volume IV - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian.” 
664 “Document 52 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and 
Integration, Volume IV - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d. 
665 “Document 41 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and 
Integration, Volume IV - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” 41. 
666 “Document 657 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 
1956, Volume XVI - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d. 
667 “Document 54 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and 
Integration, Volume IV - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d. 
668 For more on this, see Dietl, “Suez 1956.” 
  
172 
 
communique thus stated “(…) shock and revulsion” with the Soviet Union’s “(…) 
brutal suppression of the heroic Hungarian people (…)”.669 On the other, it merely “(…) 
emphasized in particular the need for rapid progress in clearing the Suez Canal in 
conformity with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (…)” and, 
moreover, “(…) the urgent need for initiating and pressing to a conclusion negotiations 
through the good offices of the United Nations with a view to restoring the Canal to full 
and free operation.”670  
Parallel with the diplomatic fence-mending in Paris, the more concrete process of 
ensuring the conditions for the re-opening of the canal continued with the ‘international 
colonisation’ of Port Said. However, readings of memoirs and diary excerpts of some 
of the Danish and Canadian UN soldiers show that the transfer of Port Said was to 
become tenser as it became clear to the residents of the town that the British and French 
forces were leaving. As the number and rate of incidents went up, the British responded 
by intensifying their patrols and putting up barbed wire around the area of the docks 
they gradually withdrew to. However, they also began conducting area- and 
neighbourhood-wide raids with tank support. In light of the situation, Burns assigned 
the overall command of the UN forces in Port Said, which at that point more or less 
amount to a rather pro-Western or neutral ‘white’ force with approximately 2.000 
Danish-Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Colombian soldiers, to the Danish 
commander of the DANOR battalion. Interestingly, the UN Commander sent the 
Colombians to Port Said rather than the already acclimatised and locally well-liked 
Indian battalion, which was holding positions outside Port Said that it had taken over 
from the Danish-Norwegian battalion. As the British-French force gradually withdrew 
and the UN force took over their positions, the Danish commander also had UNEF form 
an external perimeter of several hundred meters around the barbed wired area that the 
‘Allied forces’, as Burns called them, had set up. This zone, which shielded the 
withdrawing invasion force from reprisals of angry Egyptians, may have seemed as 
logic for the UN force, as the docks bordered the town’s ‘Arab quarter’. However, it 
may also be considered a step beyond joint patrols with the British and French forces 
that the Secretary-General specifically did not permit, as the buffer area shielded the 
invasion force from reprisals.671  
The UN force may well have been seen both as linked to the partially suspended 
Egyptian sovereignty and in part a re-actualisation of imperial forms of ‘whiteness’ and 
authority.672 While the first days after the NATO meeting saw exchanges between 
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Egyptian paramilitaries and British forces that increasingly filled the nights of Port Said 
with the sounds of automatic weapons fire and exploding hand grenades, the UN 
soldiers also felt how the withdrawal and the confrontations also changed their own 
situation. Worried about being caught in the middle in some parts of the canal town and 
their oversight of others, several of the companies of Danish-Norwegian battalion began 
training hand-to-hand combat as well as conducting shooting exercises on the edge of 
town. Minor situations also began to escalate towards incidents, perhaps an indicator of 
the legacy of the British influence on the Danish military culture from the 
aforementioned cooperation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Danish-Norwegian 
UN soldiers also increasingly resorted to warning shots. Additionally, the UN force also 
declared the ‘Arab’ part of town ‘out of bounds’. Whether related or not, the Danish 
UN soldiers who managed to get lost there were attacked by groups of young local 
angry men were only able to escape without shooting their way out through 
interventions of older local men, who perhaps knew what this type of attacks had 
previously led to. A few days before the British-French withdrawal, an entire Danish 
company was also deployed after a squad had been fired upon. In another ambush, a 
patrolling Norwegian squad had to ask a nearby British squad for help. Consequently, 
the UNEF also began to conduct house- and minor area-searches for weapons as well 
as propaganda, for led to minor incidents of sabotage in response.673 As the UN task 
force took over more areas of the town, the Danish commander realised that he needed 
more boots on the ground. Thus, he requested that Egyptian police units take over 
security and the dusk-to-dawn curfew in some neighbourhoods. Reflecting the 
continued partial suspension of Egyptian sovereignty by the UN force (alongside the 
British, French and Israeli forces), however, the Egyptian police units had to be vetted 
by the UN force to ensure that only police officers with their normal weapons and 
equipment were allowed into town to patrol. Additionally, UNEF held on to the sites 
connected to the delivery of electricity, gas, sewage and public health, and, perhaps 
even more tellingly, also established its own headquarters in the main building of the 
Suez Canal Company.674 Not surprisingly, the diaries and memoirs show that these 
young, ‘white’ and Western soldiers not only (like the British) felt more relaxed in Port 
Said’s colonial era neighbourhoods than in the ‘Arab quarter’, but that they (like the 
British) called the latter ‘the shantytown’. On and off, they also professed both 
‘professional’ respect for the forceful British (such as the removal of the 4.000 villagers 
from the little fishing village of El Qutabi outside Port Said) and a parallel disdain for 
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the Egyptian civilians, thus identifying themselves with the ‘white’ occupation soldiers 
much in the same way as the UN Commander who (even in his memories) called the 
British and French forces as ‘allied forces’.675 
On the 22nd of December, the UN force escorted the ‘allied forces’ out as British jets 
soared above Port Said. Predictably, the British officers thanked the Canadian UN 
Commander, who had fought with the British in the Second World War, for the “(…) 
harmonious ways (…)”676 in which ‘cooperation’ had found place and also warmly 
praised the Danish Colonel in charge of the UN force in Port Said. Personifying the 
bigger picture, the Danish Colonel was connected not only to the faded Danish empire 
by way of relatives who had served in the Danish West Indies, but also the then still 
active British and French empires to which he had been socialised through relatives that 
had served in the British colony of Hong Kong; his time in the British-inspired 
paramilitary scout movement in his youth years; his teen interest in the British 
archaeology in Egypt; his time in the French Foreign Legion in Algeria and Morocco; 
and, not least, his service as a UN observer in Kashmir that introduced him to the 
lifestyle, the sense of superiority towards ‘Oriental’ peoples and the officers clubs of 
British colonial officers.677 
6.5 The Clearing of the Suez Canal: UNSCO and 
The Re-establishment of the Western Frontier 
of Imperial Multilateralism  
Before his trip to Egypt in the middle of November to speak with the Egyptian 
President, the Secretary-General met the Advisory Committee to discuss not only the 
UN force, but also the clearance of the Suez Canal. As with the force, Hammarskjold 
wanted speed to be the main priority, emphasizing that the members should link their 
views and advice to “(…) the steps to be taken now as quickly as possible.”678 As he 
arrived in Cairo and the UN force started to arrive in Port Said at the northern end of 
the Suez Canal, several NATO members also began requesting US diplomats in their 
capitals to have the Eisenhower administration activate the London Oil emergency 
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Advisory Committee.679 Amongst these were Denmark and Norway, which were not 
only NATO members providing troops for the UN force, but also representing some of 
the largest canal users. Especially Norway’s request was important, as it was both the 
largest user after the Great Britain and the largest transporter of oil to Great Britain by 
1955. Indeed, at the time when Egypt nationalised the canal, nearly 80% of the 
Norwegian ships passing through were time chartered for British as well as American 
oil companies set for British ports.680 As Hammarskjold was flying back from Cairo on 
the 18th of November, Macmillan, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer who was 
taking the reins in Whitehall, also expressed the partly genuine and partly overstated 
desperation of the British cabinet on the issue of the free operation of the canal to the 
American Ambassador in London.681  
Consequently, Hammarskjold and his canal clearance group of Wheeler, McCloy 
and Katzin set a high pace after his return from Egypt on the 18th of November. They 
were aware of Western concerns with the long term prospects of the operations of the 
canal, that the consumption (and thus transport) of Middle Eastern oil was expected to 
at least double over next decade and that major business papers in the US and London 
had debated the issue of expanding the Suez Canal as well as early designs for several 
weeks (and would continue to do so for months).682 That the British Foreign Secretary 
had begun to call on both the members of Commonwealth and the Advisory Committee 
to rally behind the British move to de-link the canal clearance and their withdrawal and 
then informed the US of doing so did probably not reduce the Secretary-General’s sense 
of urgency.683 Nevertheless, at the meeting with the Advisory Committee later on the 
18th of November, the Secretary-General, however, disregarded Lall’s and thus India’s 
argument that it was the British and French that should pay for the clearance of the 
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canal despite his aversion towards the British and French invasion.684 Despite India 
being what Nehru had called”(…) a principal user (…)”685 of the canal with 
approximately 60% of its trade going through the canal, New Delhi appears to have 
been concerned not only with clearing the canal, but also dealing with issues that India 
as a recently independent state could also come to face due to imbalances in the 
international system.686  
Within a week, McCloy, Wheeler (and John Connor, his World Bank assistant) and 
Katzin had subsequently found Hammarskjold an American engineering company that 
could dispatch a team of engineers to the Suez Canal.687 The company, the Ralph M. 
Parsons Company, was predictably conducting business not only with the oil industry 
(in the form of Standard Oil and Shell) and other chemical industries, but also with the 
US military building air force bases and missile test sites and NATO governments 
through construction projects in their metropolitan territories.688 In other words, the 
company was a post-war version of the politically well-connected construction (and oil) 
corporations that had been involved in expanding the American imperial frontier in both 
Latin America and the Middle East before the Second World War.689 As he had 
promised the Eisenhower administration earlier, Hammarskjold also hired companies 
for a clearance fleet from the NATO members of the Netherlands and Denmark on 
November 26th.690 He also provided an interim permission, using here the 
aforementioned General Assembly’s permission for him to make hasty clearance 
arrangements, as the contract would need to be worked out by McCloy.691 At the same 
time London and Paris were assembling a clearance fleet of their own, Stavropoulos, 
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the Legal Advisor to the Secretary-General, was thus dispatched to Cairo to explore the 
legal details of both the force and the canal clearance.   
After having discussed the UN force on the meeting of the Advisory Committee on 
the 4th of December, Hammarskjold opened the topic of the canal clearance by putting 
himself in charge of it, “(…) there is no question that all decisions on implementation 
are taken by the Secretary-General; that is to say, it is a pending United Nations 
operation.”692 The only point of discussion with Egypt was the freedom of use of 
equipment as Egypt was seeking to prevent the British and French vessels from being 
used, but once again the Secretary-General drove the point home, “(…) we put it up the 
way we want.”693 The rest of the meeting appears to have been intended to be a 
walkthrough of the UN Suez Clearance Organization, at the time named UN Suez Canal 
Operation, by Katzin. He set out by stating that the canal was blocked by 51 
obstructions, two of which were bridges and the rest ships partly in the Port Said area 
at the mouth of the canal and the rest further south. He then noted that the British-French 
salvage teams had surveyed most of the obstructions and that the “(…) first plan of 
operation is the same which the British-French salvage teams are following (…)”.694 
This entailed that the UN fleet, which making was on its way from Denmark and the 
Netherlands, would both be the same size as the British-French fleet and clear the path 
outlined by the British to allow 65-70% of the ships to pass through before removing 
the obstructions from the canal. After stating that the UNSCO would follow the British-
French plan and there was an agreed option of taking over six British and French 
vessels, Katzin more importantly noted that it would not set up its own administration 
team. Appearing to be interested in avoiding that the committee took an interest in the 
agreement Wheeler was to negotiate with Egypt, the Secretary-General added that he 
thought it was “(…) not a thing the which this Committee is likely to wish to go into in 
any kind of detail. It is a matter of information.”695 Sensitive due to the making of the 
Panama Canal by the US by way of, the Colombian representative, Urrutia, however, 
asked Hammarskjold if Egypt had actually agreed to the British-French salvage 
operation. Hammarskjold was unclear in his response, making Urrutia repeat his 
question. As the Secretary-General admitted that they were working in Port Said and 
that the UN would take over only when it was ready, Katzin intervened, arguing that 
their work should not be dropped. After regaining his footing and a minor discussion 
with Lall, Hammarskjold ended the meeting stating, “Gentlemen, you will certainly be 
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called again very soon. This was just for information purposes. We have no real 
questions to ask you. The next time I guess there will be questions.”696  
Two days after the meeting, the Canadian UN representative not surprisingly told his 
American counterpart that Canada was impressed with Hammarskjold and his ability to 
handle the situation.697 The Canadian enthusiasm can only have grown when 
Hammarskjold a few days later informed the Advisory Committee that the General 
Assembly did not need to be privy to the canal clearance agreement with Egypt.698 With 
vessels at work near Port Said, the French likewise expressed content with 
Hammarskjold to the Eisenhower administration’s officials at the first day of the NATO 
meeting in Paris.699 On the same day, the State Department ordered the Egyptian 
ambassador in Cairo to instruct Nasser that the US expected to Egypt to both “Offer full 
cooperation in urgent clearance of Canal” and “Offer full cooperation in renewal of 
negotiations on future Canal regime”.700 To make sure the message was received, the 
Secretary of State also conveyed the same meaning to Mahmud Fawzi, the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister, and the Egyptian Ambassador to the US in Washington on the last 
day of the NATO meeting.701 As the British-French fleet was clearing the first 
obstructions near Port Said and the NATO council was convened in Paris, Wheeler 
began surveying the canal with his American team of corporate surveyors and divers 
and the first UN-chartered vessels from not only the Netherlands and Denmark as 
originally planned, but also from Belgium and Western Germany, two other NATO 
members, began arriving to Port Said.702    
While this was taking place, however, complications arose (once again). First, the 
Egyptian government not surprisingly began protesting that part of the British salvage 
fleet was becoming part of the UN fleet when British and French forces were still 
occupying parts of Port Said (and UN troops from three NATO allies were either 
patrolling or growing in numbers). At the Advisory Committee meeting, the UN 
Secretary-General presented this and his botched attempt to persuade Egypt that the UN 
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salvage teams would “(…) need some guidance (…)”703 when taking over some of the 
British-French vessels. He moved to state his hope for a result close to his ‘pragmatist’ 
approach, “(…) for it would really be an absurdity if it were to interfere”, again placing 
Egyptian sovereignty below UN authority and the Western Bloc’s oil needs.704 
Moreover, the Secretary-General was faced another challenge with the preliminary 
costs that would make it “(…) necessary to make extraordinary tiding-over 
arrangements.”705 Two days later, another hurdle surfaced. McCloy had become aware 
of an agreement between the American Secretary of State and his British and French 
counterparts that the six British vessels the UN was incorporating were to retain their 
British crews, which according to the US Permanent Representative at the UN left 
Hammarskjold in a grim mood.706 Additionally, the shipping companies of the main 
canal using countries also began to contact ‘their’ foreign ministries to have them ask 
around in both Washington and New York, adding more pressure on both the US and 
the UN to resolve the oil crisis not only via temporary alternative supply networks, but 
also opening the canal.707 Finally, it appeared that Egypt also withheld its permission 
for the UN to begin clearance operations until the Israeli government had withdrawn 
from the Sinai Peninsula.708 
 As earlier, however, most matters were resolved. This reflected mainly how the 
Eisenhower administration had regained an interest in the UN to rebalance its approach 
to the situation after having turned to NATO as most strongly manifested in the 
agreement to let British crews stay on board the vessels that were to be incorporated 
into the UN fleet without consulting the UN Secretary-General. The American 
Secretary of State therefore had Lodge speak to Hammarskjold about helping each other 
rather than risk ‘crossing wires’ on the 24th of December.709 Moreover, Cairo’s refusal 
to allow the beginning of the clearance operation appears to have been an Israeli 
construction to connect their withdrawal to the opening of the Suez Canal to Israeli 
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vessels as far as Washington was able to learn.710 With Wheeler’s help, Egypt was also 
persuaded to accept the incorporation of the British-French crews into the UN fleet.711 
Additionally, Washington took upon itself to assure the finances. Indeed, the Secretary 
of the Treasury Humphrey intensified the already close cooperation with McCloy.712 
While the administration was ready to use the Special Fund available to the President 
for matters deemed important to US national security either as an advance or as aid, it 
wanted to bring on as many other nations as soon as possible. Washington also preferred 
the World Bank as the fiscal agent, as it was believed it could increase confidence in 
the fiscal aspects of the operation, enhance the operation’s international character (in 
comparison to the Suez Canal User Association), lead more effective negotiations, and 
offer a logical avenue for transferring the compensation to the shareholders in old canal 
company. The State Department also wanted London, Paris and Cairo to offer 
assurances on the clearance, offer cooperation with the Secretary-General, and seek a 
new overall agreement under UN auspices. The first step, the Undersecretary of State 
noted to the Secretary of State, was to have Hammarskjold write a letter to all parties 
and potential donors. He added not only, “we expect to receive, informally and 
confidentially, a rough draft of the letter within the next few days”,713 but also that the 
Legal Advisers’ office was already working on a reply to the letter, indicative of what 
Washington expected from the relationship with Hammarskjold. While it is uncertain 
if he passed the letter by the administration first, he did send it the following day, the 
25th of December. Several countries responded. For example, Ceylon, both a member 
of Commonwealth and the Advisory Committee, offered a contribution.714 However, the 
largest contributors were either members of NATO, ANZUS or Commonwealth and 
not least canal users, and in two cases either troop contributor or troop contributor and 
Advisory Committee member: Norway, Denmark, Italy, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Canada, Australia and the US.715 The finances were necessary to sort out 
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as costs were running up for the hiring of vessels and crew (several of which were 
working overtime) for the UN fleet, insurance coverage, the American surveyors (from 
Parsons), engineers (from International General Electric Company), and auditors (from 
Howell & Company), not to mention the expenses the British ignobly reclaimed for 
their vessels in the UN fleet.716 In the end, these countries would pay 99.93% of the first 
loan to the UN to get the canal reopened while the rest would be covered via a 3% levy 
on Canal tolls over three  years.717  
As the UN started in the canal on the following day, the 26th of December, 
Hammarskjold approached Lodge, the American Permanent Representative at the UN, 
to share, according to Lodge, his “innermost thoughts on the long-range canal 
settlement, which he had not given to anybody”.718 On the one hand, he informally 
requested that the US either pressure Egypt or offer aid as incentive for a long-term 
agreement once clearance operations were well on their way, and that he needed to learn 
the British-French ideas on arbitration on the other.719  
All at the same time, the UN fleet set in motion Wheeler’s plan to have the canal 
open by April. The engineers from the International General Electric Company and 
Parsons took care of the out-of-water work on telecommunications, workshops, and 
lighting systems in cooperation with Egyptians. While the UN fleet also had minor 
Egyptian help, it more importantly incorporated British and French vessels. This 
entailed not only that these vessels were operated by their own crews, but also that these 
were accorded the same immunities and privileges as the UN crews.720 Blurring the 
already muddy lines further, Burns also provided the British and French crews with 80 
Swedish and Finnish soldiers, or rather fellow ‘white’ soldiers, dressed in civilian 
clothes only marked by their blue berets.721 Cairo accepted this, most probably due to 
the domestic pressure of a partially collapsed economy and growing unemployment 
(especially in the canal zone) and the pressure from Washington that had still not 
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granted Egypt access to its frozen assets in the US and also halted its aid. Although 
Nasser did not link the clearance of the canal and Israeli withdrawal,722 he unofficially 
linked the settlement with Israel’s withdrawal to have Washington and New York put 
pressure on Tel Aviv. He therefore delayed the clearance with demands for shorter 
working hours for the Egyptian workers, causing frustration with the clearance 
companies managers and the crews on the private clearance vessels many of which were 
operating on piecework contracts.723 Washington and New York were also still under 
pressure due to the inability of the alternative oil supply network to provide more than 
75% of Western Europe’s oil needs, SCUA’s lack of direct influence, and the rising 
freight rates.724 In return, the US put economic and political pressure on Egypt and 
offered assurances to its allies behind the curtain. Free to offer its assurances in public, 
the UN had every press release turn each bridge and sunk ship into epic obstacles that 
the Western world overcame; cast Wheeler as the saviour with a great authority;725 
brought tales of a glorious day and night work ethic;726 and continuously spoke of a 
‘satisfactory’ progress that was going ‘according to plan’.727 As the UN fleet cleared the 
narrow path over January, a long term settlement also became an issue of growing 
concern. The US thus sought to pressure Egypt (as well as Great Britain and France) 
towards a settlement and have the Secretary-General follow its lead.728 Hammarskjold 
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also had the Advisory Committee let the representatives of India and Norway, the two 
largest canal users in the committee and members of NATO on the one hand and the 
Commonwealth and non-aligned camp on the other, to work Egypt, Great Britain and 
France.729 Although canal was cleared opened in April, the issues of compensation, toll 
and UN loans took both spring and summer to be sorted out via the World Bank and a 
new Suez Canal Authority before the matter could be closed at the autumn session of 
the General Assembly, as the Egyptian government hunted the best outcome by seeking 
to negotiate from a position of strength.730 
Altogether, several aspects of the UN force and the public/private hybrid partnership 
of UNSCO and the World Bank have been overlooked. First, it is necessary to recognise 
that the ‘Suez Crisis’ and the hybrid UN intervention was the most visible manifestation 
both of how the late 19th century form of imperialism was becoming increasingly 
untenable and ‘counter-productive’ and consequently how Western and linked thereto 
Commonwealth economic interests were increasingly best maintained through the 
frontier of imperial multilateralism. It is also crucial to recognise that intervention 
preserved the frontier of imperial multilateralism in extension of the path laid out in the 
late 19th century and the early 20th century by the frontier of European multinational 
imperialism in the Mediterranean. Additionally, the intervention demonstrates how the 
negotiated re-incorporation in practice resulted in a non-violent but nevertheless 
penetrating authority in the frontier zone that would continue beyond the existence of 
the UNSCO. Indeed, Wheeler returned to Egypt as a World Bank consultant two years 
later to discuss with the new Suez Canal Authority the older plans of widening the canal 
to service a growing number of ships that were also growing in size, resulting in an 
Egyptian World Bank loan.731 At the same time, the Eisenhower administration also 
came to establish what Cold War historian Roland Popp has called “‘a working 
relationship’ with Nasserite Arab nationalism”,732 just as Nasser also felt compelled to 
accept the building of a pipeline from Suez to the Mediterranean in 1967.733 Moreover, 
the precedent of the World Bank’s involvement in UN interventions both during and 
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after the Cold War has been passed over in much the same way the links between 
UNSCO’s re-establishment of the Suez Canal and UNEF’s role therein. Most research 
on the interventions both during and after the twin-operation of UNSCO and UNEF has 
not involved a similar maritime component and focused, consequently, only on the 
Israeli-Egyptian state-level relations against the backdrop of the deployment of UNEF 
in the Gaza Strip. The next chapter will examine these, but in a way brings places the 
dynamics ‘on the ground’ to the fore.  
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 7 Chapter 7: Re-establishing the 
Suez Oil Artery, Mission Creep in the Gaza 
Strip: Mission Creep and UN-Israeli Relations 
With the onset of the canal clearing and the re-deployment of the force east-wards 
across the Sinai, I turn from the making and the practice of the frontier zone in Egypt 
proper to that part of the frontier zone encompassing the Egyptian-Israeli border and 
the Armistice Demarcation Line between the Gaza Strip and Israel, or thus a frontier 
region in more literal sense. Thus, Israel and its importance to the Western frontier of 
imperial multilateralism gain primacy to Great Britain and France. 
Initially, I examine the deployment of the UN force into the Sinai Peninsula and 
eventually the Gaza Strip following the reluctant and protracted Israeli withdrawal from 
the Sinai Peninsula in the period from the middle of December 1956 to the end of 
February 1957 and lastly the Gaza Strip in early March 1957. Until mid-February, the 
UN leadership and the Eisenhower Administration were uncertain about what to do with 
the Gaza Strip once Israel withdrew. The decision to ultimately enter the Gaza Strip 
was connected to how, as mentioned above, Egypt linked the canal clearance with the 
Israeli withdrawal from both the Egyptian sovereign territory of the Sinai Peninsula and 
the Gaza Strip, which Egypt administrated according to the 1949 armistice. In other 
words, the UN leadership and the Eisenhower administration did not initially see the 
phase involving the Gaza Strip as the main aspect of the UN intervention. Rather, the 
UN involvement in the Gaza Strips followed as a condition after the initially securing 
the withdrawal of the British and French forces to ensure not only the clearance and re-
opening of the Suez Canal and its continued operations, but also the salvaging of 
Western unity, here termed the frontier of imperial multilateralism.  
In this section, I link documents from the American foreign policy establishment from 
the online series of foreign policy related documents (FRUS) with unpublished cables 
and reports of the UN-employed military observers of the Egyptian-Israeli Military 
Armistice Commission (EIMAC) that was connected to the military observer 
organisation UNTSO (and thus already in the Gaza Strip when the ‘Suez Crisis’ broke 
out) as well as published memoirs of UN soldiers. Combined, these material allow for 
a new, and perhaps controlversial, reading of the entry of the UN force into the Gaza 
Strip. 
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Subsequently, I examine the first week of the UN force in the Gaza Strip and how the 
inability of the UN to (fully) internationalise the area initially led to strain in the 
relationship with Israel, who was already critical of the UN. Although the Gaza Strip 
did not become a full-fledged UN governed territory, the UN was already engaged in 
the ad hoc governance of the area in the form of the relief, social and educational 
activities of the UN Relief and Works Agency. The deployment of the UN force in the 
Gaza Strip may accordingly be understood as another phase in the process of the 
simultaneously broadening of the frontier and deepening of imperial multilateralism in 
the area that had already been part of the frontier multinational imperialism as Mandate 
Palestine under the British. Here, I link in the records of the EIMAC observers, various 
departments of the UN force itself as well as a few published documents from both the 
UN and Israel on the one hand, the memoirs of UN soldiers and the Israeli, Palestinian, 
British and broader Middle East historiographies on the other. 
The last two sections turn attention to the period from mid-March 1957 to June 1967 
(when the UN force was withdrawn). While UNEF was never stationed in Israel, the 
Israeli government (and in extension thereof the Israeli settlers) would come to find the 
UN force useful in much the same way as the Jewish settlers had benefitted from the 
British mandate regime and especially its security component before the establishment 
of Israel. In short, I show how UNEF came to serve as a de facto extra layer of Israeli 
border regulation on Egyptian-controlled territory when the Israeli border forces were 
draining funds from a society whose political elite had to deal with a growing middle 
class interested in welfare rather than warfare. In these two sections I also put to use 
EIMAC and UNEF documents as well as existing research literature on various aspects 
of Israeli society, military and defence policy.  
7.1 Redeploying through the Sinai Peninsula:  
Expanding the Frontier Zone  
Although the early November resolutions passed by the General Assembly had 
demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces, Tel Aviv had kept them in the 
Gaza Strip. It was obvious to Tel Aviv that the Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula 
and the Gaza Strip were considered less important than the clearance and re-opening of 
the Suez Canal in New York and Washington. While neither New York nor Washington 
were sure what to do with the Gaza Strip, the informal consultation of the American 
General Lucius Clay, the aforementioned overall military governor of occupied 
Germany, may well have pointed to reflections of internationalising the Gaza Strip 
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(whereas there was no doubt about the Sinai Peninsula being a part of Egyptian 
sovereign territory). So too did the suggestion of UN officials with the Egyptian Israeli 
Armistice Commission in the Gaza Strip to their superiors on November 1st to turn the 
Gaza Strip into a trusteeship with no Egyptian presence until the General Assembly 
could settle its fate.734 On the other hand, the head of the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization, the Canadian General Burns (a few days from becoming the 
commander of the to-be-made UN force), was informed by Secretary-General’s 
American Executive Assistant Andrew Cordier that “Secretary-General wishes you to 
be informed that if situation in Gaza should get out of hand he has asked the United 
States to act as UN agent to come into the area to administer it.”735 As the Israeli forces 
began bombing Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip, the UN officials also saw the US 
as the natural place to turn, having the help of a small force of US Marines evacuate 
most of their personal to the vessels of the Sixth Fleet that were still sailing amongst 
the British and French vessels.736 However, a clear course on the Gaza Strip did not 
materialise early on. It would be granted only granted minor attention until the UN force 
had taken over Port Said from the British-French forces on the 22nd of December and 
the UN fleet begun its work in the canal on the 26th of December.  
In any case, the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip on the 2nd of November ended 
any speculations with a brutality that reflected Ben-Gurion and Dayan’s aggressive 
rhetoric, terrifying many of the Palestinians living in the area’s towns and the eight old 
British bases turned into refugee camps.737 The Israeli soldiers were also “(…) 
unwarrantly rough (…)”,738 noted the American Chairman of the EIMAC in the Gaza 
Strip, who gathered the reports from UNRWA personnel and EIMAC observers. He 
also added that “(…) a good number of people have been shot down in cold blood for 
no apparent reason.739 Moreover, many (…) “key UNRWA personnel are missing from 
the camps and are believed to have been executed by the Israelis.”740 In addition to 
violently demanding authority and preventing potential key potential Palestinian 
troublemakers from mobilising, the Israeli forces also installed a curfew and searched 
the bigger towns and the refugee camps for Egyptian and Palestinian Fedayeen, the 
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paramilitary groups that had both fought in the Suez Canal guerrilla war against the 
British until 1954 and attacked Israeli settlements near the Gaza Strip since.741 As part 
thereof, Israeli military units massacred hundreds of Palestinians in the refugee camps, 
the largest massacres killing 275 people several of whom were women and children. 
Hundreds of Palestinians additionally also had to be treated in hospital.742 The attempt 
of a UNRWA convoy to bring supplies to Gaza City was also dismissed.743 The Israeli 
soldiers also started to plunder. They “(…) robbed civilians, taking watches, rings, 
fountain pens etc. away from the Arabs either in their homes or on the streets. Every 
vehicle and every bicycle has been confiscated. Private workshops and machineshops 
have been stripped of all mechanical tools. Many mules and horses have been taken 
from the stores.”744 Israel did not re-instate the police force in Gaza until the end of the 
month, at which point it was incorporated into the Israeli Police that sent hundreds of 
officers and constables to take over the four police stations in the four main towns of 
the Gaza Strip.745  
However, the brutality and plundering may well have been steps to annex the Gaza 
Strip and perhaps a part of the Sinai. As the Palestinian historian Nur Masalha has 
shown, Ben-Gurion and the members of his secret committee of high-ranking labour, 
agriculture, settlement and foreign policy officials were disappointed that ‘only’ a few 
thousand Palestinians had sought to escape in contrast to 1948746 and that many 
Palestinians believed that the massacres, some of which took place weeks after the 
occupation, were attempts to scare more people to flee.747 Israeli historians have also 
shown that the Israeli Army’s Planning Department and the Israeli Prime Minister had 
wanted the strategic hills in the northern part of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula 
for some time.748 By 1956, these ideas converged with the Soviet termination of oil 
deliveries to Israel, the little known discovery of oil near the Gaza Strip (if indeed 
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correct), and the knowledge that the Egyptian military was structured defensively and 
had not yet incorporated the Soviet arms from 1955.749  
Tel Aviv thus challenged Washington, New York, and the UN officials in the Gaza 
Strip. Indeed, the Israelis not only shut down the UN observers’ means of local 
communications and confined them to their quarters from the 4th of November. After 
having declared the Gaza Strip under a military governor on the 7th of November, they 
also seized the Gaza land registry, listed Palestinians owning land in both the Gaza Strip 
and Israel and sought to expel the UN observers to Jerusalem, Israel’s politicised non-
capital. When that failed due to the Secretary-General directly ordering the remaining 
military observers to stay, the Israeli forces returned the UN radios but turned to control 
the movement and thus knowledge of the remaining handful of international military 
observers forcing them to use Israeli vehicles with Israeli military drivers.750  
In Cairo, Nasser grew concerned with the reports of the Israeli atrocities his 
government was receiving and therefore asked Fawzi, his Foreign Minister, to speak to 
the UN to have the UN force move into the Gaza Strip, if to no immediate avail.751 While 
it is uncertain if Nasser and Hammarskjold discussed the reports during the latter’s visit, 
it is certain that it, along with the information Hammarskjold was receiving from the 
military observers in the Gaza Strip, was not presented to the Advisory Committee. This 
suggests that Hammarskjold may well have found it important, but not immediately 
actionable or as important as the British-French invasion and canal closure. In 
Washington, on the day of Hammarskjold’s return and unaware of the Israeli strategic 
goals with obtaining the Gaza Strip, Eisenhower admitted that he failed to see why 
Israel wanted the area, especially as it had no sustainable water supply.752  
Knowing that Israel could not retain the Gaza Strip without US support, Abba Eban, 
the Israeli Ambassador to the UN and the US, sought but failed to both justify Israel’s 
attack and lure Washington to commit militarily to Israel.753 Golda Meir, the Israeli 
foreign minister, also sought to have Hammarskjold send a UN representative to the 
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Gaza Strip so the annexation policies could be shown off as an improvement of social 
and political conditions while making Egypt appear to be turning the Palestinians into 
an unruly mob.754 After several Arab states brought up the rumours of the Israeli 
violence in the Gaza Strip at the General Assembly, Eban once again sought to gain US 
support for a non-Egyptian solution in the Gaza Strip, for the use of the UN force to 
safeguard the coming Israeli an oil pipeline from Eilat in the Gulf of Aqaba, and for the 
security of Israel in light of the Soviet threat.755 While Eisenhower was not as interested 
in the votes of American Jews or sympathetic to Israel as Truman and thus dismissed 
the Israeli proposals, the initial idea of sanctions against Tel Aviv was also dropped, as 
they would have had to be enforced against London and Paris.756  
Nevertheless, the hesitation and focus on the Suez Canal of both the Eisenhower 
administration and the UN General-Secretary and his closest advisors gave Israel 
leeway to pursue its plans for the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. As Masalha has 
shown, the Israeli government had several ideas for the repatriation of Palestinian 
refugees from the Gaza Strip to Libya, the US and several Latin American countries.757 
Even more indicative of its annexation plans were the Israeli military governor’s 
eagerness to make it ‘facts on the ground’ to make it harder for the UN to expel Israel. 
This involved the appointment of new local councils of agreeable notables, the initiation 
of the renovation of the old railway between Haifa and the Gaza Strip, the import of 
Gaza citrus fruits, and, the introduction of state-signifying markers as Israeli stamps, 
currency and licence plates. Until the visit of the Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative on the 27th of November, the UN observers could do little more than 
inform either the Secretary-General, Cordier, or UNTSO’s Acting Chief of Staff of the 
vetting and missing people, excursions by Israeli mining and water company engineers 
into the Sinai Peninsula, and the interest of several Western companies in building of 
the Israeli pipeline.758 Upon his three day-visit, the Special Representative reported to 
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the Secretary-General he noted there was “(…) evidence of a masterplan for the 
administration of the whole Gaza Area and economic as well as political union with the 
State of Israel”759 and that people therefore seemed reassured that the eyes of the 
international community were on the Gaza Strip. A week later, the (American) 
chairman of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Commission, learned of an Israeli plan to 
use the confiscated land ownership records to push people in the Gaza Strip with land 
in what had become Israel to sell these and migrate from the Gaza Strip, thereby seeking 
to pre-empt land claims contesting not only the legitimacy of the Israeli annexation of 
the Gaza Strip but of the state of Israel itself. He also informed his (American) UNTSO 
superior that it was necessary that the troops arrive before the Israeli departure as “(…) 
all hell will break loose (…)”760 if plans “(…) called for the occupation of the Strip by 
UN troops (…)”.761  
Feeling the lack of support for the annexation plan from both Washington and New 
York, Tel Aviv eventually sanctioned a phased withdrawal of only 100 kilometres a 
month by the beginning of December, thus using the Sinai Peninsula as a means to make 
time to ‘create facts on the ground’ in the Gaza Strip to retain it. Ben-Gurion thus 
ordered the Israeli commander, Moshe Dayan, to meet with Burns, the UN Commander, 
to settle the details for the phased withdrawal.762 However, while appearing to comply 
and also providing maps of the mine fields in the areas they were withdrawing from, 
the Israelis also destroyed all roads, the railway, and the telegraph line to buy time to 
create ‘facts on the ground’ in the Gaza Strip as well as to complicate the Egyptian 
return.763 Despite protests from the Secretary-General, the Israelis continued this 
practice along the three roads to the north, centre and south of the peninsula throughout 
the withdrawal. 
As the Scandinavian contingents whom Burns had come to favour were without 
vehicles to leave Port Said, he used the EIMAC military observers and the Yugoslavian 
reconnaissance unit that had just arrived by ship to follow the Israelis eastwards.764 Due 
to the relations between Nasser and Tito, Burns noted, the Yugoslavian UN unit enjoyed 
a warm welcome from the population of the town of El-Arish in the northern part of the 
Sinai.765 This, however, appear to be the last time the UN Force Commander used a 
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contingent of India or Indonesia, Egypt’s international political allies, as the ‘spearhead’ 
or for taking positions of strategic importance. While it may well be connected to the 
‘white’ UN contingents arriving as the first, the UN commander once again refrained 
from putting the contingents of Nasser’s political friends on the international scene in 
important or populated areas, using instead the ‘white’ units. Indeed, the Indian forces 
that had been deployed outside Port Said were sent to El Tor, a rather insignificant port 
town south of the Bay of Suez while the latest arrivals were kept in Abu Sueir.766  
Whether connected to its only recent arrival to Egypt with American ‘globemasters’ or 
not,767 the battalion of Indonesia, the other ‘brown’ friend of Egypt in the force, was 
also deployed to a less significant location in the southeastern part of the Sinai.768 The 
UN force commander also kept the Brazilian battalion in the Suez Canal Area, near 
UNEF HQ,  although the battalion appear to have been in a similar situation with 
regards to vehicles as the Indonesians after arriving as part of the expansion that also 
included Indonesia (and Canada) partly on American ‘globemasters’ and partly on a 
Brazilian warship.769  However, Finnish units were sent to serve as guards for the British 
clearance vessels in Port Said and towards Sharm El Sheik, at the entrance of the to the 
Israelis strategically important Straits of Tiran. Swedish units were deployed to El 
Qantara, another town part of the broader Suez Canal Area. He also kept the Canadian 
technical units and the still amassing Canadian reconnaissance unit, approximately 
1.000 troops, in the Suez Canal Area. After eventually being supplied with British and 
American trucks, the Danish-Norwegian unit was also ordered to trail the Israelis 
through an area that had seen heavy Egyptian-Israeli fighting. Several of the Danish 
soldiers already viewed the Egyptians with a distance if not occasional hostility close 
to that of the British soldiers they had met in Port Said: some of the Danes had even 
been estranged by leaving their posts due to a combination of having taken to its 
strategic importance and the bonding with the British units.770 According to published 
memoirs, the desert trek, however, took this further. Several indulged in necromantic 
practices with dead Egyptian soldiers once away from their commanders’ gaze on 
patrols, insulting in a very embodied way Egyptian sovereignty via the bodies of the 
soldiers. Some would kick the corpses. Others would pose for their friends’ camera: 
Playing cards across the chest of a corpse or laying in the sand holding a skull appear 
to have been amongst the more popular motifs. Several Danish soldiers also entertained 
themselves with detonating hand grenades found in Egyptian positions.771  
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7.2 What of the Gaza Strip? Mission Creep as a 
Condition to re-open the Canal 
Far away from the ending of the temporary ‘international (re)-colonisation’ of Port Said 
(and the Sinai Peninsula), the Secretary-General and the American diplomats met and 
agreed that it would be unwise to push the General Assembly in New York towards a 
broader settlement on Israel and Palestine given the tension caused by the Israeli 
destruction in the Sinai Peninsula. However, they did agree that it was necessary to use 
the General Assembly to force Israel to leave the Gaza Strip even if it remained 
unsettled if the UN were to administrate the area.772 As late December became early 
January and the UN force followed the Israeli forces across the Sinai Peninsula, Israeli 
diplomats again sought to garner support in both Washington and via the embassy in 
Tel Aviv for their ideas of letting Israeli security forces and police units stay in the Gaza 
Strip.773 However, neither Washington nor New York ceded much to Tel Aviv. For one, 
Egypt was linking the Israeli withdrawal to the clearance of the canal. Additionally, 
several members of the advisory committee had brought up the topic of their own 
interests relating to oil deliveries to Western Europe and Commonwealth trade.774 
Another attempt to promote the Eilat-Haifa pipeline and a joint Israeli-UN 
administration and security apparatus in the Gaza Strip was thus made.775 Neither taking 
the Israeli bait nor enjoying the most likely outcome in the form of an Egyptian return 
but needing the canal open, Eisenhower began to wonder if the Gaza Strip should be 
turned into a UN protectorate in a phone conversation with his Secretary of State on the 
12th of January.776 At this point in time, Hammarskjold appears to have been uncertain 
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how to deal with the Gaza Strip, even if he had wanted to bring Clay on-board. Once in 
a stronger position after the UN force had reached the international frontier (as the still 
unsettled Egyptian-Israeli border was called) on the 21st of January, however, 
Hammarskjold mirrored Eisenhower’s idea and told US diplomats that the Israelis had 
nothing to do in the Gaza Strip, although he conceded that some UN units should deploy 
to the Gulf of Aqaba to safeguard Israeli passage, and that he wanted the UN force both 
in the Gaza Strip and in Israel in extension of the Truce Supervision Organization 
framework from 1949.777 At the next day’s Advisory Committee meeting, 
Hammarskjold also indirectly linked the administration of the Gaza Strip to the UN, 
stating “(…) that the armistice agreement provides for Egyptian administration and 
does not leave any leeway either for Israeli administration or for United Nations 
administration without the consent of the controlling party”.778 In other words, while 
Egypt was to run the Gaza Strip according to the armistice, it could be run by the UN 
if Egypt consented. None of the committee members spoke against this or supported 
the Israeli goals, 779 indicating that the committee—or a majority strong enough to 
suggest that speaking against it was useless—found the notion of using the UN in an 
administrative capacity to ensure the re-opening of the canal and the protection of 
Commonwealth trade (as called for 3 weeks earlier) uncontroversial. Even if the British 
and the French forces had been withdrawn weeks earlier and Israel thus stood alone, 
Hammarskjold was unable to pressure Israel further alone. Consequently, he warned 
the US that Egypt may delay the canal clearance unless every type of pressure was put 
on Israel, indirectly asking the Eisenhower administration to do so, as well as suggesting 
that some of the committee members should propose a resolution that the US could 
back.780 Standing before the General Assembly the next day, Hammarskjold therefore 
not only rejected the Israeli plan for the Gaza Strip, but also for the first time in public 
hinted that a UN administration of the Gaza Strip might be necessary by noting that any 
change in the armistice such as an UN administration would require an agreement with 
Egypt and that the UN force should be stationed on both sides of the Armistice 
Demarcation Line (ADL). After the GA meeting, he met with US diplomats as well as 
Pearson to work out the resolution details.781 Whilst speaking with the Eisenhower 
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administration on how the two issues were in fact connected, the Secretary-General, in 
other words, both kept the canal clearance and the Gaza Strip separate in public and 
avoided the mention of turning the Gaza Strip into a trusteeship (as suggested by some 
of the American UN observers). Taking over the area in some UN administered form 
seemed inevitable if the canal were to open again and thus reopen the oil supply to 
Western Europe.  
While the UN force began to amass a few kilometres west of Rafah, one of the larger 
towns in the Gaza Strip, from the end of January, the UN military observers inside the 
Gaza Strip also began coordinating with the UN Relief and Works Agency under the 
American Henry Labouisse, who Hammarskjold had recruited from the American-led 
Economic Cooperation Administration and the Mutual Security Administration to take 
over the UNRWA in 1954, about which UNRWA sites needed UN guards.782 The 
remaining military observers, who were from New Zealand and the US, also began 
analysing how UN could occupy the Gaza Strip as a trusteeship or something else. 
Tapping into the lesser violent parts of the European and American colonial and 
imperial military cultures and ways of monitoring and regulating people, they quickly 
and with eagerly offered (very) concrete thoughts on which sites were suitable for a UN 
HQ, contingent headquarters, camps and observation posts;783 how to garner the support 
of the local notables and other “(…) proper people (…)” as their backing would mean 
cooperation rather than conflict;784 how to “(…) control the population (…)” via 
outposts, traffic control points, patrols, observation posts and loudspeakers to relay UN 
messages;785 how to man, patrol and police the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) 
night and day;786 which buildings of the former British mandate power and buildings 
that had housed Australian and other British imperial forces during the First World War 
to use, and, not least, where to place certain contingents such as the Indian due to the 
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“(…) Hindu Moslem traditional rivalry (…)”.787 They also sent lists of the Palestinians 
and Egyptians that had worked in the civilian Egyptian administration, effectively 
providing the UN with what can only be seen as both military and political 
intelligence.788  
All at the same time, hundreds of refugees began leaving the Gaza Strip for El Arish, 
not prevented from doing so by the Israelis that were presumably keen to see them 
leave. However, once the fleeing Palestinians realised that there was no water, rations 
and tents they turned back to the Gaza Strip. Not sure what to do or keen to avoid a 
(very) public human disaster (also) of their own making, the Israeli forces allowed them 
to re-enter the Gaza Strip. Passing closely by the soldiers of the Danish, Norwegian, 
Swedish and Colombian UN contingents to be searched for weapons, the Palestinians 
exposed to the UN soldiers to the misery of the refugee life.789 According to a Swedish 
officer, several of the soldiers in the Swedish units, who had met and come to respect 
Bedouins for their hard lives in their crossing of the Sinai, became sympathetic towards 
these people, if still unfamiliar with more details of both their histories and those of the 
people in the Gaza Strip.790 Nevertheless, Swedish units patrolling near the International 
Frontier in the vicinity of Israeli units were fired upon by what was assumed to be the 
paramilitary Fedayeen units.791 Similarly, Danish soldiers managed to get into heated 
arguments with Palestinian students caught there, most probably on account of their 
still somewhat banal pro-Israeli/Orientalist views, mounting cynicism and the 
combination of the waiting time and the town’s atmosphere that was characterised by 
the lack of a villa neighbourhood and a broad non-Egyptian presence. In contrast but 
perhaps less surprising, they connected better with unarmed Egyptian soldiers and those 
from whom they bought services such as café-owners and market vendors. A 
Norwegian infantry company’s shooting night-time shooting exercise near the town 
also led to a massive exodus of Egyptian that feared the Israeli army had come back.792  
In Washington (and Tel Aviv), the Eisenhower administration took up 
Hammarskjold on his request to lean on Ben-Gurion’s government. Although 
Washington eventually cancelled only the aid for the fiscal year of 1957, leaving 
ongoing projects, aid in transit, and Israeli economic assets in the US untouched (in 
                                               
787 “Cable from Acting Chairman EIMAC to Acting Chief of Staff UNTSO”, 3 February 1957, Israel 
Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-
0069-0005, UNA 
788 “Letter from Acting Chairman EIMAC to UNEF Commander and Chief of Staff UNTSO” 23 January 
1957, Israel Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, 
EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0005, UNA 
789 E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 257–58. 
790 Nils Sköld, I fredens tjänst: Sveriges medverkan i Förenta nationernas fredsbevarande styrka i 
Mellanöstern 1956-67 ([Stockholm]: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1990), 78. 
791 Jensen, Kompagni Larsen, 78. 
792 Ibid., 74–76; Kjeldsen, Fredens soldater, 44–49. 
  
197 
 
contrast to the Egyptian assets), it let the Israeli government realise not only that it 
would only survive with US support (as the Soviet Union saw other countries as 
regional assets) and that its insistence on retaining some element of military or civilian 
control in the Gaza Strip was untenable.793 Over February, the Secretary-General and 
the Eisenhower administration continued to coordinate the Israeli withdrawal, 
exchanging informal memos and holding, by then ‘standard’, meetings involving only 
US diplomats, Hammarskjold, Bunche and Cordier at the UN building.794 By the middle 
of the month, Hammarskjold began to discuss openly his aim of internationalising the 
Gaza Strip with the American diplomats after having come to view it as necessary and 
turned it over with the Egyptian Foreign Minister who did not object as long as the UN 
administration kept “(…) an Egyptian face on it.”795 Having deliberated with Henry 
Labouisse who had at least two years of experience with the Gaza Strip as the head of 
the UNRWA, Hammarskjold was settling for the idea of an Egyptian Military Governor 
alongside a UN High Commissioner, thus opting for a structure that tapped into British 
imperial configurations of sovereignty, space, and governance. Well aware that the 
issues at hand—such as financial and administrative issues that included questions of 
credits, assets, sales of citrus fruits, education and health—were normally the realms of 
sovereign states, Hammarskjold did not want a full trusteeship, testimony to 
Hammarskjold’s ability to evade the pitfalls of international politics. He also informed 
Lodge that he wanted Lucius Clay to make the plans for the UN administration of Gaza, 
given his experience from governing occupied Germany. The post, much like that of 
McCloy, he argued that it was not to be a long term field job, but a short-term position 
with Secretariat assistance. This was due to, as Lodge telegrammed the Department of 
State, the fact that “(…) an American operation in field would not be feasible”.796 
Telling of Hammarskjold’s equally acute skill of getting things moving with as little 
friction as possible by co-opting the Commonwealth (and former colonies), he wanted 
the Indian General Kodandera Thimayya to serve as High Commissioner. As Clay, 
Thimayya was also an emerging international heavyweight with roots in a Western 
imperial project. He had not only served with British Indian Army in Burma during the 
Second World War and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan 
afterwards, he had also handled ‘unruly’ Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war 
for the UN in Korea. As an ‘international celebrity’ and ‘soldier-statesman’, he was 
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liked by the American, British and Indian foreign policy and military establishments as 
well as the medias and would thus represent a scoop for Hammarskjold, Nehru and 
Nasser.797 By the time Hammarskjold wanted him in the Gaza Strip, Thimayya had just 
left his command in the Indian Pune military region, where he dispensed with a small 
Pakistani incursion force without letting the conflict escalate to war, for a post in the 
east, where he also quickly managed to peacefully stand down a local rebellion that also 
had roots in the British Empire’s politics and had received arms from both Pakistan and 
several Communist parties in the region.798 He was thus well suited for a complex post-
imperial conflict-strife area with multiple armed and frustrated factions. Keenly aware 
of the need to get the support of the Arab states as well, the Eisenhower administration 
was having both informal talks with Arab diplomats at the UN in New York and formal 
group meetings with Arab Ambassadors at the State Department in Washington.799 On 
the edge of the Gaza Strip, Burns also began to think of the administrative functions the 
UN was to take over. He was only informed that it would be a matter of some weeks 
necessary to negotiate a more permanent arrangement with Egypt.800      
Over the month of February, the Eisenhower administration kept the pressure on 
Israel, having the State Department legal experts do legal battle against their Israeli 
counterparts. In the last week of February, Israel eventually softened its stand on in the 
Gaza Strip, although it refused to the let the UN force deploy on the Israeli side of the 
ADL, arguing that it had nothing to do on Israel sovereign soil. Both Washington and 
Hammarskjold had at this point accepted that it was necessary to safeguard Israel’s right 
to use both the Suez Canal, which Egypt had prevented on and off since 1948, and the 
Gulf of Aqaba, and that the UN was needed to do so. However, they needed someone 
to put that, as well as the Israeli right to intervene if the UN arrangement were to break 
down, into a UN resolution. The French government fit the bill and did so when ‘asked’ 
by the Eisenhower administration. In doing so, France returned to the fold of the 
Western alliance.801 On the 1st of March, the US embassy in Tel Aviv received a phone 
call from the Israeli Foreign Ministry declaring that Ben-Gurion had decided to 
withdraw and instructed Moshe Dayan, the Commander of the IDF, to meet the UN 
Commander who was waiting outside Gaza Strip with the UN force composed of 6.000 
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soldiers primarily from NATO and Commonwealth member states.802 On the 4th of 
March, Burns cabled Cordier, who, rather instantly it seems, cabled the US State 
Department that the Israeli forces and civilian administrators would be out of Gaza by 
the 4th in the afternoon.803  
7.3 Riots and Redeployment in the Frontier Zone: 
A Failed Internationalisation?  
The UN Force Commander had been unsure what exactly his response was to be if the 
Egyptians demanded that their administrative officials and police be allowed to return 
(as they had done in El Tor and El Arish again after the UN had let them back into Port 
Said). In contrast, both the Eisenhower Administration and the Secretary-General with 
his higher echelon of mainly American UN officials had both acknowledged and 
accepted that it was necessary that the UN provided “(…) a UN administration in Gaza, 
not of Gaza (…)”804 in the form of a “(…) ‘marriage’ of UNEF and UNRWA (…)”805 
within the Armistice framework so as to allow Egyptian consent. However, Burns felt 
under-informed. In the days prior to the notification by the Israeli forces, he tellingly 
not only requested the UNRWA to send experts on judicial and police matters, public 
health, and finance,806 but also sought and failed to obtain American and British manuals 
on military government of occupied enemy territories from the end of the Second World 
War, a fact of which he did not find problematic and therefore noted in his memoirs.807 
Making policy ‘on-the-go’ having focused on the Suez Canal rather than the Gaza Strip, 
Hammarskjold and the Eisenhower administration agreed that Israel had to accept the 
deployment of the UN force on the Israeli side the of ADL. This idea would become 
impossible to realise. Moreover, as the Israelis began to prepare their departure (despite 
having Israeli tourists visiting, presumably to link the land to Israel mentally)808 the 
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Palestinians began to provoke and in a few cases attack the Israeli forces with 
homemade bombs, hand grenades, and small arms in public places, to which the Israeli 
forces responded with more than 200 arrests just before the withdrawal.809 However, 
much to the frustration of Hammarskjold and the Eisenhower administration, Israel also 
caused trouble in the sphere of finances. Tel Aviv was not only contesting Burns’ 
instructions to exchange Israeli pounds for Egyptian ones, but also refusing to hand 
over the money the Israeli forces had seized in the Arab Bank of Gaza, in other words, 
a large part of the holdings of the Palestinian locals and refugees.810 Complicating 
matters for the UN force Commander further, they came to disagree on how long the 
UN was to stay in the Gaza Strip. The Secretary-General foresaw only a two-month 
operation in the Gaza Strip due to the lack of Israeli willingness to let forces deploy to 
the Israeli side of the ADL whereas the Eisenhower administration favoured a longer-
term UN presence.811 Southwest of Rafah on the edge of the Gaza Strip, Burns also 
added to the confusion of what was to happen politically. Having been told to expect a 
few weeks, he spoke merely of an un-defined ‘period’ when he requested a meeting 
with the UNRWA leadership in Beirut to discuss further how to deal with the envisaged 
responsibility of the civil administration of the Gaza Strip.812 Whether or not due to the 
input of his military observers that had fed him both political and military intelligence 
on the Gaza Strip since the end of January, Burns was more certain of what to do in the 
military sphere. While he does not offer any things in his memoirs, those of a Danish 
soldier do in noting how the UN force was to occupy the Gaza Strip. Once again, the 
battalions of Yugoslavia and India, the political friends of Egypt, were to operate in 
unpopulated areas along the International Frontier or small villages such as Deir El 
Ballah. Again being placed somewhere in the middle, the Brazilian and Columbian 
battalions were to take more important areas around the medium-sized town of Khan 
Yunis. Finally, the battalion of the two Scandinavian NATO-members, some of whom 
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at this point had come to adopt the Orientalist view of the ‘Arabs’ as primitive, lazy and 
untrustworthy (as admitted by one of the soldiers writing a memoir), took the most 
important and populated areas around Gaza City to the north while the Canadian 
technical units remained in the also relatively large town of Rafah to the South along 
with the Swedish Battalion, once again promoting the ambiguity of a ‘white’ colour 
line.813 
Regardless of the lack of complete agreement (and accordingly a single overall plan), 
it became time for UNEF to take over the control of the Gaza Strip. It had been agreed 
that this was to take place on the evening and night between the 6th and 7th of March 
under the Israeli curfew to avoid conflicts. Consequently, the UN observers could report 
how the Israelis extended their tank patrols in Gaza City just as the US Sixth Fleet 
moved closer to the beaches, most probably in case US support of UNEF began entering 
the Gaza Strip a few hours before midnight with a massive presence of journalists was 
needed.814 Having no maps of the Gaza Strip let alone a larger plan beyond moving into 
the Gaza Strip, the Danish commander of the joint Danish-Norwegian battalion, who 
once again had been put at the front with his ‘white’ battalion, felt his force was literally 
scrambling in the dark when the initial Israeli police officers left them on their own to 
search for the buildings Burns considered necessary to control the Gaza Strip such as 
those of the UNRWA, the city halls, the Gaza train station, the police stations and the 
telegraph station. Moreover, the Israeli forces were not very helpful until Dayan showed 
up in person, presumably to avoid further loss of goodwill in Washington and New 
York. By the morning of the 7th of March, the Israeli forces had withdrawn and the UN 
forces had begun to move towards Sharm El Sheik and into all the towns of the Gaza 
Strip (and thus expand the frontier zone), using only what little knowledge the Israeli 
forces had passed on during the night-time deployment.815  
As the UN force moved into the different parts of the Gaza Strip, the UN soldiers 
were forced to process another Middle Eastern location both different and similar from 
the others they had seen. Some noticed the small villages and others the villa 
neighbourhoods in the larger towns, others the refugee camps. However, some of the 
Danish soldiers were puzzled with the anger they had previously met from Palestinians 
students from the Gaza Strip in El Arish as the aid provided by the UNRWA granted 
the Palestinian refugees with what the Danes saw as decent housing, better clothes and 
free schooling. Rather than finding sympathy for the Palestinian refugees, they appear 
to initially have taken a hostile view. This sense of confusion was not helped insofar as 
a few Palestinians fired some shots and threw some hand grenades at some UNRWA 
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depot buildings to see if they would be able to get materials and foodstuffs for 
themselves.816 More important for the relations between the people of the Gaza Strip, 
whether refugees or original residents, and the UN Force, however, the UN units 
distributed an Arab translation of a proclamation from Burns that had been approved 
from UN HQ in New York. Firm and unforthcoming, it declared to the Palestinians that 
not only that “(…) maintaining quiet (…)” and the “(…) responsibility for civil affairs 
in the Gaza Strip (…)” was the mandate of the UN force, but also that they should “(…) 
remain quiet (…)”, “(…) remain law-abiding and orderly (…)”, and “(…) not carry 
arms or explosives (…)”.817 Additionally, the declaration also ordered the Palestinians 
to refer their needs to their camp leaders, mayors, and village elders, the Mukhtars, 
rather than the UN. Perhaps telling of the views in the US, the military takeover, argued 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the Washington-insider and editor of the American Foreign 
Affairs, who was to be found amongst the internationals waiting at the edge of the Gaza 
Strip, was “(…) admirably executed (…)”.818  
However, the UN’s attempt to simultaneously fully internationalise the Gaza Strip 
would prove impossible. Unsurprisingly, the lack of a plan of how to more specifically 
take over the responsibility of civil affairs in the Gaza Strip (besides having Israel 
withdraw) would mark the first few days. With Ralph Bunche scheduled to arrive to 
discuss the further process with the Egyptian government, the UN force had arrived 
with only a minor ‘entourage’ of UNRWA experts and UN technical assistance experts, 
the latter from US sponsored projects in Egypt and no formal guidelines to go by.819 The 
UN force was accordingly from the outset insufficiently equipped for a civilian 
administration and thus forced to install a number of military governors in the different 
towns. These governors were ordered to ‘normalise’ the situation in part by promoting 
the formation of new councils with other political representatives than those endorsed 
by the Israeli occupation regime and sharing authority for security with the police.820 As 
part of this process, the UN Force Commander made the police station in Gaza City the 
headquarters of the UN force. Tellingly, the police station was heavily fortified, 
strategically located and mostly self-contained and had small windows and gun slits, as 
it had been built as one of the 60 forts the British mandate regime had built all over 
Palestine following the Palestinian Revolt from 1936 to 1939.821 The prisoners in the 
prison attached to the police station rioted the same night, as the UN had failed to initiate 
the scheduled release of approximately 300 of the nearly 350 prisoners as these were 
believed to be political prisoners from the Israeli occupation. The UNEF reacted the 
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only way it knew how to. Having been designated to several locations in Gaza City 
including the police station/prison by the UN Commander, the Danish soldiers took 
centre-stage once again. On the first day the UN ruled the Gaza Strip, used warning 
shots, tear gas and batons. The prisoners most probably thought that the UN soldiers 
had merely picked up where the Israeli soldiers left and that they were to remain locked 
up, given that the combined police station and prison had been the strongest symbol of 
both the British presence in the area from 1920 to 1948 and the Israeli presence from 
November 1956 to March 1957.822  
The UN force fared little better outside the prison/police station/UNEF HQ. As the 
Danish Military Governor recalls, the work of the new councils instantly came to a halt, 
allegedly since at least one Mayor had taken to Egypt for instructions. Due to the words 
of his informants, who may have exaggerated to ensure payment, the UNEF governor 
dismissed any other explanation than Egyptian influence.823 The Canadian UN Force 
Commander, his Swedish Chief of Staff and the Danish Battalion Commander, another 
Swedish UN officer and the American foreign policy pundit Armstrong all, whether 
true or not, suggest that Egypt sent in subversive agents with the sole aim of countering 
the return of the Gaza Strip to Egyptian control.824 Predictably, the advisor to the 
Egyptian President, Muhammad Heikal, made no mention of Egyptian influence.825 
Regardless of Egyptian influence or not, people gathered to demonstrate the morning 
after the prison riot. However, rather than amassing in front of the former British police 
station/priso, people gathered in front of one of the other Danish quarters, a former 
Palestinian school. Accordingly, the soldiers removed most of the furniture from the 
classrooms to make a barricade in the courtyard. By midday, the soldiers of the infantry 
company holding the school felt that the crowd soon counted more than a thousand 
people. The demonstration, however, passed without only a few minor shootings in joy 
and one incident of a Danish soldier nearly being robbed of his rifle. Expecting the 
worst, the Danish infantry companies nevertheless fortified their sites with sandbag 
positions and barbed wire and, perhaps more indicatively of how they viewed the 
situation and their own role, placed heavy machineguns on the roof of the school and 
adopted a posture of combat readiness, meaning that all soldiers walked around with all 
personal weapons, all of their ammunition as well as additional tear gas grenades. When 
one of these locations was fired upon both during the night and the following day, the 
8th of March, the Danish military governor of Gaza City consequently outlawed 
weapons held without permit, again drawing attention to the Danish-Norwegian 
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battalion. During the day, another demonstration took place. While it didn’t escalate 
into violent encounters, the day would see tension escalate. At the demonstration, 
several young Palestinians taunted the (also mostly young) Danish soldiers by pressing 
their chests into the rifle barrels of the Danes. Additionally, Yugoslavian soldiers 
cheered the Egyptian-Yugoslavian leaders with the demonstrators, which prompted the 
UN Force Commander to redeploy the unit to El Arish, effectively keeping 
predominantly pro-Western ‘white’ units to control the strategic and heavily populated 
areas of the Gaza Strip. In the evening, paramilitaries also fired upon the Coptic 
neighbourhood in Gaza City, most probably a response to actual or imagined 
collaboration with the Israelis. As an even stronger signal to the UN, the villa of UN 
Force Commander was also fired upon. Neither group of shooters were apprehended, 
leaving the UN force with little actual evidence.826 While Egypt may well have had 
political operatives or Fedayeen units acting on orders, it seems far more likely that the 
Egyptian presence at this point was aimed at monitoring the situation. Instigating 
incidents that could have caused a broader Palestinian revolt against the joint UNEF 
and UNRWA rule of the Gaza Strip would most probably have resulted in a second 
Israeli occupation by the forces that at least the Danish soldiers heard rumours of being 
amassed (or rather not dispersed).827 At this point, Egypt was not ready for another war 
with Israel. Not surprisingly, the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee came 
to agree that the operation best not discussed in the General Assembly as it was “(…) 
on thin ice (…)”828 as Hammarskjold put it, since UNEF could be seen as having started 
to operate beyond what had been authorised. 
The next morning, the Swedish Chief of Staff banned both demonstrations in any 
form and all larger meetings.829 This, however did not reduce tension. If the memoirs of 
a Danish soldiers is anything to go by, the situation grew more futile. A demonstration 
that the Danish Military Governor approved as an exemption soon escalated out of 
control. Consequently, the Danish units were ordered to put on helmets, use tear gas 
grenades, and fire warning shots, before finally attaching bayonets. After a Palestinian 
was hit by (and eventually died from) a ricocheting warning shot, others began to throw 
stones and the Danes arresting people, using their boots, elbows, rifle barrels and even 
rifle butts. Even the UN company officers had their pistols drawn. Eventually, the 
Danish Company Commander had a platoon advance in a line, combining bayonets 
thrusts and waves of warning shots over the crowd. At this point, even the soldiers on 
kitchen duty and off duty joined the ranks in helmets and kitchen clothes or underwear. 
A steel-helmeted Norwegian platoon also joined in while a Brazilian battalion was also 
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called on. As the riot was put down, UN guards were placed all over the area to show 
that the UN remained in control.830 Whether or not a form of path dependency from the 
British and Israeli eras clashing with the Egyptian attempt of re-asserting its influence, 
the opening of a relationship between a new regime-in the-making and its new host 
population was not ideal. Once again, the Gaza Strip inhabitants, original residents and 
refugees alike—whom had all already been severely tested by the three months of 
Israeli occupation with massacres, camp screenings and mass arrests—experienced 
what appeared to be another mainly ‘white’ power take over where the Israelis had left 
and begin to regulate how they could act and organise themselves publicly. The 
reactions of the local population and Egypt were as predictable as they were defining 
of the situation.  
Realising that a Palestinian revolt in the Gaza Strip could potentially cause another 
war with Israel at this point, the Egyptian president had little choice but to send back an 
Egyptian Administrative Governor and disregard Bunche who, upon arriving in the 
afternoon on the day of the riot, insisted the UN keep control. Bunche accepted.831 As 
the Governor had an administrative role with undefined duties, Hammarskjold saw 
Egypt leaving a margin for negotiation with the UN. Yet, as Hammarskjold recognised, 
the UN could not challenge the Armistice Agreement, as Egypt was entitled to 
administrate the area as it saw fit.832 However, he maintained that the force had and was 
still within the limits of international law.833 Nasser did, however, agree to Bunche’s 
demands that neither Fedayeen nor Egyptian military units would operate in Gaza Strip 
before the Egyptian Governor-General arrived on the 14th of March, marking after only 
a week of UN rule the end to any UN interim rule and all Israeli hopes for a ‘non-
Egyptian’ solution.834  
7.4 Becoming a Frontier-Regime: ‘Connecting Dots 
across Time and Space at the ADL 
In its first week in the Gaza Strip, UNEF had failed to convince both the Egyptian 
government and the Palestinians that it would act as ‘welcome visitors rather than 
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rulers’ as banners had read the first day in the Gaza Strip.835 By the time the Egyptian 
Governor arrived, the local media in the Gaza Strip was, not surprisingly, reporting that 
the UN’s abuse of power had led Nasser to demand that the force be withdrawn, whether 
this was so or not. Residents also paraded with that message at the Governor’s arrival 
until he told the crowd that the UN force was to be considered a friendly force in full 
cooperation with the Egyptian administration. Additionally, the Yugoslavian battalion 
refused to serve in the Gaza Strip without the Egyptian government renewing its 
permission. In agreement with UN HQ in New York, the UN Force Commander 
accordingly sent the unit back to El Arish.836 From un-specified sources, Burns also 
learnt that the Egyptian President may not have agreed to the part of the agreement with 
the UN that laid out the UN’s functions in the Gaza Strip were to be exclusive in the 
first instance and that this had not reached the Secretary-General.837 This may well have 
been the case and thus supportive of the claims of these memoirs of UNEF officers and 
soldiers that the first demonstrations had felt rigged and been well supplied with 
Egyptian flags and posters of Nasser. However, it should also be clear that the Gaza 
Strip Palestinians, at least in part, marked their discontent with the actions of UNEF 
that probably appeared to them as similar to the British mandate regime and partly also 
the Israeli regime. Had the majority of the Palestinians wanted a UN administration, 
which Burns claims at least a little minority wanted,838 Egypt would also have faced a 
revolt at some point. The Palestinians, especially the refugees, had been exposed to a 
genocide that had led to expulsion from their villages, an 8-year long state of 
dislocation, widespread trauma combined with overcrowding and poverty, and the 
humiliation of depending on external support systems for survival and education. While 
many were not yet organised in ways that could support a sustained political campaign 
or revolt, the potential was there. Despite being mostly poor dependents individually, 
the combined mass of the approximately 300.000 Palestinians of the Gaza Strip was a 
political force in its own right to be reckoned with.  
With the Suez Canal clearance at stake, the Secretary-General had to go to Egypt. 
Before he left for Cairo to meet with the Egyptian President, he therefore held a meeting 
with the Advisory Committee. For once disagreeing with the Canadian representative 
at the meeting—which the Brazilian member called a “(…) special session of 
disagreements (…)”839—Hammarskjold explained that he was keen to get the force to 
the ADL, away from the task of internal security. To the amazement of the Committee 
(and not hitherto noted in any research), the Secretary-General nevertheless also made 
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it clear that he saw the UN entitled to take enforcement action through the Security 
Council and all means available in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter such as placing 
additional military forces in the Gaza Strip, if Egypt continued to sanction raids and 
incursions into Israel. He, however, also recognised they had yet to deal with issues 
such as the question of whether UNEF would be able to use force in a military or police 
capacity and how UNEF was to deal with the security of the UNRWA staff, which the 
head of the UNRWA, the American Labouisse, had noted UNEF should be concerned 
with.840    
In the Gaza Strip, the UN Commander took to reorganising the force in the days 
following the Egyptian Governors’ arrival. He had already sent the Yugoslavian 
battalion back to Egypt to have them patrol the still not yet fully settled Egyptian-Israeli 
border, the International Frontier, instead of the Swedish battalion. He also redeployed 
the Danish infantry companies from downtown Gaza City to the edges of the city and 
Beit Hanun further to the north, probably realising that not doing so would overstay 
their welcome and potentially lead to new riots. As the Egyptian controlled police began 
to take over the maintenance of order and three quarters of the force had been designated 
for guarding ‘vulnerable points’ (such as police stations, water pumping installations 
and power stations) within the Gaza Strip, additional forces were also redeployed to the 
edge of the Gaza Strip.841  
Here, two things are worth noting. First, Burns still managed to ensure support from 
both New York and Cairo to bring in the Canadian reconnaissance squadron (whose 
deployment he had previously negotiated only with Canadian diplomatic personnel in 
Cairo). This was no small feat considering what had already happened in the Gaza 
Strip.842 Second, the return of the Egyptian governor and Egyptian-controlled police and 
the redeployment of the force did not fundamentally change the primary task of policing 
the Armistice Demarcation Line. There had been a focus on the UN running the Gaza 
Strip for an interim phase earlier: what changed was merely a cancelation of the interim 
UN administration and an earlier turn to cooperation with the Egyptian-controlled 
police than imagined. In late January, for example, Burns’ ADL policing plans had 
revolved around four infantry battalion areas near the towns of Gaza, Khan Yunis, 
Rafah and Deir El Ballah.843 In February (and thus still before UNEF entered the Gaza 
Strip), his plans had been elaborated by a proposal from two EIMAC military observers 
from New Zealand and the US. They suggested several methods that, when combined, 
would reduce crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel. First was a proposal of a 
                                               
840 Minutes of Advisory Committee on 16 March 1957, Notes on early meetings 1956-1959, UNEF Advisory 
Committee, UNEF Advisory Committee, Middle East, Urquhart, S-1078-0060-0001, UNA 
841 E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 270–71. 
842 Ibid. 
843 “Cable from UNEF Force Commander to Acting Chief of Staff” UNTSO 30 January 1957, Israel 
Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-
0069-0005, UNA 
  
208 
 
series of permanent or semi-permanent barbed-wired watch towers with living 
accommodations and underground defensive positions along the ADL. Then followed 
a call for the ADL to be marked by a full-length fence, fences in trouble-areas, a full-
length bull-dosed trench, or a series of dispersed concrete markers. Additionally, the 
scheme suggested a 100-yard zone on both sides of the ADL that no Palestinian, 
Egyptian or Israeli units or individuals would have the right to access. A road should 
also cut through this zone to allow the UNEF to conduct motorised, mounted and foot 
patrols (with automatic weapons and dogs) both day and night. Finally, the force was 
suggested to have an aerial reconnaissance component.844 Already upon receiving the 
scheme, Burns appears to have seen it as a ‘maximum’ regime. He declined to adopt 
the proposal in full, finding that not all, but “(…) some of Colonel Brown’s suggestions 
may be quite useful.”845. As Burns noted in his memoirs (in 1962), his concerns had 
mostly revolved around credibility, or the right to fire rather than only challenge.”846 
Accordingly, he settled for rotating units between battalion camps not in but near Gaza 
City, Khan Yunis, Rafah and Deir El Bellah and smaller company and platoon-sized 
operational camps near the ADL. Not sure how to balance concretely credibility and 
the rules of engagement on the ADL, however, he informed Hammarskjold of his 
concerns when the latter came to Egypt. Hammarskjold (and Burns) subsequently met 
Nasser and his foreign policy officials.847 According to the proposal Burns had received 
from the UN military observers, the entire General Armistice Agreement would have 
had to be renegotiated had they come to a written agreement making fundamental 
jurisdictional changes in the Gaza Strip (or in Israel).848 Once Burns had rejected an 
Egyptian idea for joint patrols between the Egyptian-controlled police and UNEF, a 
verbal agreement on ‘cooperation’ was therefore reached. Reflecting the Gaza Strip’s 
suspended sovereignty, the arrangement allowed UNEF to control a zone between the 
Gaza Strip and Israel on the Gaza side of the ADL of 100 meters during the day and 
500 meters during the night in which it would be allowed to defend itself against hostile 
action by firing, if necessary, and to take into custody people to promptly turn them 
over to the local police. For their part, the Egyptian authorities were to prevent people 
from entering the zone and Israel, reinstate penalties for crossing into the latter, and 
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have the police cooperate closely with UNEF. Although no formal publication would 
take place, both parties would inform the Gaza population.849  
However, the agreement between the Secretary-General and the Egyptian 
government not only dictated how the Egyptian-controlled police, the UN force and the 
UNRWA were to order and regulate the space of the Gaza Strip and the mobilities of 
the people in it. Unknowingly and unintentionally, it strengthened the link between 
UNEF, its functions and setup (and thus also the UN) and those of the British mandate 
(and thereby also the British Empire) beyond the existing ties. The UNEF concept—
which by then had come to consist of nearly 6.000-man strong force with light infantry 
units, armoured reconnaissance units, light aircraft and the EIMAC observers mostly 
living separately from the society it was to take part in regulating—also closely 
resembled that which recent research shows the British Colonial Office and Mandate 
regime were headed towards by the late 1940s: A growing militarisation in terms of the 
origin and training of the force, the use of aircraft and armoured vehicles, larger units 
with increasingly younger men, the growing separation from society and the challenge 
of building up knowledge. Upon taking over Palestine, the British mandate disbanded 
the municipal police and gendarmerie manned mostly by Palestinians, instead installing 
a force of British soldiers who had fought both in the First World War and the Irish war 
for independence. Over the 1920s, this force was turned into the (more) regular 
Palestine Police Force with Jewish settlers and Palestinians and—reflecting British 
thinking on imperial policing—support from two squadrons of armoured cars and an 
Airforce squadron of aircraft. However, the Palestinian revolt in 1929 led to a temporary 
enlargement of the 2.000-man force with approx. 20.000 soldiers, some of which stayed 
on as police reserves after the revolt. The Palestinian revolt from 1936 to 1939 further 
militarised both Palestine and the force. Palestine became a military geography with the 
aforementioned series of police forts while the force began to recruit soldiers, dress 
them in khaki and give them military weapons, equipment, vehicles, and tasks as 
manning roadblocks, searching for weapons and making arrests. During the Second 
World War, the force became an army-equipped mobile strike force. The post-war 
Jewish settler terrorism forced about a concept of a larger force with improved 
intelligence-gathering capacities and engaged in police-military cooperation, which 
was spread to other rebelling British colonies.850 Thus, when UNEF was formed 8 years 
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after the dismemberment of the Gaza Strip from the rest of Palestine (that the new 
Jewish settler colonial state of Israel for the most part took over), the concept—of a 
cooperative, militarily trained and equipped force of young men living separately from 
society split in stationary and mobile strike forces in self-contained bases—was clearly 
not a novel new UN formula, but rather a tried and tested British imperial method. The 
main difference was that it was now the UN and the Egyptian government that had to 
‘rule’ the Palestinians.  
As is broadly accepted amongst imperial historians, imperial formations, whether 
American or British and otherwise, depend(ed) on systems of both destruction and 
knowledge.851 A frontier-regime linked to the British model of imperial policing, the 
UN force was obviously no different in that it also needed to engage in gaining, 
building, storing and using knowledge. Although the UN force failed to have such a 
system in place in March, the proposal the UN military observers with the EIMAC had 
sent the Force Commander in late January 1957 emphasized the need to build a system 
that were to combine maps, aircraft, the EIMAC military observers, the patrol regime 
at the ADL and as part thereof the chain of observation towers. 
As for maps, Burns had had the military advisor to the UN Secretary-General, the 
Finnish General Martola, and the military observers in the Gaza Strip search not only 
the UK, the former mandate power, but also its colony of Cyprus, Israel and the US for 
at least 50 (strategic/operational level) for maps scaled 1:100.000 and at least 100 
(tactical level) maps scaled 1:25.000 from late January.852 In Mid-February, UNEF staff 
picked up 150 map sets with 1.800 sheets at the British Army Headquarters in Nicosia 
in Cyprus with a UNEF aircraft, thus tapping directly into the knowledge base of British 
Empire to build its own.853 Indeed, the British smaller-scale maps had their origins in 
the Palestinian revolt in the 1930s.854 Indeed, as argued by the historian of imperial 
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knowledge systems James Hevia, military maps emerged to serve both as strategic 
information displays and as tactical support for the imperial regulatory and disciplinary 
regimes as a result of the evolving imperial knowledge system’s union of science, 
management and information storage over the 19th century.855 Although the maps in 
extension thereof were tools intended to assist the UN force in taking over the Gaza 
Strip initially and then build an ADL regime, the UN force never got the maps to the 
people that needed them in time for the take-over of the Gaza Strip, leaving the leading 
Danish-Norwegian battalion ‘blind’ and forced to rely on inadequate Israeli 
information. If anything, the lack of maps made clear that UNEF was in desperate need 
of its own knowledge system.  
Initially used to transport Burns between Egypt and the Gaza Strip to meet Israeli 
military officials to coordinate the takeover of the Gaza-Strip and supplies (as well as 
maps), the light (Canadian) aircraft of the UN force were later used to supplement the 
Canadian battalion that Burns tasked with patrolling the International Frontier between 
Egypt and Israel and later also the Yugoslavian battalion following its refusal to serve 
in the Gaza Strip not long after the riots. As were the cases with the structure and 
composition of the force and the maps, the use of reconnaissance aircraft in the Middle 
East had, as mentioned briefly above, also evolved out of the need to police nomad 
populations to curb their capacities to defy authority in both the British and French 
mandates.856 
The military observers of the Egyptian-Israeli Military Armistice Commission had 
since 1948 been part of the General Armistice Agreement (with equivalents along the 
other Israeli borders). Still, the integration of the 8 Western and ‘white’ EIMAC military 
observers that had been in the Gaza Strip during the Israeli occupation and the new team 
after Burns had suggested the Secretary-General to do so upon UNEF entering the Gaza 
Strip, can also be seen as a parallel to the Mandate regime’s investigative branch, the 
Criminal Investigation Department (that Egypt kept active in both Egypt and the Gaza 
Strip). Indeed, these observers would serve as UNEF’s investigators of incident in the 
no-movement zone, writing up incidents reports that would gradually become a 
repository of knowledge for the force, providing micro-insights into the dynamics of 
the Gaza Strip.857  
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As for the last element of the UNEF knowledge system, the patrol and observation 
tower regime with 72 observation posts on the 59-kilometre-long ADL and the aerial 
and motorised patrol regime on the 200-kilometre-long IF was in place by early April. 
Interestingly, this dimension of the UNEF knowledge system resembled not only the 
British mandate regime in its wish to gather information to generate intelligence, but 
also a more intense version of the Jewish pre-Israeli colonial settlements in that 
observation towers as means to monitor and dominate surrounding territory had been 
hallmarks of these (and partly so after 1948). Compared to the thinly dispersed and only 
just connected pre-Israeli settlements, the UN towers, albeit smaller than settlements, 
surrounded the entire Gaza Strip, leaving in theory no part of the ADL unwatched with 
an average distance of 300-500 meters between them and overlapping lines of sight.858 
In extension of argument that the redeployment to the ADL from mid-March made little 
to no difference, Burns made only minor changes to the contingents’ (area of) 
responsibilities in the establishment phase. Parts of the Brazilian and Swedish 
battalions, for example, switched places, letting the Brazilians take over a part of the 
ADL and the no-movement zone and the Swedes take over as guards for the UNEF 
depot in Rafah and the UN HQ, the residence of the civilian female UNEF staff, and 
the Commander’s villa in Gaza City. However, the Swedes were also to guard the 
UNRWA hospital in Rafah and several UNRWA stores all over the Gaza Strip in a 
capacity as ‘aid to civil power’ using the same system (and phrase) the British mandate 
had used to provide guards and/or help maintain order.859  
Once in place, the units of the real-time UN monitoring and regulatory system began 
reporting the incidents on their day and night patrols or near their observation posts in 
the form of coded signals or report codes via the UNEF field telephone network, most 
probably generating more information than the EIMAC observers and the civilian 
UNEF administration even if they would often fail to catch and altogether miss people 
crossing the ADL (leaving footprints).860 As will be clear in both the following section 
(and chapter), however, the UNEF regime was not only similar to—and troubled like—
the British Mandate regime, it would also (unintentionally) come to favour the Israel 
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state as the British Mandate had (intentionally) favoured the Jewish colonial 
settlements.   
7.5 The Relationships between UNEF and Israel, 
the IDF and the Israeli Settlers, 1957-1967 
Mirroring the simultaneous resentment of the British and need for them to expand the 
colonial settlements during the Mandate era and provide military training,861 many 
Israelis disliked the UN from 1948 despite the fact that Israel in part owed its 
establishment to the UN and had benefitted from the General Armistice Agreement. 
Until 1956, this feeling stemmed not only from the fact that the UN didn’t condemn the 
attack on Israel in 1948 and the sense that the Military Armistice Commissions violated 
Israeli sovereignty. It was also rooted in the growing tension between the Secretary-
General-General since 1952, Dag Hammarskjold, and the Israeli Prime Minister, David 
Ben-Gurion, due to the founding of what was probably a disguised military settlement 
in the demilitarised zone in the Sinai and the inability of the Security Council to 
intervene on Israel’s behalf in relation to the use of the Suez Canal; the Fedayeen 
attacks; and the deadly exchanges between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the mid-1950s. 
From early November 1956, the UN and the Eisenhower administration also put 
pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip.862 Many had also seen 
the redeployments to ADL after the march-riots in Gaza City as UNEF’s defeat. Against 
this backdrop, it is no surprise that the Israelis did not treasure the UN soldiers at first. 
Indeed, they were disappointed with UNEF from mid-March, as many of the Gaza Strip 
Palestinians were able to return to their former villages, visit family and friends, reclaim 
or steal equipment and so on in Israel.863  
However, it appears that the hostility was less intense in the part of the Gaza Strip 
patrolled by the Danish and Norwegian units, as the Danish and Norwegian soldiers 
gained sympathy for the Israelis and vice versa already from mid- March. A Danish 
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officer noted in his published diary how their skills in English or German and 
forthcoming manner led to greetings and soon chatting. It probably also helped that the 
Israeli units sported female soldiers. By late March, the UN Force Commander found 
soldiers from the Danish-Norwegian battalion playing soccer with Israeli soldiers near 
the ADL, a breach of UNEF regulations. Nevertheless, the interactions continued, if not 
intensified with regular friendly conversations and exchanges of coffee, much to the 
concern of UNEF HQ, as Egypt could require the hard fought for Danish contingent 
changed for fraternisation.864 The ties between the soldiers, however, went beyond 
shared languages and military experience. There were also ties through the expansion 
and modernisation of Israeli agriculture, which the Israeli adaption of tractors in the 
longer history of the use of colonial experts, DDT and swamp-draining were the most 
visible signifier of at the ADL. This link was probably most obvious to the Danish 
soldiers, as they came from a country with a large agricultural sector also being 
modernised.865 However, the Danish and Norwegian soldiers also came from countries 
in which Israel stood as a ‘beacon of democracy’, and whose governments had 
supported Israel politically at the UN, labour unions had developed close ties, and not 
least, former Second World War resistance members had sent their weapons to the new 
state in 1948.866 In any case, the ties between the ‘DANOR’ soldiers and the Israeli 
soldiers and settlers strengthened. One of the Danish units went from greets, occasional 
soccer games and frequent chats and coffees to accepting invitations to visit a nearby 
kibbutz and receiving tips from the Israeli soldiers on the ways Palestinians crossed the 
ADL, thus expanding the spectrum of fraternisation.867 
Despite this warming in relations between the DANOR units and the Israelis, the 
Israeli government complained to the UN that Palestinians were still entering Israel, or 
‘infiltrating’ as it was termed in Israel. Upon receiving the Israeli complaint and still 
clearing the Suez Canal, the UN suggested both the Israelis and the Egyptians to 
construct “(…) an effective obstacle of barbed wire and possibly mines along the ADL 
(…),868 as the EIMAC observers had suggested to Burns. The Egyptians offered a tepid 
response, as the Egyptian administration would feel the heat from the Palestinians. The 
Israelis liked the idea until it was realised a barbed wire fence would have to be placed 
on both sides of the ADL, something the Israeli government had flatly rejected earlier. 
The Israeli refusal thus gave the Egyptians some breathing space, but at the same time 
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also left the ADL problem unsolved.869 This led to incidents that challenged not least 
the Danish soldiers’ naivety. In early April, some Danish soldiers witnessed two 
soldiers from an Israeli border unit take their jeep across the ADL ditch and shoot to 
scare the Palestinian shepherds that were attending their flocks on the Gaza Strip side. 
The disrespect the Israelis showed the Danish UNEF soldiers temporarily weakened 
their relationship. A week later, another Israeli border unit wounded a Palestinian trying 
to cross the ADL in front of the Danish soldiers.870   
Nonetheless, the Israeli soldiers and settlers near the ADL as well as the government 
came to appreciate the UN force as its abilities increased. A few days after the cooling 
in relations, Danish soldiers aided by an Indian observation post detained a Palestinian 
stealing irrigation pipes from an Israeli settlement.871 Soon after, an Egyptian journal 
also displayed pictures of Danish soldiers meeting with Israeli soldiers for coffee, music 
and dancing inside the Gaza Strip, a stamp of approval of sorts. If the officer’s diary 
didn’t exaggerate, most Danish soldiers on the first Danish contingent also went to visit 
a kibbutz before they were exchanged over April, as an emerging ethos belittled those 
who didn’t.872 Since 1948, Israeli units had faced Palestinians using Egyptian and Israeli 
anti-vehicle and anti-tank mines as asymmetric retaliation rather than direct 
confrontation. Seeing Brazilians attacked this way, could therefore have suggested the 
Israelis that the Brazilians—also soldiers at the centre of another racialised post-
imperial modernisation and state-building project—were to be appreciated: Clearly, 
they were not friends of the Palestinians. 873 Two weeks later, another Brazilian unit 
prevented a small group of Bedouin from bringing weapons into the Gaza Strip, 
probably improving their standing with the Israelis.874 In mid-April and early May, two 
Indonesian soldiers killed two Palestinians, perhaps letting the Israelis see the 
Indonesian units as useful, despite being Muslims.875 In mid-May, Colombian units also 
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caught a Palestinian fleeing from an Israeli unit and a group of armed Palestinians 
crossing the ADL.876 In mid-June, two Danish patrols (from the new contingent) joined 
the Indonesian battalion in killing another unarmed Palestinian, which prompted an 
Israeli unit to hand over fresh strawberries to the specific Danish unit in approval. Three 
days later, another Danish unit not only caught another Palestinian, but also killed two 
others. Another Israeli unit appeared and noted to the Danes that the new turn in the 
Danish ADL regime was most welcome.877  
By mid-June, these incidents were no longer isolated. Rather, they constituted a 
pattern. In much the same way some of the ‘white’ UNEF soldiers had identified with 
the British in El-Arish, many UN rank and file, NCO’s and officers from most if not all 
contingents to the IEMAC observers to the Force Commander himself, and thus UNEF 
at a broader level, not only saw the Palestinians as disorderly after the March 1957-riots 
against the backdrop of the British discourses from the 1920s and 1930s. Many UNEF 
members in daily conversations, diaries, incident reports, and eventually memoirs also 
adopted the Israeli classification of Palestinians in- and outside Israel as ‘Arabs’ and 
also those crossing into Israel as ‘Infiltrators’.878 Clearly, this was not just an issue of 
distancing the Palestinians by labelling them differently from the way they self-
identified. In essence, these phrases echoed the pre-Israeli and Israeli Zionist settler 
colonial narratives. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe has shown these interwoven narratives 
as framing the Palestinians as alien bodies in the wrong places within the context of the 
Zionist plans to ‘heal the land’ by clearing out the ‘Arabs’; unruly pests resisting the 
Zionist plans; and as ‘infiltrators’ once they began to return to their former homes and 
villages no longer in Palestine, but the Zionist state settler colonial state of Israel.879  The 
Holocaust may also partly have led to a pro-Israeli current in the Nordic and Canadian 
contingents, but probably less so in, for example, the Indian contingent whose 
government could not reconcile with the Jewish dependency on the British Empire as 
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well as the treatment of the Palestinians since the Mandate.880 Whether the Holocaust 
was a factor or not, the underlying narratives had clearly gained significance by mid-
June insofar discourse translated into practice all along the ADL. Although the killings 
of Palestinians led to the enforcement of the Egyptian clause in the verbal agreement 
with the UN Secretary-General and the UN Commander that UN units should only fire 
when threatened, EIMAC investigators would be called out for incidents in which UN 
soldiers had fired whether threatened or not.881  
This practice, moreover, also manifested itself in the treatment of Israelis. Were 
Israelis to enter to no-movement zone, UNEF were to hand them over to the Egyptian-
controlled police as they were to hand over Palestinians. Yet, the first Israeli held by 
UNEF in April was kept in a Danish camp for three weeks, until he escaped.882 In early 
June, Indonesian soldiers also entered Israel to help an Israeli squad that had hit a 
mine.883 A few weeks later, Danish and Norwegian soldiers unintentionally let either an 
Israeli soldier or settler, judging by the military-style approach and boot prints left in 
the sand, pass the ADL near a village with the result that a Palestinian boy was nearly 
killed by the hand grenade the Israeli ‘infiltrator’ threw into his room.884 More broadly, 
the influence of UNEF can perhaps be gaged by how Israel’s number of registered 
confrontations between Israeli border units and ‘infiltrators’— mostly Palestinians 
returning to their former homes in other words—had dropped by nearly 16% from 5.713 
to 4.801 a year after UNEF had established itself at the ADL.885 While the drop took 
place on all Israeli borders rather than only along the ADL that separated Israel and the 
Gaza Strip on the one hand, and Egypt, as noted, had promised to control the Fedayeen 
on the other, it seems sound to link the drop, at least in part, to the UN in the form of 
both the gradually more ‘efficient’ UNEF and UNRWA that was shifting from 
repatriation to improving camp conditions, providing schooling and channelling energy 
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into inward-oriented political debates (rather than outward-oriented Fedayeen activity) 
under Labouisse, the American Hammarskjold, as mentioned before, had handpicked.886 
The compliments from Israeli units in the early phase of UNEF’s establishment at 
the ADL may well have been instances of local initiative. Indeed, Ben-Gurion’s 
retaliation raids in the early and mid-1950s had resulted in a military culture that not 
only encouraged ‘self-authorisation’ for action and disobedience in all unit across sizes 
and across all ranks after these skirmishes, but also during the war of 1956.887 This 
military culture was additionally reinforced by the extreme links scholars have shown 
between state, society and individual partly forged in the Mandate and partly after 1948. 
Israeli children grew up in a militarised society on constant military alertness and were 
indoctrinated by Zionist parents, teachers, games, children’s books and media to put the 
state before themselves, to think Palestinians as primitive and criminal, to dream of 
conscription and see war as a rite of passage, and to join the youth pioneer movement 
building paramilitary and migrant camps near the borders.888 Against the combination 
of militarisation from childhood, the similar tasks of keeping the ‘unruly’ Palestinians 
under control, and increasing personal relations, some Israeli soldiers and settlers may 
well have seen the UN soldiers in some sort of mirror image. 
However, other considerations make it likely that the UN ‘efficiency’ increased and 
that Ben-Gurion’s government was aware thereof. As Israeli scholar Eitan Barak has 
noted, Israel initially saw UNEF as “(…) a factor which would prevent military attacks, 
especially surprise ones.”889 Additionally, the first kibbutz visit by UNEF soldiers in 
March 1957 was, if one of the participating Danish soldier’s information was correct, 
cleared with the local Israel military authority.890 Again, this could be a local initiative. 
If the drop on confrontations were link to an increasingly ‘efficient’ UN regime (and 
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the changing course of UNRWA), the UN gave Ben-Gurion what appears to be an 
internationally paid extra layer of border security after, as Israeli historian Guy Laron 
has shown, the Israeli middle class had been demanding better conditions at the expense 
of the standards in the migrant settlements near the borders and military spending for 
some time and the annexation of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai failed.891 In what can 
hardly be seen as a coincidence given the Israeli military’s censorship of the media, the 
Danish killings in June 1957 were mentioned in not one but several notices in the 
influential newspaper, the Jerusalem Post. One of the Danish camps even began to 
receive the newspaper when they caught (or killed) Palestinians on the ADL.892 Other 
contingents may have had similar experiences. Considering also the importance 
assigned to the un-armed and thinly manned armistice commissions from 1948 
onwards, it appears that Ben-Gurion’s cabinet, as a minimum, followed UNEF closely, 
if not letting the local Israeli units interact with the force. The Israeli scholar Eitan Barak 
partially confirms this noting that Egypt launched a formal complaint against UNEF for 
fraternising with Israeli units in 1958 and the apparent Israeli success of getting 
intelligence from a high-ranking UNEF in 1960.893  
As his predecessors in the Mandate had used the British, Ben-Gurion also sought to 
use the UN involvement when possible. The conflict between Israel, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia about Israeli ships passing through the Straits of Tiran from 1951 was one such 
matter after 1956. Although Nasser promised Israeli ships de facto passage when 
Hammarskjold went in Cairo in mid-March 1957 (to discuss the Gaza Strip), he had 
Burns deploy an infantry company to the area, fearing another war between Israel and 
Egypt. Israel first let a Danish ship sail to Eilat with commercial goods and then an 
American vessel to transport Iranian crude to Eilat, which meant both using the Suez 
Canal and potentially provoking the US navy patrol in the area into action if Egypt, or 
Saudi Arabia, were to engage the tanker. Despite Saudi and Egyptian sabre-rattling, 
Israel gained de facto passage rights that lasted a decade on basis of the UN-facilitated 
understanding and the involvement of the UN, Hammarskjold and UNEF’s Sharm-el-
Sheik contingent several times.894  
Israel also benefitted from UN involvement without knowing. As a response to Egypt 
and Syria’s formation of the United Arab Republic, Israel initiated military 
manoeuvrings in the Negev Desert in late 1958. Egypt reacted by sending forces from 
El-Arish to the IF without notifying UNEF. Once UNEF encountered these, the (then 
Indian) Chief of Staff was sent to argue that UNEF was responsible for patrolling the 
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IF with its aircraft and (Yugoslavian and Canadian) reconnaissance units. Egypt ceded 
an exclusive patrol zone 5 kilometres wide by day and 2 kilometres by night. A few 
months later, in early 1959, the UN once again intervened to Israel’s benefits. Since the 
formation of the UAR in 1958, the Israeli air force had increased its aerial patrols as 
deterrence, reconnaissance, and perhaps also intimidation of the Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip, something the UNEF could do little about. Sensibly, Egypt deployed fighter 
jets to El-Arish. Fearing that UNEF would be caught in an arms race on both sides of 
the ADL/IF, Hammarskjold spoke to Nasser.895 Yet, estimates from the Danish-
Norwegian battalion alone still put 477 of the 1.157 sightings of Israeli fighters, or 
around 41%, as illegally entering Egypt and the Gaza Strip between April 1959 and 
April 1961.896 Over February 1960, Israeli forces also engaged UAR forces in the Syrian 
part. Logically, the UAR sent about 50.000 soldiers and about 500 tanks and tank 
destroyers towards the Egyptian-Israeli IF. Caught by surprise, Israel sought 
Hammarskjold’s help. He declined, having already restrained Cairo—a government he, 
as noted earlier, strongly disliked—from reasonable defensive measures with Soviet 
equipment after it had been not only attacked by Israel, France and Great Britain 
recently, but also denied weapons and loans by the West since the 1952-coup. That 
Israel had attempted to manipulate him into thwarting the Egyptian World Bank 
negotiations for a loan to expand the Suez Canal by Israel in 1959 only ensured that he 
spoke to the US, Great Britain and Egypt but not Israel to avert the crisis.897  
Until the war in 1967 (we now know as the Six Day War) broke out, the years from 
1961 appear to have brought no other crises on the Armistice Demarcation Line or the 
International Frontier significant enough to require the involvement of either the UN 
General Secretary in New York (and the US) or UNEF. Certainly, the UN took part in 
keeping the ‘unruly’ Palestinians inside the Gaza Strip and was ready to keep things 
from heating up on the IF. However, it appears to have been a question of the Egyptian 
and Israeli energies turning inwards in the name of modernisation and partly away from 
their borders to the broader region of the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, 
most discernibly in the proxy-war Yemen, and to a smaller degree various central and 
north-eastern African states (and in Israel’s case also Iran, Syria after the collapse of 
the UAR in 1961, and the emerging European trade bloc). The energies of both 
governments were simply not tied to the Palestinians and each other (locally), as much 
as the problems and openings the Soviet Union and the US created via their military, 
political and economic aid that reflected their own regional designs. Moscow sought 
Egyptian (and later also Syrian) maintenance and supply areas in the short term and 
base rights in the long term to increase its Mediterranean power projection capabilities. 
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On its part, Washington sought to keep the Soviet Union out of the region, maintain its 
grip on the regional oil supplying states, and finally ensure that both the British ally and 
the regional defence pact remained stable.898 
Most literature has, as shown, argued that UNEF was either the first (and successful) 
peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN, or, in the case of a few scholars from 
or residing in Israel, a failure to protect Israeli interests. Going beyond these—from the 
viewpoint of imperial and global history—cursory glances or deeply embedded 
perspectives, I have in this chapter instead reviewed the UN intervention with a 
sensitivity to the deeper history of the region as well as the international system. In 
short, I argue that UNEF can be seen as a frontier zone of Western imperial 
multilateralism on basis of what can be summed up as three separate processes with 
their own dynamics that from late 1956 began to increasingly overlap. First, the broader 
process of Washington and Moscow vying for regional hegemony to either safeguard 
the Western European oil supply or to gain access to the Mediterranean furthered the 
UN down the path of mainly looking after Western interests it been on since 1942. 
Second, the UN got caught up into the highly volatile Israeli-Egyptian state of affairs 
between war and the absence of war, which tied the interests of both local actors to the 
those of the US and the USSR and thus also the UN. Thirdly, and an aspect that the 
following chapter will examine in further detail, the practice ‘on the ground’ of the UN 
intervention turned it into an ad hoc hybrid post-1945 extension of the British Mandate. 
This was not only a consequence of the expanding area of operations and jurisdiction 
from the Canal Area via the Sinai to the Gaza Strip, the ADL and IF. Practice also 
reflected deeper structural legacies from especially British configurations of imperial 
sovereignty, governance, and space. If unintentionally, the joint UN-regime of UNEF 
and UNRWA linked to the British Mandate regime and its technologies of power, being 
rooted in sovereignties in flux; an externally controlled social regime; the re-
actualisation of certain ideas of gender and race; turning to the tested concept of a 
militarized police force of young men recruited from other parts of the frontier of 
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imperial multilateralism whose struggle for control and authority shaped of shifting 
sensations of security and insecurity, in part linked to the military cultures of the 
contributing countries’ militaries, colonial militaries or intra-Western military 
cooperation. 
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 8 Chapter 8: Postcoloniality? The 
UN and The Militarisation of Life in The 
Frontier Zone of Imperial Multilateralism, 
1957-1967 
Suggesting that both the structuralising dynamics and the everyday practice of the 
frontier of imperial multilateralism are best understood from ‘within’, I examine here 
the UN regime’s links to everyday life in the Gaza Strip, both in its own right from 
March 1957 to June 1967 and against the backdrop of the British configurations of 
imperial sovereignty, governance, and space. In other words, I explore and historicise 
how the UN tied into what the political geographers Richelle Bernazolli and Colin Flint 
see as the ‘everydayness’ of the practice of military power in specific places.899 
Inseparable from this, I also explore how young and old and male and female 
Palestinians—refugees and ‘natives’ alike—and Bedouin that traditionally moved 
between the Sinai and the Negev deserts sought to negotiate the practice of UNEF and 
its structural legacies in its regime of control and authority and ideas of gender and race 
in the spaces and practices of their everyday lives. To explore these mostly unmapped 
realities with more weight on the ‘negotiatedness’ of the UN presence ‘on the ground’ 
and the actors involved than in existing research900 (and the previous chapter in that it 
focused on the force itself and its relations to Israel), I examine three different spheres 
of life linking my theoretical framework of the frontier zone of imperial multilateralism, 
the Gaza Strip population and the UN contingents: 1) Land, 2) (In)Security and 3) 
Labour and economic relations. Rather than seeing gender, race and age as only 
intersecting technologies of power and social categories, I see them as integral parts to 
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everyday practice ‘on the ground’ more visible on certain occasions and places than 
others.901  
This approach (and structure of the chapter), however, is also related to how it is 
currently not possible to gain a full overview of all incidents in the ADL area that either 
led to detention or in some cases also death, and thus their seriousness, frequency and, 
not least, significance in relation to the emerging militant nationalism (as viewed from 
the Force). Additionally, the communication between the UN Secretary-General and 
his deputies and the Force Commander on the one hand and UNEF records produced 
after serious encounters between UN soldiers and residents of the Gaza Strip on the 
other, remain classified. In other words, an important part of the material from both the 
upper layer ‘on the ground’ and the UN HQ in New York is currently not available 
either. Nevertheless, the set of records that I do have access to is still a broad set of 
sources. The majority of the records of the Egyptian-Israeli Military Armistice 
Commission (EIMAC) and UNEF that remain in the UN archive are not only available, 
they also allow for the different types of relations and conflicts the UN regime entailed 
to be explored since the reports do not record mere random incidents but investigations 
when the regime and its practices caused harm, were challenged or failed to work. The 
material is thus in many ways generous enough to build a qualified and broad insight 
into everyday life and the negotiation of the regime of the UN force. For example, I 
consult unpublished and unused incident reports, statistics and cables of EIMAC 
observers who were added to UNEF; mostly hitherto unused internal communication, 
accident reports, labour documents and administrative materials from the UNEF Chief 
Administrative Officer, the Legal Advisor, and the Force Commander to mention just 
some; and the already consulted published memoirs of members of the UN force. 
Independently, these records provide glimpses of Gaza Strip everyday life. Combined, 
they allow for a critical appraisal of the UN regime from 1957 to 1967 when unpacked 
by way of contextual literature on the Mandate regime; Palestinian nationalism; Israel; 
the imperial struggle for regional hegemony in Cold War Middle East; and the troop 
contributing states.  
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8.1 As Before (I)? Land Ownership and Usage as a 
Prism to understand the Negotiation of the UN 
Regime in the Gaza Strip 
In this section, I use land ownership and land usage as a prism to understand what the 
UN regime meant ‘on the ground’ and consequently how the different population 
groups of the Gaza Strip sought to negotiate its practices and impact(s) on their lives.  
As noted in the previous chapter, the Egyptian President and the UN Secretary-
General bypassed the existing Armistice framework, making instead a verbal agreement 
on the area of operations, functions and authority of the UN force in addition to the 
Status of Forces Agreement from February, which covered other aspects not only but 
mostly related to Egypt. As part of the verbal agreement UNEF was, as mentioned, to 
operate a 100-meter-wide zone of no-man’s-land on the Gaza Strip side of the ADL, 
which expanded to a 500-meter zone by night. Without making an announcement of 
officially dabbling into land management both ‘inside’ the Gaza Strip and on the ADL, 
the UN effectively not only continued its own meddling with regard to land use and 
ownership in Palestine, it also connected to a deeper history of externalising land 
management. This was not due to a covert conspiracy, but a consequence of the legal 
and financial aspects not having been settled in the verbal ADL arrangement and the 
UN´s longer involvement in the unmaking of Palestine and its own history and roots in 
the American and British imperial projects.  
As the cultivation season came to its peak (some months UNEF had arrived), many 
Palestinians grew frustrated with UN units both near the ADL and inside the Gaza Strip 
obstructing access to their land and crops. If failing to come to personal arrangements 
with the UN units, they shrewdly began making legal claims to the Egyptian Governor-
General. Most claimants were probably peasants with little land. Not only had many 
Palestinians peasants lost land as a consequence of Jewish and Palestinian elite 
purchases, British agricultural and economic policies, and the traditional division of 
land amongst sons in Mandate Palestine,902 nearly 4.000 people in the Gaza Strip had 
also lost some or all of their land when the Jewish settlers established the state of Israel 
in 1948.903 Most involved in agriculture in the Gaza Strip were thus small-scale peasants 
or land tenants. The expulsion of some 200.000 Palestinians from the villages and towns 
north-east of the Southern District that became the Gaza Strip only increased the 
pressure on the land. Unsurprisingly, opportunists and friends of the regime also made 
claims, adding to the pressure on the Egyptian regime, which had already made the 
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903 Jean-Pierre Filiu and John King, Gaza: A History (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 106. 
  
226 
 
Gaza Strip tax-free and supported citrus plantation start-ups. As claims began 
mounting, the much beleaguered Egyptian Governor-General had the liaison officers to 
UNEF present these to the UN force. By mid-summer, the UNEF worried about the 
“(…) considerable number of claims of landowners in the area (…)”904 that “(…) varied 
in nature and covered demands for the payment by UNEF of arbitrary rentals for the 
use of land, not based on any actual loss suffered by the owner; assertions that parcels 
of uncultivable land in use by UNEF would have been tilled if the Force was not there; 
or claims for loss of crops or alleged damage to planted fields.”905 Knowing that the 
elite of the Gaza Strip had grown close to the Egyptians (if not closer than it had been 
to the British)—on account of the severance from Palestine and dependence on its 
goodwill and allowance for middle-class Egyptians to purchase imported luxury 
goods—it seems fair to assume that at least some of the first claims may well have been 
friendly services to political allies, trials to see if compensation would be paid either 
sparingly or the opposite or both. The Under-Secretary, Ralph Bunche, also thought so, 
noting to the UNEF Force Commander that there was “(…) an apparent tendency on 
the part of Egyptian Liaison officers to act as something more than intermediaries with 
UNEF and rather the advocates of local claimants (…)”.906 He continued that “(…) it 
has been the experience of UNEF that these officers have put forward even the most 
exaggerated claims at their face value, and often for high payments, to the point either 
of encouraging the submission of claims or of entering them on their own initiative 
without a request from the claimant.”907 Rather than facing unrelenting Palestinian 
claims ad hoc, UNEF HQ and the UN HQ in New York held back not on all but on 
most of the claims for compensation in order to seek a broader negotiated policy with 
the Egyptians. This unsurprisingly led the number of claims to rise. By October, some 
40-50 claims were pending with no policy in sight.908  
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Naturally, the Egyptians were keen to let the UN pay to score points with the 
Palestinians while the UN was keen to keep costs low. Although the Under-Secretary 
informed the Force Commander that he accepted compensation for damages caused by 
UNEF beyond the few arrangements already made in the most obvious cases of damage 
in non-operational areas, he made some reservations. First, he argued that private law 
could not be used against military use. Secondly, he also contended that the land 
occupied by UNEF—which amounted to that of the large maintenance area near Rafah 
(due to the concentration of ex-British facilities and skilled labourers trained by the 
British and its proximity to its supply point in El-Arish Airstrip), six or seven battalion 
headquarters, 13 company headquarters, 27 platoon headquarters, approximately 70 
observations posts and the roads and tracks linking platoon camps and observation posts 
as well as the bulldozed ADL—constituted a minimalist approach to military land use.909 
In doing so, however, he ignored that the Gaza Strip was overpopulated in relation to 
its size (5-8 kilometres wide and a little more than 40 kilometres long) as well as unable 
to sustain itself, which meant that even a minimalist approach took away land (at night 
time the 500 meter ADL zone alone amounted to 10% of the width of the Gaza Strip).910 
Thirdly, he also (rightly) argued that most of the land UNEF used in one capacity or 
another had been uncultivable before the arrival of UNEF. Finally, he noted that 
UNEF´s land use remained within the Status of Forces Agreement entered with Egypt 
that—as the possessor of the rights of the sovereign State—had previously held the 
ADL itself. Writing the Force Commander six months after the arrival of the force, it 
was nevertheless clear that the Under-Secretary, despite his unwillingness to let the 
Egyptians take him hostage, did not hold the reins of the situation. Showing that 
political matters were decided in New York, he let the Force Commander know that the 
Legal Advisor was instructed not only to search for people “(…) both sufficiently 
neutral and sufficiently competent in administrative procedures (…)”,911 but also to 
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negotiate with the Egyptians about the making of a neutral “(…) joint indemnification 
procedure (…)”912 that was to involve both Egyptian and UN representatives, balance 
between Egyptian practices of and UN ideas and offer joint compensation with a larger 
Egyptian share.913  
However, this was easier said than done. In the Gaza Strip, peasants (and others 
interested in what else was possible) continued to pressure the Egyptians to get 
compensation, leaving the Egyptians unable to budge much. For its part, the UN made 
little internal progress despite the Secretary-General becoming part of the process (once 
again);914 despite several clarifying aide-memoires were exchanged between UNEF, UN 
and the Egyptians;915 and despite the Force Commander recommending the Legal 
Counsel to the Secretary-General that it would be wise to make some small measures 
of payments to “(…) consolidate the appeal which the presence of UNEF could have 
for the local population (…)”,916 most probably aware that at least some and 
increasingly a growing number of the claims were from struggling Palestinian peasants 
that had suffered damage to their trees, lost access to vital land or seen crops destroyed 
by UN vehicles.917 By December 1957, the UN Legal Adviser and the Egyptian Liaison 
Officer were still navigating the issues of how the Egyptian obligation to provide land 
for operational uses linked to whether or not to compensate the owners against the 
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backdrop of established Egyptian practices (of doing so or not) and UNEF seeing 
compensation as an mostly Egyptian matter and vice versa.918  
By mid-May 1958, however, Egypt and the UN appear to have found both a joint 
procedure grounded in the Status of Forces Agreement and assessors that they could 
agree upon. If only some of the claims of peasants owning land that the UN used for 
`comfort` and `convenience` (i.e. football fields and shooting ranges) had been handled 
(as they did avoided the Egypt obligation to provide land), Palestinians with claims 
related to operational use would soon have their complaints considered.919 In early June, 
17 of them received an offer for settlement from UNEF by way of the Egyptian Liaison 
staff, making note of having considered the assessments made by the agricultural expert 
of the Egyptian administration.920 Soon after, more Palestinians began filing claims for 
compensation about destroyed buildings and walls, crops such as barley destroyed by 
vehicles, and damaged or wholly destroyed trees (olive, lemon, almond and eucalyptus), 
date palms, cactus hedges and vines with the Egyptians in a steady stream.921 Aside a 
minor spat between the Egyptian regime and UNEF about what constituted 
´operational´ needs (and who could make the decisions) and the occasional case that 
had two Palestinians claim ownership and compensation for the same land (made 
possible by Israel taking part of the land registry in 1956), claims were soon dealt with 
at a rate of 15 cases per week, a pace telling of the importance UNEF granted the 
Palestinians’ feelings towards the force.922 It is uncertain how often UNEF requested 
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reimbursement from Egypt (although it reserved the right to do so), but UNEF and the 
Egyptians settled 117 cases (of which 93 related to damage from operational use such 
as storage areas, parking lots, transport and patrol roads etc.). While this left 80 claims 
unsettled on the one hand, it also provided some average amounts to go by as standards 
on the other.923 Additionally, the fact that the land area in the compensation clams had 
been reduced by nearly 70% after being jointly surveyed pleased the Legal and Political 
Adviser who informed the Force Commander and Chief Administrative Officer that 
“(…) the joint machinery for the surveying of land claims works smoothly”.924 Aside 
some minor hitches,  such as UNEF shifting to direct payments for the majority of the 
settlements in the spring of 1960 (which the Egyptian administration was not pleased 
with perhaps considering it a means to gain goodwill),925 the joint system for managing 
and compensating the claims found worthy had found its footing.   
However, that is not to say that the claims, or rather the problems causing them, went 
away. By 1963, more than 350 Palestinians—most of whom appear to have been 
illiterate peasants with small pieces of land (making their mark with a finger dipped in 
ink) rather than owners of multiple properties or large-scale landowners—had made 
claims for compensations against UNEF roads on their lands (some of which were kept 
in operation for 7 years), the destruction of crops, trees and property by UNEF and the 
loss of access to land due to UNEF operations. While the UNEF records do not shed 
light neither on how many peasants and landowners remained in the Gaza Strip, nor the 
total number of claims filed (and compensations made), it seems fair to assume that the 
claimants probably made up only a minor part of the peasant population. Nevertheless, 
their claims not only stood as very clear counter-arguments to the moderate claim of 
the UN Under-Secretary, they also caused UNEF some worries over the years. Not only 
was the joint claims system set up. UNEF also appears to have recognised that most 
claimants on whose land the force operated were probably for the most part struggling 
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peasants and that careless behaviour would be counterproductive and thus to be 
avoided. Emphasising the need for maintaining good relations with the local population, 
the Egyptian Governor-General’s administration and the Egyptian government in Cairo, 
orders to avoid damages on land, crops, hedges and property were accordingly given 
recurrently by both contingent officers and the Force Commander until the withdrawal 
of the force in 1967.926 As noted, however, the UN force also connected to Palestine´s 
deeper history of externalisation due to its entanglement with the intersecting American 
and British imperial projects and the unmaking of Palestine.  
When the League of Nations sanctioned the British takeover following the First 
World War, Palestinian peasants had not only faced uneven Ottoman policies, which 
had empowered and enlarged the urban landowning class and established oppressive 
tax systems and land-tenure systems to gain local support.927 They had also had to put 
up with the hardships of war: large-scale forced labour, deforestation, seizure of food 
and livestock as well as military units being quartered in villages. Yet, the British would 
offer little respite. Instead, they implemented a racialised regime manned it with 
colonial administrators, experts and security forces with the aim of providing strategic 
imperial linkage and integrating the mandate into the imperial and global economies. 
This entailed the monetization of the agrarian economy (and push towards landlords 
and large-scale landowners); the entrance to world market and subsequent 
commodification of land, labour and time; increased competition; and mechanization 
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(which favoured the more organized Jewish settlers that also increased in numbers). 
Unsurprisingly, the Palestinian rioted, but gained only some tariff protection. The 
depression further intensified competition with the Jewish colonial settlers, Palestinian 
communal disharmony and made the landless rural population dependent on wage 
labour (with lower wages than their Jewish counterparts who especially after 1933 were 
also allowed to immigrate in ever larger numbers). Altogether, these factors led to a 
Palestinian revolt that brought about both the enlargement and militarisation of the 
British security forces as well as turned Palestine into a militarised geography. The 
following years were even more marked by the British economic and agricultural 
policies, which had reduced the resilience of the Palestinian rural communities to poor 
harvests, droughts, cattle diseases, plagues of locusts and mice, and launched citrus 
fruits as the main export product in direct competition with Spain and South Africa. 
Neither the ensuing overcrowded and over-used lands and increase in unskilled wage 
labour, nor Palestinian-Jewish relations improved with the Second World War. By 
1945, around 10% of the Palestinian population had to make do with unskilled wage 
labour, urban slum was spreading, and the Jewish settlers and the Palestinian elite were 
buying up land at a growing pace while peasant families, following traditions of 
heritage, divided their lands into smaller plots for their sons, leaving a growing number 
of peasants with less than sustainable lands. At the same time, the Jewish colonial 
settlers staged their insurgency against the British Mandate administration with the aim 
of setting up a Jewish state, forcing the British to deploy almost 100.000 troops.928  
Enter the UN, which—on British request—took it upon itself to deal with the 
collapsing British Mandate. At that point, London had already thought about the 
partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an ‘Arab’ state for more than a decade, knowing 
well that the division of land was a major if not the largest issue.929 Echoing the British, 
the UN Special Committee On Palestine, established by a special General Assembly 
session in May 1947, recommended partition and thus the making of two states by the 
end of August 1947 against the backdrop of: the Palestinian lack of organisation and 
rejection of anything but a state of their own; the Jewish territorially aspiring web of 
armed state-like institutions; the British lack of recommendations; the US and Soviet 
silences due to institutional disagreement on policy or strategy;930 and finally the 
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Jordanian King’s wish to annex the West Bank.931 According to historian Elad Ben-
Dror, the secretariat staff (including Ralph Bunche and Constantin Stavropoulos) that 
were to service the UN’s Palestine Commission—the UN organisation that was to act 
as a provisional government while partitioning Palestine—thus left the idea of an Arab 
state and instead focused only on making a Jewish state.932 Unquestionably, the UN thus 
had a share of responsibility in the unmaking of Palestine, finalised with the Jewish 
settlers’ establishment of Israel in the Middle Eastern war in 1948. In extension thereof, 
the unmaking of Palestine linked directly to the making of the Gaza Strip hybrid 
geography, in which the UN came to provide initially relief and later social welfare via 
UNRWA.933 In doing so, the UN took on state-like responsibilities along Egypt. As 
UNRWA recognised that “(…) about one-third of the area consists of sand dunes and 
is entirely unproductive (…)934 and the population density of the Gaza Strip high, it 
started both an afforestation project to turn refugees into ‘self-supporting farmers’ and 
an agricultural training centre with American cattle. The centre was to serve as a model 
for others, but the Israelis closed it in November 1956.935  
Once the Israel withdrew, UNRWA was able to restore its developmentalist 
operations in the agricultural (and educational) sphere. More importantly, however, the 
UN force arrived to the Gaza Strip as part of the process of reopening the Suez Canal. 
Not only was this goal achieved. Incidentally, the UN (force) also both created a 
military geography of its own in the form of observations posts, camps ranging from 
platoon to battalion size, military roads, maintenance areas, communication sites, 
storage facilities, officers’ villas as well as beach and sports clubs that in no small way 
resembled the military geography of the British Mandate (forces) on the one hand and 
enlarged its own role in the management of land in the Gaza Strip in a way that built on 
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and in part continued the overall British militarised geography in the post-Mandate 
Gaza Strip on the other. While this continuation of the militarisation (of land, space and 
everyday life) and state of permanent but unstable exception brought tension, it is by 
no means enough to explore the practice of UNEF only through the prism of land: The 
practice of the UN force also needs to be examined through the eyes of the Palestinians 
and Bedouin who may have seen the security arrangements of UNEF generating as 
much insecurity as security.  
8.2 As Before (II)? Security and Insecurity as a 
Prism to understand the Negotiation of the UN 
Regime in the Gaza Strip 
In this section, I examine how the practice of UNEF was negotiated through the prism 
of security and insecurity not only because scholars on imperial and colonial expansion 
and the Mandate regimes centre security.936 Scholarship on contemporary interventions 
also link security and insecurity. Notably, military sociologist Paul Higate and gender 
and developmental scholar Marsha Henry contend that “(…) peacekeeping is about 
space, how it is seen, the way it is reconfigured by peacekeeping going about their 
security work, and crucially, the impact these spatial-security practices have (…).”937 
In the context of peacekeeping, the spatial practice of security, according to Higate and 
Henry, “shapes how space is experienced, and to the extent to which it is considered 
secure or insecure.”938 Within the Gaza Strip, the (in)security prism therefore covers 
not only military aspects, but also various everyday life encounters: 1) the ADL regime; 
2) UNEF traffic in the Gaza Strip and off duty encounters in the Gaza Strip and 3) 
Israeli crossings into the Gaza Strip. 
Shortly after the UN force arrived in March 1957, it began to provide grounds for 
the Gaza Strip ‘natives’, refugees and Bedouin to view it with less relief than when it 
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had replaced the Israeli forces. UNEF units not only met the Gaza City demonstrations 
and riots with armed soldiers, warning shots and clubs (as showed in chapter 7) and 
continued the militarisation of the land, putting further pressure on the remaining 
peasants (as touched upon previously in this chapter). The different UNEF units on the 
ADL would also—more or less right after setting up their more than 70 observation 
posts and camps there in late March 1957—generate tension (sometimes of a fleeting 
character and occasionally leading to premeditated attempted murder) in their 
encounters and relations with people living near the ADL on account of their racialised, 
gendered and often rigid ways of monitoring and regulating their assigned sectors. 
Spatialised intersecting moments of diachronic and synchronic factors, these various 
encounters reflected the tasks of the UNEF units in the respective areas in which they 
served, their experiences following their redeployment from El- Arish and the deeper 
logics, norms and practices of their national military cultures on the one hand, and the 
precarity of everyday life for the Gaza strip population and their experiences from the 
Mandate era on the other.  
 Although the UNEF reports on ADL incidents and the correspondence between the 
Force Commander and the UN General-Secretary and Under-Secretary on these remain 
inaccessible, the EIMAC records suggest that the first six to ten months in the decade 
UNEF operated on the ADL were particularly agitated. Most incidents were minor and 
did not lead to violence: In early April, for example, Danish soldiers detained two 
peasants by on suspicion of stealing grass in Israel, perhaps on account of the 
aforementioned racialised pro-Israeli views dominating the joint Danish-Norwegian 
battalion that cast Palestinians (and Egyptians) as primitive in contrast to Israelis that 
were seen as fellow and ‘civilised’ people, being ‘white’, using tractors and speaking 
both English and German.939 However, fewer but more serious incidents led to both 
killings of Palestinians and attacks on UNEF units. Also in early April, a Brazilian unit 
was attacked with redeployed Egyptian or Israeli mines, a Palestinian and Bedouin 
asymmetric tactic used against both British and Israeli forces.940 Here it is worth noting 
that the Brazilian army had grown out of the Portuguese colonial army and been used 
to both populate and colonise strategically the ‘primitive’ Amazon interior and regulate 
the mobilities of the free poor. Despite reforms, it remained governed by ideas of violent 
‘white’ masculine honour and engaged in frontier violence in the 1950s.941 In another 
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April incident perhaps re-actualising the patronising and distrustful nature of the Dutch 
colonial military and state that both the Indonesian military and state had partially 
inherited, an Indonesian soldier shot and wounded a Palestinian male refugee standing 
in a crowd of nearly 60 people near the Indonesian camp, perceiving the group as 
threatening.942 Three weeks later several Palestinian men seeking day labour were 
beaten with rifle butts and one killed by Indonesian soldiers after a guard mistakenly let 
the group enter the camp alongside a truck.943 On the following day, the UN Commander 
requested the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General that the Colombian battalion—
which was placed on the ADL off Khan Younis that housed both a camp of more than 
25.000 refugees and a camp of 31.000 Bedouin—be issued machine guns and mortars, 
which all other ADL contingents already had.944 However, both on the very day the US 
(the Colombian arms supplier) rejected the request for heavy weapons and some days 
later, Danish units killed two Palestinians.945 A week and several detentions later, the 
UN Commander issued an order on how to act should civil disorder erupt, echoing the 
British ‘Aid to Civil Power’ function. He charted seemingly sound principles of acting 
correct, not using physical coercion, and not resorting to punitive actions. Yet, he also 
ordered armoured vehicles be used sparingly to avoid losing their ‘moral effect’ on the 
locals and that “As a rule, the dispersal of rioters and the taking into custody of the 
ring-leaders are sufficient to restore order,”946 revealing that he was ready to take over 
internal security and thereby breach the verbal agreement with Nasser, the Status of 
Forces Agreement, and the 1949 Armistice Agreement. While no riot or revolt broke 
out, a Danish unit was fired upon two weeks later.947 From late May to late July, several 
Bedouin also attacked UN units all along the ADL with guns (leaving one Bedouin 
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dead) and mines (leaving two Palestinian farmers dead).948 In July, Palestinian villagers 
from the Finnish sector also first fired upon two Finnish units and later attacked an 
outpost after two drunk Finnish soldiers had rummaged their village for women for 
sex,949 an insult as the Palestinian female body had emerged as the symbol of the nation 
in the Mandate era.950 Indonesian and Colombian units were also attacked with guns and 
mines in their sectors.951 In mid-July, a Palestinian teenager was shot and wounded by 
a Brazilian soldier in the Brazilian sector. Emphasizing the soldier’s rough behaviour, 
an eleven-year-old Palestinian boy who had witnessed the shooting of his friend told 
the EIMAC observer with all the anger he could muster that he “(…) will take the police 
to these people.”952 In August, more than 25 rounds were fired upon a Danish unit with 
an automatic weapon using the ammunition of the Egyptian-controlled but Palestinian-
manned police militia’s automatic weapon, suggesting that members of the unit—which 
the Governor-General had ordered to cooperate with UNEF—now also took part in 
attacks on UNEF.953 As autumn became winter, UNEF still faced additional attacks as 
the reduced availability of vegetables and fruits raised the stakes of crossing.954 Against 
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this backdrop, it seems to fair to suggest that the Gaza Strip residents may have seen 
UNEF as engendering both fleeting sensations and longer experiences of ‘insecurity’.  
However, the year of 1958 appears to have brought less tension. Despite noting more 
than 30 cases of UNEF detaining men, women and children from January to June 1958, 
the EIMAC reports make mention of ‘only’ 4 attacks on UNEF—one involving a young 
Palestinian woman who wounded a Colombian soldier with a knife after he confronted 
her near the ADL, thus perhaps reacting to what see saw as an aggression—and no 
killings of Palestinians and Bedouin between early January and May.955 A battalion 
report from the Danish-Norwegian, however, notes 8 separate incidents from April to 
October in which its units were targeted with gun fire, challenging at least somewhat 
the number of only four incidents overall.956 As mentioned before, the UNEF records 
concerning ADL incidents may also show a different picture even if protocol was to 
dispatch the EIMAC observers to the incidents, as they had been the attacks and killings 
from April 1957 to December 1957, some of which were corroborated by a few 
memoirs.957 However, the EIMAC reports do not stand alone in noting a change. Using 
statistics from the Israeli security and military forces on ‘infiltrations’, Alina Korn, an 
Israeli sociologist focusing on political crime and legal sociology, also notes that the 
number of Palestinians crossing into Israel dropped noticeably throughout 1957 and 
1958 compared to the previous years.958 A range of different influences linked to both 
Egypt and the UN relieved tension.  
Foremost, the Egyptian government contributed, even if it was more concerned with 
avoiding a war with Israel than helping the Palestinians. First, the Egyptian President 
secured a working relationship with the US from 1958, selling itself as a stabilising 
force of Arab nationalism,959 to put, as Salim Yaqub, historian of Egypt-Israeli relations, 
noted, “(…) the Arab-Israeli issue ‘in the icebox’, insulated alike from war and 
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diplomacy.”960 Subsequently, Cairo allowed the Gaza Strip’s political elite to establish 
a ‘Legislative Council’ in 1958 after rejecting their suggestion of joining the United 
Arab Republic, a joint Egyptian-Syrian republic under Egyptian dominance. Soon after, 
Cairo also let the last of the two Palestinian battalion of frontier guards—which had 
been created in the early 1950s to guide Palestinian militancy away from Israel (even if 
that failed and was part of the Israeli motivations for the invasion in late 1956) return. 
This doubling of Palestinian security forces was a weighty concession, as it increased 
the visibility of Palestinian involvement in policing, and thus governing, the Gaza Strip, 
not least because it was to be followed of the formation of Fatah, a militant nationalist 
organisation.961 Moreover, Cairo also set up a scheme that allowed (especially the 
nationalist or leftist) teachers and unskilled workers to travel to the Gulf States. 
Egyptian loans and Egyptian access to the markets of especially Yugoslavia (that had 
troops in the Gaza Strip) and Czechoslovakia also facilitated a growing number of citrus 
plantations, offering some income opportunities (by the mid-1960s, nearly half of the 
Gaza Strip's workforce had found work on these plantations). Nevertheless, the 
Palestinians workers went underpaid as unions were illegal and the readily available 
supply of labour kept wages low just as the thirty richest Gazan families who owned 
the plantations expanded their lands ten-fold (to a third of the Gaza Strip’s fertile land 
by the mid-1960s) at the peasants’ expense.962 Egypt, rather than the UN, thus continued 
the British line of simultaneous economic inclusion and exclusion. 
As noted, the UN force also contributed to a less edgy atmosphere. For example, the 
abovementioned joint compensation procedure may have been of influence. That UNEF 
detonated several personnel and anti-armour mines in unmarked minefields on the edge 
of the Gaza strip, released the agricultural centre to let it reopen, and held information 
sessions on the population of the Gaza Strip and Islam for at least some contingents 
may also have eased relations.963 Additionally, UNEF’s shift from ignoring to 
reinforcing its no-fraternisation policy following the creation of United Arab Republic 
may also have reduced irritation by preventing ‘political eyesores’.964 Additionally, the 
(pre-arranged) departure of the Indonesian and the Finnish contingents, which had been 
involved in hostilities, may also have been a factor. Visits to the refugee camps may 
also have reduced the distance between ‘locals’ and UN soldiers: By 1966, UN soldiers 
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made contributions for a house for a 71-year old Palestinian widower and medical 
treatment for a young Palestinian girl as well as arranging Christmas parties for 
Palestinian children (ignoring the religious dimension).965  
However, this is not to say that everything completely changed, far from it. Albeit 
much less frequently compared to the first year UNEF was operational, the UN units 
were still shot at until it was withdrawn. In September 1958, for example, a member of 
the Palestinian paramilitary police/national guard that had just been allowed to redeploy 
from Egypt, sought to kill a Colombian soldier with his machinegun.966 In another attack 
on UNEF with an even clearer message, a Swedish company-size camp was fired upon 
in November 1959.967 This may have been linked to how a Swedish unit earlier had put 
several cacti-fruits under the shirt of some teenagers that had been rough to a younger 
boy mending his family’s sheep, an act that had result in the village in which the 
teenagers lived to throw rocks at Swedish units when they passed through.968 In the 
1960s, attacks appear to have been much less common (or less reported on and 
investigated), but still occurring, in some cases with arms and in others with pickaxes 
or other tools turned into weapons as situations went out of hand.969  
Aside keeping the UN visible, the mere presence of the ADL regime probably also 
fed frustrations, leading attacks to continue albeit at a smaller scale. For example, the 
Danish-Norwegian battalion alone conducted 4.180 patrols from October 1960 to April 
1961, equating roughly one patrol pr. hour. This may not sound like much as a 24-hour 
average, but most patrols were night-time additions to the daytime operation of the 
battalion’s more than 20 observation posts.970 Factoring in the patrols and the other 50 
observations posts of the entire UN force, UNEF, in fact, took part in making the Gaza 
Strip a highly monitored and regulated militarised geography. Although detentions also 
appear to have become less frequent, they did not change in character. Brazilian, 
Columbian and Scandinavian soldiers continued to detain Palestinians and Bedouin for 
picking grass near the ADL. In some cases, teenage girls and younger women were also 
deemed so vital’ to the ADL regime that they had to be pursued for more than a 
kilometre. In many cases, they had not even crossed the ADL, let alone been closer than 
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the 100 meters allowed in daytime.971 ‘White’ UN soldiers, Canadian (or Scandinavian 
for that matter), also kept causing incidents on account of what could be seen as racist 
provocations and displays of authority, occasionally leading to violent responses.972  
That life changed little for the majority of the population of the Gaza Strip was 
probably another factor contributing to incidents. Thousands may have found work in 
plantations or left for the Gulf States, but most refugees continued to face 
unemployment and squalid conditions in either Gaza City and Khan Younis, the two 
largest towns, or the 8 refugee camps, each holding between 8.000 and 35.000 people. 
Regardless of gender and dwelling, all had an insufficient dietary intake, little space for 
their families, no privacy, nowhere to go, and no prospect of realising their UN-backed 
rights to return home and compensation.973 As most refugees had been amongst those 
most dispossessed by the Mandate policies, UNRWA’s aid was hardly a match for the 
pressure on family networks due to the loss of the markets and resources of Palestine; 
the rising rents due to the lack of housing; the wage drop due to the abundance of 
unskilled labour; the contracted economy; and the lack of soil to grow food.974 In a 
particularly depressing case, a 20-year old Palestinian woman married to a poor and 
unemployed 50-year old man against her will sought to kill herself by way of either 
Israeli units or UNEF by crossing into Israel. When interrogated after being transferred 
to a Brazilian unit by an Israeli unit, she explained: “I crossed the ADL because I am 
angry with this life and wanted to be killed.”975 When asked if she wanted to return to 
Gaza, she repeated: “I don’t want this life, and want to be killed.” Unquestionably, this 
incident elucidates the intersections between the miserable situation of women (young 
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women in particular) in the Gaza Strip; the lives of Palestinian refugees; the lack of a 
horizon offering change; and the militarisation of life on both sides of the ADL. 
Despite its considerable monitory and regulatory extent, UNEF’s ADL regime was 
‘porous’. The force not only failed to prevent Palestinians from crossing into Israel. In 
several cases, it also failed to prevent Israeli settlers and soldiers from crossing the 
ADL, giving cause for fear, frustrations, anger and hate. This had been a problem 
already before 1958. For example, a Bedouin boy (and his father’s 80 sheep that he 
depended on for his livelihood) had been kidnapped near the ADL on the Gaza Strip 
side by Israeli soldiers who also shot at a young Bedouin girl when taking him. In 
another illuminating case, a Palestinian boy from a village near the ADL on the Gaza 
Strip side only just survived a hand grenade exploding in his room that the EIMAC 
observer suspected an Israeli settler from the nearby and ill-reputed settlement for 
throwing.976 After 1958, however, the UN force kept failing at preventing Israeli attacks 
and kidnappings both inside the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert of Egypt. Entering 
Egypt proper, for example, an Israeli unit killed a Bedouin woman and child as well as 
wounded another woman on February 1959.977 In September 1959, Israeli forces also 
killed several Bedouin in Israel and expelled nearly 350 others to Egypt, depriving them 
of their property and tents to finally kill a Bedouin on Egyptian territory to ensure that 
no one returned.978 On their own, these incidents may be seen as separate. Seen together 
(and with others), however, they may well be taken as a continuation of the systemic 
Israeli violence and dispossession of more than 6.000 Bedouin, ongoing since 1948 and 
part of the militarised Jewish settler state’s legacy from the British Mandate regime.979 
Instances of Israeli military units handing over captured or killed Palestinian farmers 
with assurances that they had been captured or killed in Israel also continued and 
remained equally impossible to challenge, UNEF having no jurisdiction in Israel.980 
Israeli units also continued to detain children picking grass for their families’ livestock; 
doing their homework away from the overcrowded refugee camps; or playing near the 
ADL. In some instances, Israeli units also crossed the ADL to abduct Bedouin and 
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Palestinian children,981 which in some cases may have been cause for Palestinian boys 
to set Israeli fields on fire.982 Not only linked to the UNEF’s inability to prevent these 
types of Israeli attacks, the detentions and incursions (beyond Israeli territory in 
particular) probably also reflected how the reduced funds for the border forces—a 
consequence of the growing pressure from the Israeli middle-class that wanted services 
rather than threats983—had the Israeli forces to turn, once again, to aggressive measures 
to deter Palestinians from returning to their former villages now in Israel.  
Additionally, Israel also began to enforce a more aggressive aerial patrol regime. 
Certainly, French-made Israeli jets had occasionally crossed the Egyptian-Israeli 
International Frontier as well as the ADL before 1958. Right after the UN force had 
moved into the Gaza Strip, for example, Israeli fighter jets made overflights.984 After 
the formation of the United Arab Republic (and the reduced border forces), however, 
Israel not only initiated more flights at low altitude, but also sent more of its jetfighters 
over non-Israeli territory. On May 19th 1958, for example, 21 Israeli fighter jets flew 
over the Gaza Strip.985 Subsequently, the Danish-Norwegian unit also reported 219 
overflights from April to October 1958 of its area alone.986 Although Israel seems to 
have scaled down after the end of the UAR in 1961, the Danish-Norwegian unit 
nevertheless kept noting on average 1 and 2 daily overflights of ‘their’ area alone.987 
The EIMAC records also suggest that overflights also occasionally occurred at altitudes 
as low as 50-200 meters, most likely an intimidation tactic along the lines of the Israeli 
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ground incursions into the Gaza Strip.988 Moreover, Israeli naval units detained 
Palestinian fishing crews just as larger Israeli fishing vessels entered the Gaza 
‘territorial’ waters, reminding the Palestinians that they were not only hemmed in, but 
also that the UN was unable to alter that situation.989  
When seen within a broader sphere security going beyond only encounters at the 
ADL, UNEF traffic also proved a continuous problem in the relations with the 
population of the Gaza Strip. For perhaps half of the Mandate era, the British security 
forces had rarely numbered more than 2.000 all over Palestine.990 From 1957 to 1967, 
the UN deployed UNEF that varied in size from 6.000 in 1957 to approximately 3.500 
in 1967 in the small territory of the Gaza Strip alone. Once in place in Egypt, the force 
began amassing a high number of British and American vehicles. Not surprisingly, 
accidents amassed quickly. Already after six months, the UN units had caused 77 traffic 
accidents, some of which were fatal.991 In some cases compensations were made in 
accordance to British Mandate law that Egypt kept in place and Sharia law in others, 
thus balancing claims and fears of feuds with accommodating the Muslim population 
when it came to compensation, ‘blood money’, in family matters.992 Indeed, the UN took 
traffic accidents serious. By February 1958, accidents were raised as a topic at the 
weekly conference of the commanders of the different UN contingents. Especially 
speed and drunk driving were noted as problems.993 In April 1960, the UNEF 
Commander further expressed the need to drastically reduce the number of traffic 
accidents against the backdrop of 23 UNEF-related in March.994 By September 1960, 
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the number of accidents had nevertheless risen to 449, thus averaging 10 accidents a 
month, typically involving young UNEF truck drivers either driving too fast or paying 
little attention to traffic combined with children running across the street or, less 
frequently, drunk military and civilian UN staff returning from staff villa parties.995 
Although the number of accidents vaned—most probably reflecting the gradual 
reduction of the force—the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs in 
New York, Ralph Bunche, personally kept tabs on the situation.996 However, the UN 
force also caused tension in the relations with the population of the Gaza Strip by way 
of their off-duty encounters. 
Another way the UN soldiers had UNEF associated with insecurity was through off-
duty encounters. Visiting cultural and historical sites (linked to the Western 
understanding of the ‘Orient’ and ’Middle East’) and the market of Gaza City in most 
cases probably fall outside this category.  However, the involvement of UN soldiers in 
public drunkenness, street fights, use of private brothels, black market trade, and 
narcotics trafficking in Gaza City, Rafah and Khan Younis as well as UN beach 
locations does not. Already in June, one of the officers’ villas of the Brazilian 
contingent, which was located on the beach front, had grown to be so problematic that 
the Egyptian Chief of the Palestine Police, which had become the Egyptian-controlled 
but Palestinian-manned paramilitary militia, wanted to seize the villa.997 From July 
1957, the UN force and the Egyptian regime were also forced to cooperate on the 
involvement of Brazilian, Canadian, Columbian and Indian UN soldiers in smuggling 
and distributing narcotics.998 In August 1957, the Egyptian liaison staff, under pressure 
from the Governor-general, also informed UNEF that UN soldiers took part in 
promoting theft and robbery by frequenting ‘houses of ill repute’ in Gaza City that were 
not regulated (as brothels since no formal ‘Red Light District’ existed).999 Most 
common, however, were drunkenness and altercations. Perhaps not to lose the favour 
of the ‘business classes’—that included owners of bars, casinos, restaurants as well as 
taxis—on account of soldiers causing trouble and to create off-duty venting options 
away from the local population, UNEF approved the establishments of contingent bars 
with Palestinian barmen (if these mostly worked in the officers’ clubs), and the purchase 
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of alcohol in bulk (1.800 bottles of rum at a time).1000 Not surprisingly, however, UN 
soldiers still caused trouble in the Gaza Strip throughout the operational period. While 
the UNEF Military Police records, which to a large extent are the central records for 
which to search for off-duty incidents, are still inaccessible, both internal records from 
the Danish-Norwegian Battalion and UNEF records that were sent to the Danish UN 
Department in the Danish Ministry of Defence are both accessible and illuminate the 
Danish soldiers’ off-duty behaviour. For example, it appears to have been common to 
combine souvenir shopping with lunches mostly consisting of a lot of beer, wine and 
liquor in the British era and beach neighbourhoods in Gaza City: a combination that 
occasionally ended in disturbances, altercations, fights, or stabbings. Taxi drivers, and 
bypassing women, merchants and young men typically appear to have been dragged 
into the brawling, which in some cases led to the repatriation of the UN soldiers.1001   
Altogether, it seems fair to say that the shift towards less violent relations between 
UNEF and the Palestinians and Bedouin from 1958 did not reflect a fundamental change 
in the ADL regime and the types of encounters. Rather, the cooperation between Egypt 
and the Gaza elite (against the backdrop of the tacit agreement between Cairo and 
Washington) appear to have been what released tension from the Gaza Strip and thus 
what made the shift possible. Indeed, what may have appeared as a regime of ‘security’ 
when seen from the headquarters of UNEF may well have appeared as both fleeting 
moments of and enduring senses of ‘insecurity’ when seen from the fields near the 
ADL, the villages on the outskirts of the Gaza Strip, the areas around the UN camps 
and ‘watering holes’ and beach camps. Broadly, the dynamics of UNEF not only 
indirectly linked to the British structural support of the Jewish settlers in the Mandate 
period,1002 the pattern may well also have appeared at least partly familiar to Palestinians 
old enough to remember the British era.  
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8.3 As Before (III)? Labour and Economic 
Relations as a Prism to understand the 
Negotiation of the UN Regime 
As shown in both the previous chapter and the previous sections of this chapter, the UN 
force did not entertain uncomplicated relations with the Gaza Strip population. 
However, as the Gaza Strip had become and remained a geography of precarity (to say 
the least), and as precarity links to risk, uncertainty, vulnerability and security, the UN 
force quickly came to be attractive as a means of income for people that found 
employment or as a means of gaining direct and indirect revenue due to the patronage 
of the UN soldiers and the impact of the UN force on the economic webs the Gaza Strip 
was part of. This was linked to how prices, and thus the cost of living, instantly began 
increasing with the arrival of the UN force. Indeed, five weeks after its arrival in the 
Gaza Strip, the Chairman of the EIMAC informed his superior in Jerusalem, the Chief 
of Staff of UNTSO, that “The cost of living in Gaza continues to rise as more UNEF 
funds are spent in the area. Many locals are complaining that there is no rent or price 
control as formerly.1003 Yet, some also stood to gain from these changes.  
Within weeks of UNEF arriving, the established families, merchants, 
managers/owners of plantations, restaurants, hotels and companies (built on the skills 
of craftsmen turned unskilled labour) as well as bankers would begin to profit from the 
presence of the UN force.1004 Indeed, as the EIMAC chairman noted, “(…) the business 
classes are feeling the beneficial effect of the increased spending (…).1005 Logically, the 
‘business classes’ made up only a small minority in an area as small as the Gaza Strip—
5-8 kilometres wide and a little more than 40 kilometres long—that had also seen the 
influx of more than 200.000 people carrying few possessions with them. As scholars of 
the Mandate have shown, this segment owed its rise to prominence to the British 
modernisation policies that had aimed to only gradually modernise the agricultural 
economy of Palestine to avoid the rise of nationalism (as had been the cases in both 
Egypt and India) on the one hand, and integrate Palestine into the economies of the 
region and of the British empire on the other. Decided in the Colonial Office and in 
Jerusalem, the British policies not only created a growing gap between the towns and 
villages (that saw their autonomy fade), but also enlarged what the EIMAC chairman 
called ‘the business classes’, as Palestine gradually saw the effects of the 
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commodification of land, labour and materials.1006 While these changes were slower to 
manifest themselves in the southern Gaza District (which Mandate officials considered 
a backwater), the Mandate policies nevertheless strengthened the ‘businesses classes’ 
of the Gaza Strip. Building directly on the organisation and practices of the Mandate 
administration and that of the British in Egypt, the Egyptians, Nathan Shachar, historian 
of the Gaza Strip, argues, “(…) sometimes in tandem with old rich Gazan families, 
really functioned as a superior caste, controlling and taxing every economic initiative, 
from prostitution—the cheap brothels of Gaza were well known in Cairo and drew many 
visitors—to valuable and beneficial projects.”1007 The merchants who had gained 
permission to import luxury goods from Lebanon that thousands of visiting Egyptians 
could purchase at low costs to let the Egyptian regime gain foreign currency,1008 most 
probably also benefitted from UNEF, which already from June 1957 began keeping 
Israeli naval vessels from boarding Palestinian fishing boats and boats importing 
Lebanese luxury goods, as the ADL continued into the waters of the Gaza Strip.1009 
Although many UN soldiers probably spent part of their salaries on nightclubs and 
brothels in both Beirut and Cairo once leave trips were initiated in April 1957,1010 many 
also offered the hotels (some of which were built, owned and run by wealthy 
Egyptians), restaurants, bars and taxi companies of the larger towns of Gaza City and 
Khan Younis their patronage over the years.1011 Already in late April, the UN officer 
observed (as noted above), the attitude of the ‘business classes’ towards the UN force 
was “(…) increasingly favourable and friendly (…).”1012 Most of the ‘business classes’ 
that benefited from the presence of UNEF were men much in the same way that the 
Palestinians who had worked for the British had been and the Mandate labour market 
had generally been male-dominated.  
Those who found work for UNEF were also not surprisingly predominantly men. 
This was not only on account of the types of physical labour people were needed for, 
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but also a consequence of the Mandate policy and the Jewish/Israeli expulsion of 
approximately 200.000 people to what was left of the Southern District of Palestine. 
Indeed, the hardships of the First World War and the emergence of a widely engaged 
women’s movement (if mostly active in to the north) over the late 1920s and early 1930s 
both required and enabled many women in the Southern District of Palestine to work 
as textile factory workers and fruit pickers as well as nurses and teachers (after taking 
gendering and depoliticising training in some of the (few) schools and centres for girls 
and women established by the British), their paths often functions of their family 
backgrounds. However, the making of the poverty-stricken Gaza Strip in 1948 rolled 
back most achievements and ensured that men would come to dominate the Gaza Strip 
labour market. While some women were able to return to nursing and others found low-
paid work in what remained of the textile and citrus industries, the majority of women 
had no places to seek work. Only when the Egyptian regime in 1957 made the Gaza 
Strip tax-free to promote (any) economic activity did more women find work in the 
rising number of citrus fruit plantations.1013 Reproducing the British policy of teaching 
women gendering and depoliticising subjects such as nursing, hygiene, home 
management skills and sewing, UNRWA soon shifted from only relief to training and 
education, including women’s centres and schools for girls and boys.1014 By 1957, this 
had allowed some women to work as teachers in the girl’s schools for refugees and 
some hundreds of refugee mothers and young women to make  blankets and table linen 
for other UNRWA refugee camps and embroidered skirts for visitors in UNRWA non-
commercial training centres.1015 Once in the Gaza Strip, the UN force began hiring 
Palestinian workers. Yet, six months later no more than a handful of women, all with 
Greek names worked in low admin positions.1016 From the labour-related material 
available, which amounts to numerous files and hundreds of documents, it appears that 
UNEF only began to think about hiring Palestinian women once UNRWA began 
informing UNEF that they had female commercial course graduates. When women 
could begin to take the course is unclear, but in 1966 they could still only learn typing 
in Arabic and English and shorthand while their male counterparts would also be trained 
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in book-keeping and ‘related subjects’,1017 thereby leaving UNEF (and UNRWA) with 
similar policies as the Mandate and a character resembling a scaled down version of the 
Gaza Strip that left Palestinian women with few options.  
As had also been the case in the Mandate era and the Egyptian period from 1948 to 
1956, some skilled and educated Palestinian men found full- or part-time employment 
with the power that be: some with the Egyptian administration that placed several 
Palestinians in senior positions previously held by Egyptians and some with the UN 
force even if the April 1957 riots had left it unpopular. According to the Chairman of 
the EIMAC, especially “(…) the middle and lower classes and particularly those in 
governmental departments and on fixed salaries (…)1018 were affected by the rising costs 
of living the spending of UNEF caused. If the typical Greek and Armenian names on 
the lists of locally recruited staff are anything to go by, the UN force nevertheless hired 
mostly non-Arabic male expats as administrative assistants, secretaries, and engineers 
while it hired some Palestinians in lower functions as mechanics, phone operators, 
typists and procurement, logistics, and finance clerks, thereby in some instances 
recruiting people who had previously worked for the British in either Egypt or Palestine, 
especially Rafah where the UN maintenance area was coincidentally placed.1019 In 
contrast to the British soldiers and policemen that were expected to have at least a basic 
command of Arabic soon after arriving to Palestine to enter the security forces,1020 each 
UN contingent operating on the ADL also received one or more Arabic-English 
interpreters. Being Palestinians, they were expected to have agendas of their own. 
Hence, UNEF hired only those UNRWA or EIMAC recommended or UNRWA lent to 
UNEF, suggesting a careful vetting process.1021 Possibly repeating another British (and 
Egyptian) practice, the UN units began to use their interpreters as informers: a tactic 
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0003, UNA  
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that UNEF HQ quickly criticised as unfitting.1022 However, some contingents were 
indifferent. The Brazilian battalion, for example, would use their soldiers with Lebanese 
heritage while the Indonesian battalion would use its laundry workers if in need.1023 
Custodians of the British legal system along with the Egyptian Military Governor-
General by way of running the Gaza Strip in cooperation, both UNEF and UNRWA 
also contracted Palestinians trained in legal matters by the British for occasional legal 
counsel on issues related to land and labour and perhaps most frequently compensation 
following labour or traffic incidents.1024  
As had been the case under the Mandate,1025 the larger part of the Palestinians in 
employment with UNEF, however, were manual labourers, many of whom had worked 
for the British. There was plenty of labour available not only due to the Israeli expulsion 
of Palestinians into what became the Gaza Strip. The Mandate policies had also 
gradually undermined the fabric of Palestine’s agrarian social economy to the extent 
that calculations from five villages extrapolated to the entire Mandate had almost half 
the rural population live with less land than what was required for subsistence needs 
and thousands of landless peasants had been forced into wage labour. Not surprisingly, 
they came to make up of the bulk of the refugees.1026 Equally unsurprising perhaps, 
UNEF was still recruiting amongst people that had worked for the British in 1965.1027 
After the UN force had terminated its operations in Egypt (aside operating a supply 
route out of El-Arish by plane, observing the Straits of Tiran and patrolling the 
International Frontier between Israel and Egypt), the Egyptian government, no doubt 
by way of a request from the reinstated Egyptian governor, requested that the Egyptians 
that had been hired as cooks, barbers, batmen (civilian security staff for villas, messes 
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and non-military areas), and other labourers be laid off in favour of Palestinians.1028 The 
UN force did so, and by September 1958 this mostly male labour force counted 1.025 
Palestinian employees, predominantly ‘blue collar’ workers as waiters, kitchen boys, 
sign writers, gardeners, drivers and construction day labour working in and between the 
UNEF camps and officer villas.1029 Although this number was a lot higher than the 87 
traineeships as plumbers, carpenters, electricians etc. UNRWA offered, it was not very 
high in comparison neither with the roughly 7.000 jobs UNWRA offered refugees and 
Gaza Strip ‘natives’ as teachers, textile workers and camp workers,1030 nor with the Gaza 
Strip refugee population above 15 years of age, which UNRWA—in what can be seen 
as a continuation of the British Mandate population monitoring regime—counted to 
117.270 in mid-1957.1031 A particularly gruelling case at that moment stressed the lack 
of work and the subsequent importance of gaining any work a few months after the UN 
force had arrived. Frantically seeking work, a group of several Palestinian men pressed 
at the gates of the Indonesian camp and were mistakenly let in alongside a truck. In 
response, and perhaps in an instance of re-actualised colonial military culture, several 
Palestinians were beaten with rifle butts and one killed by Indonesian soldiers.1032 While 
many labour-related files have been disposed of as part of UNEF’s appraisal process 
and subsequently also the UN Archive in New York, the records available suggest that 
such labour related violence did not occur again. However, this is not to say that UNEF 
workers had no problems. Indeed, neither the UNEF part-time nor the full-time manual 
labourers had any external outlets for their frustrations. Egypt had outlawed unions (and 
political parties) in comparison to the British that had both allowed unions and even 
promoted them during the Second World War.1033 Instead, the local UNEF employees—
some of whom may have had experience with the union for unskilled labour (Palestine 
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1030 UNRWA had also begun to negotiate with the Persian Gulf states about sending Palestinians there as 
labour. In 1957, this started with 700 people. Labouisse and UNRWA, “Annual Report of the Director of the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.” 
1031 Ibid.; For more on population counts of Palestinians as demographic surveillance, see Elia Zureik, 
“Constructing Palestine through Surveillance Practices,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 28, no. 2 
(2001): 205–27. 
1032 “Incident Report” 5 May 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957- June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area 
Files, EIMAC, Pol. Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0073-0003, UNA. For more on the issue of colonial continuities 
in both the Indonesian state and army, see for example Mark T. Berger, “Old State and New Empire in 
Indonesia: Debating the Rise and Decline of Suharto’s New Order,” Third World Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1997): 
321–61; Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Indonesia in the 1950s: Nation, Modernity, and the Post-Colonial State.,” 
Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 167, no. 4 (2011): 386-; Teitler, “The Mixed Company: 
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Arab Workers Society) or that for skilled labour (Federation of Arab Trade Unions) that 
also operated in the Southern District of Palestine1034—sought to make do on their own. 
Many sought to negotiate with their superiors to get help with rations, lodging and 
transport to make ends meet, to the extent the staff of the Chief Administrative Officer’s 
office grew concerned by the degree to which it had become necessary to help not 
international employees with these things (as was UN custom much like the British), 
but locally recruited employees.1035 The Gaza Strip was not an easy place to live in with 
an unemployment rate at nearly 90% in 1959.1036 By 1960, a clearer set of rules had 
come into existence.1037 However, a new set of disciplinary measures against employees 
in 1961 suggested that little changed for those Palestinian manual workers who 
struggled to sustain their families with a part-time income and refugee rations whilst 
given no leave, no sick leave and only first aid in case of work-related accidents.1038 Not 
surprisingly, thefts of bread, tea and petrol—that could either be used or sold in smaller 
quantities or bulk by workers—continued.1039 Moreover, requests for fulltime work and 
promotions and formal complaints over foremen and supervisors, conduct, shifts, 
dismissals and racial discrimination became regular,1040 as they had been under the 
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Mandate.1041  Others sought to cope by requesting salary reductions to be able to keep 
the UNRWA rations, yet another testimony to the Gaza Strip hardships.1042 Arguably, 
the frustrations of the UNEF workers, as they expressed and dealt with them on their 
own, were thus both as restricted as those of the broader population of the Gaza Strip 
and very particularised expressions of these as gradually expressed over the late 1950s 
and early 1960s with the formation of the militant nationalist organisation Fatah in 
1959, the Egyptian proclamation of a constitution for the Gaza Strip in 1962 and the 
Palestinian Liberation Army in 1964.1043 Whether the result of the Palestinian workers’ 
negotiations or one or more decisions on the part of UNEF, the UN force gradually 
reduced the share of part-time workers from around half of its labour force in 1958 (544 
of the 1.025 employees) to around a third in 1965 (582 of 1.481 Palestinian employees), 
as the force was gradually reduced from 6.615 in 1957 to 3.984 in 1966 due to other 
interventions launched into Congo, West Irian and Cyprus and UNEF correspondingly 
raised the number of Palestinian (male) workers.1044 
While some factors and conditions were linked entirely to or decided by Israel and/or 
Egypt, UNEF all in all in various forms built on, connected to and replicated some of 
the logics and practices of the British Mandate in the sphere of labour and economic 
relations whilst at the same time being part of a new assemblage of authority in the 
Gaza Strip.1045  
As both the previous and this chapter should have made clear, the joint rule of the 
Gaza Strip by the UN and Egypt effectively turned it into a territory consisting both of 
what military geographer Rachel Woodward sees as geographies of military activities, 
which she defined as “(…) the patterning of material entities and social relations across 
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space shaped by the production and reproduction of military capabilities”,1046 on the 
one hand, and geographies of militarism, which she defined as “(…) the shaping of 
civilian space and social relations by military objectives, rationales, and structures, 
either as part of the deliberate extension of military influence into civilian spheres of 
life and the prioritisation of military institutions, or as a product of these processes 
(…)“, on the other.1047 That everyday life otherwise gradually appeared less unstable and 
incidents appeared as ‘peaks’ linked to this new assemblage of authority—in which 
Egyptian-controlled police and the Egyptian intelligence service patrolled and 
monitored the urban areas and political groupings,1048 and the UN force patrolled and 
regulated the space near the ADL—rather than new affectionate relations or a new 
agreeable stability, again also in the context of the previous British Mandate regime. 
Yet, the establishment of this joint regime affected people of different social standing 
and age, and the places in which they lived, differently, resulting in different 
interactions and tactics for these.   
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Summary of Part 2: Negotiating Life and 
Authority in a Frontier Zone of Imperial 
Multilateralism 
In the first part of the analysis, I argued that the UN intervention in the form of both the 
Suez Clearance Organization and the United Nations Emergency Force represented not 
only one possible instrument that the Eisenhower Administration realised by way of the 
UN and a willing UN leadership against the backdrop of fearing for the survival of the 
British Empire and NATO as the quintessential expression of and means to secure the 
alliance between the Western imperial and colonial powers, medium and smaller states. 
It was also, I argued, in different ways not as much a break with the past, and thus 
something ‘new’, as it was (a non-destined yet still) path-dependent expression of the 
global imperial system as it was evolving. If anything, the gendered and racialised top-
down dynamics pointed as much ‘backwards’ to the different imperial systems and 
inter-imperial projects as they did ‘forward’.  
In the second part of the analysis, I turned to interrogate how matters ‘on the ground’ 
in what became the UN ‘mission area’ of north-eastern Egypt and the Gaza Strip, or 
what I theorised as a ‘frontier zone of imperial multilateralism’, appeared within that 
context.  
‘Connecting the dots’ of the web of the UN force from its conception to its arrival, 
showed how the context of the operation also spilled over into its composition. Initially, 
NATO-members and Commonwealth-members, several of which had economic and 
strategic interests in the functioning of the Suez Canal, provided the bulk of the units. 
When expanded, it saw the addition of units from states that had previously either 
supported the US in the Korean War militarily or received US arms and funding. Not 
insignificantly, it also emerged that had been assembled to a large extent by way of the 
American Airforce via NATO bases in Portugal and Italy as well as bases in either 
Turkey or Iran, which although not a member of NATO was a member of CENTO, the 
Middle Eastern military alliance that Egypt and Syria had not become part of. 
Additionally, the UN force acquired a great deal of the supplies and vehicles from 
initially the British invasion force and later the US. Parallel to the build-up of the force, 
Western companies also began the clearance operation of the Suez Canal, initially even 
including French and British vessels. At this point, everything still very much pointed 
to the immediate context of the Suez Crisis against the backdrop of a regime of 
international organisations under the UN umbrella attending Western interests in subtler 
ways than hitherto. 
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Analysing the deployment of the UN force to the Suez Canal Area where it was to 
escort out the British and French invasion forces and offer them what they themselves 
had called a ‘fig leaf’, it emerged that the force may well have prevented incidents, 
wider skirmishes and hostilities or a return to downright fighting with the civilian 
Egyptian population in the area near Port Said and Suez and the returning Egyptian 
security and military forces. However, it also appears that at least the Scandinavian and 
Canadian units sympathised and identified with the invasion forces more than they did 
the Egyptians. It may have been for that reason that the UN Commander frequently 
deployed these as the vanguard units and the Latin American units when he needed 
more units. However, given the warm relations between the Canadian commander of 
the UN force and the higher echelons of the invading forces, some of whom he may 
even have known personally, and the different contingents’ ties with and mimicking of 
the British and multiple shoot-outs with Egyptians, it appeared as likely that the 
systemic predisposition ‘backwards’ often also translated into similar dynamics ‘on the 
ground, when filtered through the military cultures of the various units and their 
concrete situations. Further research on the Indian and Yugoslavian units may well, 
however, point in the opposite direction in their cases.  
When examining the redeployment of the UN force into the Gaza Strip to take over 
control from the Israeli occupation force, it again appeared to be the case that it 
continued along a similar path. First was the handling of the riot in Gaza City, the ban 
on demonstrations and public gatherings soon after, and the subsequent failure of the 
UN to realise the emerging joint-US-UN plan of internationalising further the Gaza 
Strip in cooperation with Egypt, which forced the UN to have the force maintain an 
operational area along the ADL rather than also maintain internal security. The first 
months of establishing the frontier regime also suggested an orientation to something 
familiar with shootings, retaliatory assaults and detentions. Moreover, the relationship 
between the UN and Israel and the relations between the UN force and Israeli military 
units and settlers also began to appear similar to the relationship between the British 
Mandate and the British security forces on the one hand and the Jewish settler colonial 
communities on the other. 
Interrogating the relations between the UN force and the different population 
segments of the Gaza Strip also pointed towards both problematic issues and practices 
in many ways similar to those of the British Mandate. With regard to military land 
usage, the pressure from Palestinian peasants on the Egyptian administration eventually 
got to the UN, which lead to the formation of a compensatory scheme. The broader 
prism of insecurity captured not only what the UN units and soldiers did and did not do 
on the ADL in terms of detentions, ambushes and letting Israeli units and settlers into 
the Gaza Strip, but also how the force engendered insecurity on account of traffic 
accidents, drunk soldiers getting into and so on. Finally, it emerged that the presence of 
the UN force not only quickly led to rising price levels in the Gaza Strip to the detriment 
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of the bulk of the residents who were both unemployed or refugees (or both) and poor, 
but also in the long run supported the Egyptian policy of aiding an economic Palestinian 
elite to maintain control, thus again, if unintentionally, building on and replicating in 
some ways the policies of the British Mandate. 
Altogether, the issue of continuity from inter-imperial cooperation and the first 
phases of imperial multilateralism in policy and, practice appears to become even more 
pronounced when the analytical focus is shifted to how matters unfold ‘on the ground’. 
If anything, it would seem evident that policymakers, UN staffers’ and researchers’ 
characterisation of the first UN intervention of ‘classis’ and ‘successful’ need to be 
reconsidered.   
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Summary and Conclusion 
The previous chapters have covered a lot of ground and sought to make many 
connections. To be able to provide any measured reflections of my endeavour, I must 
return to my point of departure. Accordingly, this chapter first recaps the challenges of 
the research field as I see them and my aims and research questions. Then, I move on 
to present my findings. I do so in the ‘reverse’ order, initially focusing on matters ‘on 
the ground’ (or the second part of the analysis and the frontier zone of Egypt and the 
Gaza Strip), before adjusting the lens to the overall system (or the first part of the 
analysis and the frontier system). Accordingly, I reflect on how my findings contribute 
to the research field on international interventions before, finally reflecting on 
excavating the archives as a means to ‘keep the door open’ for subsequent research. 
The Challenges of the Research Context, the Aims and 
the Research Questions   
As noted in both the introduction and the methodological chapter, the early research on 
the UN interventions and their state-building components was largely published in 
Western journals and monographs from Western publishing houses by Western scholars 
rooted in Western academic institutions or think-tanks close to the Western centres of 
power. Since the end of the Cold War and the advent of especially feminist and post-
structuralist (and only marginally postcolonial) scholarship within the research field, 
the publishing channels, the disciplines and the scholars themselves have thankfully 
come a long way. Indeed, an upward number of scholars representing an ever-growing 
range of disciplines, approaches and aims have called attention to how the international 
interventions and state-building project result in systems of governance that cannot be 
held accountable, externalise the local administrations, create dependence and often 
also lead to gendered insecurity in everyday life. It is, thus, safe to say that the claim of 
Brian Urquhart—a former British military officer and UN Under-Secretary-General 
involved in several Cold War interventions—that a UN intervention was “(…) like a 
family friend who has moved into the household stricken by disaster (…)”1049 no longer 
stands unopposed. However, seeing how the scholarly critique linked to the Western 
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hegemony after the Cold War and the associated neoliberal turn in the international 
system, a group of scholars—whom I clustered together as the ‘imperial segment’—
began to characterise the structural logics, the ways of organising and the practices of 
the interventions as imperial in nature. In different ways, this cluster of scholars began 
to add a diachronic (or historical) dimension to the overall critique: a task that is still 
ongoing. 
 As a historian attempting to link imperial and colonial history, international history 
and Cold War history, I suggested that the overall research field, in all its synchronic 
contemporaneity, and the ‘imperial segment’ subsequently faced three overall 
challenges. The first challenge, as I saw it, linked to the legacies of the rather intimate 
links between most academic disciplines involved in ‘peacekeeping’ research and the 
imperial as well as the colonial projects from the late 19th century onwards, and how, 
consequently, the histories of the ‘mission areas’ and their residents and the deeper 
history of our international system still are overlooked. Instead, I suggested, these 
histories need to be seen as fundamental to the workings of our international system, 
much in the same way that the histories of colonies and their residents have become 
integral to the histories of imperialism. A second challenge, I argued, was not only how 
to engage the mainstream against this backdrop, but also to both seek and expand the 
common ground whilst promoting what Markowich and Shinn called ‘disciplinary 
elasticity’.1050 Considering the links between the situation within the research field and 
‘mission areas’ on the one hand and the two first challenges on the other, I finally saw 
the third challenge as the need to historicise the international system, the troop 
contributing states and the ‘mission areas’ and to do in a way that speaks to the common 
ground rather than the disciplinary differences of the research field. Altogether, I 
contended that these three challenges pointed towards the need for a counter-narrative, 
or, even better, a new narrative that could provide a platform for historicising the 
interventions and the overall system of governance they reflect in way that would offer 
forward social relevance. Consequently, I saw taking the first step towards creating this 
narrative as the best way to handle these challenges. My first aim, thus, was to promote 
interdisciplinary dialogue on the links between the imperial, the inter-imperial and the 
international. The means with which to do so, my second aim was accordingly two-
fold: to introduce a new analytical-theoretical framework and to provide an analysis 
based on it. To realise these aims, the theoretical framework was accordingly not only 
to be rooted in the discussion amongst imperial historians, but was also to wed systemic 
and everyday perspectives (or insist on a global-local orientation if you will).  
On the basis of this framework, I thus set out to examine 1) how the post-1945 regime 
of international organisations under the umbrella of the United Nations emerged from 
inter-imperial cooperation and the systemic significance thereof; 2) and, in this context, 
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the forms of civilian and military regimes of regulation and governance the 
interventions of the United Nations, intentionally and unintentionally, transferred to—
and engendered—‘on the ground’ in the ‘mission areas’; and 3) accordingly within this 
context, how different population groups ‘on the ground’ in the ‘mission areas’ related 
to and/or resisted these forms of civilian and military regimes.  
Linked to the interventions of the UN more broadly, these questions were too large 
to answer in a single dissertation. Instead, I chose to focus on the themes in the questions 
but through the ‘looking glass’ of the first UN intervention that came to be labelled a 
‘peacekeeping’ operation. This intervention, which took place first in Egypt and 
subsequently in the Gaza Strip and lasted from 1956 to 1967, was relevant not only 
because it set a precedent for later interventions with regard to policy making, doctrine, 
and organisation. Despite being a site for much research since 1957, the intervention 
also offered, I suggested, a much understudied oil and shipping dimension in the context 
of a militarised region at the forefront of the imperial Cold War conflict. The 
intervention, in other words, appeared, I suggested, a good, if not the best, place to start 
the unravelling of the established peacekeeping narrative and start a new counter-
narrative rooted in imperial historiography.    
My Findings: On The ‘Frontier Zone of Imperial 
Multilateralism’ (Part 2) 
Within the setting of the first ‘peacekeeping’ operation of the United Nations, the 
second part of the analysis examined the civilian and military regimes of regulation and 
governance of the UN in the ‘mission area’ and how different population groups living 
in the ‘mission area’ related to and/or resisted these.  
Concretely, I linked research on British Mandate Palestine and the Middle East in 
the Cold War, with published materials from the US and UN soldiers, and records from 
the UN force itself and its corps of EIMAC observers against the backdrop of my space-
, network- and people-centred theoretical framework. This method allowed a 
fundamentally different understanding of the UN intervention to appear, unlocking 
hitherto overlooked dynamics, practices, and conflicts (between the UN force and the 
Gaza Strip residents, the UN and Egypt and Egypt and the Gaza Strip residents) that 
should be familiar to the scholars of both the British Mandate and the current 
interventions. Indeed, it appeared that the UN failed to build a joint UN-Egyptian 
administrative regime, which would have created a situation much more familiar to 
most scholars of today’s ‘mission areas’. That this not so minor detail of a botched 
administration fell under the radar, and thus out of the narrative, enabled the 
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intervention to instead be presented as a narrow and impartial ‘buffer’ operation, 
something I suggest it was clearly not alone on account of the failure to build rapport 
with the Gaza Strip residents in the first weeks.  
However, as I showed, the tensions, conflicts and insecurities the first weeks of the 
UN presence engendered did not end as most UNEF units were relocated to operate 
only on the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) due to direct Egyptian and indirect 
Palestinian pressure. Rather, this negotiated process was also relatively violent with 
months of incidents claiming the lives of several Palestinians, Bedouin and UN soldiers. 
While it appeared the relations stabilised gradually, at least in the sense of fewer 
examples of ‘negotiations by rifle and mines’ and killings taking place, the formal 
security apparatus of the UN continued to frequently create atmospheres of insecurity. 
On and near the ADL, insecurity came primarily in the form of the omnipresent 
surveillance and regulatory regime on the ADL; the endless thereof derived wrongful 
detentions of not only but especially Palestinian and Bedouin children and women; the 
repeated failures to prevent Israeli soldiers and settlers from occasionally carrying out 
attacks with impunity; and the inability to challenge both the frequent low-altitude 
overflights of Israeli fighter jets and the Israeli naval and fishing vessels that challenged 
Palestinian fishing boats in the territorial waters of the Gaza Strip. Inside the Gaza Strip, 
the UN force (also) created atmospheres and situations of insecurity near their bases 
(which only in the case of platoon camps were placed near the ADL); in relation to 
labour conflicts or overly aggressive reactions to theft; endless traffic incidents that 
regularly killed small children on account of drunk driving, speeding and the congestion 
of the Gaza Strip and the refugee camps in particular which left the children with few 
places to play; and in the towns when UN soldiers, often drunk, engaged in arguments 
or occasionally fights with restaurant owners, taxi drivers, and bypassing Palestinians, 
men and women alike.  
The insecurity, it became evident, also extended into the economic sphere, as the 
loose regime the UN and Egypt established piecemeal with regard to both labour and 
economic dimension tended to the interests of the minor Palestinian merchant and 
landed elite as well as the Egyptians who had joined in with building new orange 
plantations, hotels and so on, whilst the unemployment rate for Palestinians, refugees 
and Gaza residents alike, skyrocketed. Eventually, the overall pressure on the Egyptian 
administration and the emerging threat of militant Palestinian environments in the 
larger towns and refugee camps led to the facilitation of the labour migration of tens of 
thousands of young Palestinians, mainly disenfranchised or politically aware men, to 
the Gulf States. The few thousand Palestinians that worked for the UN force or its 
‘development’ sibling, UNRWA, also appear not to have done so out of affectionate 
feelings for the UN, but as a means to handle the insecurity of everyday life that went 
beyond the daily struggle on the insufficient UN food rations. Perhaps unsurprisingly 
given the Egyptian prohibition of labour unions, the records also show numerous 
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attempts of UN-employed Palestinians to complain, gain benefits, increase their salaries 
and so on, on an individual basis.  
It also materialised that the UN force caused land problems for numerous Palestinian 
peasant. Many peasants had lost land (but not all as was the case for many of the people 
congested in the refugee camps) with the creation of the Israeli settler colonial state in 
1948, and thus needed to put every last piece of land to use. Again, pressure led the 
Egyptian administration and subsequently the UN to act, here in the form of a system 
of compensation for land being used for military purposes. Despite being compensated 
or in a few cases granted permission to use the land near the ADL, members of the 
peasant families, whether male or female and young and old, were frequently detained, 
thus tying the land issue to the problems and insecurities created by the ADL regime.  
However, the intervention not only appears similar to current interventions in that it 
was an externalising system of governance (organising its matters with the UN higher 
echelons and the troop contributing and funding states via New York on the one hand 
and Egypt and its Gaza Strip administration on the other); offered the Palestinians in 
the ‘mission area’ very little with regard to formal mechanisms of influence and 
accountability (the land compensation scheme perhaps being the exception); and turned 
the area of the Gaza Strip into a militarised geography (with the Israelis on the ‘outside’ 
and the Egyptian intelligence service and Palestinian-manned but Egyptian controlled 
police unit on the ‘inside’). In doing so, UNEF also very much continued in the path 
laid out of by the British Mandate. More than anything, it militarised everyday life and 
its spaces as had the British from the late 1920s onwards only in a much reduced and 
thus overcrowded area. Just as the British had favoured the Jewish settler communities 
and used the Egyptian monarchy to their own ends, the UN similarly favoured the state 
of Israel, which it had had a rather large role in making, at the expense of the 
Palestinians, and negotiated its aims in the Gaza Strip with the military regime in Cairo. 
The joint UN-Egyptian regime, if more ad hoc and ‘loose’ than initially anticipated 
following the realisation that it was necessary to enter the Gaza Strip to reopen and 
stabilise the Suez Canal to secure Western European oil supplies, also reinforced a 
process of socio-economic and political disenfranchisement and externalisation that 
also connected to the British Mandate. Often, and this needs further attention and 
unpacking by future research, it also seemed that many of the interactions between UN 
units and Gaza Strip residents (whether Palestinians or Bedouin) as well as Israelis took 
place in racialised spaces that tied national military cultures into the deeper fusion of 
imperial identities and into the sense of global ‘whiteness’, which by both inter-imperial 
cooperation and projects the UN itself carried forward well until the mid-1960s (and 
perhaps beyond).  
In the process of relocating from Egypt, the Scandinavian and Canadian contingents 
of the UN force seemed not only to tie into the idea of a global ‘whiteness’, but also to 
relate sympathetically to both the British and Israelis (more than the French) units and 
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their goals, which subsequently formed their practices. However, the underlying global 
power structure of the UN and its markers of identity, here theorised as the frontier of 
imperial multilateralism, were made visible already in the examination of the build-up 
of the force. ‘Connecting the dots’ of the geopolitical infrastructure of the intervention, 
it became clear that most of the states that provided contingents for the UN force and 
logistical sites were, to various degrees, linked to the either the British or the American 
imperial frontiers.      
My Findings:  On the ‘Frontier of Imperial 
Multilateralism’ (Part 1) 
Turning to the broader picture of how the post-1945 regime of international 
organisations under the umbrella of the United Nations emerged from inter-imperial 
cooperation and the systemic significance thereof (in what can perhaps be called the 
‘frontier region’), entails a bit of a shift in scale, emphasising the systemic aspects more 
than the matters ‘on the ground’.  
Concretely, I linked research—on the British, American, and Soviet Union’s early 
Cold War Middle East policies relating to trade, energy, naval strategy and geopolitics 
and research on Israeli and Egyptian foreign policy and strategy—with published 
materials not only but especially from the American online series of records from the 
State Department (FRUS) as well as unpublished records from the Danish Steamship 
Owners Association (which was close to the use of the Suez Canal and the negotiations 
up to the joint British, French and Israeli invasion as Denmark was amongst the ten 
most regular canal users) against the backdrop of my theoretical framework. Earlier 
works on the intervention have discussed the part of the context of the UN intervention 
that relates to the joint British, French and Israeli invasion of both Egypt and the Gaza 
Strip (against the backdrop of the Egyptian, American and British conflict about 
financing the Aswan Dam). However, the combination of the theoretical framework on 
the one hand, and the FRUS-series, the shipping records and the diverse research 
literature on the other, allowed a deeper—and both fundamentally different and 
bleaker—understanding of the UN intervention to materialise. 
Although officials from the UK, Canada and the highest echelon of the UN 
Secretariat had held talks on internationalising the Suez Canal with a military force and 
American think-tanks had made similar suggestions to the American administration in 
the early 1950s, the intervention was not a planned means for the West to re-secure 
direct control of the Suez Canal after the British had to withdraw their last forces from 
the canal area in 1954 (or prevent another war between Israel and Egypt). As for the 
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immediate context of the intervention, it is necessary, I argue, to think beyond the crisis 
(the invasion of Egypt and the Gaza Strip, which to some extent was supported in 
Western Europe as way to gain a larger space for Western Europe to manoeuvre 
globally) by also including the oil dimension (which Cold War economic historians has 
researched but no peacekeeping scholars considered). Seen against this backdrop, the 
US engagement and close partnership with the UN Secretary-General—in criticising 
the invasion and the Soviet threats, supporting the intervention at the UN General 
Assembly and in the corridors and finally assisting with finances, logistics and arms—
connected directly to two problems with potentially global ramifications. Firstly, the 
intervention, I argued, was a joint response between the Eisenhower Administration and 
the highest UN echelon to the urgent need to reopen and stabilise the Suez Canal to 
secure Western European oil supplies. Secondly, the intervention also linked to the 
Eisenhower Administration’s wish to avoid no less than what it feared to be the 
implosion of the British Empire (on account of its deteriorating economic situation) that 
would not only have regional repercussions with regard to a military presence to secure 
the oil supply of Western Europe, but also affect both NATO’s credibility and capability 
and the already globalised Cold War in which the US relied on the British and French. 
Consequently, the Eisenhower Administration not only supported the intervention as 
directly as it could, it also launched two oil supplement schemes and the economic aid 
to the British by way of the international financial organisations.  
However, both the Suez Crisis and the UN intervention, I found, had several deeper 
layers other than ‘only’ the oil supply problem from late 1956 and the increasing 
hostility between Cairo, London and Washington from 1954 onwards. Firstly, the 
period from 1950 to 1955 saw Anglo-American influence wane and thus their imperial 
frontiers weaken, as neither fully realised the extent to which the pro-Western post-
Mandate regional regimes depended on autonomy to remain stable domestically. In 
other words, I argue that the Anglo-American alliance made volatile rather than stabilise 
the region over the 1950s, giving thus the Soviet Union several openings to seek naval, 
maritime and commercial influence in the medium term so as to build rapport with 
strategically opportune regional regimes in the longer run.  
Secondly, I argued that the intervention also reflected the shifting regional frontier 
dynamics, as the wartime and early Cold War Anglo-American cooperation in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East—in the form of the regional dimension of the 
United Nations military alliance, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration and the Middle East Supply Center—reflected the American expansion 
into the Mediterranean and the Middle East both in cooperation with and at the expense 
of both the weakening British Empire British as well as the still embryonic post-
Mandate states and in hostile competition with the Soviet Union.  
Thirdly, I found that these organisations—and also the UN (both as a military 
alliance and organisation) and eventually the UN intervention in extension thereof —
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also very much built on the inter-imperial cooperation after the First World War and 
the regional expressions thereof. As the formal instrument promoting inter-imperial 
cooperation (or ‘multinational imperialism’), the League of Nations had begun to shift 
the international modus operandi further away from direct and violent imperial 
occupation towards internationally sanctioned systems of imperial governance in the 
form of the Mandates: A shift that coincided with the American ascendency to a 
position of global influence in the global imperial system as its relative strength versus 
the other imperial systems and colonial powers increased with First World War and the 
promotion of American belief that endless direct interventions and occupations would 
not yield stable influence but unending resistance and instability (after a decade of 
interventions and occupations in Latin and Central America). However, riots and 
revolts, especially in the post-Ottoman Middle East, on the one hand, and the still 
dominant agendas and repertoires of power of the larger imperial-systems and colonial 
powers on the, other eventually led to the militarisation of the Mandates, the alienation 
of Japan and Germany (and in part the Soviet Union) and the collapse of the League.  
Finally, I argued that the UN intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip, the UN 
security organisation and alliance, and the emerging competitive and cooperative inter-
imperial blocs of the inter-war also linked to the regional expressions of the pre-First 
World War phase of multinational imperialism in two ways. Not only had European 
inter-imperial cooperation since the 1850s revolved around the exclusion or at least 
reduction of Russian imperial influence in the region as the Ottoman Empire 
increasingly struggled to control its imperial territories and spheres of influence, to 
build a stronger and modern state apparatus and economy, and to control its various 
populations. The numerous inter-imperial interventions against the Ottoman Empire 
(that saw the British and French growing influence and takeovers of Cyprus and 
Lebanon, the ‘internationalisation of Crete’, and the making of Albania) on the one 
hand and the form of racialising and system-supportive agreements on inter-imperial 
trade, communications, law, hygiene, and mobilities on the other also provided a deeper 
legacy to draw upon.  
What do my Research Findings contribute to the 
Research Field on International Interventions? 
Unquestionably, the lens of my theoretical framework and my findings altogether paint 
a picture of the first UN intervention that is both fundamentally different and much, 
much bleaker than existing research. Indeed, it is quite a step to rearticulate the 
intervention from the ‘classic’ buffer (and successful) operation to a ‘frontier zone of 
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imperial multilateralism’ that in many ways built on, continued and replicated the logics 
and the practices of the British Mandate and thus also held similar influences locally 
(in the ‘partnership’ with Egypt). That is not, however, to say that more research could 
not yield new insights. Obviously, one’s scholarly background and theoretical 
framework help decide where one look, what one looks after and what eventually 
recognises more specifically. Beyond these factors of differentiation, more region-
specific research and records from the UN force and the higher echelons (that are still 
classified from top secret to strictly confidential), the Israel border units, the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, the Egyptian Governor-General’s administration as well as the 
military archives of all the troop contributing states could all potentially be very useful 
in adding further or changing the fundamental perspective. Altogether, however, the 
combination of records, published materials and research literature on the British 
Mandate, the American, British and Soviet Cold War Middle East-policies, Palestinian 
nationalism and militancy and Israeli nationalism and militarism presented here, to the 
best of my knowledge, represents the hitherto the largest collection of sources 
connected to the realities of everyday life ‘on the ground’ and literature connected to 
the dynamics of the ‘mission area’.  
If this work thus stands up to the scrutiny of colleagues, the first United Nations 
‘peacekeeping’ operation, as it came to labelled, should be recognised as anything but 
such in that had both diachronic and synchronic dimensions tying it directly to deeper 
modes of imperial cooperation. It must, however, also be recognised that 
UNEF/UNSCO was not only an expression of ‘merely’ a coming together of the 
regimes and practices of especially but not only the British and American imperial 
systems and their systems of governance. As is hopefully painstaking clear, it was also 
the expression of a system that, if tied both to the British and American British imperial 
frontiers, expanded in its own right. Here conceptualised as a frontier, it was system 
that expanded in both breadth—by way of its growing membership, how it organised 
international space and relations in a self-referential manner, its organisational 
bureaucracy steeped in Western ways and its gradually emerging military web of bases, 
ports and supply systems—and in depth (in this case) on account of ever-intensifying 
links with the frontier zone in the form of the political-geographical palimpsests of the 
various overlapping regimes of governance in the former British Mandate by way of 
the intervention and the linkups to the broader system of the United Nations.  
That is no, however, to say that the process of expansion (of the frontier) and 
incorporation (of the frontier zone) the joint UNEF/UNSCO intervention thus expressed 
should be seen as having been only imposed on the ‘mission area’ without a process of 
negotiation, externalising, militarising in nature, and disenfranchising. As scholars of 
imperial and colonial history have reminded us for some time now to be the case within 
the imperial state-systems, the colonial powers and colonial state powers all around the 
world (and also peacekeeping researcher concerned with current interventions), I 
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contend the opposite. All actors, whether individuals, families, communities, 
organisations or states, sought to—and with various degrees of success—negotiated 
their own interests within the broader framework of the expanding frontier on basis of 
what they could muster of resources and alliances, in turn often making the spaces—
such as roads, check points, observation posts, nearby villages and other sites of 
contact—of the frontier zone fluid and negotiated, if most probably often contested and 
informed by race- and gender-dynamics.  
It is here emphasis should be placed: The system(s) of governance the first UN 
intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip was shaped by and shaped and brought to the 
‘mission area’ were certainly globally structuralising processes, but they were not 
unchangeable or linear. Rather, they were the results of human choices in extension of 
previous human choices, and thus human practices that can be—and to some extent 
were—challenged and subsequently transformed ‘on the ground’, and, thus, 
expressions of something that we can understand and problematise.  
 Against this backdrop, the analysis of UNEF/UNSCO and theoretical manoeuvres 
have hopefully both pointed towards ways in which to analyse other UN interventions 
that allows such work to be both historically informed—and thus gender-, race-, and 
class-sensitive—and grounded in the dynamics of their own synchronic/contemporary 
contexts on the one hand, and emphasised the urgent need to do so on the other.  
More research along these lines will hopefully also demonstrate the relevance, if not 
timeliness, of not only engaging in the promotion of ‘disciplinary elasticity’ and firmly 
placing research within the context of interdisciplinary dialogue on the imperial in the 
international, but also to historicise both the interventions and our international system 
and our own research fields, methodologies and strategies, given the intimate links 
between most social sciences and the imperial, inter-imperial and international systems 
of governance from the late 19th century onwards. No scholar operates in a vacuum.   
Some Thoughts on Myth-busting and Levelling the 
Playing Field Between Otherwise Loud Old ‘white’ Men, 
Noisy Soldiers, Audible Brown Men, and Inaudible 
Brown Children and Women 
While research on current interventions will not likely get access to internal and still 
active records, and perhaps—depending on the dangers affiliated with field work—
engage in field work, I will here briefly engage in some further reflections on what 
challenges, opportunities and resources the holdings of the UN archive offer on basis 
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on my experiences. As it is, many scholars leave little with which to engage. Similarly, 
many archivists reject the that they hold power over social, public and political 
memories, just as many historians and historically interested scholars of international 
relations see archives as merely physical repositories.1051 It has been, and is, thus a case 
of what the archive scholars Joan M. Schwartz and Terry Cook call ‘the blind leading 
the blind’. In other words, “(…) scholars using archives without realizing the heavy 
layers of intervention and meaning coded into the records by their creators and by 
archivists long before any box is opened in the research room, and archivists treating 
their archives without much sensitivity to the larger footprints they themselves are 
leaving on the archival record.”1052  
However, as said by anthropologist and colonial historian Laura Ann Stoler, 
information systems and archival production go far beyond merely generating orders, 
weekly reports to superiors, summaries of reports and so on via circuits of 
communication such as shipping lines, courier services, and telegraphs.1053 Rather, “The 
archive was the supreme technology of the late 19th century imperial state (…).”1054 
Similarly, I learnt that UNEF depended on its ability to gather, organise and distribute 
information from its observation towers and day and night patrols to the battalion camps 
that sent them to UNEF HQ that then send them New York that sent orders the other 
way. The records and archival practices of the UN and UNEF, in other words, were as 
integral to the regime in the ‘mission area’ as the imperial and colonial practices of 
gathering and storing information were to the degree of success of implementing 
imperial and colonial policies. It is thus necessary to understand firstly, the chain of 
how something becomes a record in relation to the visible and invisible exercise of the 
regimes in the ‘mission areas’ and is then subsequently handled by the records 
management before it ends up in the archival system; secondly, how these chains from 
each ‘mission area’ are part of the overall system of governance on a global scale; and 
thirdly, what this means for archive-based research. 
Regarding the production of records, historian of Haiti Michel-Rolph Trouillot notes, 
“Silences are inherent in history because any single event enters history with some of 
its constituting parts missing. Something is always left out while something else is 
recorded.”1055 He continues, “In other words, the very mechanisms that make any 
                                               
1051 Terry Cook, “The Archive(s) Is a Foreign Country: Historians, Archivists, and the Changing Archival 
Landscape,” The Canadian Historical Review 90, no. 3 (2009): 514; Joan M. Schwarts and Terry Cook, 
“Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory,” Archival Science 2, no. 1 (2002): 2. 
1052 Joan M. Schwarts and Terry Cook, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory,” 
6. 
1053 Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival Science 2, no. 1 (2002): 98. 
1054 Ibid., 87; See also James Hevia, The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-
Building in Asia, 2012. 
1055 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston, Mass.: Beacon 
Press, 1995), 49. 
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historical recording possible also ensure that historical facts are not created equal. 
They reflect differential control of the means of historical production at the very first 
engraving that transforms an event into fact.”1056 In the case of the production of UNEF 
records, it often happened—given the UN(EF) records derived from the exercise of its 
regime—that the records made invisible/inaudible Palestinians and Bedouin and that 
details would be reduced in significance, such as when, for example, the blast of a hand 
grenade next to a Palestinian boy in his bedroom was translated literally as ‘noise’,1057 
or they became protagonists only when engaging in ‘infiltration’ into Israel or ‘barbaric’ 
feuds etc.1058  
From 1960, the UNEF central registry, which was set up in May 1957,1059 began 
sending continuously its sensitive records both to and by way of the United Nations 
Field Service, in much the same way the colonial registries continuously—and 
especially at decolonisation—sent many, if not most, of the sensitive records to 
London.1060 Given my findings, it is perhaps less startling that the records management 
and archival system of UNEF, resembled in part that of the British Empire, which had 
gradually introduced a records keeping system revolving around a central registry that 
collected documents in series, which each contained case files, correspondents files and 
subject files.1061  
Regarding using the archive, the reflections of imperial historian Antoinette 
Burton—another leading voice in the charge against positivist archival thinking— are 
useful. She notes how “Historians who visit the Oriental and India Office Collections 
for the first time are often surprised by how powerfully the archival space itself evokes 
                                               
1056 Ibid. 
1057 “EIMAC Investigation of UNEF Report” from UN Military Observer to Chairman EIMAC 27 June 1957, 
Complaints and Investigations April 1957 – June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political, EIMAC, UN 
Archives (P114-0256) 
1058 “EIMAC Investigation of UNEF Report” from UN Military Observer to Chairman EIMAC 15 May 1957, 
Complaints and Investigations April 1957 – June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political, EIMAC, UN 
Archives (P114-355) and 1058 “EIMAC Investigation of UNEF Report” from UN Military Observer to 
Chairman EIMAC 19 December 1957, Complaints and Investigations July 1957 – December 1957, Gaza 
Strip, Area Files, Political, EIMAC, UN Archives (P114-397)  
1059 “Establishment of UNEF Registry” from Chief of Personnel to Chief Administrative Officer 30 May 
1957, Reorganization of Central Registry 1960-1964, UNEF, S-0530-0011-0007 (P-124-0480) and 
“Memorandum: Staffing, UNEF Registry” by Chief of Registry 28 June 1957, Reorganization of Central 
Registry 1960-1964, UNEF, S-0530-0011-0007, UN Archives (P124-0483)  
1060 http://search.archives.un.org/united-nations-field-operations-service (25/05/2016) and Mandy Banton, 
“Destroy? ‘Migrate’? Conceal? British Strategies for the Disposal of Sensitive Records of Colonial 
Administrations at Independence,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40, no. 2 (2012): 321–
35. 
1061 Timothy John Lovering, “British Colonial Administrations’ Registry Systems: A Comparative Study of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,” Archival Science 10, no. 1 (2010): 1–23; Zohar Aloufi, “The Legacy: 
British Mandate Record Management System in Israel,” Archival Science 7, no. 3 (2007): 207–11. 
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the Raj.”1062 When visiting the UN archive I found it hard to ignore how the archive, as 
a mirror of imperial and colonial archives and colonial registries, not least employed 
mainly ‘white’ Australian, British, Italian, French and American nationals as archivists 
and consultants and ‘coloured’ or ‘black’ Jamaicans, Sri Lankans and Senegalese as 
service and maintenance staff. It was thus a very clear reminder to me that the heart of 
relations between the archive and the institution that created it, revolves around the 
power to label, in this case ‘peacekeeping’. Similarly, I could not help but note that the 
archive was not only almost located as far away from ‘mission areas’ as was the British 
archive from the colonies of the British Empire. It was also difficult to dismiss what the 
archive’s hold of hundreds of kilometres of documents, classified as Top secret, Secret 
and Classified, means for the histories of the ‘mission areas’, effectively making 
peoples’ own history unreachable for them and their descendants. For example, the 
significance of UNEF archive for Gaza Strip history cannot be overstated. One could 
perhaps, therefore, go as far as wonder—with regard to the importance of the records 
for Palestinian cultural memory— if the UN archival practice should not be seen as 
harmful as the systematic Israeli policy of hiding and scattering of the Palestinian 
written legacy? The records are not only beyond the reach of most Palestinian 
historians, but also ‘ordinary’ Palestinians. The circumstances are exacerbated by the 
fact that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency has made most of the Palestinian 
post-1948 written legacy in form of birth and death certificates and its own service 
records from health, education, relief and social services since 1948 and kept it in in 
Vienna until 1970 and Amman thereafter.1063  
Altogether, this means that the UN archive is an active site as all other archives in 
which, as Schwartz and Cook contend, “(…) social power is negotiated, contested, 
confirmed.”1064 Thus, as Burton argues, “The more deliberately we acknowledge the 
impact of our archival experiences on our research and our teaching, the better we are 
able to historicize the British Empire, its strategies of containment, its disciplinary 
mechanisms, and its visible and invisible forms of rule.”1065 The same argument can be 
forwarded for research on the UN interventions. This will allow us to, step by step, first 
contest and later harness the power of the records on the interventions in the archive of 
                                               
1062 Antoinette Burton, Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British Imperialism (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2011), 94. 
1063 Aloufi, “The Legacy”; Nur Masalha, The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating the 
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1064 Joan M. Schwarts and Terry Cook, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory,” 
1. 
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the UN. As Schwartz and Cook again contend, “When power is denied, overlooked, or 
unchallenged, it is misleading at best and dangerous at worst. Power recognised 
becomes power that can be questioned, made accountable, and opened to transparent 
dialogue and enriched understanding.”1066  
  
                                               
1066 Joan M. Schwarts and Terry Cook, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory,” 
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 9 Archives  
Rederiforeningen (formerly the Danish National Business Archives, now the Danish 
National Archives in Viborg) 
EIMAC 
UNEF Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force  
UNEF Office of the Force Commander 
UNEF Chief of Staff  
UNEF Chief Administrative Officer 
UNEF Assistant Administrative Officer  
UNEF Liaison Officer Tel Aviv 
UNEF Leave Centre, Beirut 
UNEF Leave Centre, Cairo 
UNEF Legal and Political Advisor  
UNEF Personnel Administration 
UNEF Public Relations 
UN Field Operations Service 
UN Office of Special Political Affairs 
UN Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs  
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